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SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 
1914— 1920 


"N 


SERBIA  AND  EUROPE 

1914-1920 


Edited  with  a  Preface  by 

Dr.    L.    MARCOVITCH 

PROFESSOR    IN    THE    UNIVERSITY    OF    BELGRADE  ;    MEMBER    OF 
THE    SERBIAN    PEACE    DELEGATION    IN    PARIS 


^*iKlffiLtX£Si*mEPCC 


LONDON:  GEORGE   ALLEN  &  UNWIN  LTD. 
RUSKIN     HOUSE,     40     MUSEUM     STREET,     W.C.    1 


(MfL'l.  ' 


First  published  in  1920 


(All  rights  reserved) 


M3 


PREFACE 

This  book  is  to  be  considered  as  an  attempt  to  exhibit  the 
whole  policy  of  Serbia  during  the  war.  It  is  not  a  study 
of  Serbian  politics,  but  simply  a  collection  of  articles  pub- 
lished in  La  Serbie  in  Geneva  (Switzerland)  between  1916 
and  1919.  Although  limited,  the  collection  gives  full  infor- 
mation about  the  chief  points  of  Serbian  policy  and  the 
ideal  which  has  guided  us  in  our  national  struggle.  We 
think  that  it  might  be  interesting  for  British  readers  to 
obtain  for  once  an  authentic  explanation  of  Serbia's  policy 
— as  Serbian  publicists  and  politicians  conceive  it.  The 
diversity  of  collaborators  does  not  rob  the  book  of  its  char- 
acter of  an  organic  whole,  which  is  another  proof  of  the 
unity  and  straightforwardness  of  our  policy.  One  essential 
feature  characterizes  indeed  the  whole  attitude  of  the 
Serbian  people,  before  and  during  the  world  conflict,  and 
this  is  their  clear  vision  of  the  German  peril  and  the  firm 
and  fixed  determination  of  Serbia  to  resist  it  at  all  costs, 
and  to  make  the  greatest  sacrifices  in  defence  of  her  poli- 
tical and  economic  independence. 

Europe  did  not  understand  Serbia's  policy,  and  when, 
on  certain  occasions,  she  did  display  more  comprehension 
of  our  affairs,  it  was  done  with  ill  grace  and  evident  reluc- 
tance. The  fault  of  European  diplomacy  did  not  lie  in 
ignorance  of  the  existence  of  the  German  peril — Paris, 
London  and  Petrograd  were  well  aware  of  it — but  rather 
in  its  under-estimation  of  German  aims  in  the  East.  German 
expansion,  revealed  in  two  different  methods — one  pacific, 


vi  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

tending  to  economic  penetration,  the  other  political  and 
aggressively  arrogant — had  for  a  long  time  been  directed 
towards  the  East.  But  this  significant  fact  had  not  been 
appreciated  by  Allied  Diplomacy  as  it  should  have  been. 
In  spite  of  the  experiences  of  the  Balkan  Wars,  the  Entente 
continued  to  neglect  the  Balkans  and  made  herself  the 
dupe  in  the  game  of  Ferdinand  of  Coburg  and  his  docile 
servants.  The  Entente  diplomats  did  not  discern  between 
friends  and  enemies  and  thus  neglected  an  important  ele- 
ment in  the  Eastern  problem — leaving  things  to  take  a  rather 
tragical  turn.  The  Serbian  disaster  of  1915  would  have 
been  averted  if  the  Entente  had  invited  and  encouraged 
Roumania  and  Greece  to  stand  by  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest 
in  1913.  Instead  of  it  the  Entente  forced  them  to  come 
to  an  agreement  with  the  Bulgarians  at  any  price  and  so 
to  disinterest  themselves  eventually  from  the  anti- Bulgarian, 
i.e.  anti-German  alliance  formed  at  Bucarest  in  1913. 

We  have  criticized  the  anti-Balkanic  policy  of  Roumania 
and  of  King  Constantine  of  Greece  very  severely,  but  it 
would  be  unjust  not  to  remind  people  that  a  great  share 
of  the  blame  falls  also  on  the  Allies,  due  to  their  Bulgarophile 
illusions.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  errors  of  the  past  will 
serve  as  a  lesson,  not  only  to  the  Balkan  people,  but  also 
— and  particularly — to  the  Western  democratic  powers. 

Having  revealed  the  true  policy  of  Serbia,  we  discuss 
in  Chapter  II  the  Serbo-Croat  Union,  which  is  inscribed 
as  the  ideal  on  every  page  of  the  history  of  the  Kingdom 
of  Serbia.  In  connection  with  it  we  have  outlined  in  the 
following  chapter  our  campaign  against  Austria-Hungary, 
which  consisted  mainly  in  our  effort  to  provide  public 
opinion  in  Allied  countries — (badly  infected  with  Austro- 
philism) — with  a  new  view  of  Austro-Hungarian  affairs. 
Our  estimate  of  Austria-Hungary  and  her  rottenness  proved 
to  be  quite  correct ;  our  forecast  was  realized  and  our 
prognostication  of  the  fate  of  the  Habsburg  Monarchy  has 


PREFACE  vii 

been  confirmed  by  events.  We  have  always  held  that  the 
attempt  of  Sarajevo — the  work  of  a  Bosnian  patriot — was 
only  a  welcome  pretext  for  Austria  to  proceed  to  the  execu- 
tion of  her  war  plans,  conceived  and  elaborated  a  long  time 
before.  We  can  state  with  satisfaction  to-day  that  our 
defence  of  Serbia  in  this  respect  was  only  too  legitimate. 
The  official  Austro-Hungarian  documents,  published  by 
the  Government  of  the  Austrian  Republic,  reveal  a  fact 
hitherto  unknown,  that  the  decision  to  declare  war  and 
crush  Serbia  had  been  taken  some  time  before  the  attempt 
of  Sarajevo.  It  was  inspired  by  purely  political  con- 
siderations of  the  prestige  of  the  Balkans.1 

As  to  relations  with  Bulgaria  they  are  discussed  as  fully 
as  they  deserve.  Our  aim  was  to  enlighten  Europe  on 
the  true  motives  of  Bulgarian  policy,  and  we  think  that 
we  have  succeeded.  The  documents  we  furnished  were 
worthy  of  retaining  attention.  Since  then  official  German 
and  Austro-Hungarian  secret  documents  have  dissipated 
all  doubts  of  Bulgarian  servility  and  bondage  to  the  German 
imperialistic  policy.  Yet  in  1914  Bulgaria  was  prepared 
to  enter  formally  the  Triple  Alliance,  whilst  the  Entente 
diplomats  during  the  whole  of  1915  believed  in  the  Entento- 
phile  assurances  of  Bulgarian  politicians. 

The  next  chapter  is  devoted  to  the  question  of  Italo- 
Serbian  relations.  The  spirit  of  moderation  and  conciliation 
in  which  we  have  always  conducted  our  relations  with 
Italy — despite  the  errors  and  false  calculations  of  Italian 
diplomacy — is  revealed  clearly  in  all  our  articles.  We  believed 
that  we  should  find  in  Italy  a  friend  and  an  ally  ;  we  regarded 
her  as  the  native  country  of  Mezzini. 

To-day  we  are  obliged  to  publish  that,  after  five  years 
of   unsuccessful   attempts,    Italy   did   nothing   but   pursue 

1  Diplomatische  Aktenstucke  zur  Vorgeschichte  des  Krieges,  19 14. 
Erganzungen  und  Nachtiage  zum  oesterreichisch-ungarischen  Rotbuch. 
I  Teil  (Wien  1919,  Staatedruckerei).  See  document  No.  1  and  the 
enclosed  memorandum. 


viii  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

the  same  politics  that  the  Triple  Alliance  practised  before 
with  Austria  and  continued  since  191 5  without  her.  It  is 
the  darkest  point  on  the  Southern  Slav  horizon,  this  attempt 
to  compromise  our  future  by  annexing  large  territories  of 
our  national  soil.  The  Adriatic  question  is  not  yet  settled, 
and  the  Allies  seem  to  have  lost  all  authority  to  impose 
a  solution  which  would  safeguard  the  vital  interests  of 
both  parties.  In  the  occupied  territories  in  Dalmatia, 
Istria,  and  Fiume  an  intolerable  situation  is  entertained, 
full  of  danger  for  peace  in  this  sensitive  corner  of  Europe. 
It  is  high  time  to  put  an  end  to  the  comedy  of  D'Annunzio 
and  to  proceed  to  the  definite  settlement  of  the  Adriatic 
problem.  The  patience  of  our  kingdom  has  been  tried 
past  endurance. 

Chapters  VI-X  are  devoted  to  Germany,  Russia,  Rou- 
mania  and  Greece,  and  finally  to  the  suffering  of  our  people 
under  the  foreign  yoke. 

Our  attitude  to  all  these  questions  is  perfectly  consistent 
with  the  main  trend  of  Serbian  policy.  Europe  has  not 
sufficiently  appreciated  this  Serbian  firmness,  which  affords, 
however,  a  splendid  example  of  the  wisdom  and  intelligence 
of  the  Serbian  statesmen,  who  have  led  Serbia  through  all 
the  phases  that  she  had  to  pass  before  realizing  her  national 
programme  : — the  union  of  all  Serbs,  Croats  and  Slovenes 
in  an  independent  Kingdom  under  the  Karageorgevitch. 
*  *  *  * 

The  Southern  Slav  union  is  a  political  fact  of  primary 
importance.  But  it  must  not  be  thought  that  we  are  un- 
aware of  the  many  difficulties  which  for  a  long  time  to 
come  will  check  the  free  development  of  our  national 
forces.  To-day  the  chief  work  of  our  people  is  inter- 
nal. The  political,  economic  and  social  organization  of  our 
state,  nationally  united,  is  a  formidable  task,  demanding 
the  collaboration  of  all  our  intelligence  and  initiative. 
A  great  trial  still  awaits  our  heroic  nation.      It   is   to  be 


PREFACE  ix 

hoped  that  it  will  be  surmounted,  and  that  the  people,  after 
so  many  physical  and  moral  sufferings,  will  at  last  find  peace 
in  which  to  devote  themselves  to  pacific  work  and  to  culture. 
Our  greatest  aim  at  present  is  to  achieve  a  peaceful 
organized  life  within.  If  we  are  united  internally  we  shall 
be  able  to  confront  all  external  dangers  and  injustices. 
Our  enemies  are  watching  us,  hoping  to  profit  by  our  internal 
disorganization  for  the  realization  of  their  imperialistic  aims. 
The  high  national  consciousness  of  our  people,  of  which 
we  have  given  so  many  proofs,  will  surmount,  we  are  con- 
vinced, all  our  difficulties,  and  will  lead  us  to  a  happy  and 
glorious  future. 

In  conclusion,  I  must  ask  for  the  indulgence  of  readers 
towards  the  translation  of  these  articles — made  under  cir- 
cumstances of  difficulty  which  will  perhaps  excuse  its  many 
imperfections. 

Dr.  LAZARE  MARCOVITCH. 

Belgrade. 

September,  1920. 


CONTENTS 


Preface 


CHAPTER    I 


SERBIAN  POLITICS 


I 


Serbia  and  the  Allies.     By  L.  M. 

Serbia  and  the  Treaty  of  London.    By  X. 

Serbia  and  the  European  War.    By  Dr.  M.-St. 

The  Economic  Struggles  of  Serbia.    By  X. 

The  23RD  July  1914.     By  L.  M.    . 

Serbia  and  Peace.     By  L.  M. 

The  Future  of  the  Balkan  Nations.    By  M.  D, 

Serbia  and  Obligatory  Arbitration.    By  L.  M. 

The  Russian  Peace  and  Serbia.     By  L.  M. 

On  the  Eve  of  the  Fifth  Year.     By  L.  M. 


Novakovitch 


Marincovitch 


PAGE 

I 

4 

7 

II 

14 
17 
19 
23 
25 
27 


II 

Princip-Adler.     By  L.  M.  .         .         .         .         .         .         .29 

3i 
32 
37 
39 


At  Last  !    An  Austrian  Confession  of  Premeditation.    By  X.     . 
The  Mystery  of  Sarajevo  :  More  False  Documents.     By  L.  M. 
The  Crime  of  Sarajevo  and  the  Emperor  William  II.    By  L.  M. 
The  Guilty  Persons  Unmasked.     By  L.  M. 
Serbia  and  the  Sarajevo  Crime:  A  Reply  to  German  Professors. 
By  L.  M 


41 


III 

To  the  Serbian  Army  in  Salonica.    By  R.-A.  Reiss 

Serbia  on  the  Eve  of  Battle.    By  L..M.     . 

Towards  Victory  !    By  L.  M. 

The  Victory  of  the  Vardar.    By  L.  M. 

The  Return  of  the  Serbians.    By  Alexis  Francois 

"Victory  !    By  L.  M 

Serbia  at  the  Peace  Conference.  By  L.  M.   » 

xi 


47 
48 

50 
52 
54 

57 

58 


xii  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

IV 

The  War  and  Serbian  Democracy.     By  L.  M. 

The  Serbia  of  Yesterday  and  of  To-morrow.     By  L.  M. 

An  Unjustified  Reproach.     By  "  Politicus  " 

The  Campaign  of  the  "  New  Europe."     By  L.  M. 

Concerning  an  Unfriendly  Criticism.     By  L.  M. 

Reply  of  Stoyan  Protitch  to  the  "  New  Europe  "     . 


PAGE 

62 
66 
68 
70 
73 
77 


CHAPTER    II 

THE  UNION  OF  SERBIANS,  CROATIANS  AND  SLOVENES 

I 

Serbia  and  the  Southern  Slav  Union.     By  L.  M.        .         .         .  8r 

The  German  Solutions  of  the  Southern  Slav  Question.     By  L.  M.  83 

Falsification  of  the  Southern  Slav  Idea.     By  Dr.  Victor  Kuhne  85 

The  Southern  Slav  Question  and  the  Allies.     By  M.  P.  Cemovitch  88 

The  Declaration  of  Versailles.     By  L.  M.           ....  92 

Mr.  Balfour  and  the  Southern  Slav  Question.     By  L.  M.          .  94 
Deplorable  Incoherences.     By  L.  M.  .         .         .         .         .         .96 

II 

Constitutional   Bases    of   the    Serbo-Croat-Slovene    Kingdom. 

By  X 98- 

Some  Remarks  on  Home  Affairs.     By  L.  M.          .          .          .          .  100- 

The  Kingdom  of  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes.     By  L.  M.  103 

The  Union  Without  and  Within.     By  L.  M 105 

III 

National  Frontiers.     By  Dr.  B.  Vosnjak 107 

The  Corridor  to  Bohemia.     By  A.  Chervin  .  .         .  .112 

The  Croats  and  Russia.     By  Dr.  Iv.  Gmajner  .  .         .114 

The  Slovenes  :  A  People  without  Culture  ?     By  V.  Fabiantchitch     118 
The  Bosnia-Herzegovina  Factor  of  the  Monarchy.     By  Dr.  M. 

Srskitch      ..........     123 


CHAPTER    III 

THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Succession.     By  L.  M.     .  .  .         .126 

Remember  Austria-Hungary  !     By  L.  M.      .         .  .  .          .128 

Austria-Hungary  and  the  Entente.     By  M.  M.  B.  .  .         .131 

More  Light  on  Austria-Hungary!     By  L.  M.       .  .  ...     134 


CONTENTS  xiii 

PAGE 

President  Wilson  and  Austria-Hungary.    By  L.  M.  .         .136 

An  Unnecessary  Function.  By  L.  de  Voinovitch  .  .  .138 
Austria-Hungary  and  the  Allies.     By  L.  M.  .         .         .     141 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Austria-Hungary.     By  L.  M.  .         .     144 

The  Western  Democracies  and  the  House  of  Habsburg.     By 

M.  D.  Marincovitch     .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .146 

Can  Austria-Hungary  Exist  ?     By  Dr.  Lj.  Popovitch  .         .149 

Austria-Hungary  and  the  Allies  :    A  few  Reflections  after 

Campidoglio.     By  L.  M.        .  .  .  .  .  .  .152 

The  Federalization  of  Austria-Hungary.     By  M.  D.  Marincovitch     156 
A  Necessary  Settlement.     By  L.  de  Voinovitch  .         .         .160 

The  Speeches  of  Wekerle  and  Tisza.     By  L.  M.  .  .  .165 

The  Southern  Slav  Union  and  the  Magyars.  By  Dr.  Lj.  Popovitch  167 
Michael  Carolyi  and  Oscar  Jaszi.     By  L.  Marcovitch         .         .169 

CHAPTER    IV 

THE  POLICY  OF  BULGARIA 

I 

The  Serbo-Bulgarian  Agreement  of  191 2  and  Austria-Hungary. 

By  L.  M 173 

AUSTRO-BULGARIAN  COLLABORATION  IN  THE  BALKAN  WARS.       By  L.  M.       1 77 

Bulgarian  Imperialism.     By  L.  M.         .  .  .  .  .  .      181 

The  Last  Defender  of  Bulgaria.     By  L.  M 185 

Europe  and  Bulgaria.     By  L.  M.  .         .         .         .         .         .189 

Bulgaria  and  the  Treaty  of  San-Stephano.     By  L.  M.        .  .193 

The  "  Indisputable  "  Zone  in  Macedonia.  By  "  Politicus  "  .  196 
An  Article  from  "  Mir  "   on  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  Treaty   of 

1912.     By  X 199 

The  Role  of  Bulgaria.     By  X.    .         .         .         .         .         .         .     200 

Bulgaria  in  the  Service  of  Germany.  By  "  Politicus  "  .  .  202 
The  Bulgarian  Suicide.     By  X.  ......     204 

The  Kaiser  at  Sofia.     By  L.  M. 208 

The  Confessions  of  Mr.  Rizoff.     By  L.  M.  .         .         .         .210 

Gust ave  Weigand  and  the  Bulgarian  Claims.     By  Tih.  R.  G.      .     212 


II 

The  Bulgarian  Law  of  Nations.     By  M.  D.  Marincovitch 
The  Slavism  of  the  Bulgarians.     By  L.  Marcovitch 
The  Bulgarians  Described  by  Themselves.     By  L.  M. 
A  Manifesto  of  the  King  of  Bulgaria.     By  X. 
The  Bulgarian  Summer,  1915.     By  L.  Savadjian 
Ferdinand  Replies  to  the  Pope.     By  Dr.  V.  Kuhne 
Bulgaria  and  Her  War  Aims.     By  Malicha  Taditch 


214 
217 
220 
223 
224 
226 
229 


xiv  SERBIA  AND  EUROPE 

in 

PAGK 

The  Question  of  Bulgaria.    By  L.  M. 230 

Bulgaria  and  the  Serbian  Point  of  View.    By  L.  M.  .        -.233 

The  Two  Peace  Treaties  of  Bucarest  (191 3  and  19 18).  By  L.  M.  .  235 
Bulgarian  Canossa.  By  M.  D.  Marincovitch  .  .  .  .238 
Some  Remarks  on  the  Future  Serbo-Bulgarian  Relations.    By 

L.  M 241 

CHAPTER   V 

SERBIA  AND  ITALY 
I 

Italy  and  the  Southern  Slav  Question.    By  L.  M.     .         .         .  246 

The  Nationalists  and  the  Last  Italian  Crisis.    By  Y.  M.  Tomitch  429 

Italy  and  the  Adriatic  Question.    By  Y.  M.  Tomitch        .         .  253 

Italy  and  Serbia.     By  G.  Salvemini 258 

Reply  to  Mr.  Salvemini.    By  L.  M 261 

Italy,  Serbia  and  the  Adriatic  :  A  Southern  Slav  Reply  to  M. 

Salvemini's  Letter.  By  Frano  Cvietisa  ....  261 
The  Illusions  of  an  Italian  :   Facts  relating  to  the  Southern 

Slav  Union.    By  "  Politicus  " 266 

A  Reply  to  the  President  of  the  League  "  Pro  Dalmazia  Italian  a." 

By  L.  de  Voinovitch  ........  269 

Italy  and  Serbia.    By  St.  Stanoyevitch 273 

II 

The  Congress  of  the  Oppressed  Nationalities.    By  L.  M.           .  277 

La  Questione  dell'Adriatico.     Par  le  Dr.  Lj.  Percovitch            .  279 

The  Treaty  of  London  and  the  Pact  of  Rome.  By  L.  M.  .  282 
Quo  Vadis  Italia  ?     By  M.  D.  Marincovitch         .         .         .         .285 

The  Italo-Slav  Problem.    By  M.  D.  Marincovitch       .         .         .  288 

Italy  and  the  Balkans.    By  L.  M.       .         .         .         .         .         .  293 

CHAPTER   VI 

SERBIA  AND  GERMANY 

Germany  in  Distress.     By  L.  M .  298 

Germany  and  the  Balkans.     By  L.  M.  .         .         .         .         .301 

Germany  against  Serbia.     By  L.  M.     .         .         .         .         .         .  303 

Serbia  and  the  German  Plans.     By  L.  M.   .         .         .         .         .  306 

Germania  Liber atrix.     By  M.  M.  Kossitch  .....  309 

The  Germans  of  Former  Days  and  the  Serbians.     By  X.  .         .  312 

Germany  and  Little  Serbia.    By  "  Politicus  "   .         .         .         .  313 

Misplaced  Compassion.     By  X .  315 


CONTENTS  xv 

CHAPTER   VII 
SERBIA  AND  RUSSIA 

PAGE 

The  Extravagances  of  the  Leninist  Kamarades         .        .        .317 
The  Terror  of  the  Four  Bastards  of  the  Russian  Revolution. 

By  the  Dr.  M.  Grba 319 

The  Death  of  Nicholas  II.    By  R 323 

CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  POLITICS  OF  ROUMANIA 

Roumanian  Hesitations.    By  L.  M 325 

The  Roumanian  Intervention.    By  X. 328 

The  Fall  of  Bucarest  :  A  Success  but  not  a  Victory.    By  X.     .  329 

Serbia  and  the  Roumanian  Debacle.    By  L.  M.  .         .         ,  330 

Roumania  and  Her  Treaty.     By  L.  M 334 

The  Question  of  the  Ban  at.    By  L.  P 336 

CHAPTER    IX 

SERBO-GREEK  RELATIONS 

The  Serbo-Greek  Treaty.    By  L.  M 340 

Constantine  I  or  Venizelos.    By  M.  D.  M 343 

CHAPTER    X 
AUSTRO-GERMANO-BULGARIAN  ATROCITIES 

The  Last  Straw.  By  M.  D.  Marincovitch  ....  346 
Germany  and  the  Deportations  in  Serbia.  By  L.  M.  .  .  348 
The  Bulgarians  versus  the  Law  of  Nations.  By  L.  M.  .  .351 
The  Unknown  Martyrs.     By  L.  M 353 


SERBIA    AND    EUROPE 

(1914-1919) 

CHAPTER    I 

SERBIAN    POLITICS 

Serbia  and  the  Allies. 

"  Your  Royal  Highness,  in  applying  to  me  at  a  particularly  difficult 
moment,  is  not  mistaken  in  my  sentiments  regarding  himself  and  my 
heartfelt  sympathy  for  the  Serbian  people.  So  long  as  there  is  the 
smallest  hope  of  avoiding  bloodshed,  all  my  efforts  will  be  directed 
towards  this  object,  If,  in  spite  of  our  sincerest  wishes,  we  do  not 
succeed.  Your  Royal  Highness  can  rest  assured  that  under  no 
circumstances  will  Russia  cease  to  concern  herself  with  the  fate  of 
Serbia." — (Telegram  from  the  Emperor  of  Russia  to  the  Crown  Prince  of 
Serbia,  27th  July,  1914.) 

Serbia  indeed  found  herself  in  a  difficult  position  on  account 
of  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  and  did  all  she  possibly  could 
to  avoid  an  armed  conflict  with  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy.  The  reply  of  the  Serbian  Government  to  the 
Austrian  Note  is,  in  fact,  the  model  of  submission  of  a  small 
State  to  the  demands  of  a  Great  Power  ;  but  at  Vienna 
and  Berlin  either  war  or  complete  diplomatic  victory  was 
desired,  accompanied  by  the  humiliation  of  Serbia  and, 
from  her  diminution  or  annihilation,  of  Russian  prestige 
in  the  Balkans.  In  attacking  Serbia  it  was  not  only  desired 
to  crush  for  ever  the  realization  of  Southern  Slav  unity,  but 
also  to  get  rid  of  a  State  hostile  to  the  German  "  Push  " 
towards  Constantinople,  Bagdad,  and  the  East. 

The  German  Empires,  which  never  ceased  to  complain 
of  their  unfavourable  geographical  position,  of  their  M  cen- 

2  1 


2  SERBIA  AND  EUROPE 

tral  "  situation  exposed  to  enemy  attacks,  had  succeeded 
during  the  nineteenth  century  in  growing  larger  and  extend- 
ing considerably  on  all  sides  at  the  expense  and  to  the  great 
detriment  of  other  nations — chiefly  the  Slav  nations.  After 
a  period  of  interior  consolidation,  economic  development, 
and  formidable  armament,  the  Central  Empires  decided  on 
a  new  advance — on  land  and  sea.  On  the  Continent  they 
wanted  to  establish  a  German  communication  :  Hamburg- 
Constantinople-Bagdad.  On  the  Seas,  they  demanded  the 
"  freedom  of  the  seas,"  which  meant  the  destruction  of 
British  Naval  Supremacy  and  the  establishment  of  German 
domination. 

To  the  German  plans  of  expansion  in  Asia  Minor, 
Serbia  always  represented  a  serious  obstacle,  especially 
after  the  Serbian  victories  in  the  Balkan  Wars.  Serbia 
had  no  desire  to  become  an  Austrian  province  or  a  vassal 
of  Germany.  She  wished  to  preserve  her  independence 
and  liberty  ;  from  1903  she  practised  democratic  politics, 
which  drew  her  closer  to  the  great  democratic  Powers  of 
the  West  ;  she  exercised  a  national  policy — a  policy  of 
Slav  unity,  which  naturally  brought  her  to  the  side  of 
Russia  in  all  European  problems.  To  secure  the  good- 
will or  co-operation  of  Serbia  by  diplomatic  means 
appeared  impossible  to  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary. 
There  remained  but  one  solution  :  crush  the  little  nation 
which  so  obstinately  refused  to  become  mittel-europdisch, 
to  quote  Mr.  Friedrich  Naumann,  former  leader  of  the 
German  Democrats  and  propagator  of  Pan-Germanism. 

The  three  preceding  wars  had  weakened  Serbia  to  such 
an  extent  that  the  Austro-German  plan  seemed  to  have 
every  chance  of  succeeding.  Left  alone,  in  such  a  critical 
moment,  Serbia  never  could  have  escaped  the  fate  which 
the  German  Empires  had  prepared  for  her.  But  Russia, 
France  and  England  understood  the  gravity  of  the  situation. 
In  aiming  at  Serbia,  the  Austro-Germans  wished  to  strike 
a  friend  and  ally  of  the  Entente,  to  whom  they  thus  wished 
to  deal  a  death-blow. 

As  the  Entente  was  not  prepared  for  a  decisive  struggle, 
there  was  great  anxiety  in  Serbia  as  to  whether  France, 
England  and  Russia  would  not  deem  it  better  to  sacrifice 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  3 

her  so  as  to  defer  the  great  struggle  till  later  on,  when  all 
preparations  would  be  ready  and  the  chances  of  victory 
greater.  But  the  aforementioned  telegram  from  the  Emperor 
of  Russia  at  once  reassured  the  Serbians,  who  gathered  all 
their  forces  to  defend  themselves.  France  and  England 
refused  to  remain  neutral,  and  the  Great  War  commenced, 
which  must  end  and  will  end  in  complete  victory  for  the  Allies. 

Serbia's  role  in  this  great  struggle  is  well  known.  She 
withstood,  and  on  three  occasions  repulsed,  the  Austrian 
offensive.  At  the  last  attack  by  the  combined  German, 
Austrian  and  Bulgarian  forces,  the  Serbians  opposed  the 
invaders  with  a  desperate  resistance,  hoping  to  withstand 
them  till  the  help  which  the  Allies  were  sending  should 
arrive.  But,  owing  to  unforseen  circumstances,  errors  in 
estimating  Bulgarian  policy,  and  the  attitude  of  the  Greek 
Government,  the  reinforcements  arrived  too  late  to  save 
Serbia  from  enemy  invasion.  The  hardest  endurances  did 
not  save  our  gallant  nation,  which,  even  in  these  hours  of 
great  distress,  never  wavered  or  lost  courage.  Having 
perfect  confidence  in  the  Allies  and  the  justice  of  their 
cause,  they  have  recovered  from  all  their  reverses,  and 
are  more  than  ever  devoted  to  the  Allies  whose  victory  will 
give  them  independence,  national  unity/and  free  development. 

In  order  to  express  the  sentiments  that  all  Serbians 
entertain  for  the  Allies,  we  can  only  quote  the  words  of 
our  distinguished  minister  at  Paris,  Mr.  Vesnitch,  pro- 
nounced on  the  occasion  of  the  great  demonstration  of  the 
Allies  in  favour  of  Serbia  at  the  Sorbonne  : 

"  When  the  Allies  have  gained  victory,  which  they  will 
do,  before  everything  else  the  two  nations,  the  Belgians 
and  the  Serbians — sisters  in  martyrdom  and  in  zeal  for 
national  honour — will  be  reinstated  in  the  integrity  of  their 
political  and  territorial  rights.  It  is  the  first  task  that  our 
great  Allies  will  undertake  and  one  in  which  they  will  not 
fail. 

"It  is  not  Russia,  our  powerful  sister-nation  who  for 
three  centuries  has  watched  over,  with  the  solicitude  of  a 
mother,  the  fate  of  the  oppressed  Slav  nations — it  is 
certainly  not  Russia  who  will  abandon  us. 

"  It  will  never  be  Great  Britain,  who  knows  us  since 


4  SERBIA  AND  EUROPE 

Richard,  Coeur-de-Lion,  spoke  of  our  hospitality — Great 
Britain  who  has  always  been  the  first  to  champion  liberty 
and  autonomy,  and  who  during  the  past  four  years  has 
given  us  so  many  proofs  of  her  goodwill. 

"  It  will  not  be — it  cannot  be  Italy,  with  whom  we 
have  never  had  any  differences,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
we  have  been  near  neighbours  for  a  century  or  more,  and 
whose  greatest  son  has  linked  the  two  nations  by  placing 
us  in  his  immortal  spiritual  temple — in  his  Divina  Commedia 
beside  his  best  brethren. 

"  How  can  any  one  think  that  France  will  bargain  for 
her  co-operation — France  who  has  always  been  our  chosen 
sister  ;  France,  who  in  spite  of  distance  has  always  been 
a  trusty  and  devoted  friend,  and  who  even  to-day  receives 
us  with  unequalled  tenderness. 

"  No,  my  Serbian  brethren,  with  such  friends  our  country 
can  never  perish.  She  will  revive  soon — once  more  pros- 
perous and  great.  And  we  will  return  there,  happy  at 
her  resurrection,  happy  also  to  be  able  to  say  to  our  com- 
patriots, who  have  remained  in  temporary  slavery,  to  the 
widows  of  our  heroes  and  sisters  in  sorrow,  how  good  all 
our  Allies  have  been  to  us  and  how  we  owe  them  eternal 
gratitude — especially  immortal  France." 

We  also  are  animated  by  the  same  sentiments,  and  it 
is  in  this  spirit  and  with  this  conviction  and  devotion  that 
we  undertake  to  defend  the  Serbian  Cause,  which  is  the 
common  cause  of  all  Southern  Slavs. 

May  17,  1916. 

Serbia  and  the  Treaty  of  London. 

In  the  House  of  Commons  on  the  2nd  May,  Mr.  R. 
McNeill,  Unionist,  asked  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  whether  Serbia  was  included  in  the  Treaty  or  Declar- 
ation of  the  5th  September.  "  If  not,"  added  Mr.  McNeill, 
"  will  the  Minister  state  whether  his  declaration,  that  the 
character  of  the  said  Treaty  excludes  the  possibility  of 
negotiations  for  Peace  between  the  British  Government 
and  Bulgaria  without  the  consent  of  the  other  contracting 
parties,  applies  to  the  Serbian  Government  also." 


SERBIAN  POLITICS  5 

According  to  The  Times  of  the  3rd  May,  Sir  Edward 
Grey  replied  as  follows  :  "  The  answer  to  both  parts  of 
the  question  is  in  the  negative,  but  in  a  matter  so  intimately 
affecting  the  interests  of  Serbia,  the  Serbian  Government 
would  naturally  be  consulted  in  common  with  the  other 
Allies." 

This  statement  of  the  British  Minister  is  not  quite  clear, 
and  to  avoid  ambiguous  and  misleading  interpretations, 
we  venture  to  make  some  remarks. 

To  the  first  question  :  "  Whether  Serbia  had  signed 
the  Declaration  of  the  5th  September,"  Sir  Edward  Grey 
replied  that  Serbia  had  not  signed  the  Treaty  of  the  Allies. 
This  fact  was  known  to  the  Honourable  Member  ;  he  only 
asked  the  first  question  in  order  to  be  able  to  put  the  second, 
i.e.  to  know  "  What  would  be  the  position  of  Serbia  in  the 
event  of  negotiating  peace  with  Bulgaria."  The  Treaty 
of  the  5th  September  bound  the  Allies,  as  is  well  known, 
not  to  conclude  a  separate  peace  without  the  consent  of 
all  the  others.  Serbia  did  not  sign  this  Treaty,  because 
she  was  not  asked  to  do  so.  Legally  she  is  free  to  conclude 
a  separate  peace,  and  the  Allies  themselves — from  a  legal 
point  of  view — have  the  right  of  making  peace  without 
Serbia.  But  in  reality,  such  solutions  are  not  to  be  dreamt 
of.  Serbia  had  already  refused  offers  of  a  separate  peace, 
and  even  recent  misfortunes  could  not  shake  the  faith  of 
the  Serbian  people  in  the  justice  of  the  Allies'  cause  and 
their  devotion  to  this  cause — which  was  also  their  own. 
A  formal  undertaking  from  Serbia  not  to  conclude  a  separate 
peace  would  change  nothing  in  the  existing  situation,  which 
makes  such  a  peace  quite  impossible. 

Let  us  turn  to  the  other  side  of  the  question  and  con- 
sider the  contrary  supposition  of  a  peace  concluded  by 
the  Allies  without  Serbia  :  it  is  also  theoretically  possible, 
but  will  never  take  shape.  The  categorical  statements  of 
Allied  Ministers,  especially  the  last  statement  of  the  British 
Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Asquith,  in  reply  to  the  speech  of  the 
German  Chancellor,  lays  down  the  re-establishment  of 
Serbia  as  an  essential  condition  of  Peace.  For  the  Allies, 
the  Serbian  question  is,  apart  from  their  political  interests, 
a  question  of  justice  and  ethics,  and  the  possibility  of  peace 


6  SERBIA  AND  EUROPE 

negotiations  without  Serbia  is  absolutely  inconceivable. 
For  this  reason  we  attach  no  importance  to  the  purely 
theoretical  conclusions  which  result  from  the  fact  that 
Serbia  was  not  a  signatory  to  the  Treaty  of  London.  The 
bond  which  unites  Serbia  to  the  Allies  is  much  stronger 
than  any  Treaty,  and  on  this  point  we  are  all  agreed. 

So  far  we  have  only  taken  the  question  of  principle 
into  consideration,  and  we  have  stated  that  a  peace  which 
did  not  re-establish  Serbia  is  materially  and  morally  im- 
possible. Mr.  R.  McNeill's  question  refers  to  a  possible 
peace  between  the  Allies  and  Bulgaria.  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
reply  to  this  part  of  the  question  is  incomplete,  because 
it  does  not  specify  the  main  point.  No  peace  concluded 
by  the  Allies  can  be  imagined,  according  to  Mr.  Asquith's 
statements,  without  the  complete  re-establishment  of  Serbia. 
The  territorial  and  political  integrity  of  Serbia  is  the  mini- 
mum of  the  Allies'  pretensions.  This  integrity  logically 
excludes  the  hypothesis  of  territorial  concessions  to  the 
Bulgarians  in  southern  Serbia ;  and  the  previous  promises 
of  such  concessions  made  by  the  Allies  and  in  a  great  measure 
consented  to  by  the  Serbian  Government,  have  completely 
lost  their  value  since  the  armed  intervention  of  Bulgaria 
in  favour  of  the  Central  Empires. 

When  the  British  Minister  declared  that  in  the  event 
of  peace  negotiations  with  Bulgaria  the  Serbian  Govern- 
ment would  be  consulted,  it  must  necessarily  be  supposed 
that  the  consultation  with  the  Serbian  Government  would 
be  on  points  unconcerned  with  the  political  and  territorial 
integrity  of  Serbia,  this  being  an  indispensable  and  pre- 
liminary condition  in  all  negotiations  for  peace.  The 
integrity  of  Serbian  soil  is  a  question  on  which  there  can 
be  no  discussion. 

The  British  Minister's  brief  reply  has  given  rise  to  the 
supposition  that  our  Allies  could  begin  negotiations  for 
peace  with  Bulgaria,  binding  themselves  only  to  "  consult  " 
Serbia.  This  conception  is  unjustified,  because  the  object 
of  the  eventual  consultation  with  Serbia,  as  we  have  stated, 
is  not  the  question  of  our  integrity — winch  is  beside  the 
point — but  the  general  position  of  future  Bulgaria.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  did  not  specify  this,  but  it  is  naturally  under- 


SERBIAN  POLITICS  7 

stood,  and  we  believe  it  is  in  the  common  interest  to  lay 
stress  upon  it,  so  as  to  dispel  all  misunderstanding.  Recent 
statements  of  the  British  Minister  regarding  the  conditions 
of  peace  confirm  this  point  of  view,  which  is  the  only 
reasonable  and  logical  one. 

May  21,  1916. 

Serbia  and  the  European  War. 

In  the  struggle  against  Austria  and  German  expansion, 
a  struggle  in  which  we  were  compelled  to  join  to  safeguard 
our  future  and  the  unity  of  our  people,  we  began  by  showing 
irresolution,  defects,  and  errors.  Our  people  were  unpre- 
pared to  resist  all  the  ruses  and  wrell-known  manoeuvres 
of  Ballplatz  politics.  Austria,  who  was  aware  of  the  danger 
that  our  unity  would  be  for  her  plans  for  the  future, 
exploited  our  weakness  to  make  us  less  dangerous.  As  we 
were  divided  into  provinces,  Austrian  policy  consisted  in 
encouraging  local  patriotism  in  the  different  sects  of  our 
race  ;  in  sowing  religious  discord  ;  and  in  perverting  true 
patriotism  and  national  conscientiousness.  Ballplatz  states- 
men even  ventured  to  exploit  our  differences  and  tried  to 
make  us  give  up  our  legitimate  ambition.  During  the 
thirty  years  following  the  Berlin  Congress,  Serbia  was 
divided  by  internal  conflicts  and  dynastic  rivalry  in  which 
she  spent  all  her  strength.  And  these  internal  political 
quarrels,  which  were  absolutely  out  of  place  and  dangerous 
for  our  national  ideal,  were  encouraged,  developed,  and 
supported  by  Austria,  who  thus  hoped  to  make  us  incapable 
of  agitating  for  the  liberation  of  our  brethren  who  were 
oppressed  by  her.  Austria  weakened  us  on  one  hand  and 
slandered  us  on  the  other.  For  a  long  time  Serbian  credit 
in  Europe  was  very  low.  We  Serbians,  no  doubt,  like  all 
other  nations,  have  our  good  and  bad  qualities.  And  un- 
happily Austria,  who  was  our  only  means  of  communication 
with  civilized  Europe,  systematically  exposed  our  defects 
and  concealed  our  good  points. 

At  last,  Vienna,  believing  us  sufficiently  weakened, 
divided,  and  disorganized,  thought  the  moment  had  arrived 
to  strike  us  a  death-blow.     Taking  advantage  of  the  general 


8  SERBIA  AND  EUROPE 

favourable  circumstances,  Austria  annexed  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina.  By  a  strange  coincidence,  the  Bulgarians  at 
the  same  time  declared  their  independence. 

Well,  this  annexation  which  was  contrary  to  all  prin- 
ciples of  International  Law  and  the  liberty  of  nations, 
instead  of  being  a  death-blow  to  us,  has  been  the  means  of 
reviving  our  national  energy,  which  till  then  was  latent 
and  wasted.  The  Austrians  imagined  they  could  dispose 
of  us.  We  were  weakened  by  internal  quarrels  and  party 
rivalry,  which  had  even  penetrated  into  the  Army,  making 
them  believe  that  we  were  incapable  of  great  deeds  and 
unconscious  of  our  national  duty.  They  grabbed  hold  of 
Bosnia  and  thought  that  impotent  Serbia,  paralysed  by 
discord  and  having  a  reputed  worthless  army,  was  going 
to  look  on  unmoved  at  the  crumbling  of  all  her  national 
hopes.  What  a  shock  and  surprise,  when  we  were  found 
rising  up,  oblivious  of  our  rancour,  our  personal  hatred, 
our  party  quarrels,  electrified  by  the  danger  which  menaced 
our  race — having  but  one  object,  one  idea:  to  save  our 
people  and  gain  the  independence  of  our  whole  race. 

It  is  only  right  to  admit  that  prior  to  1908,  we  had 
never  thought  of  settling  the  Austro-Serbian  question  by 
force  of  arms.  We  were  only  too  well  aware  of  the  dis- 
proportion which  existed  between  the  forces  of  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Serbia  to  dream  of  war.  Our  chief  object 
was  to  strengthen  pride  of  race,  and  to  develop  and  en- 
lighten the  national  conscience  of  the  Serbians  under 
Austria.  We  must  then  work  within  the  limits  of  Austrian 
political  law,  but  with  a  perseverance  which  would  not 
remain  unfruitful.  Before  us  we  had  the  admirable  example 
of  national  energy  displayed  by  the  Czechs.  We  felt  con- 
vinced that  after  a  period  of  national  propaganda — not 
revolutionary  but  pacific,  intellectual,  literary  and  artistic 
— we  would  reach  a  point  when  the  question  of  the  liquida- 
tion of  a  superannuated  State  such  as  Austria  was,  would 
settle  itself  ;  and  having  realized  the  intellectual  unity  of 
all  parties  of  the  Serbo-Croat  people,  we  would  attain 
political  unity  without  much  difficulty  or  bloodshed. 

Austria  did  not  wish  it.  Our  work  of  pacific  propa- 
ganda, though  barely  organized  and  started,  appeared  too 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  9 

dangerous,  too  opposed  to  her  designs  of  German  penetra- 
tion, for  her  to  tolerate  it  very  long.  And  since  1908,  it 
is  Austria  who  has  provoked,  deceived,  and  persecuted  us. 
To  our  peaceful  organizations — the  only  object  of  which 
was  to  strengthen  the  nationalism  of  the  Serbians  in 
Austria,  by  raising  their  intellectual  level,  to  these  organi- 
zations conformable  to  the  orders  of  the  Monarchy — Austria 
hastened  to  give  a  false  revolutionary  character.  In  Croatia 
and  Bosnia  she  concocted  plots  to  compromise  the  most 
influential  Croats  and  Serbians.  She  organized  trials  in 
which  her  agents  did  not  hesitate  to  invent  untruths  of 
which  she  made  use  to  persecute  and  condemn  our  friends. 
She  made  use  of  coups  d'etat  to  prevent  the  Serbo-Croat 
majority  from  taking  part  in  the  local  government  of 
Croatia  and  Slavonia.  In  face  of  these  persecutions,  this 
ever  increasing  terror,  the  Serbians  of  Croatia  and  Bosnia 
showed  a  superb  resistance,  national  energy  and  dignified 
tenacity  worthy  of  their  ancestors. 

All  hopes  of  peaceful  work  were  scattered.  We  began 
to  feel  that  Austria  found  us  too  dangerous  to  tolerate 
longer.  Free  Serbia  was  an  obstacle  not  only  to  Austrian 
ambition  but  to  the  whole  German  plan  of  penetration  by 
the  Balkans  into  Asia  Minor  as  far  as  the  Persian  Gulf. 
Our  enemies  had  then  to  try  to  get  rid  of  this  obstacle. 
With  resignation  we  prepared  to  resist  the  attack  which 
was  going  to  be  sprung  upon  us  some  day  or  other. 

The  whole  nation  had  a  presentiment  that  serious  and 
decisive  events  were  going  to  happen.  The  moral  force 
which  was  latent  in  us,  and  which  we  ourselves  did  not 
dream  of,  revived  and  increased  to  a  very  high  degree.  In 
expectation  of  the  war  with  Austria,  the  Balkan  War 
broke  out. 

Austria  had  counted  on  our  defeat.  We  were  victorious. 
In  this  war,  in  which  the  bravery  of  our  soldiers  won  back 
after  five  centuries  the  ancient  cities  and  provinces  of  our 
Kings  and  Emperors  of  the  Middle  Ages,  our  national 
patriotism  increased. 

We  quickly  finished  with  Turkey.  But  if  our  old 
reckoning  with  the  Asiatic  Empire  was  definitely  settled, 
there  were  others  with  whom  a  settlement  was  about  to 


10  SERBIA  AND  EUROPE 

arise.  Austria  watched ;  and  she  was  going  to  ask  us 
how  we  dared  dream  of  the  future  prosperity  of  our  race. 
Austria,  who  had  already  thought  us  dangerous,  was  going 
to  consider  us  as  altogether  menacing.  Our  victories  over 
the  Turks  had  stirred  up  patriotic  feelings  in  all  sections 
of  our  race,  and  Austria  was  terrified  at  the  enthusiasm  of 
her  Southern  Slav  and  Serbo-Croat  subjects  at  our  success. 
After  the  Balkan  victories  of  1912,  Viennese  politicians 
had  but  one  idea,  one  purpose  :  "  Crush  Serbia."  Since 
1913,  they  have  incited  the  Bulgarians  against  us.  And 
when  their  treacherous  attack  was  checked — the  result 
being  to  increase  the  size  of  our  State  more  than  ever — the 
wrath  of  the  Austrians  knew  no  bounds.  They  had  wanted 
to  make  use  of  others  to  fight  us  ;  having  failed  in  this, 
they  attacked  us  themselves.  Germany  wanted  nothing 
better.  And  less  than  a  year  after,  Austria  declared  war 
on  us. 

We  did  not  want  war.  The  best  proof  of  this  is  that 
we  were  quite  unprepared.  We  were  worn  out  by  the  two 
successive  wars  of  1912  and  1913,  which  had  cost  us  many 
lives.  Our  arms  and  munitions  were  exhausted.  We 
needed  a  long  period  of  peace  to  repair  our  losses  and  to 
reorganize.  Austria  knew  all  this  and  looked  upon  us  as 
a  mere  mouthful  to  swallow.  But  she  was  mistaken. 
Although  circumstances  were  against  us,  for  three  months 
we  resisted  an  uninterrupted  offensive,  and  in  December  1914 
inflicted  a  complete  defeat  on  the  Austrians.  During  four- 
teen months  of  war  we  checked  the  enemy  and  preserved 
our  country  from  invasion.  And  finally,  if  we  were  com- 
pelled to  retreat,  it  was  owing  to  the  coalition  of  three 
armies,  a  simultaneous  attack  on  three  fronts,  and  the 
crushing  superiority  of  heavy  artillery — we  having  only  a 
few  big  guns.  We  retreated  step  by  step,  never  losing 
courage  and  always  hoping  to  be  reinforced.  But  rein- 
forcements never  reached  us.  We  retreated  towards  coun- 
tries less  and  less  hospitable,  and  the  retreat  became  more 
and  more  difficult.  Our  soldiers,  famished,  exhausted  and 
half-frozen,  still  continued  to  repulse  attacks  and  take 
prisoners.  I  have  seen  the  soldiers  and  refugees  who  have 
come  through  Albania.     They  still  bear  traces  of  the  terrible 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  11 

physical  sufferings  they  have  had  to  endure.  But  do  you 
think  they  were  dejected  and  discouraged  ?  Far  from  it. 
Their  words  were  full  of  an  infinite  sadness — the  sadness 
of  no  longer  being  in  their  own  country.  And  through 
their  sorrow,  hope  and  faith  revealed  themselves. 

I  must  conclude.  Every  nation  has  certain  qualities, 
and  these  qualities  are  not  only  the  characteristics  of  the 
race,  but  also  the  result  of  the  historical,  geographical  and 
physical  conditions  in  which  these  people  have  been  brought 
up.  The  conditions  under  which  the  Serbian  people  have 
lived  for  centuries  have  inculcated  them  with  great  power 
of  resistance  and  unequalled  tenacity.  These  qualities, 
combined  with  intense  patriotism  and  a  great  love  of  inde- 
pendence, have  given  the  Serbians  the  moral  power  which 
has  distinguished  them  till  now  and  which  will  help  them 
not  only  to  reconquer  their  country,  but  finally  to  realize 
their  national  ideal. 

July  16,  1916. 

The  Economic  Struggles  of  Serbia. 

The  Economic  Conference  of  Paris  led  to  an  exchange 
of  views  regarding  new  regulations  for  economical  relations 
between  the  Allies.  Serbia  took  part  in  these  conver- 
sations, and  the  peace  which  will  give  us  a  new  Serbia — 
greater  and  happier — will  also  give  us  new  economic 
conditions. 

Having  alluded  to  the  discussion  on  the  economic  future 
of  our  country,  we  wish  to  point  out  in  a  few  words  the 
economic  struggles  we  have  had  against  Austria-Hungary, 
and  the  deluded  hopes  of  certain  Serbian  personages  on  the 
possibility  of  an  economic  agreement  between  ourselves 
and  Germany  without  Austria.  As  a  matter  of  fact  in 
our  country  there  existed  a  certain  volume  of  opinion  which 
desired  an  economic  agreement  with  Germany,  and  attempts 
were  made  to  realize  it.  Serbian  politicians  thought  at 
one  time  that  the  community  of  political  interests  between 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  would  not  prevent  the 
development  of  commercial  relations  between  Serbia  and 
the  German  Empire.     Experience  has  shown  us  that  this 


12  SERBIA  AND  EUROPE 

was  an  illusion  and  that  the  Central  Empires  formed  an 
economic  body  just  as  they  were  a  political  unity. 

For  a  long  time,  from  an  economic  point  of  view,  Serbia 
was  in  a  state  of  almost  complete  dependence  on  Austria- 
Hungary.  Being  an  agricultural  country,  she  could  only 
send  agricultural  produce  to  the  European  markets,  and 
the  only  markets  she  knew  were  Budapest  and  Vienna. 
The  only  practical  commercial  routes  were  the  Danube 
and  the  Belgrade-Budapest-Vienna  Railway.  At  the  same 
time,  the  manufactured  goods  that  she  imported  came 
from  Budapest  and  Vienna.  About  90  per  cent,  of  Serbian 
foreign  commerce  either  came  from  the  north  or  went  to 
the  north.  The  Serbians  were  accustomed  to  Austro- 
Hungarian  produce,  and  Serbian  exporters  had  nothing  to 
complain  of  about  the  Budapest  and  Vienna  markets.  The 
idea  of  emancipating  themselves  from  Austrian  markets 
would  never  have  occurred  to  the  Serbians,  if  Austria- 
Hungary  had  not  sought  to  gain  political  advantages  from 
the  economical  position.  Instead  of  regarding  this  situa- 
tion, so  favourable  for  her  commerce  and  industry,  as  the 
result  of  circumstances  which  might  change,  the  Dual 
Monarchy  deceived  itself  by  a  dangerous  illusion.  Viennese 
politicians  believed  that  Serbia,  on  account  of  her  geogra- 
phical position,  was  indissolubly  bound  to  Austria-Hungary, 
and  that  she  was  condemned  to  remain  for  ever  in 
this  state  of  dependence.  Austrian  economists,  with  Mr. 
Matlecovitch  at  their  head,  supported  this  opinion  and 
maintained  that  from  the  moment  the  Austrian  frontier 
was  closed  to  Serbian  produce,  Serbia  would  find  herself  in  a 
desperate  position  and  would  literally  be  suppressed. 

Political  leaders  in  Vienna,  believing  in  the  accuracy  of 
this  argument,  set  about  bringing  pressure  to  bear  on 
Serbia  with  a  view  to  gaining  political  advantages,  frankly 
threatening  to  close  the  frontier  if  the  Government  at 
Belgrade  would  not  accept  Austrian  terms  of  political 
domination.  The  limit  of  this  vexatious  and  deceitful 
policy  was  the  Austro-Hungarian  demand,  formulated  in 
the  spring  of  1906,  that  the  field-artillery  which  the  Serbian 
Ministry  of  War  wanted  to  order  in  France  at  Creusot's, 
should  be  supplied  by  the  Austrian  Scoda  Factory  at  Pilsen  ! 


SERBIAN  POLITICS  13 

It  was  the  chief  condition  in  the  negotiations  for  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Austro-Serbian  Commercial  Treaty.  Serbia 
would  not  accept  this  condition,  considering  it,  rightly  or 
wrongly,  as  a  blow  at  her  sovereignty.  An  economic  conflict 
ensued  which,  with  a  few  intervals,  lasted  for  nearly  three 
years  ;  from  this  conflict  Serbia  emerged  victorious  and 
economically  stronger  than  ever. 

Austrian  calculations  proved  entirely  wrong.  It  is  true 
that  the  complete  cessation  of  commercial  traffic  with  a 
country  which  was  our  only  market,  was  a  great  blow  to 
Serbia.  But  there  were  other  commercial  routes,  very 
difficult  it  is  true,  and  full  of  risk  and  danger,  but  they 
were  used  all  the  same.  The  desire  to  free  ourselves  from 
the  continual  aggressions  of  our  powerful  neighbour,  en- 
couraged us  to  make  certain  efforts  which  had  their  effect. 
The  economic  conflict  would,  therefore,  mean  a  temporary 
weakening  for  Serbia,  whilst  Austrian  industry  would  lose 
clients  that  could  not  be  replaced,  if  Serbia  succeeded  in 
finding  other  markets.  This  possibility  must  certainly  have 
occurred  to  Austrian  politicians,  but  they  never  thought 
that  we  were  capable  of  maintaining  the  struggle  till  the  end. 
In  estimating  Serbian  energy,  the  Austrians  were  entirely 
wrong.  Serbia  did  not  give  in,  and  maintained  the  eco- 
nomic conflict  with  unparalleled  skill  and  perseverance. 

The  steps  that  Serbia  took  for  defence  were  of  several 
kinds,  and  they  all  proved  efficient.  Among  them  was 
the  attempt  made  by  the  Government  to  conclude  a  com- 
mercial treaty  with  Germany  at  a  special  tariff.  It  was 
the  first  time  that  we  concluded  a  treaty  of  this  sort  with 
a  country  other  than  Austria-Hungary.  We  generally 
concluded  commercial  treaties  which  contained  a  clause 
for  the  most  favoured  nation,  and  the  concessions  made 
to  Austro-Hungarian  industry  virtually  spread  to  the  in- 
dustry of  the  contracting  State.  Meanwhile  Austria-Hungary 
preserved  her  superiority,  thanks  to  her  geographical  position, 
to  the  proximity  of  the  Serbian  market  and  to  the  ties 
formed  by  a  commerce  established  for  many  years. 

To  replace  Austrian  goods,  Serbian  merchants  applied 
to  German  manufacturers,  and  the  latter  quickly  adapted 
themselves  to  the  taste  and  needs  of  the  Serbian  public. 


14  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

The  Germans  did  all  they  could  to  monopolize  the  market. 
They  allowed  their  clients  long  credit,  to  which  the  latter 
were  accustomed,  they  consented  to  produce  articles  specially 
required  by  Serbian  customers — chiefly  cheap  articles  of  an 
inferior  quality.  The  Germans  succeeded  in  setting  a  firm 
foot  in  Serbia,  and  at  once  became  formidable  competitors 
for  Austrian  industry  and  commerce. 

In  spite  of  the  German  commercial  development  in 
Serbia,  the  Government  at  Berlin  adopted  a  very  undecided 
attitude.  They  replied  in  the  affirmative  to  the  Serbian 
request  for  a  tariff  treaty,  but  they  considerably  restricted 
the  number  of  articles  specially  mentioned  in  the  tariff. 

The  German  Consul  at  Belgrade,  Mr.  Schlieben,  made 
great  efforts  to  facilitate  German  commerce,  and  manu- 
facturers in  Germany  were  quite  satisfied  with  his  activity. 
The  percentage  of  German  commerce  increased  in  a  marked 
degree,  while  the  Austrian  90  per  cent,  fell  to  20  per  cent.  ! 
Then,  owing  to  Austrian  diplomatic  intervention,  Mr. 
Schlieben  was  recalled  and  the  Serbian  Government  ascer- 
tained that  official  Germany  did  not  wish  to  maintain 
German  competition  against  Austrian  industry.  Political 
events  which  followed  convinced  our  Government  of  the 
necessity  for  seeking  elsewhere — in  France,  Italy  and 
England — the  manufactured  goods  which  she  needed. 

Formerly,  Serbia  was  quite  satisfied  with  German  and 
Austrian  goods,  but  the  present  war  has  put  an  end  to  all 
commerce  with  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  It  is  to 
their  friends  the  French,  British  and  Italians  that  Serbian 
merchants  will  in  future  apply  for  all  the  articles  that 
Serbia  imports. 

May  14,  1916. 

The  23RD  July,  1914. 

It  is  two  years  ago  to-day  that  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Minister  Plenipotentiary,  Baron  Giesl  von  Gieslingen,  called 
at  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  Belgrade  and  pre- 
sented, by  order  of  his  Government  a  Note,  the  tenor  of 
which  produced  great  consternation  in  Serbia.  The  history 
of  diplomacy  contains  no  parallel  for  the  demand  from  an 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  15 

independent  country  of  conditions  so  humiliating  and  so 
incompatible  with  its  sovereign  dignity. 

The  conditions  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  were  so 
exorbitant,  that  they  could  not  be  explained  except  as  a 
desire  of  the  Monarchy  to  bring  about  a  rupture  and  war. 
In  spite  of  this  evidence,  Serbian  circles  which  were  accus- 
tomed to  the  extraordinary  proceedings  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarians,  did  not  wish  to  think  of  war,  and  the  Govern- 
ment, in  order  to  avoid  an  armed  conflict,  consented  to 
nearly  all  the  terms  of  the  Note.  Serbia,  whom  the  three 
campaigns  of  1912  and  1913  had  acquainted  with  all  the 
horrors  of  war,  bowed  her  head  and  accepted  all  the  con- 
ditions, in  the  hope  that  this  complete  diplomatic  victory 
would  suffice  and  that  the  catastrophe  of  a  general  war 
would  be  spared  Europe.     But  Austria  wanted  war  ! 

It  is  no  secret  that  the  revival  of  Serbian  national  pride, 
which  manifested  itself  so  brilliantly  in  the  Balkan  Wars, 
menaced  the  plans  of  Austro-Hungarian  politics  in  the 
Balkans,  and  that  the  Monarchy  sought  by  every  means 
to  prevent  the  enlargement  and  development  of  Serbia. 
Since  the  month  of  November  1912,  when  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  protested  in  the  name  of  "  rights 
of  nationalities  "  against  a  Serbian  outlet  on  the  Adriatic, 
till  the  ultimatum  of  the  23rd  July,  1914,  Vienna  diplomats 
did  not  tire  of  raising  obstacles  in  the  way  of  Serbian  pro- 
gress and  in  trying  to  provoke  an  armed  conflict.  The 
negotiations  which  took  place  in  London  for  settling  the 
boundaries  of  Albania  ;  the  question  of  Scutari ;  the  inciting 
of  the  Bulgarians  to  attack  the  Serbians;  the  attempt  to 
cajole  Italy  into  a  war  against  Serbia,  immediately  after 
the  Treaty  of  Bucarest  ; '  the  ultimatum  to  Serbia  in 
November  1913,  demanding  that  all  Serbian  troops  be 
immediately  withdrawn  from  strategic  positions  they  occu- 
pied in  Albania  to  prevent  a  new  Albanian  invasion  of 
Serbian  territory — all  these  acts,  malevolent  and  directly 
hostile  to  Serbia,  showed  a  dangerous  disposition  in  leading 
circles  in  Vienna  regarding  the  Serbians,  who  had  great 
trouble  in  extricating  themselves  from  these  onslaughts. 
The  constant  failure  of  these  actions  ended  by  exasperating 
Austria,  and  when  she  was  certain  of  effective  help  from 


16  SERBIA  AND  EUROPE 

Berlin,  she  decided  on  a  big  attack  and  sent  Serbia  the 
ultimatum  of  the  23rd  July. 

The  history  of  this  ultimatum  has  not  yet  been  cleared 
up,  for  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  will  not  allow  the 
correspondence  exchanged  between  them,  before  and  after  the 
ultimatum,  to  be  published.  Direct  proof  that  the  Central 
Empires  wished  to  provoke  a  general  war  is  not  needed. 
All  discussions  based  on  the  diplomatic  negotiations  which 
took  place  after  the  sending  of  the  ultimatum  appear 
absolutely  useless  to  us,  for  the  two  principal  documents, 
the  Austrian  ultimatum  and  the  reply  of  the  Serbian  Govern- 
ment, establish  in  a  most  emphatic  manner  that  the 
Monarchy  wanted  war  and  that  Germany  also  wanted  it 
— and  not  only  a  war  with  Serbia,  but  a  general  European 
war.  Sir  Edward  Grey,  with  his  customary  lucidity,  had 
declared  that  it  was  a  well-known  fact  in  European  politics 
that  Russia  would  never  allow  Serbia  to  be  crushed,  and 
from  the  moment  that  Austria-Hungary,  in  company  with 
Germany,  prepared  to  annihiliate  Serbia,  it  was  quite  evident 
that  they  wanted  a  general  war. 

Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  are  alone  responsible 
for  the  conflagration  which  is  devastating  Europe.  To 
prove  their  guilt,  one  has  only  to  read  the  provocatory 
Note  of  Austria-Hungary  and  the  completely  submissive 
reply  of  the  Serbian  Government.  These  two  documents 
will  always  remain  the  most  damning  proof  of  Austro- 
Hungarian  aggression.  Posterity  will  never  understand 
the  mentality  of  the  people  who  with  inconceivable  levity 
set  Europe  on  fire,  because  the  reply  of  the  Serbian  Govern- 
ment— so  humble  and  submissive — did  not  satisfy  them. 

When  the  Entente  Powers  asked  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  to  wait  a  few  days,  promising  to  obtain  other 
concessions  from  Serbia,  German  diplomats  refused  to 
intervene  with  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  for  an 
extension  of  the  forty-eight  hours,  and  replied  evasively. 
The  war  broke  out  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Germany — a  terrible  war,  which  will  fill 
humanity  with  shame  for  ever,  and  for  which  the 
responsibility  lies  entirely  with  Vienna  and  Berlin. 

July  23,  1916. 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  17 


Serbia  and  Peace. 


Platonic  conversations  regarding  peace  have  not  yet 
come  to  an  end,  and  they  will  probably  last  a  certain  length 
of  time,  thanks  to  the  German  efforts  to  induce  the  nations 
to  leave  off  the  struggle  and  accept  the  "  German  Peace." 
These  tactics  are  not  at  all  new.  They  emanate  from  the 
same  system  as  practised  by  the  Germans  before  the  war. 
All  conflicts  which  preceded  the  European  war,  and  in  which 
the  Germans  participated,  appeared  indeed  under  this 
aspect.  Germany  arbitrarily  undertook  an  action  affecting 
the  general  interests  of  the  whole  of  Europe,  and  when 
the  other  powers  protest  and  rise  up  against  such  an  abusive 
practice,  she  accuses  them  of  wishing  to  disturb  the  peace  ! 
The  case  of  Serbia  and  of  the  Austro-German  policy  with 
regard  to  this  little  country  is  typical  in  this  respect.  In 
1908  Austria-Hungary  violated  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  in 
proclaiming  the  annexation  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  contrary 
to  the  fundamental  rules  of  the  law  of  nations  and  of  inter- 
national morality.  The  Entente  powers  protested  and 
demanded  an  international  conference  in  order  to  settle 
the  fate  of  the  two  Serbian  provinces.  At  that  moment, 
Germany  rose  up  threateningly  and  sent  an  ultimatum  to 
Russia.  The  Russian  Government,  in  face  of  such  an 
arrogant  and  aggressive  attitude,  was  obliged  to  yield  and 
to  approve  the  annexation.  Immediately  afterwards  the 
whole  of  Germany  uttered  cries  of  joy  in  proclaiming  the 
German  Emperor  as  a  peacemaker  ! 

In  1914,  the  same  game.  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany 
decided  to  crush  Serbia  and  do  away  with  the  sole  barrier 
which  closed  to  them  the  road  to  the  East.  With  under- 
hand scheming  they  prepared  the  blow,  hoping  to  obtain 
the  same  result  as  in  1909.  Russia,  again  this  time,  took 
the  part  of  the  threatened  kingdom  of  Serbia  ;  but  the 
Berlin  Government  cried  :  "  You  want  war,  you  are  pro- 
voking war  !  "  Serbia,  for  her  part,  with  the  desire  to 
avoid  a  conflict  artificially  provoked  by  Austria,  went  to 
the  utmost  limits  of  concession  in  her  reply  to  the  Austrian 
ultimatum,  and  accepted  all  the  demands  of  the  Monarchy, 
humiliating  and  unjustified  as  they  were.     We  will  not  only 

3 


18  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

quote  the  opinion  of  Viscount  Grey,  that  "  never  was  any 
country  exposed  to  such  humiliation  as  Serbia  in  accepting, 
in  her  reply,   the  unreasonable  claims   of   Austria."     The 
Vorwaerts  wrote  in  the  same  sense,  on  July  25,  1914,  before 
knowing  the  Serbian  reply  :    "  The  demands  of  the  Austrian 
Government  are  more  brutal  than  any  Note  that  has  ever 
been  addressed  in  the  whole  course  of  history  to  an  inde- 
pendent State.     They  have  only  one  aim  :   to  provoke  war. 
The    conscious    proletarians    of    Germany,   in    the    name 
of    humanity    and    culture,    raise    their    violent    protests 
against  this  criminal  action."     The  editors  of  the  Vorwaerts 
thought   the   Serbian   Government   would   not   be   able   to 
accept  the  ultimatum,  and  yet  Serbia  did  accept  it,  in  the 
interests  of  peace.     The  Neue  Freie  Presse  of  January  5, 
1917,  confessed,  for  the  first  time,  that  the  reply  of  the 
Serbian  Government  was  satisfactory  !     The  Ballplatz,  how- 
ever, expected  a  negative  reply,  and  the  order  had  been 
given    to    Baron   Giesl,    the    Austrian    Minister,    to    leave 
Belgrade  in  any  case  on  the  25th  of  July,  on  the  expiration 
of  the  delay  granted  for  the  reply,  which  he,  in  fact,  did. 
During  three  days,  from  the  25th  to  the  28th  of  July,  the 
Austrian    and    German    Governments    deliberated,    and    it 
was  only  on  the  28th  of  July  that  Austria-Hungary  declared 
war  on  Serbia,  taking  no  notice  of  the  satisfactory  reply 
of  the  Serbian  Government. 

One  knows  only  too  well  in  what  manner  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  armies  penetrated  into  Serbia  and  accomplished 
the  task  of  "  punishing  the  Serbian  people."  The  testi- 
monies of  Professor  Reiss  and  the  authentic  documents 
not  yet  published  on  all  the  atrocities  committed  by  the 
Magyar  soldiers,  are  distinct  proofs  of  the  intention  of  the 
Austro-German  Governments  to  annihilate  the  Serbian 
nation.  This  intention  Austria-Hungary  alone  was  not 
able  to  realize.  Thrice  defeated  by  the  Serbians,  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  armies  found  they  were  incapable  of  accom- 
plishing the  work  of  destruction  and  were  obliged  to  ask 
for  German  and  Bulgarian  assistance.  The  real  motive 
of  the  war  and  the  German  plans  of  conquest  were  plain 
after  this  fourth  military  expedition  against  Serbia,  con- 
fided to  the  famous  Mackensen.     Serbia,  ravaged  by  epi- 


SERBIAN  POLITICS  19 

demies  and  weakened  by  former  wars,  inspired  no  pity  on 
the  part  of  the  Germans.  She  was  the  barrier  in  the  way 
of  the  German  thrust  towards  the  East,  the  sole  obstacle 
to  the  Drang  nach  Osten.  And  it  was  necessary  to  get 
her  out  of  the  way,  since  she  was  not  willing  to  bend 
before  the  German  fist  and  German  Culture.  Attacked  on 
three  sides,  Serbia  had  to  give  in.  She  was  badly  bruised, 
but  not  conquered. 

To-day  Germany  has  the  Balkans  provisionally  in  her 
power.  The  route  to  the  East  is  open  to  her  for  the  moment, 
and  she  would  like  to  keep  it  so  always.  To  the  bleeding 
nations  she  holds  out  her  hand  and  speaks  to  them,  in  the 
name  of  humanity,  of  the  bloodshed,  of  the  immense  sacri- 
fices of  war  and  the  blessings  of  peace.  Certainly  the  un- 
fortunate Serbian  people  would  rejoice  more  than  any  other 
if  there  could  be  peace,  but  a  real  peace,  a  peace  with  liberty 
and  not  with  slavery.  It  is  this  desire  to  remain  free  that 
urges  our  nation  on  to  resistance,  that  gives  it  the  strength 
to  bear  the  heavy  burden  of  the  war  until  the  end,  until 
the  victory  of  Justice  over  Injustice.  It  is  also  the  reason 
why  it  sees  in  the  offer  of  peace  from  those  who  wished  to 
crush  it,  a  manoeuvre  which  it  repels  with  all  its  strength, 
as  it  repelled  the  former  offers  made  in  view  of  a  separate 
peace. 

February  4,  1917. 

The  Future  of  the  Balkan  Nations. 

The  nearer  we  feel  to  the  issue  of  the  present  conflict, 
the  greater  is  the  obligation  imposed  upon  politicians 
to  consider  the  final  solution  of  various  problems  presented 
by  the  war.  Among  these  problems  one  of  the  most  serious 
and  most  important  is,  without  doubt,  the  Balkan  problem. 

The  present  war,  of  which  one  of  the  more  remote  causes 
was  the  dissension  in  the  Balkans,  has  upset  the  equilibrium 
which,  thanks  to  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest, 
had  at  last  been  established  in  the  East.  This  equilibrium 
can  never  more  be  restored.  The  Bulgarians,  who  did  not 
desire  it,  have  destroyed  it  in  joining  the  Austro- Germans 
for  the  dividing  up  of  the  Balkans.     Having  done  every. 


20  SERBIA  AND  EUROPE 

thing  in  order  to  upset  equilibrium  in  the  Balkans  and  not 
even  hesitating  to  get  the  Germans  to  intervene  in  the 
affairs  of  the  Peninsula,  they  have  by  that  very  action  lost  the 
right  and  the  advantage  of  appealing  to  the  principles  of  which 
they  had  failed  to  appreciate  the  strength  and  the  value. 
Not  wishing  to  respect  the  formula  "  The  Balkans  for  the 
Balkanic  peoples,"  they  will  be  the  first  to  suffer  the  con- 
sequences. It  can  therefore  no  longer  be  a  question  of 
re-establishing  the  equilibrium  existing  before  the  war,  but 
of  making  a  judicious  and  fair  partition,  by  which  each 
nation  will  obtain  that  part  forming  its  national  patrimony. 
The  boundaries  of  the  regions  inhabited  by  different 
elements,  that  is  to  say  where  the  different  races  are  so 
mixed  up  and  confused  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  define 
precisely  the  ethnical  character  of  these  regions,1  must 
necessarily  fall,  at  the  time  of  partition,  to  the  most  important 
of  the  nations  ;  we  mean  that  one  to  which  will  belong  in 
the  future  the  principal  role  in  the  Balkans  by  virtue  of 
its  ethnical  and  political  importance  and  its  geographical 
position.  Which  nation  should  this  be  ?  That  is  the 
question  to  which  we  propose  to  reply,  basing  our  argument 
on  facts  and  reasonings  taken  from  the  writers  of  enemy 
countries  as  well  as  from  those  of  allied  countries. 

If  by  the  importance  of  a  nation  we  mean  only  its 
material  power,  in  fact  the  power  of  numbers,  it  is  not 
difficult  to  prove  that,  among  the  Balkan  nations,  the 
Serbian  nation  forms  part  of  the  race  comprising  the  greatest 
number  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  Peninsula.  The  Serbian 
nation,  or  Southern  Slavs,  numbers  more  than  12  millions, 
forming  an  ethnical  whole,  well  defined  and  easily  recog- 
nizable, of  an  imposing  amplitude  and  variety.  Its  ethnical 
frontiers  extend  from  the  shores  of  the  Adriatic  on  the 
West,  as  far  as  the  rivers  Iskar  and  Mesta  on  the  East, 
and  from  Temesvar  and  Theresiopel  (Szabadka)  on  the 
North,  as  far  as  to  Salonica  on  the  South.*  The  moral 
strength  of  the  Serbian  nation  equals  its  numerical  import  - 

1  As  is  the  case  with  the  population  of   the  valley  of   the  Mesta. 

2  For  the  ethnographical  frontiers  of  the  East,  see  the  ethno- 
graphical map  of  Mr.  M.  Andonovitch,  university  professor,  1892  (in 
Serbian)  and  1903  (in  French). 


SERBIAN  POLITICS  21 

ance.  Its  glorious  past,  the  purity  of  its  moral  ideal,  its 
ancient  civilization,1  its  capacities  for  development,  lastly 
the  purity  of  race  and  chivalrous  character  of  the  people, 
these  are  all  elements  of  moral  power  which  mark  it  out 
for  the  important  role,  and  give  it  the  right  to  a  special 
place  in  the  Balkans. 

Finally,  the  geographical  position  of  the  Serbian  nation, 
occupying  the  centre  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  with  the 
basins  of  its  principal  rivers,  Morava,  Vardar  and  Strouma, 
also  constitutes  an  important  element  of  its  political  power. 
The  possession  of  these  river  basins  by  the  Serbians  dates 
from  1330,  as  is  proved  in  the  book  of  the  Bulgarian  author, 
Jschirkoff,  The  Western  Boundaries  of  Bulgarian  Lands,  in 
which  one  reads  :  "  But  it  was  only  after  the  battle  of 
Velboujde  (Kustendil,  June  28,  1330)  that  the  rivalry 
between  Bulgarians  and  Serbians  for  the  possession  of  the 
valleys  of  the  Morava,  the  Strouma  and  the  Vardar  was 
decided  in  favour  of  the  latter"  (p.  12).  Thus  the  justice 
of  these  observations  is  confirmed,  even  in  certain  enemy 
avowals.  To  quote  another  one,  interesting  and,  perhaps, 
less  known,  we  refer  to  the  correspondence  exchanged 
between  Karl  Marx  and  Engels,  in  which  one  finds  a  letter 
produced  recently  by  the  socialistic  review  Die  Glocke. 
In  this  letter  Marx,  speaking  of  the  Eastern  question, 
declares  that  the  Turkish  Empire  in  disintegration  must 
disappear  and  give  place  to  a  young  nation,  which,  accord- 
ing to  him,  is  none  other  than  the  Serbian  nation.  The 
latter,  according  to  Marx,  by  its  central  position  in  the 
heart  of  the  Balkans,  is  clearly  meant  to  succeed  the  Otto- 
man Empire.  The  compatriots  and  successors  of  Marx, 
the  Germans  of  to-day,  in  publishing  this  letter,  do  their 

1  Except  for  a  few  rather  vague  notions  as  to  our  national  poetry, 
recognized  as  belonging  to  the  most  beautiful  and  most  original  epic 
verse,  almost  nothing  in  general  is  known  in  foreign  countries  regarding 
the  ancient  Serbian  civilization.  Here,  however,  is  a  competent  judg- 
ment of  ancient  Serbian  art :  "  And  it  is  marvellous  to  see  these 
patriarchal  tribes,  which  have  lived  for  centuries  in  proud  inde- 
pendence, turn  again  towards  Byzantium,  to  listen  to  its  lessons  and 
to  surpass  it  in  boldness  of  conception,  in  number  and  magnificence  of 
their  monuments.  We  owe  them  indeed  the  richest  collection  left  us 
by  Christian  art  in  the  East. — (G.  Mtllet,   Glorious  Serbia.) 


22  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

utmost  to  lessen  its  effect  and  diminish  its  importance, 
by  pretending  that  the  master  socialist  was  mistaken 
and  that  it  is  to  the  Bulgarians,  their  present  allies, 
that  the  predominating  role  in  the  Balkans  is  due.  All 
the  same,  the  celebrated  socialist  writer  saw  clearly  in 
assigning  to  the  Serbian  nation  the  predominating  role 
in  the  Peninsula.  Besides,  all  facts  tend  to  favour 
this   opinion. 

The  attitude  adopted  by  the  Serbian  people  in  the  present 
conflict,  in  embracing  the  cause  of  Right  and  of  Liberty, 
and  the  degree  of  political  development  attained  in  the 
free  part  of  the  nation  represented  by  the  kingdom  of 
Serbia,  where  the  democratic  and  representative  regime 
has  long  been  in  force,  are  both  proofs  of  the  development 
as  well  as  of  the  political  sense  of  the  Serbian  race.  Indeed, 
the  political  regime,  more  or  less  free,  under  which  a  country 
lives,  is  also  one  of  the  expressions  of  the  culture  of  the 
nation.  The  notions  of  liberty,  justice  and  equality,  firmly 
rooted  in  the  minds  of  the  Serbian  people,  are  pillars  of  the 
social  and  political  edifice  of  its  State.  When  the  soul  of 
a  nation  is  braced  up  by  its  past  and  by  a  high  moral  ideal, 
its  future  is  for  ever  assured.  Its  role  among  its  neighbours 
is  therefore  determined  beforehand.  This  role  the  Serbian 
nation  played  already  in  a  not  distant  past.  Under  the 
Prince  Michel  Obrenovitch  (i860- 1868)  the  Balkan  Con- 
federation, with  Serbia  at  its  head,  was  on  the  eve  of  being 
formed,  and  it  was  only  the  sudden  death  of  this  prince 
that  prevented  its  realization.  Without  being  impelled 
by  a  spirit  of  conquest,  without  coveting  the  lands  of  its 
neighbours,  and  without  cherishing  projects  of  hegemony, 
the  Serbia  of  that  time  assumed  the  role  of  guide  and  pro- 
tector of  the  Balkan  peoples,  with  the  lofty  moral  mission 
of  liberating  the  oppressed  nations,  among  which  were  her 
enemies  of  to-day,  the  Bulgarians.  The  heads  of  the  Bul- 
garian nation  at  that  time  called  for  the  protection  and 
support  of  Serbia  and  of  her  prince,  not  having  faith  in  th'e 
strength  of  the  Bulgarian  nation  which  in  those  days  repre- 
sented an  amorphous  mass  with  no  national  sentiment. 
The  future  belongs,  then,  to  the  Serbian  nation.  That 
proceeds  from  a  law  of  historical  necessity,  against  which 


SERBIAN  POLITICS  23 

no  force  is  capable  of  struggling.  It  would  be  wiser  to 
understand  and  follow  historical  laws  than  to  try  to  stop 
their  course.  *~ 

May  20,  1917. 

Serbia  and  Obligatory  Arbitration. 

The  replies  of  the  Germanic  Powers  and  of  their  Turkish 
and  Bulgarian  allies  to  the  Note  of  the  Pope,  reveal  such 
extraordinary  political  hypocrisy  that  it  seems  useless  to 
lay  special  stress  upon  it.  One  believes  one  is  dreaming 
when  one  sees  the  factitious  deference  with  which  Germany 
and  her  acolytes  speak  of  the  principles  of  Right  in  the 
international  reports  and  of  obligatory  arbitration  for  the 
pacific  solution  of  conflicts.  It  is  particularly  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Bulgaria  who  to-day  declare  themselves 
ready  to  adopt  obligatory  arbitration,  as  though  the  world 
had  forgotten  that  these  two  powers,  encouraged  and  sup- 
ported by  Germany,  have  committed  the  most  serious 
offences  against  this  principle,  one  of  them  having  even 
broken  her  formal  agreement  to  submit  all  disputes  with 
Serbia  to  the  arbitration  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia.  What 
a  difference  between  Serbia,  who,  on  two  occasions,  in 
particularly  unfavourable  circumstances,  preferred  to  accept 
arbitration  rather  than  provoke  armed  conflict,  and  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Bulgaria,  whose  whole  policy  was  hostile  to 
the  idea  of  a  peaceful  solution  of  political  differences  ! 

On  the  28th  of  June,  1913,  in  the  Serbian  Parliament, 
the  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Pachitch,  declared,  after  having 
expounded  at  length  the  political  situation,  that  the  Serbian 
Government,  in  answer  to  the  request  of  Russia,  had  decided 
to  submit  the  dispute  with  Bulgaria  regarding  the  settle- 
ment of  frontiers,  to  the  arbitration  of  the  Emperor  of 
Russia,  in  conformity  with  the  formal  stipulations  of  the 
Serbo-Bulgarian  alliance.  Mr.  Pachitch  asked  the  Serbian 
Parliament  to  approve  this  decision,  which,  although 
dangerous  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  legitimate  pre- 
tensions of  Serbia,  was  in  conformity  with  the  loyalty  with 
which  Serbia  intended  to  hold  to  her  engagements.  The 
next  morning  the  political  clubs  held  long  meetings  in  order 


24  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

to  determine  their  attitude.  The  Radical  party,  which 
was  in  the  majority,  unanimously  decided  to  approve  the 
decision  of  the  Government.  The  Opposition  also  stated 
precisely  their  opinion,  but  had  not  time  to  express  it 
publicly,  because  in  the  night  of  the  2gth-3oth  June  the 
Bulgarian  army,  by  the  orders  of  its  commander-in-chief, 
had  attacked,  without  declaration  of  war,  the  Serbian  troops 
all  along  the  line.  On  the  30th  June,  in  the  morning,  when 
the  Serbian  Parliament  was  going  to  approve  by  a  formal 
vote  the  point  of  view  of  the  Government,  the  Radical 
Club  having  already  given  its  adhesion  to  the  policy  of 
Mr.  Pachitch,  a  telegram  announcing  the  Bulgarian  attack 
rendered  all  discussion  and  all  voting  useless.  It  is  there- 
fore an  historical  fact  that  the  Serbian  Government  and 
Parliament  had,  in  1913,  in  spite  of  Serbia's  favourable 
chances  in  the  event  of  an  armed  conflict,  preferred  to  accept 
arbitration. 

In  1914  Serbia  received  the  brutal  ultimatum  of 
Austria-Hungary,  the  unreasonable  demands  of  which  were 
more  than  humiliating.  In  London,  where  they  have  regard 
for  international  propriety,  the  most  peace-loving  men  were 
stupified  at  the  humiliation  imposed  upon  the  little  country 
by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy.  The  Serbian  Govern- 
ment, nevertheless,  accepted  all  points  of  the  ultimatum 
except  two  accessory  questions.  According  to  the  subse- 
quent avowal  of  the  authorized  organ  of  the  Ballplatz,  the 
Neue  Freie  Presse  of  January  5,  1917,  the  Serbian  reply 
was  satisfactory.  But  the  Serbian  Government  went  still 
further  in  its  submission  and  accompanied  its  reply  with 
the  following  declaration,  which  will  ever  remain  one  of 
the  most  important  points  of  the  accusation  which  humanity 
will  have  to  bring  forward  against  those  who  have  ruined 
the  world  by  bringing  about  the  present  slaughter  : 

"  In  the  event  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government 
not  being  satisfied  with  this  reply,  the  Royal  Serbian 
Government,  considering  it  is  in  the  interests  of  all  not 
to  precipitate  the  solution  of  this  question,  is  ready,  as 
always,  to  accept  a  peaceful  agreement,  submitting  this 
question  either  to  the  decision  of  the  International  Hague 
Tribunal,  or  to  the  great  Powers."     Austria-Hungary  and 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  25 

Germany  would  not  hear  of  this.  The  Austro-Hungarian 
Minister  at  Belgrade  left  the  Serbian  capital  half  an  hour 
after  receipt  of  the  Serbian  reply.     And  it  was  war.  .  .  . 

To-day,  in  front  of  a  million  graves  (to  speak  only  of 
the  Serbians),  the  very  ones  who  brought  about  the  carnage 
dare  speak  of  right  and  of  arbitration  !     . 

Hypocrites  ! 

October  7,  1917. 

The  Russian  Peace  and  Serbia. 

The  Russian  maximalists  have  just  accomplished,  by 
the  conclusion  of  an  armistice  with  Germany  and  her  Allies, 
an  act,  the  consequences  of  which,  however  serious  they 
may  be,  must  be  considered  calmly  and  coolly.  Russia  will 
not,  or  cannot  fight  ;  such  is  the  brutal  fact  with  which 
one  must  henceforth  reckon.  As  military  factor  in  the 
struggle  against  Germanism  Russia  no  longer  exists,  and 
it  is  with  one  Ally  the  less  that  we  must  continue  the  war, 
if  we  wish  to  gain  the  victory.  The  Russian  breakdown 
is  all  the  more  grievous  in  that  it  occurs  under  circum- 
stances rather  tragi-comic.  It  is  tragical  to  see  a  great 
and  noble  nation  commit  an  act  of  treachery,  not  only  odious 
from  a  moral  point  of  view  but  disastrous  for  the  future  of 
Russia  herself.  And  it  is  comical  to  assist  at  peace  nego- 
tiations between  Lenin,  Trotsky  and  party  on  the  one  side 
— who  adorn  themselves  with  the  title  of  apostles  of  revo- 
lution and  of  social  justice — and  representatives  of  William, 
Charles,  Ferdinand  and  Mohammed  on  the  other — these 
four  monarchs  knowing  no  other  right  than  that  of  their 
own  power :  issue  of  the  divine  will !  However,  this  is  not 
the  moment  to  look  at  the  grotesque  side  of  the  situation 
created  by  the  Bolshevists,  whose  audacity  seems  to  be 
boundless.  That  which  occupies  our  attention  is  the  fate 
of  our  people  and  of  our  dear  Fatherland  who  believed  in 
Russia  as  in  God,  and  who  feels  the  treachery  of  the  Bol- 
shevists like  a  blow  struck  at  the  very  heart  of  its  hopes. 

The  war  has,  however,  hardened  the  Serbians,  and  the 
numerous  trials  through  which  the  Serbian  nation  has  had 
to  pass  has  taught  it  to  resist  the  greatest   misfortunes. 


26  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

The  moral  basis  of  our  policy  is  not  weakened  by  the 
treachery  of  Petrograd,  and  if  we  cannot  count  upon  the 
co-operation  of  the  Russian  divisions,  that  is  no  reason  for 
forgetting  that  the  high  ideal  of  liberty  and  justice,  to 
which  we  have  sacrificed  everything,  commands  us  to  con- 
tinue the  struggle.  Russia,  represented  at  this  moment  by 
a  band  of  adventurers  and  German  agents,  accepts  the 
German  domination.  She  consents  to  submit  to  the  Prussian 
mailed  fist  rather  than  continue  the  war. 

We  had  already  been  confronted  by  this  dilemma,  we 
and  our  Allies,  before  the  war,  and  to-day,  tike  yesterday, 
it  appears  under  the  same  form.  We  have  to  choose  : 
either  to  perish  and  lose  political  and  economic  independence, 
to  serve  eternally  the  interests  of  German  masters,  or  else 
to  continue  the  defence  in  alliance  with  the  greatest  and 
most  civilized  states  in  the  world.  Under  such  conditions, 
there  is  no  choice.  Russia  was  very  dear  to  us  ;  we  believed 
in  her  and  we  looked  to  her  for  salvation.  France,  England 
and  America  did  not  know  us  and  were  not  much  interested 
in  our  fate.  The  war  has  changed  the  situation,  and  not 
only  political  ideology,  but  also  and  above  all  the  most 
elementary  interests,  advise  our  Allies  to  guarantee  us  our 
national  liberty  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word.  The  spectre 
of  a  "  Mittel-Europa  "  stretching  from  Hamburg  to  Bagdad 
has  taken  a  particularly  threatening  form  after  the  Russian 
breakdown.  The  fate  of  the  whole  world  is  at  stake  on 
the  European  continent,  and  courageous  Serbia  represents 
there  the  most  serious  obstacle  to  the  establishment  of  a 
German  hegemony.  The  Allies  have  pledged  their  honour 
for  the  restoration  of  Serbia,  but  the  most  vital  interests 
of  a  calm  and  peaceful  Europe  demand  the  realization  of 
our  national  aspirations. 

The  Austro-Germans  wish  to  insinuate  that  after  the 
treachery  of  Russia  Serbians  should  give  up  the  struggle, 
the  chief  support  of  their  policy  having  collapsed.  We  shall 
have  occasion  to  come  back  to  this  false  argument,  and 
for  the  moment  we  will  only  affirm  that  the  principal  pillars 
of  our  policy  are  the  justice  of  our  cause,  the  right  to  live 
and  the  desire  to  be  free  and  delivered  from  all  foreign 
domination.      Russian     treachery     has     altered     nothing. 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  27 

After  all,  the  war  is  far  from  being  at  an  end  and  the 
material  forces  of  the  Allies  are  so  imposing  that  even  the 
faint-hearted  revive,  when  they  look  closely  into  things. 
But  among  the  Serbians  there  are  no  weaklings.  And 
we  have  reason  to  believe  that  the  errors  of  the  past  will 
not  be  repeated  and  that  the  Salonica  front  will  in  time 
be  reinforced  to  meet  any  eventuality. 

December  23,  1917. 

On  the  Eve  of  the  Fifth  Year. 

This  week  is  the  anniversary  of  the  week  of  the  Austrian 
ultimatum  to  Serbia.  The  23rd  of  July,  1914,  will  ever 
be  a  sinister  date  in  the  world's  history.  It  is  on  that  day 
that  Austria-Hungary,  acting  in  unison  with  Germany, 
attacked  the  independence  and  liberty  of  a  little  nation 
whose  only  fault  was  that  it  was  situated  on  the  road  chosen 
by  Germany  for  the  conquest  of  the  East.  The  pretext  of 
Sarajevo — of  which  we  speak  elsewhere — was  meant  to 
cover  Austro-German  premeditation — premeditation  con- 
demned even  by  some  enlightened  Germans.  To-day,  Serbia 
has  no  longer  any  need  to  defend  herself  against  the 
calumnies  issued  by  the  Vienna  and  Budapest  press.  It 
is  she  who  now  rises  up  as  the  accuser,  it  is  she  who  calls 
upon  the  nations  to  render  justice  and  to  render  it  in  full. 
The  kingdom  of  Serbia  was  the  only  barrier  against  the 
German  thrust  towards  the  East.  The  Serbians  would  not 
own  themselves  beaten  in  an  unequal  struggle,  full  of  fine 
exploits  of  unparalleled  heroism.  They  have  had  to  yield, 
losing  all  save  honour.  It  is  not  only  for  the  defence  of 
their  country,  but  also  for  the  liberty  of  their  race,  that 
they  went  out  to  fight,  these  admirable  Serbian  soldiers. 
At  the  most  critical  moment  of  her  existence,  Serbia  thought 
first  of  all  of  her  unredeemed  Serbian,  Croatian  and  Slovene 
brothers.  In  the  appeal  issued  by  the  Prince  Regent 
Alexander  to  the  Serbian  Army,  on  August  4,  1914,  the 
unequal  struggle  against  powerful  Austria-Hungary  was 
set  up  as  the  symbol  of  the  deliverance  and  the  union  of 
the  whole  Southern  Slav  world. 

"  My  heroes,"  said  the  Prince  Regent  in  his  proclamation, 


28  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

"  the  greatest  sworn  enemy  of  our  State  and  of  our  people 
has  suddenly  and  without  any  motive  made  a  furious 
attack  upon  our  honour  and  our  life.  Austria,  our  insati- 
able neighbour  of  the  north,  has  massed  her  troops  on 
our  frontier  and  has  already  tried  to  cross  our  northern 
frontier  in  order  to  subjugate  our  beautiful  Fatherland. 
It  was  not  sufficient  for  her  to  have  witnessed  for  so  many 
years  our  sufferings  over  the  desperate  lamentations  of 
millions  of  our  brothers  who  have  come  to  us  from  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina,  from  Banat  and  Batchka,  from  Croatia,  from 
Slavonia,  from  Syrmie,  from  the  sea  coast  and  from  our 
rocky  Dalmatia.  Austria  now  demands  of  us  the  supreme 
sacrifice  :  she  desires  the  life,  the  independence  and  the 
honour  of  Serbia  herself. 

"  After  our  brilliant  feats  of  arms  of  1912  and  1913, 
which  have  won  for  us  acquisitions  recognized  by  all  Europe 
at  the  Peace  of  Bucarest,  I  sincerely  desired  that  the  country 
and  my  valiant  warriors  might  rest  from  the  great  efforts 
of  war  and  enjoy  the  fruits  of  their  victory.  That  is  why 
Serbia  was  ready  to  come  to  a  friendly  agreement  with 
Austria-Hungary  in  all  disputed  questions.  Unfortunately, 
we  soon  realized  the  true  aims  of  Austria,  who  refused  to 
treat  with  us,  even  had  we  yielded  to  all  her  unreasonable 
demands.  She  was  determined  to  attack  us,  to  humiliate 
us  and  to  assassinate  us.  Though  still  exhausted  from 
recent  victories,  I  call  upon  you  to  reassemble  under  our 
victorious  banners  and  form  a  solid  rampart  for  the  defence 
of  the  Fatherland.  To  arms,  mes  glorieux faucons  !  Forward 
into  battle  for  the  liberty  and  independence  of  the  Serbian 
nation  and  of  Slavism  !  " 

These  aims  were  confirmed  by  Act  of  Parliament  and 
by  the  Government.  After  the  Austrian  defeat,  in  winter 
1914,  the  Serbian  Government,  on  the  7th  December,  made 
the  following  declaration  before  the  National  Represen- 
tatives : 

"  The  Government,  assured  of  the  confidence  of  the 
Parliament  as  long  as  it  endeavours  to  serve  the  great  cause 
of  the  Serbian  nation  and  the  Serbo-Croatian  and  Slovene 
race,  believes  its  first  duty  is  to  salute  with  the  utmost 
respect     the    sacred     victims     who    have     heroically    and 


SERBIAN  POLITICS  29 

voluntarily  sacrificed  themselves  on  the  altar  of  the 
Fatherland. 

"  The  Government  of  the  kingdom,  sure  of  the  firm 
intention  of  the  entire  Serbian  nation  to  persevere  to  the 
end  in  the  struggle  for  the  defence  of  its  country  and  its 
liberty,  looks  upon  it  as  its  principal  and  unique  duty  in 
these  critical  moments  to  assure  a  favourable  issue  to  this 
war,  which  became,  as  soon  as  ever  it  broke  out,  the  struggle 
for  the  deliverance  and  for  the  unity  of  all  our  undelivered 
Serbian,  Croatian  and  Slovene  brothers. 

V  The  Government  will  endeavour  to  remain  faithful  to 
this  national  decision  and  will  await  the  hour  of  victory  in 
company  with  its  powerful  and  heroic  Allies,  confident  in 
the  future." 

Hoc  signo  vinces.  The  Southern  Slav  flag  borne  by 
the  Serbian  bayonets  has  served,  also,  the  cause  of  demo- 
cratic Europe.  Serbia  is  fighting  for  the  victory  of  Right 
and  Justice,  and  the  victory  of  these  great  principles  over 
German  militarism  and  hegemony  will  give  occasion  to 
Europe  to  acquit  herself  of  her  debt  towards  Serbia  by 
helping  her  to  accomplish  on  the  one  hand  her  Southern 
Slav  mission,  and  on  the  other,  her  task  of  democratic 
guardian  of  the  entrance  to  the  Balkans.  It  is  with  this 
firm  belief  and  animated  by  the  resolute  intention  to  hold 
out  to  the  end,  that  all  Serbians,  without  exception,  are 
entering  upon  the  fifth  year  of  the  war. 

July  20,  1918. 

II 

Princip — Adler. 

It  was  the  28th  June  1914  at  Sarajevo.  A  young  man 
of  eighteen  years,  a  Serbian  of  Bosnia,  an  Austrian  subject 
and  the  son  of  a  people  which  had  had  the  unhappy  fate 
of  exchanging,  after  the  rising  of  1875,  '76  and  'yyy  a  Turkish 
master  for  an  Austrian  master,  fired  a  revolver  at  the  Arch- 
duke Francis  Ferdinand,  when  the  latter  was  driving  in 
state  through  the  streets  of  Sarajevo.  The  28th  of  June 
is  the  day  of  Vidov  Dan,  the  greatest  national  festival, 
the  greatest  symbol  of  Serbian  hopes,  and  one  can  easily 


30  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

conceive  what  effect  was  produced  on  the  minds  of  young 
men  of  the  oppressed  Serbian  nation,  by  the  announcement 
of  the  visit  which  the  Archduke,  ill-inspired,  had  fixed 
expressly  for  that  day,  in  order  to  show  the  solidity  of  the 
Austrian  regime  in  the  Serbian  provinces  of  Bosnia-Herze- 
govinia.  A  crime  committed  under  such  circumstances  is 
nothing  extraordinary.  But  an  attempt  upon  the  life  of 
any  one  is  always  an  odious  action,  and  the  shots  fired  by 
Princip,  a  fanatical  young  patriot,  shocked  the  whole  world. 
But,  instead  of  seeing  in  this  assault  the  rash  action  of 
an  irresponsible  mind,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy, 
ignoring  all  the  rules  of  logic  and  good  sense,  accused  as 
guilty  the  whole  Serbian  nation  and  particularly  Serbia 
as  a  state.  The  Austrian  ultimatum  of  July  23rd  is  based 
upon  the  assertion  that  it  is  the  entire  Serbian  nation  that  is 
the  author  of  the  assault,  and  therefore  the  nation  must 
bear  the  consequences.  Austria  carried  this  theory  into 
practice  by  giving  to  her  army  the  formal  order  not  to  spare 
the  civil  population.  And  the  whole  war  against  Serbia 
was  called  "  Straf expedition,"  the  "expedition  of  punish- 
ment," which,  after  the  defeat  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
army  in  December  1914,  was  ironically  changed  by  the 
Serbians  into  "  bestrafte  Expedition,"  the  "  punished  expe- 
dition !  " 

Yet  Dr.  Frederic  Adler,  the  author  of  the  attempt  on 
the  life  of  the  Minister  Stiirgkh  in  Vienna,  is  an  intellectual 
Austrian,  a  man  over  forty.  A  well-known  politician, 
director  of  a  socialistic  review  Der  Kampf,  of  which  the 
collaborators  are  recruited  from  among  the  best  Austrian 
writers  such,  for  example,  as  Karl  Renner,  he  was  fully 
aware  of  the  consequences  of  his  act.  The  attempt  on  the 
life  of  the  Prime  Minister  Stiirgkh  did  not  take  place  either  in 
a  centre  of  nationalist  agitation,  in  a  town  smarting  from 
the  offence  to  its  most  sacred  sentiments,  but  in  the 
sumptuous  drawing-rooms  of  the  luxurious  hotel  Meissl  and 
Schadn.  After  a  succulent  repast,  Dr.  Adler  approached 
the  table  of  the  Prime  Minister  and,  with  perfect  calmness, 
pressed  against  the  smiling  face  of  his  victim  a  loaded 
Browning.  Shots  rang  forth,  and  as  Mr.  Stiirgkh  sank 
powerless,    Dr.    Adler,    without    even    trying    to     escape, 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  31 

declared  to  the  astounded  witnesses  that  he  would  explain 
the  motives  of  his  action  before  the  judgment  seat. 

The  two  crimes  of  Sarajevo  and  Vienna  owe  their 
cause  to  the  faults  of  a  superannuated  system  on  which 
the  Austro-Hungarian  edifice  is  based.  The  excited  patriot 
Princip  and  the  educated  and  well-balanced  socialist  Adler, 
in  killing  men,  wished  to  kill  the  system.  But  in  Austria 
one  takes  care  not  to  put  them  on  the  same  footing.  Prin- 
cip's  crime  was  made  use  of  by  the  Monarchy,  which  hoped 
to  stifle  the  cries  of  her  oppressed  subject  nations  in  carry- 
ing out  a  victorious  war  against  free,  democratic  and  inde- 
pendent Serbia,  towards  which  were  directed  the  eyes  of 
all  the  Southern  Slavs.  This  plan  has  failed,  and  the 
Monarchy  has  seen  the  question  of  her  own  existence  brought 
up  for  discussion.  As  to  the  crime  of  Dr.  Adler,  Vienna's 
difficulty  in  explaining  it  to  the  world  is  comprehensible. 
The  first  action  taken  was  to  declare  that  its  author  was 
mad,  but  the  impossibility  of  maintaining  such  an  assertion 
in  presence  of  the  categorical  and  perfectly  reasonable 
declarations  of  Dr.  Adler  was  quickly  perceived.  That  is 
why  the  Vienna  press  commentaries  contain  nothing  precise 
or  definite,  while  the  German  papers,  less  scrupulous  in 
hiding  the  weaknesses  of  the  Monarchy,  abound  in  the  most 
interesting  commentaries. 

As  for  ourselves,  we  see  in  this  crime  still  another  proof 
of  the  absolute  necessity  for  a  transformation  of  the  old 
Habsburg  Monarchy  into  a  group  of  national  states — free, 
independent,  and  united  in  resistance  against  any  Ger- 
manic domination.  Princip  and  Adler  were  wrong  to  kill 
men  in  order  to  get  at  the  system.  The  system  is  too 
strong,  as  the  German  papers  say,  to  be  destroyed  by 
revolver  shots.  Its  fate  can  only  be  decided  on  the  battle- 
fields. 

October  29,  1916. 

At  Last  ! 

An  Austrian  Confession  of  Premeditation. 

The  truth  is  unalterable  and  immortal.  This  truth 
was   svstematicallv    dissimulated    by    the    Austro-Germans 


32  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

in  the  course  of  the  present  war,  but  it  is  beginning  to  come 
to  light  even  amongst  the  most  deluded  of  our  adversaries. 
We  are  able  to  record  to-day  a  formal  and  categorical 
confession  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  that  it 
desired  war,  and  since  the  Monarchy  desired  war,  it  is 
perfectly  clear  that  its  master,  the  German  Empire,  also 
desired  it.  We  read  indeed,  in  the  leading  article  of 
the  Neue  Freie  Presse  of  January  5th,  the  confession  that 
the  reply  of  the  Serbian  Government  to  the  Austrian  ulti- 
matum of  July  23,  1914,  satisfied  all  the  demands  of  the 
Monarchy.  This  is  the  first  time  that  Austria  has  con- 
fessed her  premeditation  as  well  as  her  intention  of  pro- 
voking war  and  crushing  Serbia.  This  confession  is  of 
the  greatest  importance,  and  we  quote  the  passage  in 
question :  "  Die  serbische  Regierung  hat  von  der  Note 
in  der  Hauptsache  nur  abgelehnt,  dass  unsere  Polizei- 
beamten  an  der  Verhiitung  von  politischen  Morden  durch 
Ueberwachung  der  Grenze  und  durch  ahnliche  Massregeln 
mitwirken,  wie  Deutschland  und  Frankreich  sie  freiwillig 
fur  die  russischen  Sicherheitsbehorden  zugelassen  haben  "  ; 
in  English  :  "  The  Serbian  Government  has  really,  out  of 
the  terms  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  only  declined  to  agree 
to  the  demand  for  the  co-operation  of  our  police  authorities 
in  guarding  the  frontiers,  and  other  similar  measures — a 
participation  that  Germany  and  France  accepted  willingly 
for  the  Russian  police  authorities." 

At  last,  Vienna  decides  to  confess  her  crime.  Since, 
therefore,  Serbia  accepted  all  the  points  of  the  ultimatum, 
except  that  which  we  have  just  quoted,  why  was  war 
declared  upon  her,  why  has  our  country  been  ravaged  and 
the  whole  world  set  ablaze  ?  Why  ?  Answer,  you  who 
to-day  assert  that  you  did  not  want  war  ! 

January  21,  1917. 


The  Mystery  of  Sarajevo. 

More  False  Documents. 

Certainly  the  Austrians  do  not  wish  to  give  up  their 
customary  habits  and,   in  spite   of  repeated  checks,   they 


SERBIAN  POLITICS  33 

persist  in  returning  to  the  charge  against  Serbia.  The 
crime  of  Sarajevo,  which  was  so  cleverly  exploited  by  the 
Monarchy,  is  still  shrouded  in  mystery,  and  this  encourages 
the  Ballplatz  to  renew,  from  time  to  time,  the  accusations 
against  Serbia  and  Serbian  official  circles,  and  to  denounce 
them  as  the  instigators  of  the  assassination.  The  effect 
produced  by  these  puerile  accusations  is  very  mild,  especially 
after  the  experiences  one  has  had  with  the  "  documents  " 
and  the  "  proofs  ■'  produced  by  the  Austrians  in  the  Fried- 
jung  lawsuit.  It  has  also  happened  that  the  last  communique 
of  the  Viennese  Correspondence  Bureau  regarding  the  pre- 
tended culpability  of  Serbian  official  personages  in  the 
Sarajevo  drama,  which  we  will  deal  with  here,  was  repro- 
duced in  Swiss  newspapers  "as  a  curiosity "  !  But  we 
have  no  intention  of  showing  the  same  indulgence  towards 
the  chanceries  which  concoct  such  documents,  and  we 
therefore  permit  ourselves  to  go  more  closely  into  this 
fresh — is  it  the  last  ? — Austrian  attempt  to  justify  the 
aggression  against  Serbia  and  the  instigation  of  the  European 
war. 

In  this  communique  it  is  related  that  the  debates  in 
the  course  of  the  trial  for  high  treason  of  a  Serbian  of 
Ljesnica,  named  Banjac,  have  proved  that  the  Serbian 
Society,  Narodna  Odbrana,  was  a  Serbian  institution ! 
We  cannot  help  laughing  at  such  an  assertion  !  A  purely 
private  association,  whose  aim  is  intellectual  culture,  and 
which  was  founded  by  a  small  number  of  private  persons, 
is  said,  in  this  Austrian  communique,  to  be  an  official  insti- 
tution, and  it  is  pretended  that  the  debates  of  the  Banjac, 
trial  have  confirmed  its  "  official  character  "  !  But  this  is 
not  all.  In  order  to  give  it  at  least  the  appearance  of  truth, 
the  authors  of  this  communique  remind  one,  in  capital 
letters,  that  the  President  of  the  Odbrana  was  General 
Jancovic,  without  mentioning,  however,  that  General 
Jancovic  is  a  retired  general  and  that  he  exercises  no  official 
functions.  In  order  to  impress  readers,  the  names  of  the 
Serbian  commanders,  Tankosic  and  Pribicevic,  well  known 
for  their  activity  in  Macedonia,  are  also  added.  However, 
since  the  legend  of  the  culpability  of  these  two  Serbian 
officers    has    been    launched    forth    already    several    times, 

4 


34  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

without  taking  root,  a  further  step  is  taken,  and  we  are 
told  that  it  "  has  also  been  proved  that  the  Crown  Prince 
Alexandre  himself  for  a  long  time  took  an  active  part  in 
the  agitation  against  the  Monarchy."  Thus,  it  was  not 
only  Serbian  officers  who  took  part  in  the  assassination  of 
Sarajevo,  but  also  the  Prince  Regent  of  Serbia  himself ! 
Finally,  we  read — risum  teneatis  ! — in  this  communique, 
that  the  Ballplatz  "  possesses  an  original  document  of 
the  Serbian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  addressed  to  the 
Serbian  Minister  of  War,  from  which  it  appears  that  the 
Narodna  Odbrana  was  directed  by  Serbian  committees." 
What !  The  Narodna  Odbrana  directed  by  Serbian  com- 
mittees !  Well  really !  And  we  had  believed  that  the 
Narodna  Odbrana  was  a  society  of  Patagonia  and  that  it 
was  directed  by  Patagonians  !  He  who  has  procured  this 
new  "  document  "  has,  indeed,  discovered  a  great  truth 
and  posterity  will  owe  him  much  for  his  inventive 
genius. 

But  joking  apart,  we  beg  to  say  that  these  new  "  proofs  " 
are  vulgar  forgeries.  We  can  easily  prove  it.  The  com- 
munique* in  question  was  edited  in  two  versions  :  one  for 
Austria  and  Germany,  the  other  for  neutral  countries  and 
the  Allies.  In  the  communique  destined  for  neutral  coun- 
tries and  which  was  reproduced  by  Swiss  papers,  there  are 
missing  two  important  assertions  which  are  to  be  found  in 
the  Austrian  and  German  papers,  and  which,  if  they  were 
not  fictions,  would  strengthen  the  accusations  against 
Serbia.  The  first  concerns  Tchabrinovitch.  We  are  told 
that  the  Crown  Prince  of  Serbia  came  one  day  to  the  Serbian 
state  printing  office,  in  order,  with  the  assistance  of  the 
director  of  the  printing  office,  to  make  the  acquaintance 
of  this  individual  and  to  encourage  him  in  his  anarchist 
designs  !  The  Vienna  Chancery,  knowing  that  Europe  is 
well  informed  about  Tchabrinovitch  and  the  patronage  he 
enjoyed  at  the  hands  of  Austrian  diplomatic  representatives, 
preferred  to  suppress  this  passage  so  as  not  to  expose  itself 
to  an  easy  refutation.  The  other  assertion  is  more  char- 
acteristic. It  is  suggested  that  a  former  Serbian  Minister, 
Dr.  Vojislav  Belimarkovitch,  had  made  compromising  state- 
ments  regarding   the   relations    of   official    Serbian   circles 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  35 

with  the  pretended  dealings  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana.  Now, 
we  affirm  that  there  exists  no  former  Serbian  Minister  of 
the  name  of  Dr.  Vojislav  Belimarkovitch.  There  does  not 
even  exist  to-day  in  Serbia  any  person  of  the  name  of  Dr. 
Vojislav  Belimarkovitch.  It  is  therefore  an  entirely  faked- 
up  story.  The  fact  that  this  passage  was  also  suppressed 
in  the  communique  destined  for  abroad,  while  it  was  pub- 
lished by  the  Austrian  press  (see  the  Neue  Freie  Presse  of 
February  nth),  sufficiently  emphasizes  the  doubtful  character 
of  these  "  documents/' 

Since  the  Vienna  Correspondence  Bureau  is  endeavouring 
to  throw  more  light  on  the  mystery  of  Sarajevo,  we  beg  to 
put  a  few  questions  to  it  in  order  to  facilitate  its  task.  We 
will  speak  neither  of  the  hypotheses  of  Mr.  Steed  nor  of 
the  researches  of  Mr.  Chopin,  nor  yet  of  the  possible  reve- 
lations of  the  head  of  the  Sarajevo  police,  Gerde,  who,  in 
spite  of  the  high  favour  he  enjoyed  in  Budapest  and  Vienna, 
has  just  been  arrested.  We  shall  only  deal  with  the  points 
which  those  who  are  carrying  on  the  calumnious  campaign 
against  Serbia  should  be  able  to  clear  up  without  great 
difficulty.  Here  are  these  questions :  i.  Why  was  the 
Sarajevo  trial  carried  out  with  closed  doors  ?  If  the  crime 
was  instigated  and  perpetrated  by  Serbia,  the  Habsburg 
Monarchy,  which,  at  the  time  of  the  trial,  had  already 
declared  war  on  Serbia,  had  every  interest  in  establishing 
with  all  publicity  the  guilt  and  complicity  of  Serbian  circles. 
2.  Why  were  the  evidence  of  the  witnesses  and  the  declara- 
tions of  the  authors  of  the  assassination  of  Sarajevo  not 
published  ?  The  first  measure  did  not  absolutely  entail 
the  second  and  one  could  doubtless  have  learnt  something 
from  these  documents.  3.  Finally,  the  third  and  principal 
question  concerns  the  extraordinary  attitude  of  the  Sara- 
jevo police  and  of  Austro-Magyar  official  circles  towards 
Tchabrinovitch,  the  young  man  who  threw  bombs  at  the 
Archduke,  in  a  street  where  Francis-Ferdinand  should  not 
have  passed  according  to  the  arrangements  made  before- 
hand. This  Tchabrinovitch  was  a  well-known  anarchist, 
and  the  Sarajevo  police  had  once  expelled  him  as  such  from 
Sarajevo  and  sent  him  to  his  native  town,  Trebinje.  From 
Trebinje,  Tchabrinovitch  went  to  Serbia,  to  Belgrade,  but 


36  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

the  police  of  that  town  would  not  allow  him  to  stay  there 
as  they  suspected  him,  and  it  was  intimated  to  him  that 
he  must  immediately  leave  Belgrade  and  return  to  Austria. 
Tchabrinovitch,  a  notorious  anarchist,  protests  and  invokes 
the  protection  of  the  Austrian  consulate  !  The  Austrian 
Consulate  makes  enquiries  and  stands  guarantee  for  Tcha- 
brinovitch's  good  conduct  to  the  Belgrade  Prefecture. 
Thus,  the  Belgrade  police  was  obliged  to  allow  him  to  stay 
in  Belgrade  !  / 

Here  now  is  the  most  serious  aspect  of  the  affair.  Tcha- 
brinovitch went  to  Sarajevo  by  an  unknown  route.  The 
Austrians  assert  that  it  was  the  Serbian  frontier  authorities 
who  facilitated  his  passage,  but  this  assertion  is  a  farce. 
Indeed,  we  do  not  understand  why  it  should  have  been 
necessary  to  facilitate  the  entry  into  the  Monarchy  for 
an  Austro-Hungarian  subject  who  was  vouched  for  by  the 
most  competent  authority,  the  Austro-Hungarian  con- 
sulate at  Belgrade.  Arrived  at  Sarajevo,  Tchabrinovitch 
walked  about  there  in  perfect  liberty  for  several  days, 
paying  visits,  and  nobody  troubled  him,  not  even  the  Sara- 
jevo police,  who,  as  a  rule,  do  not  show  so  much  indulgence. 
For  instance,  at  the  time  of  the  visit  of  Francis- Joseph, 
some  years  previously,  this  police  had  even  ordered,  as  a 
precautionary  measure,  the  expulsion  of  two  members  of 
the  Bosnian  Parliament,  as  suspected  persons  !  How  can 
one  explain  such  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  police,  the 
head  of  which  was  the  famous  Gerde  who,  now  that  he 
is  in  prison,  could  no  doubt  tell  us  something.  Let  the 
Vienna  Correspondence  Bureau  therefore  pay  a  little  atten- 
tion to  these  very  important  clues  and  give  up  the  pleasure 
of  issuing  "  news  "  and  "  established  facts  "  regarding  the 
culpability  of  Serbian  official  circles  in  a  purely  Austrian 
matter.  This  advice  is  all  the  more  justifiable,  as  neutrals, 
to  whom  these  "  explanations "  are  addressed,  register 
them  simply  "  as  curiosities,"  and  we  think  that  a  press 
bureau,  even  though  it  is  Austrian,  ought  to  serve  for  some- 
thing other  than  the  production  of  "  curiosities  "  in  the 
form  of  forgeries. 

February  18,  1917. 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  37 

The  Crime  of  Sarajevo  and  the  Emperor  William  II. 

Most  allied  papers  have  not  paid  any  attention  to  a 
conversation  of  the  German  writer  Dr.  Hans  Miiller  with 
William  II,  at  the  time  of  the  Emperor's  last  visit  to  Vienna, 
which  was  published  in  the  Neue  Freie  Presse  of  February 
14th.  Like  all  preceding  declarations  of  the  German 
Emperor,  this  conversation  contains  many  interesting  and 
characteristic  things  which  should  not  be  overlooked  by 
any  student  of  German  psychology.  The  historic  mysti- 
cism, with  which  William  II  loves  to  see  himself  surrounded, 
is  revealed  here  in  the  Emperor's  words,  when  he  confessed 
to  his  interlocutor  that  he  has  been  haunted,  ever  since 
his  early  youth,  by  "  some  historic  figures  who  still  expect 
to  receive  their  promotion  through  a  poetical  genius.  .  .  . 
This  is  especially  the  case  with  Charles  V.  .  .  .  Think,  if 
the  Emperor  Charles  were  to  meet  Martin  Luther — cannot 
one  see  in  that  one  of  those  contrasts  which  produce,  on 
the  stage,  eternal  effects  ?  "  And,  after  a  short  silence, 
the  Emperor  slowly  and  gravely  adds  :  "  Who  knows,  if 
these  two  men,  Charles  V  and  Luther,  had  indeed  met  to 
work  together,  who  knows  where  the  German  nation  would 
now  be  !  "  And  so  on.  The  conversation  turned  upon 
present  day  questions,  and  the  Emperor  says,  speaking  of 
his  letter  to  the  Chancellor  of  the  Empire  :  "  Yes,  this 
letter  ought  to  be  written,  this  step  ought  to  be  taken  !  " 

In  the  second  part  of  the  conversation  the  mysticism 
had  given  place  to  more  concrete  statements,  and  it  is  then 
that  the  Emperor  pronounced  words  which  have  astounded 
us  and  to  which  we  must  make  a  summary  reply.  In 
speaking  of  the  general  character  of  the  present  war,  the 
Emperor  cried  :  "  How  short  people's  memories  are  !  Is 
it  already  forgotten  that  the  Entente  is  protecting  the 
assassins  of  the  Archduke  Francis-Ferdinand  ?  "  The 
assassins,  these  are  the  Serbians,  because  it  is  the  Serbian 
nation  that  the  Entente  wished  to  save  from  the  destruction 
to  which  the  Austro-Germans  had  condemned  it  !  Thus, 
from  the  mouth  of  the  German  Emperor  himself  we  hear 
the  accusation  we  have  refuted  already  a  hundred  times, 
but  which  our  adversaries  never  cease  to  renew.     We  are 


38  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

therefore    forced    to    repeat    what    we    have    already    said 
many  times  : 

i.  That  the  Sarajevo  crime  was  committed  by  two 
Austro-Hungarian  subjects,  natives  of  Bosnia  ; 

2.  That  the  Sarajevo  police  showed,  before  and  after 
the  crime,  an  almost  criminal  negligence  ; 

3.  That  one  of  the  authors  of  the  crime,  Tchabrinovitch, 
a  notorious  anarchist  and  the  son  of  a  Sarajevo  police  spy, 
had  enjoyed,  at  Belgrade,  the  special  protection  of  the 
Austrian  Consulate  ; 

4.  That  the  Sarajevo  trial  was  held  behind  closed  doors  ; 

5.  That  the  evidence  was  never  published  ; 

6.  That  the  Serbian  Government  expressed  its  indig- 
nation at  the  crime  and  was  ready  to  assist  the  legal  com- 
mission in  the  search  for  accomplices,  but  that  the  Vienna 
Government  and  the  Sarajevo  authorities  did  not  pay 
attention  to  this  declaration  ; 

7.  That,  even  in  the  event  of  the  crime  having  been 
committed  by  Serbian  subjects,  it  would  be  an  enormity 
to  make  a  whole  nation  responsible  for  a  crime  committed 
by  private  persons.  This  theory,  which  the  Austro-Germans 
have  applied  to  Serbia — starting  with  a  false  accusation — 
and  which  has  resulted  in  the  destruction  of  a  quarter  of 
our  population  (the  Serbian  losses  amount  to  one  million 
souls,  exactly  a  quarter  of  our  population)  would  have 
incalculable  consequences  if  one  applied  it  to  the  Germans 
for  crimes  they  have  committed  in  reality  and  of  which 
the  number  is  enormous. 

As  to  the  Emperor  William,  we  will  say  nothing  about 
him,  out  of  respect  for  the  hospitality  we  enjoy  in  Switzer- 
land, a  country  neutral  by  its  character  and  its  position. 
Impartial  history  will  confirm,  in  so  far  as  it  has  not  already 
done  so,  whether  it  is  to  the  Serbian  nation  that  the  title 
of  assassin  belongs,  with  which  the  Emperor  William  has 
deigned  to  honour  it.  With  the  calmness  and  composure  which 
have  never  deserted  us,  we  shall  go  still  further  and  plead 
certain  extenuating  circumstances  in  favour  of  the  German 
Emperor,  who  has  accorded  none  to  a  martyred  nation. 
Indeed,  the  serious  accusations  which  the  Emperor  has 
raised  against  our  nation  were  pronounced  by  him  on  the 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  39 

13th  February,  two  days  after  the  publication  of  the  last 
communique  of  the  Viennese  Correspondence  Bureau  regard- 
ing the  pretended  complicity  of  Serbian  official  circles  in 
the  Sarajevo  crime.  In  this  communique,  it  was  asserted 
that  a  former  Serbian  Minister,  Dr.  Vojislav  Belimarkovitch, 
had  made  revelations  most  compromising  for  Serbia  with 
regard  to  the  affair.  It  was  therefore  under  the  influence 
of  this  publication,  brought  to  the  Emperor's  knowledge 
by  the  first  chamberlain  of  the  Archduke,  Baron  Rummer- 
skirch,  that  the  Emperor  William  uttered  his  accusations 
against  Serbia  and  the  Serbian  people,  calling  them  assassins. 
We  have  already  asserted,  in  the  last  number  of  La  Serbie, 
that  there  exists  no  former  Serbian  Minister  of  the  name 
of  Dr.  Vojislav  Belimarkovitch  and  that  there  is  no  person 
at  all  of  that  name  in  Serbia.  There  is  therefore  not  the 
slightest  doubt  that  the  communiqu6  was  a  fabrication  from 
beginning  to  end.  Its  first  and  only  victim  was  the  Emperor 
William. 

February  25,  1917. 


The  Guilty  Persons  Unmasked. 

The  Lichnovsky-Miihlon  revelations,  appearing  just  at 
the  moment  of  the  great  German  offensive,  have  served 
to  confirm  the  devout  character  of  the  decisive  struggle 
going  on  on  the  western  front.  The  allied  soldiers  who 
are  sacrificing  their  lives  to  hold  back  the  German  push 
and  save  the  world  from  a  regime  unworthy  of  our  state 
of  civilization,  are  not  fighting  for  a  mere  chimera.  Two 
eminent  Germans,  the  one  an  aristocrat,  the  other  a  business 
man,  affirm,  proofs  in  hand,  that  this  atrocious  war  was 
desired  by  Austro-Germany,  that  she  had  made  prepara- 
tions for  it  and  deliberately  provoked  it.  After  these  un- 
deniable testimonies  it  can  no  longer  be  questioned.  The 
culprits  are  unmasked  for  ever.  And  if  to-day  one  sees 
Germany  proceeding  openly  or  disguisedly  to  annex  vast 
foreign  territories,  it  is  only  the  realization  of  the  plan 
conceived  in  1914  and  put  into  effect  by  the  conflagration 
of  the  whole  world. 

The   Lichnovsky-Miihlon  statements  have  a  particular 


40  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

importance  for  Serbia  and  the  Serbian  people.     The  per- 
fidious  accusations   brought   forward    against   our   country 
by  an  unscrupulous  press  and  a  lawless  propaganda  starting 
from  Vienna,  Budapest  and  Berlin,  are  found  to  be  false 
by  the  categorical  affirmation  of  Prince  Lichnovsky  that 
Austria  was  practising  a  policy  of  strangulation  with  regard 
to  Serbia  and  that  he,  the  ambassador  of  a  great  empire, 
could  not  conceive   for  what   reason  his  country  lent   her 
support  to  such  a  policy.     The  Austrian  ultimatum,  drawn 
up  with  the  mutual  consent  of  the  highest  Berlin  circles, 
had  alarmed  this  honest  German,  and  in  order  to  avoid  the 
world  war,  he  tried  to  obtain  from  Serbia  a  conciliatory 
reply.     Sir  Edward  Grey  and  Mr.  Sazanoff  brought  pressure 
to  bear  upon  Belgrade  and  the  unprecedented  ultimatum 
of  Vienna  received  from  the  Serbian  Government  a  reply 
which  nobody  expected.     All  the  demands  of  the  ultimatum 
were  accepted,  except  the  two  points  upon  which,  according 
to  Count  Lichnovsky,  an  understanding  could  easily  have 
been  accorded.     But  the  Germanic  powers  were  determined 
upon  war  and  did  not  wish  to  discuss  the  matter.     At  one 
moment  it  was  Vienna,  at  another  Berlin  who  showed  her- 
self inflexible,  and  behind  all  this  play-acting  there  appeared 
the  threatening  figure  of  the  Kaiser,  resolved  to  stake  the 
adventure  that  his  eldest  son,  the  Crown  Prince,  has  called 
"  the  greatest  sensation,"  the  sudden  attack. 

We  have  already  shown  several  times  how  the  Sarajevo 
crime,  still  somewhat  a  mystery  in  itself,  served  as  a  pre- 
text for  an  open  declaration  of  war  to  crown  the  policy  of 
chicanery,  pressure,  blackmailing,  and  intimidation  practised 
by  the  Monarchy  in  regard  to  the  Southern  Slav  Piedmont. 
The  Lichnovsky-Miihlon  relevations  teach  us  Serbians 
nothing  new.  Serbia  had  long  since  become  conscious  of 
the  Germanic  danger,  and  when  the  Serbian  Government, 
at  midday,  on  the  25th  July,  1914,  issued  orders  for  mobili- 
zation, before  the  Serbian  reply  which  was  only  sent  at 
six  o'clock  in  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  was  known  at 
Vienna,  it  did  so  with  the  full  consciousness  that  Austria 
and  Germany  desired  war,  and  that  the  Serbian  reply, 
however  docile  it  might  be,  could  alter  nothing.  But  for 
those  who  do  not  look  closely  into  things  and  who  still 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  41 

believe  that  little  Serbia  was  the  cause  of  the  European 
war,  the  Lichnovsky-Muhlon  revelations  will  be  a  useful 
lesson.  Serbia  is  completely  exonerated  from  the  reproach 
made  to  her  sometimes  even  by  her  friends,  unconscious 
victims  of  the  Austro-Magyar-German  propaganda. 

It  is  thus  that  the  Germans  appear  to-day  completely 
unmasked,  their  own  sons  having  brought  upon  them  this 
merited  humiliation.  For  our  ravaged  country,  violated 
and  befouled  by  insidious  calumnies,  it  is  indeed  a  splendid 
satisfaction. 

May  30,  1918. 


Serbia  and  the  Sarajevo  Crime. 
A  Reply  to  German  Professors. 

In  one  of  his  recent  writings  on  the  Sarajevo  crime, 
Professor  Kohler,  of  Berlin  University,  with  the  picturesque 
language  peculiar  to  himself,  has  been  so  kind  as  to  honour 
the  Serbian  people  with  epithets  which  one  usually  finds 
only  in  the  black  and  yellow  press.  He  calls  us  a  nation 
of  "  Nihilists,  anarchists,  terrorists,  and  rebels  against  God 
and  against  all  order  of  state."  I  take  the  liberty  of  reply- 
ing briefly  to  all  these  invectives,  as  well  as  to  the  other 
reflections  of  the  learned  professor  upon  Serbia  and  her 
pretended  guilt. 

I  wish  to  do  so,  first  of  all  because  Mr.  Kohler  speaks 
himself,  in  one  passage  of  his  book,  of  discussions  he  had 
in  1908  with  me  on  the  subject  of  the  annexation  of  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina.  Besides,  the  opinions  of  Kohler  regarding 
the  Sarajevo  crime  differ  so  greatly  from  his  theories  in  the 
happy  pre-war  days  about  crime  and  punishment,  causality 
and  responsibility,  it  is  only  fair  to  grant  to  those  who  were 
inclined  to  agree  with  his  former  theories  the  right  to  make 
at  least  some  remarks  on  the  subject  of  the  prejudiced  ideas 
put  forth  to-day  by  the  learned  Berlin  professor. 

In  reading  Kohler's  book  I  involuntarily  thought  of 
that  international  legal  congress  held  at  Frankfurt-on- 
Main,  in  May  1914,  under  the  presidency  of  Mr.  Kohler. 
When  the  official  work  of  the  congress  was  finished,  an 


42  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

excursion  was  organized  to  visit  the  surroundings  of  Frank- 
furt, particularly  an  old  Roman  castle,  reconstructed  b}' 
German  professors  under  the  supervision  of  the  Kaiser 
himself.  After  the  visit  to  this  castle,  in  other  respects 
devoid  of  interest,  the  congressists  betook  themselves  to 
a  neighbouring  restaurant  where,  during  the  meal,  beauti- 
ful speeches  were  made  by  the  German  professors  on  the 
community  of  nations,  on  the  legal  and  economic  equality 
of  all  nations,  as  well  as  on  the  peaceful  development  of 
civilization.  These  words  produced  a  peculiar  impression 
upon  me  and  I  wondered  whether  it  was  not  doing  harm 
to  the  Germans  to  flourish  the  phantom  of  a  Germanic 
danger.  At  that  same  moment,  my  neighbour  at  table,  a 
very  witty  Frankfurt  lawyer,  a  certain  Doctor  G.,  whis- 
pered in  my  ear  :  "  My  dear  doctor,  why  on  earth  are  you 
looking  so  serious  ?  All  this  is  only  chatter ;  there  is  not 
a  word  of  truth  in  the  whole  story."  Very  surprised,  1 
turned  towards  him  :  "  What  do  you  say  ?  I  do  not  under- 
stand you."  "  But,"  replied  he,  "I  think  .  .  .  the  story 
of  the  Roman  castle,  you  know,  our  Kaiser  loves  that  sort 
of  child's  play  and  our  professors,  in  their  capacity  of  Privy 
Councillors  of  the  Court,  are  eager  to  construct  such 
mirages.  ..." 

To-day  I  ask  myself  if  my  Frankfurt  friend,  who  is  an 
excellent  man,  was  not  alluding  to  other  mirages  !  What 
does  Privy  Councillor  Mr.  Kohler  think  of  that  ?  Was  it 
a  coincidence  or  something  else  ? 


The  Sarajevo  trial  took  place  behind  closed  doors.  It 
is  known  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  led  up 
to  its  famous  ultimatum  and  the  declaration  of  war  on 
Serbia,  as  well  as  "  the  punishment  expedition  "  against 
the  little  country  (expedition  afterwards  turned  by  the 
Serbians  into  a  "punished"  expedition),  by  sensational 
revelations  brought  to  light  by  the  proceedings  against 
the  authors  of  the  crime,  revelations  which,  according  to 
Vienna  and  Budapest,  proved  the  culpability  of  official 
Serbia. 

It  seemed,  however,  very  strange  even  to  the  Austrians 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  43 

themselves  that  the  Sarajevo  trial  proceeded  almost  in 
secret,  behind  closed  doors,  in  a  little  room  of  the  Kom- 
mandantur  of  Sarajevo.  The  Monarchy  had,  however, 
prime  interest  in  seeing  Serbia  unmasked.  Austria-Hungary 
had  proceeded  to  convict  a  whole  nation  on  the  evidence 
of  pretended  damning  proofs  supplied  by  the  preliminary 
examination.  But,  strange  to  say,  the  publication  of  these 
proofs  and  of  these  revelations  took  a  long  time,  and  the 
trial  itself  was  conducted  in  the  greatest  secrecy.  How 
could  this  enigma  be  explained  ?  It  is  only  to-day  that 
the  Austrian  Government,  with  the  help  of  a  professor  of 
Berlin  University,  has  decided  to  publish  a  few  facts  taken 
from  the  records  of  the  proceedings  of  the  trial.  The  book 
The  Trial  of  the  Authors  of  the  Sarajevo  Crime,  should  attain 
this  end,  and  it  has  been  entrusted  to  Privy  Councillor 
Professor  Kohler  to  write  the  preface  to  this  publication.1 
The  author  of  the  book  says  in  his  preface  that  he  has 
given  the  proceedings  of  the  trial  according  to  the  official 
shorthand  reports.  It  must,  however,  be  stated  that  it 
is  not  a  question  in  his  book  of  a  verbatim  report,  but  rather 
of  a  partial  publication  of  the  stenographed  reports.  He 
has  neither  preserved  the  continuity  which  enables  the 
reader  to  get  a  clear  and  faithful  idea  of  the  proceedings, 
nor  has  he  reproduced  the  declarations  of  the  accused  in 
extenso.  Only  the  first  examination  of  the  accused  has 
been  reproduced  almost  in  full.  The  declarations  of  the 
witnesses  are  all  missing,  as  well  as  the  ulterior  and  last 
declarations  of  the  accused.  But,  nevertheless,  what  has 
been  declared  by  the  accused,  according  to  the  reports 
published  in  the  present  book,  is  one  of  the  most  terrible 
accusations  against  the  Habsburg  Monarchy  and  at  the 
same  time  the  best  and  most  visible  proof  of  the  innocence 
of  Serbia.  All  the  accused  persons,  namely  :  Tchabrino- 
vitch,  Princip,  Grabez,  Illitch,  as  well  as  their  young  accom- 
plices, have  declared  that  the  decision  to  kill  the  Archduke 
was  an  act  of  their  own  personal  will  and  that  nobody 

1  Der  Prozess  gegen  die  Attentdter  von  Sarajevo.  Aktenmassig 
dargestellt  von  Professor  Pharos.  Mit  Einleitung  von  Professor 
Dr.  Joseph  Kohler,  Geh.  Justizrat  (Berlin,  191 8,  R.  v.  Deckers 
Verlag) . 


44  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

incited  or  ordered  them  to  make  the  attempt,  least  of  all 
any  authority  of  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia.  The  crime  was, 
according  to  its  conception  and  its  realization,  a  personal 
act  of  Bosnian  patriots  who  believed  that  by  such  an  action 
they  were  serving  their  oppressed  people.  The  official 
Austro-Hungarian  fables  as  to  the  complicity  of  Serbia 
therefore  fall  to  the  ground  and  humanity,  after  this  fresh 
proof  of  the  premeditation  of  the  Central  Powers,  supplied 
by  an  official  publication  of  the  Vienna  Government,  will 
have  to  insist  with  still  greater  energy  on  the  absolute 
security  of  the  future  peace. 

The  only  thing  one  can  lay  to  the  charge,  not  of  Serbia, 
but  of  a  Serbian  subject,  concerns  the  relations  of  a  Serbian 
officer,  Tankossitch,  with  the  authors  of  the  crime.  It  is 
asserted  of  him  that  he  was  aware  of  the  plan  to  make  the 
attempt  on  the  life  of  the  Archduke,  and  that  it  was  he 
who  helped  the  assassins  to  procure  money  and  weapons. 
The  other  person  who  also  knew  of  the  attempt  is  a  sub- 
ordinate official  of  the  Serbian  railway  management,  of 
the  name  of  Ciganovitch,  but  this  last  is  an  Austro- 
Hungarian  subject.  However,  the  principal  accused, 
Tchabrinovitch,  Princip  and  Grabez,  spoke  of  Tankossitch 
as  of  someone  who  knew  of  the  preparation  of  the  crime 
and  who  was  ready  to  assist  the  authors  of  it,  but  they 
all  definitely  add  that  Tankossitch  exercised  no  influence 
on  their  decision  taken  previous  to  their  conversation  with 
the  Serbian  officer,  and  an  act  of  their  own  free  will. 

But  even  supposing  Tankossitch  to  have  really  been 
an  accomplice,  it  is  evident  to  every  one  that  a  Serbian 
officer  is  not  identical  with  the  whole  Serbian  nation 
and  especially  not  with  the  Serbian  Government.  I 
may  also  add  that  Tankossitch  was  a  very  self-assertive 
officer,  who  gave  a  lot  of  trouble  to  the  Ministry  of  War. 
In  spite  of  his  personal  bravery,  he  had,  just  at  that  time, 
to  be  dismissed  from  the  active  service  list.  The  Austrian 
legation  in  Belgrade  had  full  information  about  this  officer, 
and  it  is  impossible  that  it  could  have  identified  a  sub- 
ordinate Serbian  officer,  whose  name  was  associated  with 
scandals,  with  Serbian  official  circles.  When  the  Austrian 
ultimatum   was   transmitted   to  the   Serbian   Government, 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  45 

Tankossitch  was  immediately  arrested  by  order  of  the 
Government,  so  that  his  guilt  and  complicity  might  be 
enquired  into  and  established.  Serbia  could  not  do  more 
than  that.  The  Serbian  Government  was  willing  to  have 
other  possible  accomplices  arrested  had  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment made  such  a  demand  in  the  usual  formal  manner 
and  accompanied  by  the  necessary  proofs.  This  demand 
failed  to  come  and  in  its  place  there  arrived  the  declaration 

of  war. 

*  *  *  * 

It  is  known  to-day  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment was  not  very  anxious  for  the  punishment  of  the 
criminals.  The  first  examinations  had  at  once  proved 
that  the  crime  was  an  act  solely  of  Serbians  of  Bosnia, 
that  it  had  been  conceived  and  carried  out  by  Austro- 
Hungarian  subjects  by  way  of  protest  against  the  oppres- 
sion of  a  whole  nation.  If  it  had  then  come  to  a  public 
trial,  it  would  have  been  a  fresh  scandal  for  the  Monarchy. 
One  sees,  in  fact,  as  the  Pharos-Kohler  book  shows,  that 
the  young  accused  persons  were  not  afraid  to  state,  even 
behind  closed  doors  in  a  room  of  the  barracks,  some  bitter 
truths  concerning  Austria- Hungary.  One  can  get  some 
idea  of  what  they  would  have  said  in  a  public  trial,  from 
the  results  of  the  famous  trials  of  Agram  and  of  Friedjung. 
The  Viennese  Government  wished  to  prevent  that,  and 
that  is  why  the  trial  was  held  in  barracks  and  in  secret  ; 
but  neither  Vienna,  nor  Budapest,  nor  Berlin  wished  to 
lose  the  opportunity  of  declaring  war  on  Serbia  and  ruining 
if  possible  the  Serbian  people.  The  whole  Serbian  people, 
in  Serbia  and  out  of  Serbia,  was  declared  guilty  and 
immediate  steps  were  taken  to  carry  out  the  sentence. 
The  unprecedented  atrocities  committed  by  the  Royal  and 
Imperial  army  in  Serbia  were  to  be  the  expiation  of  an 
imaginary  crime,  and  such  proceedings,  which  recall  the 
times  of  Attila,  Privy  Councillor  Kohler,  one  of  the  greatest 
German  jurists,  has  the  courage  to  shield  with  his  illustrious 
name  ! 

f  H^  *p  ••* 

The  Faculty  of  Law  of  the  Berlin  University  had  three 
eminent    representatives  :     Franz    v.    Liszt,    the    eminent 


46  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

criminal  lawyer  and  specialist  in  international  law  ;  Otto 
Gierke,  the  head  of  the  Germanic  legal  school,  and  Josef 
Kohler,  the  world-renowned  jurist  and  the  most  democratic 
— by  reputation  at  least — of  German  jurists. 

What  has  become,  in  the  course  of  the  war,  of  these 
great  Germans  ?  Franz  v.  Liszt  made  himself  celebrated 
by  an  article  published  in  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung  of 
October  29,  1916.  At  the  very  moment  when  the  Germans 
were  carrying  out  the  deportation  of  numerous  Belgian 
families,  Professor  Liszt  was  writing  that  the  German 
administration  in  Belgium  was  a  model  of  international 
justice.  u  Future  occupations  will  be  carried  out  according 
to  the  German  pattern,  because  Germany,"  cried  Mr.  Liszt, 
"  by  her  methods  in  occupied  Belgium,  has  enriched  inter- 
national law  !  "  Otto  Gierke  went  a  step  further.  During 
forty  years  Gierke  taught  that  Right  is  not  identical  with 
Might,  that  its  root  is  to  be  found  in  the  idea  of  what  is 
just  and  consequently,  that  Right  and  Might  are  in  two 
totally  different  categories.  And  now,  what  does  Professor 
Gierke  think  about  it  ?  In  his  book  Unsere  Friedensziele 
(Berlin  1917),  Gierke  writes  that  Right  is  simply  the  ex- 
pression of  Might.  Might  creates  first  an  indeterminate 
state  of  affairs  and  Right  then  moulds  it  to  form.  Gierke 
labels  his  previous  conceptions  M  doctrinal  theories  and 
phrases  of  no  importance.  It  is  Might  which  finally 
decides  everything "  (page  29).  Let  us  point  out  also 
that  Gierke  considers  it  superfluous  that  the  little  States, 
as  for  example  Serbia,  should  continue  to  exist  after  the 
war. 

Mr.  Kohler  has  not  been  able  to  resist  the  temptation 
of  following  these  fine  examples.  All  his  previous  theories 
on  crime,  causality  and  responsibility,  have  become  void 
and  he  teaches  an  incredible  and  monstrous  theory,  accord- 
ing to  which  every  act  of  private  persons  is  the  responsibility 
of  the  whole  nation  ! 

Really  one  doubts  whether  Berlin  University  will  gain 
in  reputation  from  such  theories. 

July  20,   1917. 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  47 

III 

To  the  Serbian  Army  in  Salonica. 

We  have  seen  from  the  papers  that  the  whole  Serbian 
army  is  now  at  Salonica.  The  long  months  of  reconstitu- 
tion  and  reparation  are  therefore  over  and  the  soldiers  of 
King  Peter  are  starting  again  to  fight,  in  order  to  rescue 
their  country  from  the  vile  hands  of  the  enemies  of  the 
Entente. 

Without  doubt  General  Sarrail  will  have  cordially  wel- 
comed these  admirable  warriors.  May  a  friend,  who  had 
the  honour  of  accompanying  the  Serbian  Army  almost  since 
the  beginning  of  this  terrible  war  until  the  autumn  of  1915, 
also  be  allowed  to  send  his  best  wishes  to  these  valiant 
soldiers. 

Soldiers  of  heroic  Serbia,  we  ask  from  you  a  new  and 
great  sacrifice.  We  ask  you,  you  who  represent  the 
remaining  youth  of  your  country,  to  enter  the  struggle 
again,  and,  if  necessary,  to  die  for  the  common  victory. 
I  know  you  will  accomplish  this  sacrifice  joyfully  and 
proudly.  Have  you  not  already  solicited  the  honour  of 
being  the  first  to  attack  your  enemies,  particularly  the 
Bulgarians,  who  have  betrayed  the  Slav  race  ? 

There  is  no  need  to  wish  you  good  courage.  I  have 
seen  you  in  battle  :  at  Goutchevo,  in  the  trenches  of  Match- 
kov  Kamen,  at  Chabatz  under  the  bombardment,  and  on 
many  other  occasions.  Your  nation  does  not  know  fear. 
I  have  also  seen  you  taking  prisoners.  Before  a  disarmed 
enemy  your  anger  cooled,  and  you  only  saw  in  the  man 
trembling  before  you,  a  poor  defenceless  being.  Your  first 
question  was  :  "  Are  you  hungry  ?  "  and,  on  the  affirmative 
reply  of  your  adversary,  always  starving,  you  drew  from 
your  pocket  your  last  morsel  of  bread  to  give  it  to  him. 
I  am  sure  that  you  will  continue  to  maintain  this  admirable 
behaviour  and  that,  in  presence  of  your  enemies,  you  will 
remember  that  the  laws  of  humanity  always  count,  and 
that  he  who  does  not  observe  them  puts  himself  under 
the  ban  of  society. 

History  must  not  only  be  able  to  proclaim  your  material 


48  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

victory,  but  also  your  spiritual  victory  !  Advance,  then, 
heroes  of  Choumadia,  of  Timok,  of  the  Danube  and  of  the 
Morava,  to  fight  with  your  generous  brothers-in-arms  of 
France  and  England.  The  best  wishes  of  your  friends 
go  with  you.  Victory  is  yours,  for  you  are  righting  for 
sacred  rights  and  for  liberty  ! 

June  4,  1916. 

Serbia  on  the  Eve  of  Battle. 

Speeches  and  discussions  have  just  been  brought  to  an 
end  and  bleeding  humanity  nerves  itself  for  a  fresh  shock 
of  material  forces,  the  last,  it  is  said,  and  the  most  for- 
midable of  all.  If  present  signs  are  not  misleading,  it 
is  Germany  who  has  decided  to  take  the  offensive,  and  to 
try  again  to  finish  with  fire  and  sword  the  work  begun  in 
1914,  and  originally  conceived  as  a  purely  military  enter- 
prise. After  the  check  to  the  original  plan  and  with  the 
gradual  wearing  out  of  her  strength,  Germany  has  had  to 
alter  her  strategy.  In  fact,  during  the  whole  of  1917  she 
showed  herself  in  the  light  of  a  "  pacifist,' '  and  her  leaders 
aspired  rather  to  a  diplomatic  victory,  in  accordance  with 
the  first  results  of  the  war.  This  diplomatic  strategy  has 
failed,  like  others,  and  Germany  therefore  sees  herself 
obliged  to  have  recourse  to  arms,  these  natural  resources 
of  her  policy  of  aggression.  She  does  so  reluctantly,  for  in 
spite  of  the  elimination  of  Russia,  the  chances  of  a  decisive 
German  victory  on  the  western  front  are  no  longer  so  great 
as  they  were  in  the  preceding  years,  and  this  shows  pretty 
clearly  what  will  be  the  issue  of  coming  battles.  But  this 
confidence,  which  the  Serbians  share  equally  with  their 
Allies,  could  not  and  must  not  prevent  us  from  conscien- 
tiously considering  whether  fresh  sacrifices  are  really  neces- 
sary, and  whether  there  are  not  some  means  of  sparing 
the  world  new  sufferings,  perhaps  more  terrible  and  more 
deadly.     The  following  is  the  Serbian  point  of  view  : 

Serbia  finds  herself,  in  the  midst  of  all  the  belligerents, 
in  an  exceptionally  grave  situation.  The  Serbian  army  at 
Salonica,  after  proof  of  its  accustomed  heroism,  sees  itself 
forced,  by  an  unjust  fate,  to  shed  its  last  drop  of  bloo 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  49 

on  the  altar  of  the  Fatherland.  The  country  is  entirely 
occupied  by  the  enemy,  violated,  ravaged  and  exposed  to 
systematic  spoliation,  to  ill-treatment  of  all  kinds,  from 
the  coarsest  to  the  most  refined.  The  acts  committed,  for 
example,  by  the  Bulgarians  in  occupied  Serbia  surpass  all 
imagination.  After  having  recruited  the  few  Serbians 
remaining  in  the  country  who  were  fit  for  service,  under 
the  pretext  that  they  are  Bulgarians  and  not  Serbians, 
to-day,  after  two  years  of  occupation,  they  fall  upon  the 
women  and  old  men,  that  is'  those  who  had  not  yet  been 
deported,  and  wish  to  force  them  to  declare  themselves 
Bulgarians  ! 

In  answer  to  all  the  cries  of  despair,  no  encouragement, 
no  help  is  given,  no  effort  made  to  put  an  end  to  these 
infamous  proceedings,  which  are  a  disgrace  to  the  whole 
world  which  calls  itself  civilized  and  remains  unmoved 
before  such  cruelties.  Besides  this,  famine  is  raging  merci- 
lessly among  the  exhausted  and  exasperated  population. 
For  a  whole  year  a  discussion  continues  as  to  whether  it 
is  necessary  to  send  food  to  Serbia  or  not,  and  the  generous 
initiative  of  the  Swiss  encounters  the  resistance  of  the 
bureaucrats  of  London  and  Paris.  What  can  one  say  to 
our  Serbian,  Croatian  and  Slovene  brothers  in  Austria- 
Hungary,  who  are  only  longing  to  be  united  to  Serbia,  and 
for  whom  Serbia,  confident  in  the  political  programme  of 
the  Allies,  has  sacrificed  more  than  a  quarter  of  her  popu- 
lation ?  The  Southern  Slav  question  is  not  yet,  however, 
understood  by  our  Allies,  and  we  run  the  risk  of  being 
delivered  up  to  the  Germans  and  Magyars  in  pursuance  of 
an  entirely  false  conception  of  Austria-Hungary. 

Under  such  circumstances  any  other  nation  would  give 
in,  but  the  Serbians  do  not  dream  of  doing  so.  They  are 
fighting  for  liberty  and  independence  and  they  will  never 
consent  to  German  bondage.  The  faults  and  errors  of  the 
Allies,  however  great  they  may  be,  do  not  affect  the  stead- 
fast and  unchangeable  decision  of  the  Serbians  to  hold  out 
to  the  end,  and  this  we  proclaim  at  this  very  moment  when 
at  Corfu  the  constitution  of  the  new  Serbian  cabinet  is 
under  discussion.  The  Serbian  policy  remains  the  same 
because   the  Germano-Magyar- Bulgarian  danger  is  still  the 

5 


50  SERBIA  AND  EUROPE 

same,  even  greater  to-day  than  "yesterday,  especially  after 
the  peace  imposed  upon  Roumania.  Serbian  soldiers  and 
civilians  are  animated  by  a  robust  confidence  in  the  justice 
of  their  cause.  They  are  living  in  the  hope  that  justice 
will  be  done  to  all,  and  that  the  war  cannot  end  without 
the  violated  rights  of  all  the  martyred  peoples  being  restored 
and  sanctified.  To  those  who  speak  to  us  of  Macedonia  and 
of  the  eventual  assignment  of  Serbian  territories  to  Bul- 
garia, we  reply  that  Serbia  is  not  fighting  for  territory,  but 
for  a  much  higher  ideal.  Before  thinking  of  bestowing  a 
part  of  Serbian  territory  upon  Bulgaria — what  a  monstrous 
idea  ! — we  demand  that  the  crime  committed  by  the  Bul- 
garians should  be  punished.  It  is,  therefore,  justice  that 
we  are  claiming  from  our  Allies.  The  first  duty  of  that 
High  Court  of  Nations,  of  which  Mr.  Wilson  spoke  recently, 
will  be  to  perform  this  justice. 

Belgium  is  awaiting  it,  Serbia  also  is  awaiting  it,  and 
it  is  this  faith  which  holds  together  the  remnant  of  the 
Serbian  nation.  Justice  for  the  Austro-Magyar  aggression, 
justice  for  the  Bulgarian  crime — this  last  above  all.  Instead 
of  distributing  lands  and  marking  off  frontiers,  the  Allies 
must  think  of  the  redress  of  wrongs  and  the  execution  of 
justice.  That  is  the  great  aim  worthy  of  fresh  sacrifices, 
and  it  is  for  this  aim  that  the  Serbians  are  ready  to  submit 
to  everything. 

March  9,  1918. 

Towards  Victory  ! 

The  victorious  advance  of  the  Allied  armies  in  France 
promises  the  happiest  results.  The  march  of  the  Germans 
"  nach  Paris  "  has  been  transformed,  all  at  once,  into  a 
forced  retreat,  a  sure  sign  that  the  combative  strength  of 
the  enemy  is  giving  way.  The  German  offensive,  started 
on  the  21st  March,  is  thus  ending  in  a  collapse,  the  political 
importance  of  which  far  surpasses  the  immediate  strategic 
consequences.  At  the  time  of  the  allied  offensives  in  1916 
and  1917,  the  Germans  were  rather  contemptuous  of  the 
result  obtained  ;  in  1918  it  is  with  very  different  sentiments 
that  the  press  and  public  opinion  across  the  Rhine  are 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  51 

receiving  the  news  of  Foch's  victories.  The  Allies,  how- 
ever, without  indulging  in  excessive  optimism,  are 
reckoning  with  new  combats,  still  harder,  still  bloodier, 
but  they  have  the  steadfast  conviction  that  all  combats 
will  henceforth  take  place  with  the  omen  of  victory.  This 
victory  of  Right  over  injustice,  of  Truth  over  falsehood, 
of  Mind  over  matter  and  brute  force,  will  bring  peace  and 
security  to  the  suffering  world.  It  will  inaugurate  a  new 
era  in  the  life  of  all  nations.  It  will,  above  all,  put  an  end 
to  the  Serbian  martyrdom. 

The   Serbians   have   never   doubted   this   final   victory. 
For  whole  centuries  the  Serbian  people  have  been  subject 
to  the  Ottoman  yoke,  but  their  faith  in  the  future  and  the 
resurrection   has   never   been    extinguished.     The    national 
sentiment,   already   very   strong  in   the   Middle   Ages   and 
developed  from  contact  with  the  two  neighbouring  civiliza- 
tions, eastern  and  western,  has  been  able  to  resist  all  the 
attacks  of  Turkish  barbarism.      The  rising  of  Karageorge 
in  1804  found  the  Serbian  nation,  in  spite  of  four  centuries 
of  bondage,  ready  to  resume  the  struggle  for  the  supreme 
blessing,  national  liberty.     During  the  whole  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  Serbians,  alone  or  with  the  support  of  Russia, 
have  been  putting  forth  every  effort  to  break  loose  from 
Turkish    clutches    and   not    to   fall   into    Germano-Magyar 
slavery.     Squeezed  in  between  Turkey  and  Austria,  Serbians 
could   scarcely   breathe   freely.     An   almost    uninterrupted 
struggle  against  two  great  dangers,  a  perilous  oscillation 
between  the  Turkish  Scylla  and  the  Austrian  Charybdis, 
such  is  the  character  of  the  whole  of  modern  Serbian  history. 
When,  in  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the 
gradual    decline    of    Ottoman    power    began    to    awaken 
the  greatest  hopes  in  the  soul  of  the  Serbian  nation,  the 
Germano-Magyars  succeeded  in  replacing  the  Turks  with 
the  Bulgarians  and  setting  the  latter  to  He  in  wait  for  Serbia. 
The  Bulgarian  nation,  of  Touranian  origin  but  by  all  out- 
ward signs  Slav,  especially  in  their  language,  proved  a  most 
docile  tool  in  Austro-Magyar  hands.     Psychologists,   after 
the  war,  will  have  to  enquire  into  the  means  by  which  it 
proved  possible  to  persuade  the  Bulgarian  nation  to  turn 
aside  from  the  only  path  it  ought  to  have  followed,  that 


52  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

of  Balkan  solidarity.  The  Bulgarians,  yoked  to  the  Ger- 
man chariot,  rushed  upon  Serbia  in  1913  and  1915,  in  order 
to  clear  the  road  for  the  German  conqueror.  The  Serbian 
nation  was  obliged  for  the  moment  to  bend  beneath  the 
weight  of  the  triple  attack,  but  its  desire  to  live  and  to 
resist  all  bondage  has  only  been  thus  increased.  The  Allies' 
victories  in  France  are  for  Serbia  the  first  sign  of  dawn. 

But,  as  we  have  often  stated,  there  will  be  no  security 
either  for  the  Serbian  nation  or  for  the  whole  of  Europe, 
without  complete  victory.  The  supreme  aim  of  the  Allies 
is  to  abolish  for  ever  the  German  peril,  and  this  peril  will 
only  be  done  away  with  when  its  living  source,  Prussian 
militarism,  has  been  broken  and  exterminated.  In  the 
domain  of  politics,  the  suppression  of  German  militarism 
signifies  the  deliverance  of  the  Slav  and  Latin  nations  from 
an  encroaching  State,  founded  on  militarism  and  dynasty. 
The  victory  of  allied  arms  must  be  the  victory  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  nationality,  the  consecration  of  the  right  of  each 
nation  to  self  disposal.  Serbia  does  not  insist  merely  on 
her  restoration  and  her  independence.  She  is  fighting  for 
the  deliverance  of  the  whole  Southern  Slav  nation.  The 
sacrifices  made  by  the  Serbian  people  for  the  victory  of 
right  over  might  are  not  to  be  rewarded,  but  crowned 
by  the  realization  of  the  high  ideal  aspired  to  by  all  Serbians, 
Croatians  and  Slovenes.  All  the  Southern  Slavs  look  for- 
ward to  victory  bringing  about  the  resurrection  of  Serbia 
and  the  realization  of  the  Southern  Slav  political  union 
with  Serbia  and  around  Serbia.  It  is  for  this  ideal  that 
they  are  ready  to  sacrifice  all  the  strength  that  remains  to 
them.  It  is  with  such  sentiments  that  we  follow  the  heroic 
march  of  the  allied  armies  towards  victory. 

August  17,  1918. 

The  Victory  of  the  Vardar. 

The  victorious  advance  of  the  Allied  troops  on  the  Serbian 
front  is  a  fresh  blow  to  German  power,  not  less  vigorous 
than  that  dealt  in  Picardy  by  the  armies  of  Foch.  The 
Serbian  divisions,  overcoming  formidable  difficulties  due  to 
the  nature  of  the  ground  and  breaking,  in  an  impetuous 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  53 

rush,  the  Germano-Bulgarian  resistance,  are  engaged  in 
retrieving,  day  and  night,  with  the  fraternal  support  of 
the  French,  English,  Italians  and  Greeks,  the  sacred  soil 
of  their  Fatherland.  What  renders  the  Serbian  victory 
still  more  important  is  the  efficacious  co-operation  of  the 
thousands  of  Serbian,  Croatian  and  Slovene  volunteers  of 
Austria-Hungary,  formed  into  a  special  Southern  Slav 
division,  which  has  proved  its  worth  at  Dobroudja.  By 
its  present  exploits  it  has  added  fresh  laurels  to  its  reputa- 
tion for  valiance  and  heroism.  Southern  Slav  solidarity 
has  thus  manifested  itself  once  more  in  the  most  indisputable 
fashion.  A  nation  which  sheds  blood  for  the  sake  of  the 
Fatherland,  has  by  this  very  fact  acquired  the  best  right 
to  liberty  and  independence.  At  the  moment  when  the 
Serbian  Prime  Minister  was  discoursing  at  Paris  upon  the 
subject  of  the  concrete  solution  of  the  national  union  of 
the  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes,  the  victories  in  the 
south  of  Serbia  were  most  opportune,  as  indicating  the  only 
possible  road  to  true  Southern  Slav  independence.  This 
independence  is  about  to  be  realized  with  Serbia  and  around 
Serbia,  on  the  basis  of  the  Declaration  of  Corfu. 

Just  recently  we  have  heard  the  categorical  declarations 
of  Senator  Lodge  and  of  the  former  President  Roosevelt, 
as  to  the  absolute  necessity  of  freeing  the  nations  of 
Austria-Hungary  and  constituting  national  Czech,  Polish 
and  Southern  Slav  States.  By  a  regrettable  coincidence 
the  question  of  Serbia  is  treated  separately  in  this  con- 
nection, a  fact  which  can  give  rise  to  misunderstandings 
and  uncertainty.  It  may,  however,  be  pointed  out  that 
the  Southern  Slav  problem  is  essentially  a  Serbian  problem, 
and  that  no  reasonable  man  could  for  a  single  instant  think 
of  separating  Serbia  from  the  millions  of  Serbians,  Croatians 
and  Slovenes  of  Austria-Hungary.  It  is  the  Habsburg 
Monarchy  that  is  seeking,  by  the  camouflage  of  the  Southern 
Slav  question,  to  solve,  no  matter  how  unsatisfactorily,  this 
vital  problem  of  the  Balkans  and  Central  Europe,  but  the 
Allies  will  not  make  the  deplorable  error  of  considering  our 
national  question  from  a  point  of  view  other  than  anti- 
Austrian,  that  is,  from  the  Serbian  point  of  view.  To 
put  an  end  to  all  equivocation,  it  is  certainly  time  that 


54  SERBIA  AND  EUROPE 

the  Allies  expressed  their  opinion  on  the  Declaration  of 
Corfu  and  that  they  should  state  in  terms  as  clear  as 
possible,  that  the  independence  of  the  Serbo-Croates  and 
Slovenes  will  be  realized  in  a  Serbo-Croat-Slovene  State, 
instituted  on  the  basis  of  the  principles  established  by  the 
Declaration  of  Corfu  and  placed  outside  any  combination, 
however  federalist  it  may  be,  of  Austria-Hungary. 

And  this  is  not  all.  The  Allies  must  not  hesitate  over 
the  question  of  sending  Southern  Slav  troops  into  Serbia. 
America  and  Italy  should  profit  from  recent  experiences 
in  Southern  Serbia  and  as  soon  as  possible  should  dispose 
all  the  available  Serbo-Croats  and  Slovenes  on  the  Serbian 
front,  because  that  is  the  surest  and  most  efficacious  way 
to  strike  a  blow  at  our  most  powerful  and  most  dangerous 
enemies,  the  Austro-Magyars.  It  is  through  Serbia  that 
the  road  passes  to  Jugoslavia. 

The  victory  of  the  Vardar  is  the  symbol  of  the  Southern 
Slav  union.  The  punishment  of  the  Bulgarians  is  well  on 
the  way,  and  the  Serbian  heroes,  so  eager  to  deliver  their 
country,  are  greeted  all  over  the  world  with  unutterable 
admiration  and  respect.  But,  while  dealing  the  accomplice 
the  blow  he  has  merited,  one  must  not  forget  the  principal 
enemy,  he  who  is  treading  under  foot  the  bulk  of  our  nation. 
The  Bulgarian  collapse  is  only  the  prelude  to  the  favourable 
solution  of  our  national  question. 

October  i,  1918. 

The  Return  of  the  Serbians. 

This  is  more  the  moment  for  silence  than  for  speech. 

It  was  necessary  to  speak  when  we  were  insulted  by 
the  odious  Austro-German  ultimatum,  which  some  of  us 
would  like  us  forget  for  love  of  Charles  IV. 

It  was  necessary  to  speak  when  the  cannons  of  Francis- 
Joseph — old  evil-doer — or  of  Conrad — over-ambitious  field- 
marshal — were  firing  their  first  shots  against  the  citadel 
of  Belgrade,  ringing  the  knell  of  Europe,  striking  to  the 
heart  the  liberty  of  small  nations. 

It  was  necessary  to  speak  when  the  armies  of  the  valiant 
General  Potiorek  penetrated  into  Serbia  on  several  sides 


SERBIAN  POLITICS  55 

at  once,  but  only  to  be  beaten  hollow  by  the  "  swine- 
breeders  "  of  the  old  voivode  Putnik. 

It  was  necessary  to  speak  when  the  Serbian  regiments, 
attacked  from  behind,  as  usual,  by  their  former  Bulgarian 
allies,  fell  back  step  by  step  before  the  guns,  rather  than 
before  the  soldiers,  of  Mackensen. 

It  was  necessary  to  speak  during  that  epic  retreat, 
across  the  mountains  of  Albania,  of  a  whole  nation  in  arms, 
preferring  exile  to  bondage,  annihilation  to  a  shameful 
peace  offered  with  the  left  hand. 

It  was  necessary  to  speak  when  the  august  descendant 
of  the  mountaineer  chiefs,  liberators  of  Serbia — and  not  a 
mere  sovereign  borrowed  from  some  poor  Germanic  branch 
— King  Peter  Karageorgevitch,  horribly  jolted  on  his  rough 
litter,  set  forth  at  the  slow  pace  of  his  bearers,  shedding 
as  he  went  tears  as  of  Priam  and  of  David. 

It  was  necessary  to  speak  when  those  miserable  remnants 
of  one  of  the  finest  races  in  Europe  arrived,  worn  and 
emaciated,  on  the  inhospitable  shores  of  the  Adriatic, 
living  skeletons  rather  than  men,  and  of  whom  a  great 
number  gave  way  utterly  at  the  sight  of  the  ships  which 
were  to  receive  them  and  bear  them  away  to  a  more  merciful 
land. 

It  was  necessary  to  speak  when  those  barques  filled 
with  Serbian  corpses  put  out  to  sea,  one  by  one,  to  empty 
their  sinister  load  into  the  wide  stretch  of  smiling  blue  water. 

It  was  necessary  to  speak  when  the  few  surviving 
Serbians  in  Serbia  did  not  cease  to  be  taxed,  ill-treated, 
martyred,  massacred — men,  women  and  children — by  Mag- 
yar or  Bulgarian — in  danger  of  disappearing  also — if  the 
Serbian  people,  that  hardiest  of  races,  could  ever  disappear 
from  the  earth  !  But  I  am  thinking  of  how  still  at  this 
hour  these  sufferings,  this  persecution,  this  famine  is  con- 
tinuing, and  how  at  Belgrade  alone,  under  Austrian  adminis- 
tration, there  are  8,500  tuberculous  Serbian  children. 

It  was  necessary  to  speak  when  the  voracious  and 
plundering  Bulgarian,  encouraged  by  the  Prussian,  his 
emulator,  stole  from  the  Serbians,  in  order  to  destroy  or 
to  sell  them,  their  objets  d'art,  their  books,  their  flocks, 
their  wool,  their  corn,  and  all  they  could  find  in  the  bottom 


56  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

of  abandoned  cupboards,  pots  of  pomade  or  bottles  of 
Eau  de  Cologne — and  even,  oh  !  unsurpassed  profanation, 
the  monuments  from  the  cemeteries,  in  order  to  use  them 
for  their  own  dead. 

It  was  necessary  to  speak  when  the  government  of  the 
felon  Czar  ordered  the  recruitment  of  the  Serbians  of  Mace- 
donia and  of  Serbia,  in  order  to  force  them  to  fight  against 
the  liberators  of  their  brothers. 

It  was  necessary  to  speak  when  Bulgarian  divisions 
suppressed  with  the  sword  the  least  effort  at  revolt  and 
avenged  themselves  upon  the  inoffensive  population,  by 
massacre  or  wholesale  deportation,  for  the  alarm  caused 
them  by  the  indomitable  Kosta  Voinovitch. 

It  was  necessary  to  speak  when,  amid  the  clamour  of 
miserable  diplomatic  disputes,  Serbia,  slowly  and  unflinch- 
ingly, sank  into  the  abyss,  without  the  slightest  glimmer 
of  light  on  the  horizon  to  sustain  her  faith  and  her  courage 
— yet  still  she  remained  faithful  and  did  not  despair. 

It  was  necessary  to  speak  even  when,  in  the  eyes  of 
men,  there  was  no  longer  any  Serbia. 

It  was  necessary  to  speak  in  order  to  protest  in  the 
face  of  the  world  against  such  an  iniquity,  to  speak  again 
in  order  to  re-animate,  if  possible,  with  a  word  of  sympathy, 
those  who  were  defending  against  the  vultures  this  great 
remnants  of  a  people,  whether  in  Serbia  or  abroad. 

But  to-day  we  are  constrained  to  keep  silent,  while 
the  work  of  resurrection  begins,  while  this  handful  of  valiant 
men  which  at  this  hour  represents  the  whole  of  the  Serbian 
army,  goes  back  again  towards  the  north,  while  on  all  sides 
the  dead  heroes  rise  up  from  their  graves  to  show  to  the 
survivors  the  road  to  the  lost  Fatherland,  the  road  to 
victory. 

What  words  would  be  fitting  to  describe  such  a  return, 
such  a  prompt  revenge  ?  Where  can  one  find  words  to 
express  not  only  the  thundering  march  of  the  Serbian 
warriors,  but  that  voice  which  echoes  in  their  hearts  as 
they  approach  their  devastated  homesteads,  that  murmur 
which  ripples  on  the  surface  of  the  mutilated  earth  and 
advances  to  meet  them,  half  wail  and  half  song  of  joy  ? 
All  that  is  too  great,  too  profound,  too  solemn  to  bear  the 


SERBIAN  POLITICS  57 

least  comment  from  a  stranger,  the  least  sound  coming 
from  a  country  that  has  not  suffered,  where  they  have  not 
fought,  and  where  they  have  perhaps  doubted. 

Silence,  sceptical  and  cowardly  lips  !  on  the  road  from 
Salonica  to  Monastir,  from  Monastir  to  Prilep,  from  Prilep 
to  Veles,  from  Veles  to  Uskub  and  to  Nisch — passing  by 
Kumahovo  are  advancing,  draped  in  the  tri-colour  banner, 
those  two  immortal  sisters  :  Justice  and  Liberty  ! 

Silence  .  .  .  Silence.  .  .  . 

October  J,  1918. 

Victory  ! 

Immense  joy  is  being  spread  over  the  world  at  the  news 
of  the  capitulation  of  Germany.  The  accomplices  having 
laid  down  their  arms  one  after  the  other,  first  the  Bulgarian, 
ever  a  gambler,  then  the  Turk,  brigand  and  fatalist,  after 
them  the  Austro-Magyar  already  on  the  point  of  death, 
it  is  now  the  turn  of  the  principal  actor,  the  head  of  the 
whole  enterprise.  The  Germanic  nightmare  of  which  the 
black  spectre  was  haunting  the  world  in  the  sinister  form 
of  an  "  armed  peace,"  is  definitely  dispelled.  All  nations 
will  be  able,  for  the  first  time  in  history,  to  breathe  freely 
the  fresh  air  of  a  veritable  League  of  Nations.  Their  future 
will  no  longer  depend  upon  any  but  themselves,  their  fate 
being  placed  in  their  own  hands.  We  are  not  to-day  in 
a  position  to  calculate  the  full  extent  of  the  victory  and 
realize  all  its  significance.  One  thing  is  certain,  and  that 
is  that  it  brings  to  Serbia  and  to  the  whole  Serbo-Croat- 
Slovene  nation,  union  and  liberty.  The  martyrdom  of  the 
Serbian  people  will  not  have  been  in  vain.  The  high  ideal 
of  national  union  which  has  been  their  guide  throughout, 
has  culminated  in  a  complete  triumph.  What  a  fine 
recompense  for  the  Serbian  people,  what  a  revenge  for 
the  brutal  force  and  criminal  premeditation  of  Berlin, 
Vienna,  Budapest,  Sofia  and  Constantinople. 

The  work  accomplished  by  Serbia  in  this  struggle  against 
oppression  belongs  to  history.  It  is  for  history  to  render 
homage  to  the  Serbian  statesmen,  who  were  able  to  lead 
the  country  in  its  historic  mission,  to  glorify  the  Serbian 


58  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

army  whose  bravery  and  endurance  astonished  alike  friend 
and  foe,  and  finally  to  judge  the  faults  and  errors  com- 
mitted. That  must  not,  however,  prevent  us  from  stating 
that  the  Serbian  conception  of  the  Southern  Slav  union 
triumphs  over  the  false  conception  of  an  eventual  Jugo- 
slavia within  the  Habsburg  Monarchy.  As  specified  by 
the  German  deputy  Wendel  two  months  ago,  in  the  Neue 
Rundschau,  the  Serbo-Croat-Slovene  union  had  to  be 
formed  with  the  Habsburg  Monarchy  or  with  the  Kara- 
georgevitch.  In  order  to  destroy  at  the  outset  all  chances 
of  the  Serbian  solution,  Austria  decided  in  1914  upon  a 
preventive  war  against  Serbia.  The  blow  has  not  struck 
home  and  r<  little  Piedmont,"  in  spite  of  the  unutterable 
sufferings  endured,  has  gained  the  upper  hand.  It  is  this 
unequal  struggle  of  the  Serbian  David  against  the  Austro- 
Germano-Bulgaro-Magyar  Goliath,  that  has  conferred  upon 
Serbia  the  title  of  "  Piedmont,"  a  glorious  title,  but  one 
which  must  not  cast  a  shadow  in  any  way  on  the  other  parts 
of  the  nation.  Serbia  has  done  her  duty,  simply,  nobly. 
In  the  great  re-united  family  she  aspires  to  no  special 
position.  It  is  absolute  equality,  political,  economic  and 
social,  which  is  inscribed  on  her  programme  for  the  internal 
organization  of  the  united  nation. 

In  the  Constituent  Assembly  heroic  Serbia  will  not  have 
to  blush  for  democratic  Serbia.  The  Serbo-Croat-Slovene 
State  will  range  itself  worthily  alongside  the  democracies 
of  the  entire  world. 

November  18,  1918. 

Serbia  at  the  Peace  Conference. 

The  inter-allied  conference  will  meet  next  week  to 
prepare  the  preliminaries  of  peace.  Each  allied  power 
will  on  this  occasion  set  forth  its  own  particular  claims, 
the  legitimacy  of  which  will  be  examined  by  the  conference. 

Serbia  will  present  herself  to  the  conference  in  her  new 
capacity  of  Kingdom  of  the  Serbians,  Croatians  and 
Slovenes,  but  this  national  union  will  in  no  way  diminish 
the  actual  rights  which  the  Serbian  nation  intends 
to  maintain  in  support  of  its  national  aspirations.      The 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  59 

Wilson  principles,  to  which  our  enemies  also  make  appeal 
to-day,  only  signify  for  Serbia  the  consecration  of  the  sacred 
rights  she  has  acquired,  long  before  the  messages  of  Mr. 
Wilson,  by  her  heroic  struggle  and  by  her  unequalled 
political  idealism. 

The    annexation    of    Bosnia-Herzegovina    in    1908    had 
wounded  the  Serbian  nation  to  the  heart.     But   Europe, 
in  order  to  preserve  peace,  was  disposed  to  accept  without 
a  murmur  this  flagrant  attack  upon  the  most  elementary 
principles    of     international     law.      Serbian    protestations 
awakened,  however,  the  consciences  of  the  western  demo- 
cracies, who  did  not  fail  to  perceive  the  great  peril  incurred 
by  the  acceptance  of  this  dangerous  and  immoral  practice 
of  changing  an  international  treaty  like  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 
at  the  sole  desire  of  one  of  the  contracting  powers.     In 
face  of  the  German  menace  the  Entente,  however,  gave 
way  and   advised   Serbia   to   do   the   same.     The   Bosnian 
crisis  ended  in  the  victory  of  German  diplomacy,  but  the 
victory  of  right  and  morality  was  on  the  side  of  the  Serbians. 
In  1912,  on  the  advice  of  Russia,  Serbia  concluded  a 
treaty  of  alliance  with  Bulgaria,   but  this  treaty,   in  the 
minds  of  Austro-Bulgarians,  was  intended  to  become  the 
grave  of  Serbian  independence.     In  accord  with  Austria, 
Bulgaria  counted  upon  a  Serbian  defeat,  and  in  order  to 
render  this  defeat  more  sure,  the  Bulgarians  withdrew  their 
formal  engagement  at  the  last  moment  and  did  not  send 
the  Serbians  the  100,000  soldiers  promised.     A  still  more 
serious  fact,  and  one  that  remains  to  be  explained,  is  the 
eagerness  of  the  Turks  to  attack  the  Serbians  at  Koumanovo, 
before  the  junction  of  the  three  Serbian  armies  on  the  plateau 
between  Uskub,  Stip  and  Veles  could  be  effected,  and  even 
before  the  concentration  of  the  Turkish  armies  was  complete. 
It  was  probably  suggested  by  Vienna,  and  in  view  of  the 
secret   connections   between   Sofia   and   Vienna,    it   is   not 
impossible  that  this  suggestion  had  its  origin  in  Sofia  !     In 
any  case  the  Bulgarians  counted  upon  the  Serbian  defeat, 
and  Austria-Hungary  held  herself  in  readiness  to  interfere 
under  pretext  of  "  saving  "  Serbia  from  the  Turkish  invader. 
That  would  have  been  the  realization   of  the  famous 
programme  of  Count  Berchtold  for  administrative  "  decen- 


60  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

tralization  "  in  Turkey  under  the  form  of  an  autonomous 
Macedonia  protected  by  Bulgaria,  and  an  Albania,  also 
"  autonomous,"  which  would  extend  as  far  as  the  Vardar, 
and  which  would  be  entrusted  to  the  protection  of  Austria. 

Austria  and  Bulgaria  would  thus  have  shared  the  Balkan 
Peninsula.  The  Serbian  victory  over  the  Turks  at  Kouma- 
novo  in  1912  saved  not  only  Serbia,  but  also  the  entire 
Serbo-Croat-Slovene  nation  and,  in  certain  respects,  also 
democratic  Europe.  Without  this  victory,  Serbia,  being 
vanquished,  would  have  lost  her  force  of  resistance  and 
all  the  Balkans  would  have  fallen  under  Austro-Germanic 
guardianship.  The  line  Berlin-Bagdad  would  have  been 
re-established  and  Germany  would  have  had  much  more 
favourable  chances  for  the  general  war. 

Furious  at  the  Serbian  victories,  Austria-Hungary,  urged 
on  and  supported  by  Germany,  tried  in  every  way  to  limit 
the  success  of  the  little  Kingdom.  After  having  forced 
Serbia  to  withdraw  from  the  Adriatic,  Austro-Germany, 
on  June  29,  1913,  set  Bulgaria  against  our  country  in  the 
hope  of  seeing  us  crushed  by  the  Balkanic  Prussians.  The 
Serbian  victory  of  Bregalnitsa  thwarted  this  diabolic  plan 
and,  for  the  second  time  in  1913,  Serbia  escaped  the  fate 
prepared  for  her  by  Germany.  The  Serbo-Greek-Roumanian 
solidarity  of  1913  proved  a  great  success,  and  the  preser- 
vation of  peace  in  the  Balkans  depended  only  upon  these 
three  nations.  Unfortunately  Greece  and  Roumania  were 
not  ripe  for  an  anti-German  policy.  The  treaty  of  Bucarest, 
which  should  have  formed  the  basis  of  this  triple  Balkan 
alliance,  was  abandoned  by  Greece  as  well  as  by  Roumania 
at  the  very  moment  when  it  should  have  produced  its 
principal  effects.  So  Serbia  remained  the  only  rampart 
against  the  German  "  Drang  nach  Osten." 

In  1914  Austria  and  Germany  decided  to  accomplish 
for  themselves  that  which  their  Turkish  and  Bulgarian 
mercenaries  had  not  been  able  to  realize.  Serbia  resisted 
and  this  time  the  Entente  supported  her.  The  support 
given  by  the  Allies  to  Serbia  has  been  well  merited  by  our 
country,  which  has  been  drained  of  its  last  drop  of  blood, 
but  has  held  firm.  Roumania,  not  only  abandoned  us  to 
our  fate  in  1915,  but  she  even  went  so  far  as  to  conclude 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  61 

in  1916,  at  our  expense  and  behind  our  back,  an  agreement 
with  the  Allies  which  was  afterwards  dropped,  through 
the  separate  peace  made  by  Roumania,  but  which  never- 
theless forms  a  document  of  which  the  Roumanians  have 
no  reason  to  be  proud.  We  have  had  no  treaties  with  the 
Allies  in  1915,  but  at  no  moment  of  our  national  catastrophe 
has  the  idea  occurred  to  us  of  concluding  a  separate  peace. 
Roumania,  at  a  like  moment,  has  not  adopted  the  same 
attitude.  As  to  Greece  under  Constantine,  she  formally 
betrayed  us  and  abandoned  us  to  the  Bulgarians.  King 
Constantine  only  waited  for  the  opportunity  of  serving  his 
brother-in-law  William,  without  caring  about  the  true 
interests  of  the  Greek  nation.  Thanks  to  Venizelos  the 
Hellenic  nation  has  adopted  again  the  policy  of  Balkan 
solidarity,  and  the  Greek  divisions  have  distinguished  them- 
selves by  their  combative  ardour  in  the  last  offensive  in 
Macedonia.  And  Roumania  now  finds  herself  in  a  position 
to  be  able  to  take  up  again  the  threads  of  that  1913  policy, 
the  only  one  which  is  in  the  interests  of  her  national  develop- 
ment. 

Italy,  former  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  had  adopted 
a  special  attitude.  Italy  has  in  fact  never  considered  as 
a  political  possibility  the  liberation  and  integral  union  of 
our  nation.  She  was  preparing,  rather,  to  protect  herself 
against  Austria-Hungary  in  assuring  for  herself  the  posses- 
sion of  a  good  part  of  our  national  soil.  History  will  relate 
whether  Italy  had  the  idea  of  coming  to  a  friendly  arrange- 
ment with  Austria,  at  the  expense  of  our  territory,  and  of 
remaining  neutral  until  the  end  of  the  war  ;  or  whether 
she  had  from  the  beginning  of  the  world  war  a  clear  realiza- 
tion of  the  importance  of  the  struggle  that  had  begun. 
What  is  certain  is  that  Italy  stipulated  as  a  condition 
of  her  intervention  on  the  side  of  the  Allies  that  special 
advantages  should  be  guaranteed  to  her,  and  that  Serbia 
should  not  be  acquainted  with  them.  The  London  Treaty 
ratified  this  bargain.  This  treaty  is  not  binding  on  the 
conference,  which  must  solve  the  Italo-Slav  problem  on 
quite  another  basis.  As  to  ourselves,  it  is  rather  interesting 
to  recall  to  mind  that  on  one  occasion  Serbia  refused,  and 
refused  categorically,  to  obey  the  Allies,  and  this  was  when 


62  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

Italy,  who  had  refused  to  recognize  Serbia  as  one  of  the 
Allies  and  who  had  pledged  and  mortgaged  Southern  Slav 
lands,  applied  to  the  Allies  in  June  1915  with  the  demand 
that  Serbia  should  be  forced  to  take  the  offensive  in  order 
to  facilitate  the  task  of  the  Italian  army  !  We  were  asked 
to  do  so  at  a  moment  when  we  were  enduring  a  terrible 
internal  crisis,  provoked  by  epidemics.  And  the  Italians 
still  have  a  grudge  against  us  to-day  for  our  refusal. 

We  abstain  intentionally  from  speaking  of  the  military 
exploits  of  the  Serbian  army  and  of  the  volunteer  legions 
of  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes.  What  charac- 
terizes Serbia's  policy  is  the  perseverance  shown  in  the 
struggle  against  Germanism,  her  loyalty  towards  the  Allies, 
and  a  spirit  of  sacrifice  which  indeed  does  honour  to  the 
Serbian  national  conscience.  The  peace  conference  must 
bear  in  mind  these  elements  of  our  national  problem.  It 
will  do  so  not  only  by  the  recognition  of  the  new  Kingdom 
of  the  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes,  but  by  the  abso- 
lutely legitimate  protection  of  the  integrity  of  our  nation 
in  the  east  as  well  as  in  the  west,  in  the  south  as  in. the  north. 
And  if  the  future  security  of  Europe  is  to  rest,  apart 
from  the  League  of  Nations,  on  a  solid  bulwark  against 
Germanism,  it  is  the  Serbian  barrier  that  must  be  streng- 
thened. But  for  that  it  is  necessary  that  Serbia,  who  has 
never  bargained,  should  not  be  the  object,  neither  she  nor 
any  part  of  the  united  Serbo-Croat-Slovene  nation,  of 
any  bargaining. 

December  23,  1918. 


IV 

The  War  and  Serbian  Democracy. 
The  internal  political  organization  of  Serbia,  too  little 
known  by  the  European  public,  merits  being  called  to  mind 
in  these  historic  hours  when  this  country  is  fighting  at  the 
side  of  the  great  democratic  powers  of  the  West  for  the 
same  ideal  of  liberty  and  justice.  It  is  not  by  chance  that 
Serbia  finds  herself  in  the  group  of  the  Entente  powers. 
The  determinative  causes  of  this  community  of  arms  are 


SERBIAN  POLITICS  63 

more  profound,  and  it  is  necessary  to  point  out  in  the  first 
place  the  similarity  of  the  forms  of  government  enjoyed 
in  the  allied  countries.  Conformity  in  forms  of  domestic 
government  has  contributed  greatly  to  the  formation  of 
the  same  tendencies  in  foreign  policy,  which  are  embodied 
in  the  programme  of  the  Allies  and  which  have  for  basis 
equal  rights  for  all  nations  and  respect  for  the  liberty  and 
peaceful  development  of  each  of  them.  If  we  set  aside 
Russia,  the  great  sister  nation  of  Serbia,  to  whom  the 
Serbian  people  owe  so  much  of  her  independence  and 
political  liberty,  and  for  whom  all  Serbians  are  animated 
with  a  deep  love  and  sincere  devotion,  one  can  say  that 
the  gravitation  of  Serbian  policy  towards  France  and 
England  was  the  consequence  of  the  democratic  Serbian 
form  of  government,  borrowed  entirely  from  those  nations 
and  from  Belgium.  A  free  and  democratic  Serbia  had 
necessarily  to  rely  upon  the  countries  which  practised  a 
similar  form  of  government.  The  truth  so  oft  repeated 
regarding  the  intimate  connection  existing  between  the 
foreign  policy  of  a  country  and  her  home  policy  is  confirmed 
anew  by  the  example  of  Serbia. 

Political  life  in  Serbia  has  passed  through  three  prin- 
cipal phases  :  (a)  autocratic  and  bureaucratic  government 
which  lasted  until  1869 ;  (b)  constitutional  government, 
inaugurated  by  the  constitution  of  1869  and  practised  with- 
out any  great  change,  or  check  until  1883  ;  from  1883  to 
1903,  the  same  constitutional  government,  with  fierce 
struggles  for  the  establishment  of  parliamentary  govern- 
ment. This  period  of  twenty  years  was  characterized  by 
pretty  frequent  changes  of  government,  by  various  experi- 
ments, all  of  short  duration,  by  the  incessant  struggle 
between  the  democratic  nation  and  a  Crown  more  or  less 
autocratic  ;  (c)  democratic  and  parliamentary  government 
from  1903  up  to  the  present  day.  This  form  of  government 
was  inaugurated  by  the  constitution  of  1903  and  the 
accession  of  the  Karageorgevitch  dynasty,  and  it  is  to  it 
that  Serbia  owes  the  progress  attained  since  that  time  in 
all  domains  of  social  life.  In  giving  here  the  synthesis  of 
political  organization  in  Serbia,  and  in  insisting  on  its 
democratic  character,  we  wish  to  show  how  this  little  nation, 


64  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

with  matchless  courage,  has  been  able  to  gain  for  itself, 
from  the  point  of  view  of  political  liberty,  a  first  place 
among  the  civilized  States  of  the  West. 

The  constitution  of  1903  endowed  Serbia  with  parlia- 
mentary rule  based  on  the  principle  of  national  sovereignty 
and  on  the  effective  participation  of  the  people  in  the 
government  of  the  country.  This  form  of  government, 
judicially  constructed  by  the  constitution,  would  not  have 
been  able  to  function  regularly  without  the  consciousness 
possessed  to  a  high  degree  by  the  Serbian  people  of  its 
right  and  its  duty  to  take  a  very  active  part  in  the  affairs 
of  State.  The  political  education  of  the  Serbian  people  is 
also  shown  by  the  marvellous  organization  of  the  parties 
ruling  political  life  in  Serbia,  which  are  real  factors  of  pro- 
gress and  civilization.  It  is  a  most  characteristic  fact  that 
Serbia,  a  relatively  young  State,  should  be  considered  as 
the  model  of  a  democratic  State,  because  of  the  constitution 
of  her  political  parties,  the  firmness  of  their  convictions 
and  the  devotions  of  their  members  to  the  parliamentary 
regime.  In  Bulgaria,  for  instance,  the  men  called  to  power 
by  the  Crown  always  have  a  chance  to  obtain  a  majority 
by  new  elections,  the  Bulgarian  people  not  having  enough 
moral  independence  to  form  a  personal  judgment  upon 
the  government  in  question.  The  Bulgarian  democratic 
party,  the  head  of  which  is  Mr.  Malinoff,  was  not  repre- 
sented in  the  Bulgarian  Sobranje,  when  Malinoff  was 
appointed  to  office,  except  by  two  members.  Mr.  Malinoff 
succeeded,  however,  without  great  difficulty  in  obtaining 
by  means  of  new  elections  an  overwhelming  majority,  and 
the  number  of  democratic  members  went  up  from  2  to  140  ! 
When  the  Malinoff  Cabinet  was  replaced  by  that  of  Mr. 
Guechoff,  the  democrats  almost  disappeared  and  only  had 
a  few  representatives.  The  same  phenomenon  occurred  at 
the  time  of  the  elections  held  under  the  Radoslavoff  govern- 
ment in  1913.  In  Greece  and  in  Roumania  such  practices, 
it  seems,  are  also  very  frequent,  and  there  constitutional 
government  with  the  preponderance  of  the  Crown  is  pre- 
ferable to  parliamentary  government.  In  Serbia  any  such 
effort  to  create  a  ministerial  majority  would  be  condemned 
beforehand   to   complete   failure,   universal   suffrage,    open 


SERBIAN  POLITICS  65 

and  secret,  not  permitting  misuse,  and  the  conscience  of 
the  electors,  organized  into  large  political  parties,  not 
facilitating  the  creation  of  purely  personal  majorities. 

Political  life  in  Serbia  is  all  concentrated  in  political 
parties  which,  by  free  competition,  with  equal  chances, 
develop  their  programmes  and  seek  to  win  over  the  electors 
to  their  cause.  The  Serbian  elector  is,  in  general,  very  well 
informed  as  to  political  matters  and  does  not  lightly  place 
his  confidence  in  those  to  whom  the  Crown  would  confide 
the  power.  If  one  wishes  to  acquire  power  one  must  go 
among  the  people,  gain  their  sympathies  and  their  confidence, 
and  it  is  only  then  that  the  Crown,  taking  into  account  the 
will  of  the  people,  consecrates  it  by  the  call  to  office.  That 
is  the  road  that  leads  to  power  in  the  countries  having  parlia- 
mentary rule,  and  not  the  contrary  fashion  practised  under 
the  constitutional  system,  where  the  confidence  of  the  Crown 
is  the  first  essential,  the  confidence  of  the  people  not  being 
difficult  to  gain  by  elections  more  or  less  arranged  to  conform 
with  the  Government. 

The  parliamentary  system  is  considered  in  Serbia,  and 
that  justly,  as  the  greatest  benefit  of  the  new  era  begun 
in  1903.  The  two  principal  factors  of  public  life,  the  Crown 
and  the  national  representation,  have  done  everything  to 
preserve  and  perfect  it.  Thanks  to  this  political  system, 
Serbia  has  drawn  decidedly  nearer  to  the  great  western 
powers,  because  the  Germanic  Empires,  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary  with  their  anti-parliamentary  home  policy, 
their  bureaucratic  and  militarist  regime,  had  nothing  to 
offer  to  the  free  and  democratic  Serbia.  These  same  prin- 
ciples of  right,  justice  and  equality,  applied  in  all  the  domains 
of  home  political  life,  Serbia  would  like  to  see  realized  also 
in  the  relations  between  nations  and  between  States.  When 
it  is  said  that  the  Allies  are  fighting  for  a  new  international 
law,  more  just  and  more  humane,  these  are  not  empty 
words — it  is  a  fact,  which  can  justify  all  the  sacrifices  of 
the  war.  The  States  which,  in  their  home  policy,  have 
realized  democratic  and  parliamentary  rule,  are  well  qualified 
to  fight  for  an  international  democratic  policy.  We  are 
glad  to  know  that  Serbia  can,  in  this  respect,  range  herself 
on  the  side  of  the  powers  who  first  gave  birth  to  political 

6 


66  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

liberty.     Serbian    Democracy    has    been    able    to    lead    the 
country  to  where  her  place  was  already  prepared  for  her. 

June  25,  1916. 

The  Serbia  of  Yesterday  and  of  To-morrow. 

The  book  of  Mr.  Stoyanovitch  l  is  distinguished  from 
similar  publications  by  its  great  variety  of  arguments  and 
political,  economic  and  psychological  sketches  upon  Serbia 
and  the  other  Southern  Slav  countries.  The  author's  idea 
is  to  represent  in  its  entirety  the  essential  role  played  by 
Serbia  in  the  struggle  for  the  independence  and  the  union 
of  all  the  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes.  He  has  done 
so  by  drawing  in  turns  short  sketches  of  the  national  and 
social  forces  which  have  made  of  Serbia  the  Southern  Slav 
Piedmont.  His  book  bears  the  stamp  of  a  work  destined 
not  only  to  inform,  but  also  to  instruct,  by  means  of  explana- 
tion more  or  less  documentary.  Such  books  are  the  most 
difficult  to  write  and  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  if  Mr. 
Stoyanovitch,  who  is  more  a  fighter  than  a  political  writer, 
has  not  been  able  to  attain  equal  success  in  all  parts  of  his 
work,  which  is  without  doubt  very  interesting.  The  picture 
he  draws  for  us  of  the  political,  economic  and  national 
activity  of  the  Serbian  nation  is  indeed  rendered  rather 
dull  by  an  awkward  effort  to  represent  the  work  accom- 
plished as  the  fruit  of  such  and  such  a  factor,  of  such  and 
such  a  political  or  social  routine  and  not  of  another.  Mr. 
Stoyanovitch,  being  a  native  of  Bosnia,  where  he  has  spent 
nearly  the  whole  of  his  life,  does  not  possess  a  profound 
knowledge  of  Serbian  affairs,  which  is  some  excuse  for  the 
superficial  and  one-sided  character  of  his  elucidations,  but 
all  the  same  we  must  regret  the  digressions  into  which  he 
has  been  drawn  and  which  have  inevitably  diminished  the 
value  of  the  book. 

Without  wishing  to  enter  thoroughly  into  the  questions 
which  in  our  opinion  have  been  treated  erroneously,  and 
have  caused  Mr.  Tardieu  himself  to  make  some  reservations 
in  his  preface,  we  yet  must  make  some  observations  on  the 

1  La  Serbie  d'hier  et  de  demain,  by  Nicolas  Stoyanovitch.     Preface  by 
Andre  Tardieu  (Paris,  Berger-Levrault) . 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  67 

subject  of  a  few  important  points  relating  to  the  progress 
realized  by  Serbia. 

Thus  the  distinction  made  by  Mr.  Stoyanovitch  between 
the  young  and  the  old  is  on  the  one  side  arbitrary  and  on 
the  other  ill-founded.  The  work  of  Serbian  regeneration, 
prepared  in  the  period  from  1883  to  1903  and  accomplished 
in  the  decade  1903  to  1913,  ought  in  reality  to  be  credited 
almost  entirely  to  those  who  were  born  before  1875.  Doubt- 
less the  old  men,  as  Mr.  Stoyanovitch  calls  them,  have  had 
excellent  collaborators  among  the  young  generations,  but 
they  were  none  the  less  the  principal  actors  and  instigators. 
History  will  judge  of  their  work,  which  is  still  in  course  of 
realization  and  which  the  allied  victory  will  crown  with 
well  merited  laurels.  Any  discussion  at  this  moment  would 
not  only  be  premature,  but  necessarily  subjective  and  pre- 
judiced. In  the  second  place,  we  must  remark  on  the 
strange  opinion  formed  by  Mr.  Stoyanovitch  as  to  the 
concrete  factors  of  the  Serbian  evolution,  especially  as  to 
the  role  and  activity  of  political  parties  in  Serbia.  The 
Liberal  party,  with  Yovan  Ristitch,  and  the  Progressive 
party,  with  Garachanine  and  Pirotchanac,  cannot  and 
ought  not  to  be  presented  to  the  European  public  in  a  few 
insignificant  words,  as  has  been  done  in  Mr.  Stoyanovitch's 
book.  As  to  the  Radical  party,  it  has  only  met  with  mixed 
sympathy  with  Mr.  Stoyanovitch.  That  would  be  of  no 
importance  if  it  were  a  question  of  a  book  expressing  only 
the  sentiments  and  the  personal  opinions  of  the  author 
and  not  of  a  work  on  the  Serbia  of  yesterday  and  to-morrow. 
If  the  Radical  party  was  indeed,  in  character,  constitution 
and  activity,  such  as  Mr.  Stoyanovitch  depicts  it,  it  would 
not  be  possible  to  conceive  the  remarkable  work  accom- 
plished by  the  Radicals,  the  founders  and  propagators  of 
the  modern  Serbian  democracy.  Neither  can  one  pass  by 
in  silence  the  quite  inaccurate  appreciation  of  the  elements 
which  have  rendered  Serbia  capable  of  undertaking  the 
immense  task  of  the  liberation  of  the  whole  Southern  Slav 
nation.  Mr.  Stoyanovitch,  for  instance,  represents  Serbian 
officers  as  the  torch-bearers  of  progress  and  evolution.  It 
is  true  that  our  officers  are  most  admirable,  but  they  are 
only  the  worthy  leaders  of  their  soldiers,  whose  valiance  is 


68  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

proverbial.  Serbia's  development,  which  has  manifested 
itself  also  in  the  formation  of  a  corps  of  excellent  officers, 
is  due  in  the  first  place  to  the  intelligent  and  perspicacious 
work  of  Serbian  statesmen.  Well  managed  finances,  develop- 
ment of  the  national  productive  forces,  consolidation  of 
the  general  economic  situation,  armament  of  the  country 
on  the  most  complete  and  modern  lines,  political  tact,  con- 
clusion of  necessary  international  agreements,  courage  in 
making  great  decisions  and  accepting  entire  responsibility, 
all  this  is  what  has  enabled  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia  to  rise 
up  and  become  with  extraordinary  rapidity  the  uncontested 
centre  of  Jugoslavism.  What  was  indeed  nothing 
but  the  abuse  resulting  almost  inevitably  from  military 
successes,  that  auto-suggestion  manifested  by  some  officers 
who  occupied  responsible  posts  in  the  army,  is  taken  by 
Mr.  Stoyanovitch  for  the  starting  point  of  national  progress. 
A  fatal  error  like  this  has  led  many  officers  into  regrettable 
excesses,  and  it  must  not  be  repeated.  Every  good  Serbian 
and  patriot  must  wish  the  army  to  keep  within  its  limits 
and  its  functions,  leaving  the  civilians  to  take  care  of  political 
matters.  Mr.  Stoyanovitch,  writing  a  book  upon  Serbia, 
did  wrong  to  arouse,  even  involuntarily,  by  thoughtless 
words,  a  useless  and  prejudicial  discussion. 

The  second  part  of  the  book,  which  treats  of  the  Slavs 
of  the  South,  in  Austria-Hungary,  of  the  psychological 
results,  of  the  Serbian  Balkan  victories,  of  the  future  Serbian 
or  Southern  Slav  State,  is  very  suggestive  and  merits  the 
greatest  attention. 

August  19,  1917. 


An  Unjustified  Reproach. 

The  excellent  review  The  New  Europe  published,  in  its 
fortieth  number  of  the  19th  July,  an  important  article  on  the 
decisive  phase  of  the  war,  in  which  can  be  found  some  very 
just  and  useful  information  relating  to  Balkan  questions. 
Much  interest  is  shown  in  our  national  problem,  which  is 
treated  with  impeccable  logic.  It  is  particularly  noticeable 
that  the  author  pays  special  attention  to  Serbia,  insisting 
on  her  position  and  the  importance  of  the  complete  solution 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  69 

of  the  Serbo-Croat-Slovene  question.  Following  this  train 
of  thought,  the  author  reminds  us  that  the  allied  powers 
will  not  be  able  to  admit,  when  it  comes  to  the  realization 
of  Roumanian  national  unity,  that  the  districts  of  the  Banat 
and  of  the  Central  Hungarian  plain,  where  there  is  either 
a  total  absence  of  Roumanian  population,  or  else  a  distinct 
minority,  should  be  assigned  to  Roumania.  In  the  same 
way,  as  we  read  further  on,  it  is  impossible  to  uphold  the 
claims  of  Italy  to  a  part  of  Dalmatia,  where  the  inhabitants 
of  the  Slav  race,  as  compared  to  those  speaking  Italian, 
are  in  the  proportion  of  10  to  i.  Some  just  and  outspoken 
words  are  addressed  to  Italy,  and  it  is  to  be  hoped  they 
will  find  listeners  among  those  concerned  in  the  matter. 

There  is,  however,  in  this  same  article  a  passage  relating 
to  the  action  of  the  Serbian  Government,  a  passage  which 
we  cannot  pass  over  in  silence  precisely  because  of  the  high 
esteem  in  which  we  hold  the  New  Europe  and  its  honour- 
able contributors.  The  author  of  this  article  finds  that 
the  Serbian  Government  is  not  irreproachable — is  there 
any  Government  that  professes  to  be  so  ? — and  he  sums 
up  his  criticism  as  follows  :  "  The  Prince  Regent  has  indeed 
proclaimed  the  realization  of  the  Southern  Slav  ideal  as 
the  supreme  war  aim,  but  his  government  has  never  placed 
this  war  aim  frankly  before  the  Allies  as  being  the  Serbian 
national  programme.  He  has  hesitated,  bargained  and 
wrangled,  placing  the  friends  of  Serbia  and  the  partisans 
of  a  lasting  European  arrangement  in  the  unenviable  situa- 
tion of  appearing  more  Serbian  than  the  Serbians  them- 
selves." It  is  not  at  all  our  intention  to  take  up  the  defence 
of  the  Serbian  Government,  the  time  having  not  yet  arrived 
when  every  one,  the  government  as  well  as  private  indi- 
viduals, will  have  to  give  an  account  of  what  they  have 
done  for  the  Fatherland.  We  shall  then  hear  what  the 
Government  has  to  say  and  each  of  us  will  be  able  to  pass 
judgment  on  it  one  way  or  the  other.  But  the  reproach 
made,  however  vague  it  may  be,  appears  to  us  so  unjustified 
that  we  feel  ourselves  obliged  to  clear  it  at  once.  From 
the  beginning  of  the  war  until  to-day,  the  Serbian  Govern- 
ment, supported  by  the  Crown,  by  the  Parliament  and  by 
the  public  opinion  of   the  entire  nation,  has  kept  to  the 


70  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

programme  of  the  deliverance  and  the  integral  unity  of 
our  single  nation  of  three  names.  In  respect  of  this,  never 
— we  repeat  it — never  has  there  been  nor  will  there  be  any 
hesitation,  still  less  bargaining  or  wrangling.  It  is  the 
programme  of  our  whole  nation  stated  by  the  Serbian 
Government  on  several  occasions,  in  spite  of  the  passive 
resistance  of  those  who  themselves,  according  to  the  New 
Europe,  have  not  yet  decided  to  accept  Serbia  as  an  Ally 
on  an  equal  footing.  It  is  in  view  of  this  supreme  aim 
that  the  Serbian  nation  has  sacrificed  almost  everything, 
and  the  Serbian  Government,  upon  which  rests  the  heavy 
responsibility  of  the  national  policy,  faithfully  followed  in 
the  darkest  days  of  our  history,  ought  not  to  be  accused 
of  weakness  in  a  question  in  which  it  has  shown  only  firmness 
and  consistency. 

August  19,  1917. 


The  Campaign  of  the  "  New  Europe." 

The  British  review,  the  New  Europe,  has  just  started 
an  incomprehensible  campaign  against  the  present  govern- 
ment of  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia.  In  two  of  its  last  numbers, 
of  the  22nd  and  29th  August,  it  has  published  no  fewer 
than  three  articles  attacking  vehemently  Mr.  Pachitch  and 
his  Ministry,  composed  at  present  solely  of  members  of 
the  Radical  Party.  Two  of  these  articles  emanate  from 
the  editors  themselves  of  the  New  Europe,  while  the  third 
is  signed  by  "  a  group  of  Serbians  "  who  have  not  wished 
to  give  their  names,  but  for  whom  the  New  Europe  gives 
its  formal  assurance  that  they  are  persons  "  inspiring  respect 
and  confidence.' ' 

We  do  not  wish  to  enter  upon  an  examination  of  the 
questions  dealing  with  home  affairs  raised  by  the  New 
Europe,  our  paper  being  consecrated  solely  and  entirely 
to  the  defence  of  the  independence  and  the  liberty  of  the 
Serbo-Croats  and  Slovenes  and  to  the  realization  of  the 
national  mission  of  Serbia. 

The  one  thing  which  we  must,  however,  assert  with 
regard  to  the  criticisms  and  menaces  of  the  New  Europe, 
in  as  far  as  they  concern  Serbian  home  affairs,  is  that  happily 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  71 

the  governmental  organization  of  Serbia  has  remained 
intact  in  spite  of  the  occupation  of  the  country,  and  that 
consequently  all  contested  and  disputed  home  questions, 
however  difficult  they  may  be,  can  find  their  solution  in 
the  forms  prescribed  by  Serbian  laws  and  constitution. 
The  appeal  issued  by  the  New  Europe  in  favour  of  the  inter- 
ference of  the  Allies  in  Serbian  home  affairs  is  therefore 
unwarranted  and  will  certainly  meet  with  no  response. 
The  western  democracies  are  not  accustomed  to  meddle 
with  the  independence,  at  home  or  abroad,  of  their  Allies, 
small  or  great.  Therefore,  it  is  for  the  three  constitutional 
factors  of  Serbia,  the  King  (Prince-Regent),  the  Govern- 
ment and  the  Parliament,  to  decide  on  Serbian  policy, 
and  it  is  for  them  to  find,  by  constitutional  means  and  in 
the  forms  prescribed  by  the  usages  of  Parliamentarism,  the 
solutions  for  any  disputed  question.  The  editors  of  the 
New  Europe  should  not  have  lost  sight  of  the  fact  that 
Serbia  is  an  independent  State  which  does  not  admit  of 
foreign  interference  in  its  own  affairs.  If  the  New  Europe 
has  formed  another  idea  of  Serbia,  it  is  grossly  mistaken. 
But  if  we  ignore  the  criticisms  of  the  New  Europe  con- 
cerning questions  dealing  with  home  affairs,  we  cannot 
pass  over  in  silence  the  other  part  of  the  New  Europe  articles 
dealing  with  Serbia's  foreign  policy.  There  lies  the  root 
of  the  whole  campaign  of  the  New  Europe,  and  it  is  this 
that  obliges  us  formally  to  contest  some  quite  uncalled  for 
assertions  contained  in  these  articles.  Two  of  these  asser- 
tions are  most  absurd :  the  first  relates  to  an  assumed 
"  choice  "  with  which  Serbia  finds  herself  confronted  in 
consequence  of  her  policy,  and  the  second  refers  to  the 
application  of  the  Corfu  manifesto.  Now,  Serbia  has  no 
choice  open  and  neither  has  she  ever  wavered  in  her 
national  policy.  Since  the  first  cannon  shot  in  19 14, 
Serbia  has  proclaimed  her  national  programme,  and  it 
is  to  this  programme  that  she  has  sacrificed  more  than 
a  quarter  of  her  population.  Serbia  is  fighting  for  the 
deliverance  of  her  Serbian  brothers,  she  is  fighting  also 
for  the  deliverance  of  the  Croatians  and  Slovenes,  and 
all  her  efforts  are  strained  towards  this  lofty  aim  :  to 
reunite  all  Serbians,   Croatians   and  Slovenes  in  an  inde- 


72  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

pendent  Serbo-Croat  and  Slovene  kingdom,  free  from  all 
domination  and  from  all  foreign  influence.  Serbia  is 
faithfully  fulfilling  the  mission  entrusted  to  her  by  destiny 
itself,  and  she  has  preferred  to  accept  the  unequal  struggle 
with  a  great  power,  rather  than  submit  to  the  order  from 
Vienna  to  give  up  her  independence  and  all  idea  of  a  union 
with  her  brothers  of  Austria-Hungary.  The  article  of  the 
New  Europe  is  a  deplorable  error,  an  action  contrary  to 
historical  and  national  realities,  a  sword  thrust  in  the  air. 
The  policy  of  Serbia  has  not  to  be  created,  it  exists  and 
has  existed  for  a  long  time,  clear,  precise,  full  of  abnegation 
and  sacrifice,  but  resplendent  with  faith  and  with  confi- 
dence in  the  victory  of  right  and  justice.  The  glorious 
tombs  of  a  million  Serbians  have  well  marked  the  track 
of  Serbian  policy,  and  one  must  be  blind  to  be  able  to  speak 
to-day  of  a  "  choice  "  ! 

The  New  Europe  reproaches  also  the  Serbian  Govern- 
ment with  not  carrying  out  the  policy  of  the  Corfu  Declara- 
tion, but  striving  rather  after  selfish  and  narrow  aims. 
And  the  proofs  ?  The  New  Europe  does  not  furnish  them, 
for  the  very  simple  reason  that  these  proofs  do  not  exist. 
Serbia  is  fully  conscious  of  her  duty  towards  the  Serbo- 
Croats  and  Slovenes,  and  she  would  be  unworthy  of  the 
fallen  victims  if  she  followed  the  advice  of  the  New  Europe 
to  merge  the  martyred  Piedmont  into  incomplete  Italy, 
before  the  accomplishment  of  her  historic  mission. 

As  to  the  article  signed  "  a  group  of  Serbians,"  it  con- 
tains some  things  which  one  is  not  accustomed  to  see 
expressed  by  Serbians.  The  signers  of  this  article  appeal 
in  effect  to  the  allied  governments  to  intervene  in  Serbian 
home  affairs  and  to  take  up  an  attitude  in  favour  of  the 
opposition  parties  and  against  the  present  government. 
As  excuse  for  such  an  unwonted  step  they  declare  "  that 
in  normal  times  the  opposition  would  have  advised  the 
people  not  to  pay  the  taxes,  and  would  have  forced  the 
government  to  appeal  to  the  electors.  Under  present  cir- 
cumstances it  can  only  apply  to  the  allied  governments." 
Now,  this  way  of  looking  at  it  is  more  than  astonishing. 
In  other  allied  countries  there  also  exists  an  opposition, 
even   an  opposition  which  does  not  even  approve  of  the 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  73 

general  policy  pursued  by  the  governments,  yet  nobody 
in  these  countries  has  thought  of  resisting  the  government 
by  such  fantastic  means  as  those  employed  by  the  "  group 
of  Serbians  "  patronized  by  the  New  Europe. 

What  is  most  deplorable  is  the  imprudent  and  carelessly 
made  declaration  of  these  anonymous  Serbians,  saying 
"  that  to-day  there  does  not  exist  any  Serbian  or  Jugoslav 
who  would  not  consider  that  our  moral  duty  and  our  national 
interests  command  us  to  remain  to  the  end  with  the  Allies, 
but  if  the  present  government  continues  to  hold  the  power, 
no  one  can  guarantee  the  future." 

How  have  the  editors  of  the  New  Europe,  who  assert 
that  they  have  for  Serbia  and  the  Serbian  nation  "  the 
greatest  admiration  and  the  most  profound  esteem,"  how 
have  they  been  able  to  extend  hospitality  to  lines  so  un- 
worthy of  any  Serbian,  no  matter  whom  !  If  in  the  frenzy 
of  party  struggles  there  have  been  found  over-excited  poli- 
ticians writing  such  stupidities,  the  New  Europe,  as  a  sincere 
friend  of  Serbia,  ought  to  have  prevented  the  publication 
of  words  which  are  as  unseasonable  as  they  are  untrue.  In 
spite  of  party  differences  all  Serbians  will  be  unanimous 
in  condemning  the  aforementioned  declaration,  which  is 
contrary  to  our  national  ideal,  to  all  the  political  past  of 
Serbia,  and  to  the  admirable  spirit  of  sacrifice  of  which 
Serbia  has  given  so  many  brilliant  proofs  in  the  course  of 
the  present  war.  Political  morality  should  have  demanded 
that  the  anonymous  authors  of  the  article  in  question  should 
sign  their  names  to  a  declaration  which  is  in  flagrant  opposi- 
tion to  the  formal  declarations  of  the  heads  of  the  opposition 
themselves  in  Parliament  and  out  of  Parliament.  [See  the 
speech  of  the  member  Drachkovitch  in  the  Skoupchtina, 
published  by  La  Serbie,  18th  May,  and  the  letter  of  the 
member  Marincovitch  in  The  Times  of  the  5th  August.! 

September  14,  1918. 

Concerning  an  Unfriendly  Criticism. 

It  is  neither  easy  nor  agreeable  to  reply  to  friends, 
especially  when  their  reproaches  lack  clearness  and  precision. 
The  criticisms  formulated  by  the  New  Europe  and  repeated 


74  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

in  part  also  by  The  Times,  oblige  us,  however,  to  contest 
in  the  most  formal  and  categorical  manner  the  unfortunate 
assertions  published  lately  by  these  papers. 


The  criticisms  of  the  New  Europe  do  not  date  from 
yesterday.  In  No.  40,  of  July  19,  1917,  the  New  Europe 
vigorously  attacked  the  Serbian  Government,  accusing 
it  of  not  displaying  enough  energy  in  the  defence  of  our 
nation.  "  The  Prince- Regent,"  wrote  the  New  Europe, 
"  has  indeed  proclaimed  the  realization  of  the  Southern 
Slav  ideal  as  the  supreme  war  aim,  but  his  government 
has  never  openly  placed  this  war  aim  before  the  Allies  as 
being  the  Serbian  national  programme.  It  has  hesitated, 
bargained,  wrangled,  putting  the  friends  of  Serbia  and  the 
partisans  of  a  lasting  European  arrangement  in  the  un- 
enviable situation  of  appearing  more  Serbian  than  the 
Serbians  themselves/'  To  this  criticism  our  collaborator 
Politicus  replied  in  La  Serbie  of  the  19th  August,  by  an 
article  entitled  "  Un  reproche  in  Justine  "  (an  unjustified 
reproach),  in  which  he  made  the  following  assertions  : 

"  From  the  beginning  of  the  war  until  to-day,  the 
Serbian  Government,  supported  by  the  Crown,  by  the 
Parliament  and  by  the  public  opinion  of  the  entire  nation, 
has  kept  to  the  programme  of  the  deliverance  and  the 
integral  unity  of  our  single  nation  of  three  names.  In  this 
connection,  never — we  repeat  it — never  has  there  been  or 
ever  will  be  any  hesitation,  still  less  bargaining  or  wrangling. 
It  is  the  programme  of  our  whole  nation,  stated  by  the 
Serbian  Government  upon  several  occasions.  It  is  in  view 
of  this  great  purpose  that  the  Serbian  nation  has  sacrificed 
almost  everything,  and  the  Serbian  Government,  upon 
which  rests  the  heavy  responsibility  of  the  national  policy 
faithfully  followed  in  the  darkest  days  of  our  history,  ought 
not  to  be  accused  of  weakness  in  a  question  in  which  it 
has  shown  only  firmness  and  consistency." 

It  may  be  pointed  out  that  the  criticism  of  the  New 
Europe  came  at  the  moment  when  the  Serbian  Government 
and  the  Jugoslav  Committee  had  already  terminated  their 
discussions    and    drawn    up     the    famous    Declaration    of 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  75 

Corfu,  a  fact  of  which  the  New  Europe  cannot  have  been 
ignorant. 

Last  August — a  year  later — the  New  Europe  returned 
to  the  charge  with  criticisms  no  less  violent.  In  spite  of 
evidence,  the  editors  of  the  New  Europe  spoke  this  time 
of  a  "  choice  "  laid  before  Serbia  in  her  national  policy  ; 
and  the  Serbian  Government  was  besides  accused  of  not 
following  the  policy  formulated  by  the  Declaration  of  Corfu. 
Hospitality  was  even  given  in  the  New  Europe  to  articles 
dealing  with  our  home  policy,  and  so  ought  to  be  put 
in  the  background.  In  La  Serbie  of  September  14,  1918, 
we  have  replied  to  the  criticisms  of  the  New  Europe  and  we 
have  established  :  (1)  that  no  "  choice  "  was  laid  before 
Serbia  and  that  her  national  policy,  in  complete  accordance 
with  her  historic  mission,  has  been  aiming  for  a  long  time 
at  the  complete  deliverance  of  all  the  Serbo-Croats  and 
Slovenes  and  their  union  with  Serbia  and  Montenegro  into 
an  independent  State  ;  (2)  that  Serbia  has  no  intention 
of  departing  from  this  national  programme  which  has  found 
expression  in  the  Corfu  declaration,  and  that  she  remains 
faithful  to  this  declaration  which  she  considers  as  the  basis 
of  our  national  union.  In  the  same  spirit  the  Serbian 
Government  still  to-day  insists  upon  the  Allies  recognizing 
the  Southern  Slav  unity  and  independence. 

The  New  Europe  has  received  besides  a  very  efficient 
reply  from  Mr.  Stoyan  Protitch,  but  it  does  not  seem  at 
all  satisfied  with  the  arguments  brought  forward  in  answer 
to  its  criticisms.  In  the  number  of  the  26th  September, 
the  very  one  containing  the  reply  from  Mr.  Protitch,  the 
New  Europe  has  brought  fresh  charges  against  Serbia, 
charges  of  a  very  serious  nature,  but,  naturally,  as  unfounded 
as  those  previously  instigated. 

"  Serbia,"  writes  the  New  Europe,  "  has  the  choice,  either 
of  guiding  the  Jugoslav  movement  towards  union,  or  of 
remaining  a  little  Balkan  kingdom,  without  any  claim  to 
the  consideration  of  those  who  believe  that  the  complete 
unity  of  each  different  race  is  the  indispensable  preliminary 
to  the  formation  of  that  league  of  free  nations  which  will 
have  to  control  in  the  future  the  destinies  of  human  civili- 
zation.     If  Serbia  guides   the   Jugoslav    movement    in    a 


76  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

disinterested  fashion,  discarding  all  thoughts  of  '  pre- 
domination '  or  of  simple  '  annexations/  she  can  lay 
the  foundation  of  a  glorious  future  for  her  people  and  for 
all  her  brothers.  If  she  only  endeavours  to  enlarge  herself 
in  order  to  ensure  an  agreeable  existence,  she  must  run 
the  risk  of  failure  in  her  aims.  One  thing  is  certain,  and 
that  is  that  when  the  terms  of  peace  are  laid  down,  there 
will  be  no  place  for  '  annexations  '  or  ■  compensations/ 
Government  with  the  assent  of  the  governed,  that  will  be 
the  dominating  principle.  The  support  of  the  Allies  will 
only  be  accorded  on  a  basis  of  complete  unity,  and  this 
unity  must  be  obtained  not  by  conquest  but  by  voluntary 
consent." 

Never  has  an  adversary  of  Serbia  thrown  so  much 
suspicion  on  our  country  and  her  national  policy.  The 
editors  of  the  New  Europe  have  very  strange  ideas  if  they 
are  capable  of  supposing  for  a  single  instant  that  the  union 
of  our  brothers  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  of  Dalmatia,  of 
Croatia,  Slavonia,  Syrmia,  Banat,  Batchtka  and  of  the 
Slovene  countries  with  Serbia  could  be  designated  by  the 
name  of  "  annexation  "  or  "  compensation  "  !  We  regret 
exceedingly  that  such  thoughts  should  have  appeared  in 
a  review  which  proclaims  its  love  for  Serbia  and  the  Serbian 
people.  What  will  those  legendary  Serbian  heroes  say, 
those  last  remains  of  the  glorious  battalions,  who,  at  this 
very  moment,  are  in  the  act  of  freeing  their  little  country 
and  who  will  dash  forward  to-morrow,  as  they  have  done 
in  1914,  on  the  other  bank  of  the  Save,  of  the  Danube  and 
of  the  Drina,  in  order  to  rescue  their  brothers  from  the 
Austro-Magyar  clutches,  what  will  they  say  upon  learning 
that  there  are  in  London,  among  our  British  friends,  people 
who  give  that  the  name  of  conquest  and  annexation  ? 


The  Times  of  the  8th  October  has  repeated  the  accusa- 
tions of  the  New  Europe,  but  delivered  them  in  a  slightly 
different  form.  In  an  article  devoted  to  His  Royal  Highness 
the  Prince-Regent,  on  the  occasion  of  the  promotion  of  the 
Prince  to  the  rank  of  General,  The  Times  says  that 
the  Allies  ought  not  to  lend  an  ear  to  the  suggestions  of 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  77 

those  who  would  like  to  discard  the  Corfu  declaration  and 
adopt  the  narrow  principle  of  Serbian  imperialism  !  This 
implication  is  a  very  serious  one,  although  quite  without 
foundation.  It  would  be  desirable,  particularly  in  the 
interests  of  our  national  cause,  that  The  Times  should  name 
those  who  make  such  suggestions  and  that  it  should  indicate 
at  the  same  time  the  sources  of  its  information.  Serbia  is 
a  democratic  and  parliamentary  country  where  there  is 
no  room  for  secret  combinations.  As  to  the  national  pro- 
gramme of  Serbia,  "  only  superior  force  can  compel  Serbia 
to  content  herself  with  a  limited  Serbian  basis,  and  against 
this  force  Serbia  has  battled  in  the  past  with  all  her  strength, 
and  she  will  continue  also  to  battle  in  the  future  "  (Stoyan 
Protitch,  in  the  New  Europe  of  26th  September).  Instead 
then  of  unjustly  suspecting  Serbia  and  thus  injuring  the 
Jugoslav  Piedmont,  the  influential  editors  of  The  Times 
ought  rather  to  help  her  to  remove  for  ever  the  possibility 
of  that  superior  force  of  which  Mr.  Protitch  speaks.  A 
greater  service  to  the  Jugoslav  cause  could  not  be  rendered. 

October  21,  1918. 


Reply  of  Stoyan  Protitch  to  the  "  New  Europe." 

Corfu,  September  3,  1918. 
Seton  Watson,  Esquire,  London. 

Dear  Sir, 

I  have  just  read  your  article  "  Serbia's  Choice," 
which  appeared  in  the  New  Europe  of  the  22nd  August 
last.  Your  friendship,  your  sympathy,  your  work  on  behalf 
of  our  national  cause,  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  my  political 
past  career,  give  me,  I  think,  the  right  to  write  you  these 
few  words.  You  have,  my  dear  friend,  been  rather  taken 
in  regarding  this  affair. 

The  removal  of  the  Voivode  Putnik  was  necessitated 
by  his  physical  incapacity  for  work.  It  is  my  firm  belief 
that  this  should  have  been  done  much  sooner  and  then 
we  would  not  have  witnessed  the  unusual  and  unprecedented 
spectacle  of  the  Serbian  army  bearing  its  commander  on 
its  shoulders  instead  of  being  led  by  him.    More  than  a 


78  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

year  has  already  passed  since  the  Voivode  Putnik  first 
became  incapable  of  paying  a  single  visit  to  the  front.  It 
was  nothing  unusual  for  a  whole  week  to  pass  before  he 
would  take  an  urgent  decision.  For  the  change  in  his 
General  Staff  you  will  find  a  sufficient  reason  in  your  article 
itself.  The  group  "  Union  or  Death  "  had  obtained  a 
remarkable  influence  in  the  Voivode 's  circle.  We,  old 
Radicals,  or,  as  you  put  it,  the  Conservative  forces  of 
the  country,  have  always  fought  against  the  preponderance 
of  military  authorities  in  the  Government,  we  wished  and 
still  wish  that  civil  authority  should  have  the  upper  hand, 
and  that  it  should  be  the  sole  representative  of  the  will 
of  the  State  and  of  the  people.  The  "  Black  Hand,"  or 
the  group  of  officers  "  Union  or  Death,"  was  a  secret 
society  which  dealt  with  politics  and  desired  to  gain  for 
itself  a  predominating  influence  in  the  Government.  The 
Voivode  Putnik  himself  succumbed  to  this  influence  and 
his  great  authority  served  as  protection  to  the  members 
of  this  secret  society.  Colonel  Dimitrievitch  was  the  head 
of  the  "  Black  Hand."  It  is  he  who  protected  and  hid 
Malobabitch  ;  as  to  Malobabitch's  past,  you  can  ask  for 
information  from  Hinkovitch.  According  to  my  firm  belief, 
he  was  an  Austrian  spy.  In  any  case,  it  is  a  notorious 
fact  that  he  was  the  election  agent  of  the  Government  at 
the  time  of  the  elections  in  Croatia. 

None  of  the  accused  officers  have  made  any  complaint 
whatsoever  against  the  court  of  justice  or  the  judges. 

Throughout  the  crisis  His  Royal  Highness  the  Crown 
Prince  maintained  the  only  attitude  worthy  of  a  modern 
and  constitutional  sovereign. 

The  Opposition  had  not,  nor  has  it  to-day,  a  clearly 
defined  attitude  with  regard  to  the  officers  who  dealt  in 
politics  and  who  had  founded  the  "  Black  Hand."  In  the 
struggle  against  the  Government  and  the  Radical  Party, 
the  Opposition  threw  in  its  lot  with  the  "  Black  Hand  "  ; 
it  is  for  this  reason  that  the  Opposition  provoked  the  crisis 
of  July  1917,  in  spite  of  the  existence  of  an  expressly  written 
document  which  absolutely  prohibited  the  pardon  of  Dimit- 
rievitch. This  is  even  to-day  one  of  the  principal  obstacles 
in  the  way  of  concentration  of  political  forces. 


SERBIAN   POLITICS  79 

The  Opposition,  moreover,  shows  the  following  incon- 
sistency :  it  desires  concentration  and  coalition,  but  at 
the  same  time  it  excludes  Pachitch,  myself,  Lj.  Yovanovitch 
and  Andra  Nikolitch  whom  it  has  obliged,  in  a  vehement 
manner,  to  resign  the  chairmanship  of  the  national  Skoup- 
chtina.  Pachitch  is,  it  is  true,  advanced  in  years,  but  in 
mind  and  opinion  he  is  much  younger  than  many  of  those 
gentlemen  of  the  Opposition.  He  is  a  national  asset,  that 
no  wise  man  and  no  wise  group  would  wish  to  throw  away. 
To  our  great  regret  our  Opposition  has  done  so.  In  Pachitch's 
youthfulness  there  is  no  semi-Turkish  tradition  ;  on  the 
contrary,  in  this  youthfulness  there  are  revolutionary  and 
western  traditions,  just  as  one  finds  with  us,  the  Conser- 
vative forces.  In  the  Serbia  of  Karageorge  there  has 
never  been  room,  either  for  semi-Turkish  traditions  or  for 
semi-Austrian  traditions.  The  history  itself  of  the  Kings 
of  Serbia  proves  this,  and  that  is  why  Serbia  has  been  and 
still  is  the  standard-bearer  of  liberation  and  of  national 
unification.  She  is  the  personification,  if  you  like,  of  the 
great  revolutionary  principle.  You  yourself  must  have 
feared,  a  few  years  ago,  that  the  unification  and  liberation 
of  our  nation  could  not  be  realized  without  the  destruction 
of  Turkey,  which  is  nothing  but  a  military  camp  in  Europe, 
on  foreign  territory,  and  without  the  destruction  of  Austria, 
which  is  only  an  administration  and  not  a  State,  as  Mazzini 
has  said.  What  is  more  to  be  feared  is,  in  my  opinion, 
that  one  may  encounter  in  your  own  vicinity,  my  dear 
friend,  semi-Turkish  and  semi-Austrian  traditions,  hinder- 
ing the  realization  of  the  liberation  and  unification  of  our 
nation  on  the  basis  of  the  Declaration  of  Corfu,  which  Serbia 
only  wishes  to  consolidate  and  enlarge  and  by  no  means 
to  limit  or  to  weaken.  A  parliamentary  and  democratic 
Serbia,  that  is  the  best  guarantee  that  Piedmont  may 
become  immerged  in  Italy,  provided  always  that  Italy  is 
parliamentary  and  democratic.  In  Germany  the  greatest 
particularist  is  Prussia,  and  with  us  it  is  those  who  choose 
Prussia  as  a  model,  and  those  who  show  themselves  inclined 
to  form  in  our  united  kingdom  new  relations  modelled  upon 
those  which  exist  between  Hungary  and  Croatia. 

Serbia   can   only   be   constrained   by   superior   force   to 


80  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

content  herself  with  a  restricted  Serbian  base.  She  is, 
however,  fighting  against  this  force  by  every  possible  means, 
still  to-day  as  she  was  doing  yesterday  and  before  yester- 
day, and  as  she  will  do  to-morrow  and  after  to-morrow. 

While  being  at  your  disposal  for  any  other  information, 
which  you  can  always  verify,  as  well  as  for  any  discussion 
even  though  our  views  may  differ,  I  beg  you,  my  dear 
friend,  kindly  to  remember  this  :  Serbia  also  has  her  diffi- 
culties, like  all  the  others,  in  this  great  and  terrible  war  ; 
in  her  most  exceptional  and  delicate  situation  it  would  be 
rather  astonishing  if  they  were  not  even  greater  and  more 
serious.  Would  it  be  too  much  to  ask  of  her  tried  friends, 
of  which  you  are  one,  not  to  aggravate  these  difficulties 
by  such  ill-founded  criticisms.  I  leave  it  to  you  and  to 
our  other  good  English  friends  to  give  a  fair  answer  to  this 
question. 

I  am  sending  you  by  post  the  communique  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  26th  June-c;th  July  last,  concerning  the  last 
crisis. 

I  need  hardly  say  that  I  authorize  you  to  make  what 
use  you  think  fit  of  this  letter  with  my  signature. 

Your  devoted, 
(Signed)        Stoyan  M.  Protitch. 

November  4,  1918. 


CHAPTER    II 

THE    UNION    OF   SERBIANS,    CROATIANS   AND 
SLOVENES 


Serbia  and  the  Southern  Slav  Union. 

An  official  communique  announced  the  other  day  that  the 
Serbian  troops,  after  violent  combats  on  heights  reaching 
to  2,700  metres,  have  repulsed  the  Bulgarians  and  Germans 
and  driven  them  across  the  frontier.  Our  brave  soldiers 
have  made  a  victorious  entry  into  Serbian  territory  that 
an  unjust  fate  had  obliged  them  to  abandon  for  a  time  last 
winter.  "  Freed  Serbia  now  comprises  200  square  kilo- 
metres, seven  villages  and  a  frontier  of  45  kilometres." 
It  is  with  these  words,  modest  and  at  the  same  time  full  of 
pride,  that  the  Serbian  staff  has  announced  the  first  victory, 
the  first  step  towards  the  realization  of  complete  liberty. 
After  4  years  of  war,  entailing  inestimable  losses,  after 
terrible  ravages  cased  by  epidemics,  after  the  tragic  retreat 
through  Albania,  whose  horrors  are  not  yet  sufficiently 
known,  the  Serbian  army,  reduced  in  numbers  but  inspired 
by  the  same  spirit  of  sacrifice  and  abnegation,  continues  the 
struggle.  The  last  able-bodied  sons  of  faithful  and  heroic 
Serbia,  do  not  hesitate  to  offer  their  lives  to  save  their  mother 
country.  This  unique  spectacle  of  a  people  struggling  to 
the  death,  in  the  literal  sense  of  the  words,  is  the  proof  of 
the  determination  of  the  Serbian  nation  to  go  on  to  the  end, 
to  obtain  a  complete  deliverance,  that  is  to  say  the  union 
of  all  the  Southern  Slavs  into  one  free  and  independent 
State. 

History  can  already  furnish  examples  of  nations  paying 
for  their  national  unity  with  their  blood.     But  the  efforts 

ij  81 


82  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

of  the  Serbian  people,  the  sacrifices  they  have  made,  and 
continue  to  make,  in  order  to  assure  their  independence  and 
to  free  their  Serbian,  Croatian  and  Slovene  brethren  from 
a  foreign  yoke,  surpass  all  that  has  been  seen  up  to  this  time, 
and  in  the  presence  of  this  spectacle,  so  tragic  from  the 
human  point  of  view,  so  noble  and  so  significant  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  destinies  of  nations,  the  friends 
and  the  enemies  of  our  nation  will  be  able  to  understand 
why  Serbia  maintains  this  life  and  death  struggle.  The 
communiques  speak  of  square  kilometres  set  free,  but 
Serbian  blood  shed  in  torrents  indicates  the  aim,  the  only 
possible,  the  only  conceivable  aim,  the  complete  and  total 
liberation  of  our  nation. 

Serbia  did  not  desire  the  war.  The  struggle  was  forced 
on  our  people  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  which, 
seconded  and  urged  on  by  Germany,  proposed  to  break  the 
national  strength  of  Serbia,  to  nip  in  the  bud  the  develop- 
ment of  a  free  Serbia  and,  by  the  German  advance  towards 
the  East,  to  render  impossible  all  attempts  of  the  Southern 
Slavs  to  disengage  themselves  from  the  grasp  of  the  Austro- 
Magyars.  But  Serbia  would  not  submit  tamely.  She 
defended  herself,  and  the  Allied  powers — who  were  not  slow 
to  perceive  the  danger  they  themselves  ran  should  Germany 
and  Austro-Hungary  realize  their  plan  of  reaching  Salonica, 
Constantinople,  Bagdad,  Egypt — took  up  the  contest  likewise. 
Thus  began  the  great  war  in  which  the  forces  of  Germanism 
measure  themselves  against  the  resistance  of  the  Latin- 
Slavs  and  from  which  Europe  must  emerge  purified  from 
the  mediaeval  spirit  of  certain  monarchs,  freed  from  Prussian 
militarism  and  democratized  internationally.  With  the 
framework  of  this  general  programme,  the  Serbian  or 
Southern  Slav  question  presents  itself  as  one  of  the  principal 
elements  of  the  regeneration  of  Europe.  The  unity  of  the 
Southern  Slavs  is  thus  not  a  theory,  a  sentiment  or  an 
idealist  aspiration.  It  is  one  of  the  aims  of  the  present  war. 
It  is  not  only  from  a  sociological  point  of  view  that  the  reunion 
of  the  Southern  Slavs  justifies  itself,  not  only  by  the  com- 
munity of  race,  of  language,  of  aspirations,  but  it  is  above 
all  from  a  political  standpoint  that  the  Southern  Slav  question 
demands  solution.     If  the  war  ends  in  a  draw,  if  the  status 


SERBIANS,  CROATIANS,  AND  SLOVENES        83 

quo  is  re-established,  Europe  will  have  no  more  peace. 
The  German  forces,  kept  in  check  for  the  moment,  will 
seize  the  first  favourable  opportunity  of  attempting  again 
what  they  have  failed  to  do  in  the  present  war.  Such  a 
prospect  would  be  sad  enough  but  nothing  could  then  be 
done  to  save  humanity  from  another  war,  still  longer  and  more 
frightful.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Allies  crush  Germany 
and  force  her  to  a  peace,  which  must  be  a  firm  and  lasting 
peace,  the  conclusion  of  such  a  peace  would  necessarily 
imply  the  liberation  of  the  Southern  Slavs  from  all  foreign 
domination. 

Serbia  has  always  been  aware  of  the  gravity  of  what  is 
at  stake ;  if  she  had  wished  to  consider  only  her  territorial 
integrity,  she  might  have  accepted  the  repeated  offers  of  a 
separate  peace  that  have  been  made  to  her.  Even  under  the 
hardest  trials  Serbia  did  not  flinch  and  would  not  bow  before 
the  German  mailed  fist.  The  Serbian  nation  wishes  to  be 
free,  whole,  and  united  to  her  Croatian  and  Slovene  brothers. 
It  is  in  view  of  this  union  that  she  sheds  the  last  drops  of 
her  blood.  Thus  one  should  cease,  if  not  from  conviction, 
at  least  out  of  respect  for  her  glorious  soldiers,  to  talk 
about  the  "  integrity  M  of  Serbia  or  of  her  "  outlets  "  on  the 
Adriatic.  The  Serbian  people  bleed  for  their  integrity  and 
they  claim  that  it  shall  be  absolutely  complete. 

October  15,  1916. 

The  German  Solutions  of  the  Southern  Slav 
Question. 

For  some  time  the  Southern  Slav  question  has  been  pre- 
occupying the  Austro-Magyar-German  publicists  and  politi- 
cians in  an  alarming  manner.  The  persevering  declarations 
of  the  Southern  Slav  deputies  to  the  Austrian  Parliament, 
claiming  nothing  less  than  political  independence,  have 
produced  visible  uneasiness  in  the  ruling  circles  of  Central 
Europe.  The  Central  Powers  went  to  war  in  order  to  solve, 
in  the  German  sense,  not  only  the  Southern  Slav  question, 
but  the  whole  Balkan  and  Asiatic  Eastern  question.  The 
concrete  form  of  the  solution  was  worked  out  by  the  staff 
at  Berlin,  while  the  theoretical  side  was  treated  by  Friedrich 


84  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

Naumann  in  his  famous  work  on  Mitteleuropa.  It  only 
needed  German  victory  to  realize  this  vast  project  of  the 
hegemony  not  only  of  Europe  but  of  the  world.  But 
the  victory  has  miscarried  and  the  questions  raised  by  the 
German  war  are  in  process  of  receiving  different  solutions 
from  those  foreseen  and  prepared  by  German  aggression. 
That  is  what  determines  some  Germans  to  change  their 
tactics  and  begin  to  plead  in  favour  of  solutions  less  brutal, 
but  not  differing  perceptibly  from  the  original  projects. 
They  wish  to  preserve  German  power  over  Slav  peoples 
and  with  this  object  in  view  they  are  ready  to  sacrifice  the 
form,  to  change  the  exterior.  But  the  Southern  Slavs  will 
not  be  taken  in  by  these  new  snares,  that  is  a  foregone  con- 
clusion. To-day  new  German  plans  fill  the  columns  of  the 
German  press.  We  do  not  mean  the  fantasies  of  Mr.  Danzer 
who  simply  wishes  to  annex  Serbia  ;  we  are  thinking  of  the 
small  number  of  shrewd  Germans  and  Austrians  who  reckon 
with  realities.  The  Austrian  deputy  Zenker  continues  his 
campaign  in  favour  of  an  Austrian  Jugoslav  State  which, 
while  nominally  an  autonomous  Slav  formation,  would 
follow  the  path  traced  by  the  German  leaders.  "  The 
definite  solution  of  the  Croat-Serbian  question " — writes 
Zenker  in  the  Dresdner  Anzeiger — "  ought  to  be  one  of  the 
strongest  corner  stones  of  a  lasting  peace.  That  is  why  it 
is  of  the  most  vital  interest  for  us  in  Austria  and  Germany, 
that  this  question  should  not  be  settled  against  us.  .  .  .  The 
Southern  Slav  union,  outside  the  Monarchy  and  against  it, 
would  create  a  situation  unbearable  even  for  Germany, 
because  the  new  Slav  state  would  hold  in  her  power  all  the 
keys  to  the  doors  of  the  East,  and  the  Adriatic  ports  as 
well  as  the  railways  to  Constantinople  would  be  in  the  hands 
of  Great  Serbia." 

Mr.  Zenker  declares  that  he  does  not  wish  to  do  any 
injury  to  Serbia  nor  to  the  other  Southern  Slav  States  and 
assures  us  that  it  would  be  in  the  interest  of  our  nation  to 
form  an  integral  part  of  the  Empire  of  the  Habsburgs. 
Another  German,  Hermann  Wendel,  a  member  of  the  Reich- 
stag, better  informed  as  to  the  Serbian  character  and  men- 
tality, only  proposes  a  customs  union  of  Serbia  with  Austria- 
Hungary  and  the  improvement  of  the  situation  of  the  Southern 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND   SLOVENES        85 

Slavs  within  the  Monarchy.  A  Magyar  democrat,  Oskar 
Jaszi,  pronounces  himself  also  in  favour  of  the  Southern 
Slav  union,  but  joined  to  Hungary  and  under  the  Magyar 
protectorate.  The  Austrian  and  Hungarian  socialists  on 
their  side,  promise  democracy  to  every  one,  with  the  express 
reservation  that  Austria  shall  be  preserved !  There  is 
only  one  small  Austrian  socialist  minority,  anonymous, 
moreover,  that  does  not  consider  the  existence  of  Austria 
as  a  political  dogma.  All  these  manifestations  of  Germanism, 
open  or  disguised,  malevolent  or  benevolent,  suspicious  or 
sincere,  that  are  noted  in  this  number,  should  attract  the 
full  attention  of  democratic  Europe.  Our  Allies  should 
not  lose  sight  of  the  solution  "  in  reserve  "  nor  of  the  lines 
"  prepared  beforehand  "  of  the  political  retreat  of  the  Ger- 
mans. The  Southern  Slavs  are  struggling  for  their  lives, 
but  they  are  also  struggling  for  Europe  and  her  peace. 
The  Southern  Slav  question  is  eminently  a  European  question 
and  it  is  in  the  solution  of  this  question  that  the  victory  over 
Germanism  should  be  reflected.  No  guarantees  of  peace 
are  possible  without  the  liberation  of  the  Southern  Slavs 
from  the  German-Magyar  yoke.  The  Serbian  people,  victims 
of  a  premeditated  aggression,  have  sacrificed  even  their 
country  rather  than  submit  to  Germanic  power.  They  have 
the  right  to  expect  that  dangerous  delusions  of  benighted 
minds  should  not  hinder  the  accomplishment  of  a  work 
demanded  by  morality  and  justice  in  the  interests  of 
humanity  and  civilization. 

July  8,  1917. 


Falsification  of  the  Southern  Slav  Idea. 

The  Southern  Slav  question  has  forced  itself  on  the 
attention  of  Europe.  Before  the  war,  the  general  public 
was  in  the  habit  of  placing  all  the  Balkan  peoples  in  the  same 
basket  ;  it  confused  the  Czechs  of  Bohemia  with  the  Tziganes 
and  saw  in  the  empire  of  the  Habsburgs  only  Germans, 
Magyars  and  Poles.  The  general  public  knows  to-day  that 
Austria-Hungary  is  "  a  Slav  building  with  a  German  fron- 
tage." Still  better,  the  world  conflagration  has  brought 
to  light  the  aspirations  of  the  Czecho-Slovaks,  the  Southern 


86  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

Slavs,  the  Poles,  the  Ruthenians,  the  Roumanians  and  the 
Trentins.  It  is  known  that  the  Slovenes,  the  Croatians 
and  the  Serbians  form  one  and  the  same  people,  whose  ideal 
is  to  be  united  to  the  Serbians  of  Serbia  and  of  Montenegro 
in  an  independent  State. 

It  is  necessary  to  recall  that  the  future  Southern  Slav 
State,  as  conceived  by  the  manifesto  of  Corfu,  realizes  all 
the  conditions  of  a  visible  entity.  Unfortunately  this  union 
of  all  the  Slavs  of  the  South,  which  for  centuries  haunted 
the  imagination  of  the  Southern  Slav  intellectuals  and  which 
ended  by  becoming  the  ideal  of  the  great  mass  of  the  people, 
this  union  is  hindered  by  one  obstacle  :  namely,  the  Habs- 
burg  State. 

Lord  of  the  majority  of  the  Southern  Slav,  Francis- 
Joseph  formerly  expected  to  be  able  to  bring  about  a  union 
in  his  own  fashion,  by  introducing  the  principality  of  Serbia 
into  the  framework  of  his  empire.  Such  an  annexation  by 
gentle  means  clashed  with  the  indomitable  spirit  of  indepen- 
dence of  the  Serbian  people  who  desired  the  union  with  Serbia 
and  not  with  the  Monarchy.  Because  nationalism  was 
reviving  in  the  Jugoslav  territories,  the  Habsburg  govern- 
ment endeavoured  to  stifle  the  idea  of  union  by  dividing 
the  mass  of  the  people — j\  million  souls — into  eleven  distinct 
administrations,  with  fourteen  different  legislations ;  the 
scission  was  completed  and  reinforced  by  an  artificial 
opposition  of  the  Catholic  Croatians  to  the  Orthodox  and 
Mussulman  Serbians. 

The  Serbian  victory  in  the  economic  war  against  the 
Monarchy,  and  especially  the  glorious  Balkan  campaign, 
had  aroused  such  enthusiasm  amongst  the  Slavs  of  the  South 
that  Austria-Hungary,  tyrannical  and  mediaeval,  could 
not  fail  to  take  offence  at  Serbia,  become  the  Piedmont,  the 
centre  of  attraction  of  Jugoslavism  and  the  incarnation 
of  the  idea  of  national  unity.  Rather  than  abandon  his 
old  policy,  of  "  divide  to  rule,"  the  autocrat  of  Vienna  had 
recourse  to  violent  means,  to  war,  which  by  strangling 
independent  Serbia,  should  annihilate  the  idea  of  which 
she  was  the  living  symbol.  Never  did  men  more  completely 
lack  psychology  and  fail  to  follow  the  trend  of  the  age  than 
did  Francis-Joseph  and  his  advisers.      Serbia  was  invaded, 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND  SLOVENES       87 

trodden  under  foot,  the  Jugoslav  peoples  were  tortured, 
massacred,  but  the  ideal  remained  victorious  and  avenging. 

By  the  declaration  of  May  30,  1917,  the  Jugoslavs 
acquainted  the  Parliament  of  Vienna  with  their  unanimous 
desire  to  be  united  freely  into  an  independent  state  under 
the  sceptre  of  the  Habsburgs.  This  was  only  a  provisional 
and  temporary  formula  and  the  true  and  definite  formula 
appeared  in  subsequent  declarations,  in  which  the  Pact  of 
Corfu  is  regarded  as  the  ideal  realization  of  the  projected 
union  and  the  independent  Jugoslav  State  is  placed 
outside  the  limits  of  the  Monarchy.  Such  is,  for  example, 
the  memorial  addressed  on  January  31,  1918,  by  the  Jugo- 
slav Club  of  the  Reichsrat  to  the  German,  Austro-Hungarian, 
Russian  and  Ukrainian  negotiators  at  the  conference  of 
Brest- Lit  owsk. 

From  Ossiek  to  Lioubliana  (Laibach),  from  Mostar  to 
Zagreb  (Agram),  from  Tselovetz  (Klagenfurt)  to  Rieka 
(Fiume),  there  were  manifestations  in  favour  of  Jugo- 
slav unity,  with  cries  of  "  Long  live  Serbia  !  "  "  Long  live 
King  Peter  !  "  "  Long  live  Trumbitch  !  "  Austria-Hungary 
finds  herself  incapable  of  stemming  the  impetuous  flood  of 
the  triumphant,  national  idea.  After  four  years  of  an 
exhausting  war  she  is  obliged  to  reckon  with  the  Jugoslav 
question.  Necessity  is  the  mother  of  invention  and  the 
untractable  Dual  Monarchy  which  no  longer  dares  to  ward 
off  the  peril  by  "  gallows  and  prisons,"  offers  now  to  make 
concessions,  which  she  is  prepared,  according  to  a  tradition 
dear  to  the  Habsburgs,  to  withdraw  as  soon  as  the  danger  is 
past.  From  the  negotiations  held  between  Vienna  and 
Budapest,  this  delightful  plan  issues :  To  balance  the 
attachment  of  the  future  Poland  to  Austria,  Hungary,  by 
the  union  with  Dalmatia  and  Croatia-Slavonia,  by  the  total 
acquisition  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  which  is  actually  common 
territory,  would  become  mistress  of  the  greater  part  of  the 
Jugoslav  territory,  for  this  plan  of  union  in  the  protecting 
bosom  of  Hungary  does  not  exclude  an  annexation  of  that 
part  of  Serbia  which  has  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  Monarchy. 
However,  this  caricature  of  a  Great  Croatia  is  contrary  to 
the  wish  of  the  overwhelming  majority  of  Croatians  who 
place  the  idea  of  an  integral  union  above  a  regional  partic- 


88  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

ularism.  It  goes  without  saying  that  a  certain  number  of 
different  interpretations  might  be  grafted  on  to  the  original 
project.  But  all  these  plans  have  only  one  aim  :  to  deceive 
Europe  and  the  Jugoslavs.  For  the  Jugoslavs  know 
their  masters  too  well  to  be  taken  in  once  more.  They  will 
not  modify  by  one  iota  their  formula  :  "  full  union  outside 
the  Habsburg  limits/'  It  is  consequently  impossible  for 
them  to  accept  any  of  the  solutions  proposed  by  Vienna  or 
Budapest,  for  full  union  must  unite  the  Slovene  territories, 
retained  by  the  Germans  as  means  of  access  to  the 
Adriatic,  and  it  can  have  nothing  in  common  with  the  dual 
Monarchy. 

Although  incomplete,  the  recent  Declaration  of  Versailles 
is,  however,  a  compliance  of  the  Entente  with  the  legitimate 
aspirations  of  the  three-named  Jugoslav  people  and  of  her 
dear  Czecho-Slovak  brothers. 

As  a  Croatian  newspaper  wrote  recently  :  "  Only  a 
single  idea  stands  out,  the  new  times  have  not  changed 
them."  The  Habsburgs  have  learnt  nothing  and  forgotten 
nothing.  Their  methods  are  out  of  date,  their  tricks  are 
discovered,  the  eyes  of  the  Slav  are  opened,  he  knows  his 
enemy  and  will  resist  him  until  the  general  peace  which  alone 
will  decide  his  fate. 

June  29,  1918. 

The  Southern  Slav  Question  and  the  Allies. 

The  Southern  Slav  question  has  developed  and  come  to 
maturity  independently  of  the  great  European  policy. 
Not  long  ago  this  question,  as  a  whole,  was  considered 
Utopian,  pernicious  to  the  maintenance  of  the  existing 
political  situation  and  it  was  only  taken  into  account  to  be 
set  down  as  a  negative  and  unimportant  phenomenon.  The 
burden  of  such  an  erroneous  conception  of  our  national 
question  fell  with  all  its  weight  upon  Serbia.  It  was  upon 
small  and  weak  Serbia  that  the  task  devolved  of  freeing  our 
national  cradle,  our  classical  Fatherland  :  Macedonia.  Serbia, 
while  honourably  acquitting  herself  of  the  task,  was  hindered 
by  the  complexity  of  interests  of  the  Powers,  which  since 
the  Congress  of  Berlin  guarded  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND   SLOVENES       89 

Empire  considering  that  to  be  an  absolute  and  indispensable 
necessity. 

Then  Serbians  had  also  to  think  of  her  sons  living  under 
the  domination  of  Austria-Hungary.  In  so  far  as  that  con- 
cerned the  solution  of  this  question,  all  Europe  showed  her- 
self inflexible  towards  the  national  aspirations  of  Serbia. 
The  archaical  and  chimerical  dogma  according  to  which  the 
double  Monarchy  must  be  preserved  in  the  interests  of 
European  equilibrium,  had  sapped  the  foundations  of  the 
realization  of  our  national  aspirations.  The  Congress  of 
Berlin  had  placed  the  fate  of  the  Southern  Slav  Piedmont, 
of  Serbia,  in  the  hands  of  Austria-Hungary,  so  that  the  ques- 
tion of  our  national  unity  lay  at  the  mercy  of  our  worst 
enemy,  Austria-Hungary.  Europe  had  thus  condemned 
Serbia  to  the  following  dilemma  :  either  to  perish  or  consent 
to  be  the  vassal,  the  vanguard  of  Germanism.  And  Serbia 
chose  the  first  possibility  by  not  only  refusing  to  be  the 
vanguard  of  Germanism  but  by  proposing  to  be  the  barrier 
against  it. 

In  1908  we  had  made  Europe  realize  that  there  existed 
a  national  question  which  ought  to  be  examined  :  the 
Southern  Slav  question.  Serbia's  energetic  protestation 
against  annexation  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  had  aroused 
Europe  from  her  inertia  and  shaken  the  frail  edifice 
of  the  double  Monarchy.  But  all  the  same,  Europe 
did  not  understand  the  significance  of  this  national 
movement. 

The  wars  of  1912-1913  proved  to  our  friends  and  to  our 
foes  the  real  value  of  the  Southern  Slav  Piedmont,  Serbia. 
The  years  1912  and  1913  made  Vienna  and  Berlin  understand 
the  danger  of  the  apparition  of  the  Southern  Slav  question. 
The  monster  State  of  Germano-Magyar  dualism  which 
exists  at  the  expense  of  the  oppressed  Slav  peoples,  must 
of  necessity  break  up,  which  was  proved  indeed  by  the 
fermentation  in  the  south  of  the  Monarchy  that  manifested 
itself  on  the  eve  of  1914.  The  Southern  Slav  tendencies 
which  became  an  important  question  of  the  day,  were  a  sure 
symptom  of  the  partition  that  threatened  the  Monarchy. 

The  manifesto  of  the  Serbian  Parliament  of  1914  which 
aimed   at   the  creation   of  an  independent   Southern   Slav 


90  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

State,  which  would  unite  all  the  Serbians,  Croatians  and 
Slovenes,  was  not  rightly  understood  in  the  political  circles 
of  our  Allies.  However,  before  this  manifesto,  at  the  very 
beginning  of  the  war,  Austria-Hungary  set  to  work  to  exter- 
minate the  Southern  Slav  intellectual  classes  who  might 
serve  as  guides  to  the  people.  All  the  Southern  Slav  intellec- 
tuals whom  Austria-Hungary  judged  capable  of  working 
for  the  emancipation  of  the  people,  found  a  place  on  the 
bench  of  those  accused  of  "  high  treason  "  and  were  thrown 
into  prison. 

When  we  think  of  our  Russian  brothers,  it  does  not 
seem  astonishing  to  us  that  our  English  and  French  friends 
should  not  have  perceived  this  lamentable  situation,  during 
the  first  year  of  the  war.  When  our  politicians,  working  for 
our  national  unity,  had  made  known  to  the  Russian  public 
the  ideas  of  Southern  Slav  national  unity,  the  "  Slav  circles  " 
of  Russia  treated  us  as  imperialists,  evidently  not  knowing 
that  the  unity  of  the  Southern  Slav  people  is  no  more 
"  imperialist  "  than  was  the  unity  of  the  Italian  people. 

It  is  only  after  three  years  of  effort,  of  struggle,  of  super- 
human sufferings  and  of  immense  sacrifices,  that  the  public 
opinion  of  our  Allies  begins  to  get  a  clear  idea  of  the  legiti- 
macy and  justice  of  our  national  unity.  But  public  opinion 
is  separated  from  the  cabinets  of  ministers  by  a  distance 
which  has  still  to  be  bridged.  To  demonstrate  the  accuracy 
of  this  opinion  we  shall  refer  to  the  Polish  question,  drawing 
a  parallel  between  it  and  ours. 

The  Southern  Slav  and  Polish  questions  bear  a  strong 
resemblance  to  each  other  ;  they  are  nearly  identical  as  regards 
their  interior  aspect  and  their  importance  from  a  national 
point  of  view.  Still,  the  Polish  question  passed  long  ago 
from  public  opinion  to  the  real  policy  of  the  allied  cabinets. 
The  deliverance  and  unity  of  the  Polish  people  have  found 
a  place  in  the  programme  of  all  the  Allies  as  an  essential 
condition  of  peace.  It  is  not  the  result  of  sympathy  for 
the  noble  Polish  people,  but  rather  the  result  of  a  clear  and 
just  conception  of  the  Polish  question.  A  great  and  strong 
Poland  is  necessary  to 'the  Allies  :  a  free  and  united  Poland 
must  prevent  the  German  penetration  into  the  Eastern  Slav 
countries.     The  necessity  of  creating  such  a  Poland  has  made 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND  SLOVENES       91 

itself  felt  especially  since  the  revolution  in  Russia  ;  the 
Russian  patriots  as  well  as  the  socialists  are  quite  well  aware 
of  it.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  every  one  considers  the  restitu- 
tion of  Belgium  and  of  Serbia  with  Montenegro,  the  return 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France,  and  the  reconstitution  of 
Poland  as  the  minimum  of  the  revendications  of  the  Allies. 

The  Southern  Slav  question  does  not  thus  form  a  part  of 
the  minimum  programme  of  the  Allies,  but  it  belongs  to  the 
number  of  questions  to  be  solved,  to  the  number  of  questions 
which  will  be  settled  by  the  realization  of  the  principle 
in  virtue  of  which  the  peoples  are  free  to  dispose  of  themselves. 
This  principle  has  its  real  base  in  the  decision  of  the  Allies 
to  end  this  struggle  only  with  victory,  in  the  programme  of 
the  Republic  over-seas,  in  our  firm  intention  to  carry  out 
our  national  emancipation  to  the  end,  in  the  sympathy  of 
our  Allies  for  our  just  and  lawful  cause.  However,  it  is 
necessary,  it  is  indispensable,  that  our  Allies  should  have  a 
clear  and  just  conception  of  the  real  advantage  they  will 
derive  from  our  deliverance  and  our  national  unity. 

The  resistance  of  Serbia  to  the  military  penetration  of 
the  Austro-German  troops  is  for  the  Allies  an  epic  heroism,  a 
great  episode  of  the  war.  It  was  at  the  moment  when  Serbia 
succumbed  to  the  triple  enemy  invasion  that  one  realized 
the  true  and  great  importance  that  the  little  Serbian  front 
possessed  for  the  Allies.  That  alone  would  suffice  to  prove 
that  a  Southern  Slav  State  of  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes 
is  called  upon  to  play  a  part  as  important  as  that  of  Poland. 
A  Southern  Slav  State  in  the  south  will  have  the  same 
importance  for  the  Allies  as  a  Poland  in  the  north  ;  our 
task  is  to  convince  the  Allies  of  it  and  then  we  may  consider 
our  national  question  as  having  triumphed  over  the  errors 
that  our  friends  and  Allies  have  laboured  under  up  till  now. 

When  a  just  conception  of  the  importance  of  a  Southern 
Slav  State  has  been  formed,  all  the  compromises  concluded 
to  our  detriment  will  no  longer  be  justifiable  and  will  conse- 
quently have  to  be  annulled.  Neither  from  a  practical  nor 
a  moral  point  of  view  will  it  be  possible  to  demand  now,  in 
order  to  fulfil  some  compromise,  that  the  integrity  of  the 
Polish  people  should  be  mutilated  ;  why  then  should  it  be 
possible   to   demand   it   with   regard    to    our    people    and 


92  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

especially  while  we  are  waging  war  in  common  with  our  Allies  ? 
We  deserve  to  be  treated  with  equity  and  justice  by  the 
Allies.  It  is  in  their  own  interest,  to  be  fair  to  us  at 
the  moment  of  solving  our  national  problem. 

February  2,  1918. 

The  Declaration  of  Versailles. 

The  Southern  Slav  question  progresses.  This  unques- 
tionable fact  can  be  gathered  from  the  manifestations  and 
events  of  these  last  days.  After  the  congress  of  oppressed 
nationalities  at  Rome,  the  official  declaration  of  Lansing, 
saying  that  the  national  aspirations  of  the  Czechs  and 
Southern  Slavs  meet  with  the  liveliest  sympathy  at  Washing- 
ton, came  at  the  right  moment  to  throw  more  light  on  the 
vague  formula  of  national  autonomies.  The  Declarations  of 
Versailles,  too,  have  taken  a  step  forward.  The  Allied  govern- 
ments, associating  themselves  with  the  manifestation  at 
Washington,  have  expressed  the  same  sympathy  for  the 
Czecho-Slovak  and  Southern  Slav  aspirations  towards 
liberty.  If  there  were  no  clear,  precise  and  categorical 
postulate  concerning  Poland,  one  could  not  but  heartily 
applaud  this  official  declaration  about  the  Southern  Slavs, 
which  connects  itself  after  so  much  hesitation  with  the  Allied 
Note  of  January  10,  1917.  The  distinction  drawn  between 
Poland  on  the  one  hand,  and  Jugoslavia  and  Bohemia  on  the 
other,  obliges  us  to  examine  the  situation  more  closely. 
And  that  in  order  to  discern,  if  necessary,  what  lies  beneath 
the  surface.  The  jubilations  of  the  Neue  Freie  Presse  of 
June  nth,  saying  that  the  Declaration  of  Versailles 
throws  cold  water  on  the  creators  of  Southern  Slav  and 
Czecho-Slovak  States,  seem  to  us  to  be  as  unjustifiable  as  is 
the  unconditional  approbation  expressed  by  a  part  of  the 
Allied  press.  Let  us  make,  like  the  Council  of  Versailles,  a 
distinguo. 

Considered  from  a  purely  political  point  of  view  and 
judged  according  to  all  that  has  preceded  it,  the  Declaration 
of  Versailles  only  represents  in  reality  one  stage  in  the 
evolution  of  the  ideas  of  liberty  to  which  the  war  has  given 
birth.     As  such  we  greet  it  with  the  greatest  satisfaction. 


SERBIANS,    CROATIANS,    AND   SLOVENES       93 

If  the  Declaration  of  Versailles  was,  on  the  contrary,  the  last 
word  of  the  Allied  Powers,  if  it  expressed  their  definite 
formula,  then  we  should  have  the  most  serious  objections 
to  make.  The  tactics  to  be  adopted  differ  according  to  the 
countries  and  the  special  circumstances.  We,  mere  onlookers, 
who  do  not  possess  the  faculties  necessary  in  order  to  judge 
objectively  a  concrete  action,  are  the  last  to  wish  to 
criticize  a  priori  the  expediency  of  an  attitude  determined 
by  questions  of  ways  and  means.  But  from  the  moment 
that  final  aims  and  definite  solutions  are  in  question,  the 
situation  changes  and  it  is  our  duty  to  give  warnings  and 
make  reserves.  In  the  present  case,  in  spite  of  the  errors  and 
the  many  illusions  of  Allied  diplomacy,  we  cannot  think 
there  is  a  question  of  anything  else  but  tactics,  which  that 
do  not  injure  in  any  way  the  principle  of  the  complete  inde- 
pendence of  the  peoples  and  more  especially  of  the  Southern 
Slavs.  One  may  judge  tactics  as  one  likes,  but  they  must 
not  be  confused  with  the  ideal  whose  realization  is  sought 
after.  Thus  we  see  in  the  Declarations  of  Versailles  a  power- 
ful encouragement  to  our  struggle  for  national  independence, 
and  our  faith  in  the  Allies  has  become  greater  and  stronger. 

The  leading  idea  in  the  work  of  liberation  of  peoples 
must  remain  steadfastly  the  same.  The  Allies  have  no 
interest  in  granting  privileges  to  some  and  in  neglecting 
others.  As  regards  Poland,  all  the  Slav  efforts  tended  up 
to  now  to  obtain  from  the  Poles  a  policy  of  solidarity.  The 
tempting  promises  from  Vienna,  made  lately  to  the  Poles 
with  the  view  of  separating  them  from  the  Southern  Slavs 
and  Czecho-Slovaks,  seem  doomed  to  complete  failure,  to 
judge  from  the  resolution  voted  by  the  assembly  at  Cracow. 
The  Allied  declaration  on  Poland  would  certainly  have 
gained  in  strength  and  importance  if  it  had  been  accom- 
panied by  similar  declarations  on  the  Southern  Slavs  and 
Czecho-Slovaks.  All  is  linked  together  and  a  really  free 
Poland  is  only  possible  if  the  other  national  states  beside  her 
are  free  and  independent.  If  Poland,  once  united,  were  to 
remain  wedged  in  between  Germany  and  Austria,  her  fate 
would  be  the  same  as  that  of  Belgium.  She  would  be  always 
at  the  mercy  of  the  German  Staff.  The  Southern  Slav 
question  is  in  a  certain  measure  more  advanced  than  that  of 


94  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

Poland.  As  the  Southern  Slav  State  is  to  be  formed  round  the 
Kingdom  of  Serbia,  the  much  tried  home  of  the  resistance 
to  German  penetration,  on  the  basis  laid  down  by  the  mani- 
festo of  Corfu,  it  would  have  been  preferable,  precisely  for 
tactical  reasons,  to  employ  a  clearer  and  firmer  language. 
At  the  moment  when  the  Magyar  lords  are  preparing  calmly 
to  appropriate  Bosnia-Herzegovina  and  Dalmatia,  calling 
it,  with  unheard  of  cynicism,  the  "  solution "  of  the 
Southern  Slav  question,  the  Declaration  of  Versailles  ought 
to  have  recalled  the  act  of  Corfu,  to  show  that  the  liberty 
promised  to  the  Southern  Slavs  by  the  Allies  will  have 
no  connection  with  the  Monarchy  of  the  Habsburgs. 

June  22,  1918. 

Mr   Balfour  and  the  Southern  Slav  Question. 

The  remarkable  speech  delivered  by  Mr.  Balfour  at  the 
inaugural  meeting  of  the  National  Serbian  Committee 
represents  a  step  forward  in  the  evolution  of  British 
conceptions.  By  this  speech  Mr.  Balfour  has  indeed 
emerged  from  general  formulas  to  come  into  close  touch 
with  the  Czech  and  Southern  Slav  problems.  For  a 
responsible  Minister  of  Great  Britain,  who  holds  in  his  hands 
the  political  direction  of  the  Allied  war,  it  is  no  small  matter 
to  express  himself  in  a  definite  manner  on  questions  which, 
for  the  British  public,  have  still  to  come  to  maturity.  If 
we  also  take  into  account  the  special  qualities  of  Mr.  Balfour, 
his  philosophical  inclinations,  we  shall  neither  find  his  words 
obscure  nor  his  conclusions  equivocal.  The  whole  con- 
struction of  his  thoughts  leads  inevitably  to  a  single  result  : 
the  political  and  moral  necessity^ for  Europe  to  proceed 
to  the  liberation  of  the  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary  and  to 
their  constitution  into  freehand  independent  States.  For 
the  Serbo-Croats  and  Slovenes,  the  speech  of  Mr.  Balfour 
signifies  the  complete  acceptance  by  Great  Britain  of  the 
Serbian  point  of  view,  the  unqualified  approbation  of  the 
general  aspirations  of  all  the  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes, 
and  the  forecast,  we  may  dare  to  hope,  of  promises  and 
engagements  still  more  formal,  still  more  pronounced. 

The  guiding  principles  contained  in  the  four  points  read 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND  SLOVENES       95 

by  Mr.  Wickham  Steed,  express  our  whole  programme. 
The  independence  and  the  union  of  the  Southern  Slavs, 
that  is  the  primordial  point  in  the  war  aims  of  the  Serbians. 
Mr.  Balfour  in  speaking  of  Austria-Hungary,  pointed  out 
the  conclusive  circumstances  which  should  determine  the 
Allies  to  solve  the  question  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  in  a  radical 
manner.  First,  there  is  the  brutal  domination  exercised 
by  the  Germans  and  Magyars  over  the  Slav  races,  a  domina- 
tion obtained  formerly  by  marriages,  by  cunning  and  by 
violence,  but  incompatible  with  the  elementary  conceptions 
of  modern  civilization  entirely  based  upon  liberty  and 
independence.  This  situation,  very  precarious  in  itself,  is 
still  further  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  Austria-Hungary 
has  put  herself  at  the  service  of  Germany  and  of  her  plans  of 
world  domination.  Great  Britain  considers  that  German 
domination  must  be  broken  at  all  costs  ;  otherwise  there 
will  be  neither  peace  nor  liberty  in  the  world.  As  for 
Austria-Hungary,  Mr.  Balfour  declares  that  in  future  the 
Polish,  Czecho-Slovak  and  Southern  Slavs  slavery  must 
come  to  an  end.  For  the  Southern  Slavs  in  particular,  Mr. 
Balfour  finished  his  speech  by  expressing  his  conviction 
that  the  Serbian  Minister  would  see,  when  peace  came,  not 
only  his  country  restored  and  indemnified,  but  also  all  his 
Serbian,  Croatian  and  Slovene  brothers  set  free  and  in  full 
possession  of  liberty  and  independence.  This  declaration 
will  have  a  considerable  echo  which  will  reverberate  from 
end  to  end  as  far  as  the  last  Southern  Slav  cottage. 

The  Allied  victory  on  the  Marne  inaugurates  to-day  a 
new  phase  in  the  struggle  for  the  world's  liberties.  The  hour 
of  deliverance  from  the  German  nightmare  approaches  and 
then  cunning,  the  other  weapon  of  the  Germans,  will  be 
brought  into  action.  It  is  not  without  reason  that  Mr. 
Wickham  Steed  mentioned  the  ignorance  of  the  Allies  as 
the  fourth  factor  in  the  preservation  of  Austria.  It  is  upon 
that  ignorance  that  the  Austrians  and  Magyars  stake  their 
greatest  hopes.  The  day  of  peace  will  be,  according  to  Mr. 
Steed,  the  most  dangerous  day  of  the  whole  war.  The 
enemy,  vanquished  by  force,  will  seek  by  cunning  to  secure 
for  himself  the  possibility  of  a  return  to  his  original  plans. 
They  will  shrink  before  no  means  and  will  do  their  utmost 


96  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

to  prevent  the  complete  and  definitive  destruction  of  the 
foundations  of  the  German  power.  The  question  of  Austria- 
Hungary  will  play  the  principal  part  and  after  it  and  in 
connection  with  it,  the  question  of  Bulgaria.  To  parry 
this  danger,  Mr.  Steed  recommends  the  education  of  the 
public  and  the  formation  of  a  strong  and  enlightened  public 
opinion  which  would  be  capable  of  preventing  all  policy  con- 
trary to  the  supreme  interests  of  the  nation.  It  is  certainly 
the  surest  and  most  efficacious  means.  But  events  are 
hurrying  on  and  the  governments  themselves  ought  to 
guard  against  the  danger  of  solutions  having  an  appearance 
of  justice,  but,  in  fact,  serving  the  interests  of  Germany.  To 
the  Southern  Slavs  it  is  of  the  highest  importance  that  the 
project  of  an  independent  State  of  Serbians,  Croatians  and 
Slovenes,  in  the  sense  of  the  Declaration  of  Corfu,  should  be 
inscribed  on  the  official  and  minimum  programme  of  the 
Allies.  What  Mr.  Balfour  said  at  the  meeting  of  the 
National  Serbian  Committee,  is  the  forecast,  the  announce- 
ment of  imminent  decisions  still  more  concrete,  still  more 
definite.  The  Allied  cause  can  only  gain  by  it  and  the 
enemy  will  see  that  the  other  weapon  will  serve  him  still 
less  than  the  sword. 

August  10,  1918. 

Deplorable  Incoherence. 

The  fine  speeches  delivered  at  the  opening  meeting  of 
the  Paris  Conference  have  not  effaced  the  painful  impression 
produced  by  the  decision  of  the  five  great  powers  not  to 
grant  to  the  Kingdom  of  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes 
the  right  of  bejng  represented  at  the  Conference.  The 
Kingdom  of  the  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes  not  being 
formally  recognized,  this  decision  might,  strictly  speaking, 
be  defended  by  subtleties  of  a  juridical  order.  But  the  law, 
if  it  remains  what  it  is  by  nature — an  assembly  of  rules 
resulting  from  the  idea  of  what  is  just  and  useful,  and  regulat- 
ing the  real  life  of  individuals  and  of  nations — must  not 
deviate  from  the  ground  of  realities.  Now  it  is  an  uncon- 
tested and  incontestable  fact  that  the  Kingdom  of  the 
Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes  exists.     All  the  constitutive 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND  SLOVENES       97 

elements  of  a  State  are  present  :  territories,  subjects  and 
organized  power ;  and  we  cannot  suppose  that  those  who  voted 
the  decision  in  question  were  not  aware  of  it.  The  motives 
of  their  decision  are  then  of  a  political  order.  Some  political 
interest  must  have  prevailed  over  all  the  arguments  of  law 
and  equity.  We  do  not  know  what  this  interest  is  and  we 
can  only  deplore  that  the  first  act  of  the  Conference  should 
have  been  unfavourable  to  our  people.  We  must  emphasize 
all  the  more  that  it  is  the  second  disappointment  we  have 
had  since  the  collapse  of  Austria-Hungary. 

Everyone  remembers,  indeed,  the  declaration  of  the 
Italian  Government  recognizing  the  aspirations  of  the  Slavs 
of  the  South  for  a  national  union.  It  was  in  the  month  of 
October  of  last  year.  The  reply  of  President  Wilson  to  the 
last  Austrian  Note  will  likewise  be  remembered,  a  reply  in 
which  it  stated  that  America  leaves  the  peoples  of  the 
Monarchy  free  to  settle  their  relations  with  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Empire  themselves.  Now  what  has  happened 
since  then  ?  At  the  moment  when  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Army  broke  up,  the  Allies  concluded  an  armistice  which 
took  into  account  only  the  Monarchy  of  the  Habsburgs 
and  whose  clauses  were  compiled  in  correlation  with  the 
Treaty  of  London.  The  powers  who  declared  themselves 
in  sympathy  with  the  national  movement  of  the  South 
Slavs  and  seemed  ready  to  support  it  with  all  their  strength, 
forgot  to  put  these  promises  into  practice  when  the  oppor- 
tunity presented  itself.  The  consequences  of  this  incoherent 
policy  are  well  known  :  a  brutal  occupation  of  purely  Slav 
regions  by  the  Italian  troops,  a  dangerous  awakening  of 
Italian  imperialism,  and  an  extreme  excitement  amongst 
the  Slav  populations. 

Another  inconsequence  characterizes  the  attitude  of 
the  Allies  in  the  question  of  our  national  union.  When  the 
Kingdom  of  Serbia  asked,  long  before  the  downfall  of  Austria, 
that  Serbia  and  all  the  Serbian  people,  Croatians  and  Slovenes 
with  her,  should  be  recognized  as  Allies,  and  that  the  right 
of  Serbia  so  to  represent  from  an  international  point  of  view, 
the  other  "  irredente  "  parts  of  our  nation,  should  be  recog- 
nized, the  Allies  did  not  accede  to  the  request.  Now  that 
Serbia  has  realized  her  national  programme  and  has  trans- 

8 


98  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

formed  herself  into  the  Kingdom  of  the  Serbians,  Croatians, 
and  Slovenes,  the  Allies,  rather  late  in  the  day,  admit  that 
Serbia  should  represent  the  whole  South  Slav  nation.  The 
request  of  the  Serbian  Government  was  quite  legitimate, 
because  it  was  indeed  only  Serbia  that  could  represent 
abroad  that  part  of  the  nation  which  was  under  the  Austro- 
Magyar  yoke.  To-day  the  authorized  representatives  of 
this  freed  people  have  allied  themselves  with  Serbia ;  they 
make  common  cause  with  her  ;  it  is  therefore  just  to  recog- 
nize them  and  to  accept  them  at  the  Conference.  The  argu- 
ments of  those  who  hinder  the  realization  of  our  national 
unity  did  not  succeed  in  forcing  Serbia  to  draw  back  and  to 
separate  herself  even  momentarily  from  her  kinsfolk.  So 
recourse  was  made  to  a  fiction.  The  Conference  considers 
the  delegates  of  the  Kingdom  of  the  Serbians,  Croatians 
and  Slovenes  as  delegates  of  Serbia.  They  consider  them- 
selves as  delegates  of  the  whole  nation.  It  seems  it  was 
necessary  to  invent  this  expedient  in  order  to  conceal  the 
mystery  for  some  time  longer.  Let  us  hope  it  will  soon  be 
cleared  up  ! 

January  27,  1919. 

II 

Constitutional  Bases  of  the  Serbo-Croat- 
Slovene  Kingdom. 

The  Serbian  Government  and  the  Southern  Slav  Committee, 
the  one  representing  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia  and  the  other  the 
Slavs  of  the  South  under  Austro-Hungarian  domination, 
have  come  to  an  agreement  concerning  the  essential  basis 
of  the  future  organization  of  the  Serbo-Croat-Slovene  King- 
dom, which  is  to  unite  all  the  sons  of  our  single  though 
three-named  people.  This  document,  which  we  published 
in  our  last  number,  will  have  a  considerable  importance  as 
much  from  an  exterior  as  an  interior  point  of  view.  From  the 
exterior  point  of  view  it  came  at  the  right  moment  to  re- 
affirm the  steadfast  determination  of  the  three  fragments 
of  a  single  Southern  Slav  people,  to  be  delivered  at  all  costs 
from  the  foreign  yoke  and  to  be  united  with  Serbia  into  an 
independent  and  democratic  national  State.     This  aspiration 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND   SLOVENES      99 

of  our  people  is  not  new,  and  when  the  war  broke  out,  when 
the  numerous  Austro-Hungarian  armies  threw  themselves  on 
little  Serbia  to  crush  her,  the  Prince- Regent  Alexandre  and 
the  Serbian  Government,  in  the  proclamation  they  addressed 
to  the  people  and  to  the  army  inviting  them  to  defend  them- 
selves, placed  in  the  foreground  of  the  gigantic  struggle 
which  was  to  be  one  of  life  or  death  for  the  whole  nation, 
the  liberation  of  the  Serbian,  Croatian  and  Slovene  brothers 
from  the  Austro-Hungarian  yoke.  Since  then  the  Serbian 
Government  has  formulated  this  programme  several  times, 
inviting  democratic  Europe  to  support  it,  because  without 
its  realization  the  future  peace  could  not  be  lasting.  The 
work  of  the  Serbian  Government  has  been  upheld  by  the 
Southern  Slav  Committee,  composed  of  notable  personages, 
very  well  qualified  to  be  the  interpreters  of  the  desires  of 
their  enslaved  brothers.  At  the  present  moment,  when  the 
right  of  self-determination  is  everywhere  proclaimed,  the 
Southern  Slav  people  confirms,  by  the  Declaration  of  Corfu, 
its  firm  intention  to  be  free  and  to  escape  from  all  foreign 
domination.  Those  belated  minds  that  are  trying  to  preserve 
the  broken  down  organism  of  the  Danubian  Monarchy  will 
be  struck  by  the  breath  of  vital  energy  with  which  the 
manifesto  of  Corfu  is  animated. 

From  the  internal  point  of  view  the  principles  laid  down 
in  the  Declaration  of  Corfu  will  not  fail  to  produce  an  equally 
profound  impression.  The  Kingdom  of  Serbia  is  ready  to 
give  up  its  democratic  constitution,  in  the  conviction  that 
the  constituent  assembly  of  the  Serbo-Croat-Slovene  people 
will  be  animated  with  the  same  democratic  spirit,  and  that 
it  will  endow  our  future  state  with  a  liberal  constitution 
based  on  the  principles  expressed  in  the  Declaration  of 
Corfu.  The  unity  of  the  State  and  the  absolute  equality  of 
all,  such  are  the  leading  ideas  of  this  project,  and  in  the 
framework  of  a  united  State  the  door  of  the  decentralization 
of  those  branches  of  public  life  that  do  not  directly  effect 
the  mechanism  of  the  State  as  such,  is  left  wide  open.  In 
the  same  way  the  autonomies  of  an  administrative  order, 
prescribed  for  economic  and  social  reasons,  would  be  granted 
by  the  Constituent  Assembly,  which,  elected  by  universal 
suffrage,  would  know  how  to  safeguard  the  interest  of  the 


100  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

Southern  Slav  people  as  a  whole.  Reserving  the  right  to 
discuss  further  the  special  points  of  the  Declaration,  we 
conclude  for  the  moment  with  the  ardent  hope  that  democratic 
Europe  and  Republican  America  will  support,  for  their  own 
good  also,  this  programme  of  the  Southern  Slav  national 
democracy. 

August  12,  1917. 

Some  Remarks  on  Home  Affairs. 

The  Allied  victory,  the  first  condition  for  the  union  and 
independence  of  the  Serbian,  Croatian  and  Slovene  people, 
permits  us  to  think  also  of  the  political  construction  of  our 
united  State. 

With  the  breaking  up  of  the  ancient  Habsburg  Monarchy 
all  difficulties  have  not  disappeared,  and  we  cannot  yet 
devote  ourselves  to  the  work  of  interior  organization  with 
that  serenity  of  mind  which  should  preside  over  work  of  that 
kind.  Our  national  question  is  at  present  in  a  transitory 
phase  and  the  first  duty  of  every  good  Serbian,  Croatian  and 
Slovene  patriot  is  to  impose  on  himself  a  sort  of  national 
discipline,  and  not  to  hinder  by  idle  talk  the  unifying  action 
directed  by  the  Government  of  Serbia  and  the  National 
Council  of  Zagreb.  This  restriction  applies  equally  and  more 
especially  to  the  press,  whose  task  consists  in  elucidating 
affairs  and  not  in  confusing  them.  If  we  speak  to-day  of 
internal  questions  we  do  so  solely  with  the  desire  to  rectify 
certain  erroneous  information  which  has  been  circulating 
for  some  time  and  which  is  evidently  spread  by  circles 
hostile  to  our  national  union.  The  manifest  tendency  of 
all  these  rumours  is  to  represent  the  Serbian,  Croatian  and 
Slovene  people  as  divided  and  pulled  asunder  by  profound 
interior  divergencies,  and  thus  to  weaken  the  sympathies 
of  our  great  friends  and  Allies  for  our  national  cause.  Two 
principles,  universally  admitted  by  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia, 
by  the  emigrated  representatives  of  the  Serbian,  Croatian  and 
Slovene  people,  as  well  as  by  the  National  Council  of  Serbians, 
Croatians  and  Slovenes  at  Zagreb,  dominate  our  whole 
interior  problem.  First,  it  is  the  resolute  and  quite  spon- 
taneous affirmation  of  the  unanimous  desire  of  the  whole 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND  SLOVENES     101 

nation  to  form  a  unified  state  corresponding  to  the  sentiments 
of  national  duty.  The  psychological  conception  of  South 
Slav  national  unity  leads  up  logically  to  the  constitution 
of  a  unified  State,  compact  and  animated  by  a  single  mind. 
This  conception  of  the  unified  State  does  not  exclude  an 
administrative  organization  based  on  the  widest  autonomy, 
the  State  as  a  whole  having  every  interest  in  delegating  a  part 
of  its  functions  to  autonomous  bodies  (districts,  departments, 
provinces).  The  second  principle  stands  for  the  absolute 
equality  of  all  branches  of  our  people,  political,  economic, 
religious  equality,  which  alone  can  guarantee  by  the  free 
competition  of  the  forces  inherent  to  all  parties  of  the  people, 
the  prosperous  development  of  the  whole  nation.  Serbia, 
in  uniting  herself  with  other  parts  of  the  nation,  did  not  exact 
for  herself  in  the  Declaration  of  Corfu  any  special  position. 

Serbia  intends  to  end  the  work  of  national  union,  as  she 
has  begun  it,  in  a  spirit  of  absolute  equality.  The  mere  fact 
that  Serbia  does  not  think  of  reserving  a  special  position  for 
herself  and  works  rather  to  produce  a  political  fusion  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  proves  in  an  unmistakable  manner  what 
are  the  dispositions  and  intentions  of  the  South  Slav  Pied- 
mont. If  we  cherished  the  slightest  desires  of  domination, 
we  should  not  demand  a  unified  and  absolutely  equal  organi- 
zation, but  should  follow  the  example  of  Prussia,  who, 
while  accomplishing  German  unity,  reserved  for  herself, 
in  the  German  Federal  State,  a  predominant  and  privileged 
situation. 

These  things  are  so  well  known  that  they  become  almost 
platitudes,  and  yet  voices  are  heard,  for  the  most  part  anony- 
mous and  consequently  suspicious,  calling  out  against  a 
pretended  Serbian  imperialism  and  demanding  as  remedy, 
federation  and  a  republic.  The  confusion  produced  by  such 
suggestions  is  utilized  by  the  adversaries  of  the  Serbians, 
Croatians  and  Slovenes  to  prove  the  want  of  necessary 
cohesion  amongst  the  different  parties  of  our  people.  The 
other  day,  a  collaborator  of  the  Neue  Zurcher  Zeitung,  wrongly 
informed  by  some  "  good  friend  "  of  the  South  Slav  union, 
wrote  in  the  said  paper  (of  the  19th  November)  that  a  diver- 
gency of  views  existed  between  Serbia  and  the  other  parties 
of  our  people  as  regards  the  future  organization  of  our  State. 


102  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

According  to  him,  the  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes 
would  like  to  give  a  republican  and  democratic  character 
to  the  new  State  and  to  construct  it  on  the  federal  basis, 
whereas  the  Government  of  Great  Serbia  (!)  would  prefer  a 
union  of  all  the  Serbian,  Croatian  and  Slovene  countries 
with  the  Serbian  Empire  (!).  Briefly,  a  pack  of  lies.  The 
National  Council  of  Zagreb  has  pronounced  itself  resolutely 
in  favour  of  a  unified  State,  and  this  manifestation  should 
satisfy  every  decent  man.  If  any  one  personally  is  in  favour 
of  federation,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  him  from  saying  so 
publicly,  but  let  him  abstain  from  passing  off  his  personal 
views  as  the  desires  of  the  people.  Serbia  has  proved  by 
the  Declaration  of  Corfu,  that  she  recommended  a  union 
inter  pares  and  it  is  malevolent  to  suspect  her  and  to  talk  of 
the  imperialism  of  a  little  State  that  has  lost  a  quarter 
of  its  population  in  the  struggle  against  the  oppressors  of 
the  Serbian,  Croatian  and  Slovene  people. 

Again,  the  New  Europe,  by  a  fresh  attack  against  Mr. 
Pachitch  (see  November  14th  number)  and  by  the  attempt 
to  oppose  the  "  reactionary  "  government  of  Serbia  to  the 
"  democratic  "  Southern  Slav  Committee,  imitates  absolutely 
the  Austrian  press,  which  has  worn  itself  out  in  seeking  to 
divide  that  which  in  the  long  run  must  remain  united.  What 
surprises  us  is  that  the  New  Europe  should  try  to  revive  the 
already  ancient  divergencies  between  the  Government  of 
Serbia  and  the  Southern  Slav  Committee,  at  a  moment  when 
these  divergencies  no  longer  are  of  any  importance,  the 
National  Council  of  Zagreb  having  taken  in  hand  the  power 
to  which  the  members  of  the  Jugoslav  Committee  aspired 
and  the  Government  of  Serbia  having  expressly  recognized 
this  Council  of  Zagreb.  The  New  Europe  will  excuse  us  for 
not  following  her  in  this  path,  which  can  only  lead  to  injury 
to  the  Serbian,  Croatian  and  Slovene  cause. 

As  regards  the  form  of  State,  which  is  also  troubling 
some  South  Slav  "  friends,"  this  question  has  nothing  to  do 
with  democracy.  Those  who  know  the  history  of  Serbia 
even  superficially,  know  very  well  that  Serbia  elected  the 
dynasty  Karageorgevitch  of  her  own  free  will  and  that  this 
dynasty  derives  its  authority  from  the  confidence  of  the 
people.     The  Serbian  parliamentary  and  democratic  regime 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND   SLOVENES     103 

has  made  of  Serbia  a  veritable  monarchical  republic,  which 
was  happy  to  have  at  its  head  a  Peter  Karageorgevitch, 
an  essentially  national  and  democratic  king,  and  a  young 
Crown  Prince  who  has  devoted  himself  entirely  to  the  work 
of  national  unity  and  who  has  never  dreamt  of  separating 
himself  from  his  people. 

The  Declaration  of  Corfu,  signed  by  the  President  of  the 
Southern  Slav  Committee,  paid  a  well  deserved  homage  to 
the  dynasty  of  the  Karageorgevitch,  by  proclaiming  the 
union  of  the  Serbian,  Croatian  and  Slovene  people,  under  the 
sceptre  of  Peter  Karageorgevitch,  King  of  the  Serbians, 
Croatians  and  Slovenes.  The  question  of  the  form  of  State 
is  thus  solved  for  all  those  who  desire  the  unity  and  concord 
of  our  people. 

This  very  simple  situation  does  not  suit  those  who  wish 
to  trouble  our  union,  endeavouring  to  create  artificial  differ- 
ences and  to  sow  mistrust.  The  conscious  nation  of  Serbians 
Croatians  and  Slovenes  will  not  let  itself  be  misled. 

November  25,  1918. 

The  Kingdom  of  Serbians,  Croatians  and 
Slovenes. 

The  Declaration  of  Geneva,  first  fruit  of  the  direct  contact 
between  the  Serbian  Government  and  the  authorized  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Serbian,  Croatian  and  Slovene  nation  of 
the  former  Habsburg  Monarchy,  does  not  seem  to  have 
satisfied  the  great  mass  of  our  people.  The  extreme  caution 
with  which  the  question  of  the  constitution  of  the  single 
State  of  all  the  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes  was  broached 
is  explained,  with  the  exception  of  more  or  less  incom- 
prehensible reasons,  by  the  distance  at  which  the  conference 
was  held,  that  is  to  say,  by  the  want  of  direct  contact  with 
the  native  land,  as  our  distinguished  friend  Mr.  Marin- 
covitch  very  justly  remarked  in  his  article  on  the  Declaration 
of  Geneva.  This  Declaration  had  one  main  fault,  that  of 
having  proclaimed  the  State  without  having  at  the  same 
time  instituted  its  supreme  organ,  its  chief,  who  would  be 
the  expression  of  its  unity  and  sovereignty.  This  chief 
need  not  necessarily  have  been  a  person,  a  monarch,  but 


104  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

in  principle,  without  him  there  was  no  practically  "  organized 
State."  Why  the  members  of  the  Conference  of  Geneva 
have  neglected  this  elementary  postulate,  we  do  not  wish 
to  enter  into  here.  What  is  certain  is  that  failing  a  Chief 
of  State  it  was  not  possible  either  to  constitute  his  responsible 
organ,  the  South  Slav  Ministry.  The  constitution  of  the 
State  of  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes  has  been  pro- 
claimed but  its  logical  inferences  have  not  been  drawn. 
The  nomination  of  a  commission  of  six  members — three 
designed  by  the  Government  of  Serbia  and  three  by  the 
National  Council  of  Zagreb — was  only  of  a  temporary  nature, 
because  in  spite  of  the  name  of  Ministry  given  to  this  com- 
mission it  was  really  nothing  more  than  the  mandatory  of 
the  government  of  Serbia  and  of  the  National  Council  of 
Zagreb.  Its  authority  and  its  competence  depended  on  the 
confidence  of  the  two  above-named  factors,  which  had  pre- 
served their  plenary  powers. 

Now  the  Serbian  Government  at  Belgrade  and  the 
National  Council  of  Zagreb  have  agreed  together  to  enlarge 
and  complete  the  work  of  Geneva.  While  proclaiming  the 
political  union  of  the  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes  they 
have  at  the  same  time  summoned  the  Prince  Alexandre  to 
the  Regency  of  the  Serbo-Croat-Slovene  Kingdom.  Having 
thus  elected  the  chief  of  the  new  State,  they  were  able  to 
proceed  to  the  formation  of  its  responsible  organs.  Indeed, 
according  to  news  from  Zagreb,  the  delegates  of  the  National 
Council,  furnished  with  mandates  in  due  form,  have  just 
gone  to  Belgrade,  where  the  constitution  of  the  South  Slav 
Ministry  will  be  determined.  This  Ministry  will  be  appointed 
by  the  Prince  Regent,  but  its  members  will  be  elected  by  a 
body  called  the  Council  of  State,  which  will  play  the  part  of 
preliminary  parliament,  until  the  convocation  of  the  National 
Assembly,  for  the  whole  South  Slav  territory.  This  national 
assembly  will  work  out  the  constitution  and  will  thus  decide 
definitely  all  the  questions  concerning  the  organization  of 
the  State.  There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  the 
practical  questions  on  which  depends  the  effective  unification 
of  our  people  will  be  easily  and  satisfactorily  solved.  All 
the  Serbo-Croat-Slovene  patriots  must  remember  that  our 
national  unity  still  encounters  secret   opposition,   and  that 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND   SLOVENES     105 

only  concord  and  union  can  guarantee  to  the  nation  the 
realization  of  all  her  legitimate  aspirations.  The  great  friend 
of  the  South  Slavs,  Mr.  Gauvain,  writes,  in  the  Journal  des 
Debats  of  November  27th,  of  all  sorts  of  obstacles  interior 
and  exterior,  which  are  being  raised  "  against  the  realization 
of  Southern  Slav  unity.  .  .  .  Quite  lately  again  evil  influences 
had  been  at  work  against  the  application  of  the  programme 
of  Corfu."  Some  day  we  shall  know  the  source  of  these 
influences.  They  are  not  to  be  neglected  because  they  are 
found  in  different  circles.  This  is  proved  by  the  incident 
of  the  false  communique"  sent  by  a  former  functionary  of 
the  Serbian  Press  Office  at  Geneva  to  the  newspapers  of  the 
Swiss  and  Allied  Press,  as  emanating  from  the  official 
Serbian  Bureau,  in  which  it  was  stated  that  the  Conference 
of  Geneva  had  recognized  the  State  of  the  Serbians,  Croatians 
and  Slovenes  of  the  former  Dual  Monarchy.  Instead  of  the 
union,  separation  would  have  been  proclaimed.  In  spite  of 
the  immediate  contradiction  by  the  Serbian  Consulate  at 
Geneva,  this  false  communique"  was  circulated  even  in  the 
important  papers,  producing  confusion  and  uncertainty.  The 
work  that  is  being  accomplished  at  Belgrade,  at  this  very 
moment,  will  cut  short,  we  hope,  all  these  dangerous  and 
malicious  intrigues. 

December  2,  1918. 

The  Union  Without  and  Within. 

The  solemn  proclamation  of  the  Serbo-Croat-Slovene 
Kingdom  inaugurates  a  new  era  in  the  life  of  our  nation. 
United  without  and  within,  we  are  to-day  prepared  to  face 
with  more  strength  and  more  energy  all  the  difficulties  that 
the  realization  of  the  integral  union  of  the  Serbo-Croat- 
Slovene  people  may  encounter  in  Italy,  as  well  as  elsewhere. 
The  Kingdom  of  Serbia  had  entire  moral  authority  to  repre- 
sent the  wishes  of  the  whole  nation  in  so  far  as  concerned 
the  defence  of  our  national  integrity.  In  order  to  construct 
and  to  give  a  visible  and  concrete  expression  of  the  collective 
will  of  the  whole  nation,  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia  needed  the 
formal  adhesion  of  the  other  parts  of  the  nation  to  the  national 
programme  pursued  by  Serbia  with  an  unexampled  tenacity. 


106  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

This  adhesion  has  just  taken  place  at  Belgrade  in  a  form  that 
on  the  one  hand  preserves  the  continuity  of  our  national 
effort,  and  on  the  other  assigns  to  all  the  branches  of  the 
nation  a  situation  of  perfect  equality.  The  union  of  the 
Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes  of  former  Austria-Hungary 
with  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia  is  so  formed  that  all  the  South 
Slav  countries  will  form  henceforth  part  of  the  united 
Kingdom  of  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes.  The  Royal 
Regency  of  this  united  State  will  be  exercised  by  Prince 
Alexandre  Karageorgevitch,  according  to  the  principles  of 
modern  democracy. 

The  first  consequence  of  this  memorable  act  will  be  the 
formation  of  a  government  exercising  power  over  the  whole 
extent  of  our  national  territory.  This  government  may  be 
organized  in  a  decentralized  manner  to  facilitate  the  normal 
function  of  the  authorities  in  the  different  provinces,  but 
that  will  have  no  influence  on  the  interior  and  exterior  state 
unity.  This  unity  is  expressed  in  the  Chief  of  the  State  as 
well  as  in  his  parliamentary  government.  On  the  other 
hand,  to  agree  with  the  principle  of  parliamentary  govern- 
ment that  is  in  force  in  Serbia,  and  which  will  be  fully  pre- 
served in  the  Kingdom  of  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes, 
the  government  must  enjoy  the  confidence  of  national 
representation.  Now  at  the  present  moment  our  nation 
has  no  real  parliament  for  the  whole  country  and  we  are 
obliged  to  create  a  kind  of  preliminary  parliament.  For 
Serbia,  which  is  an  organized  state,  the  delegates  for  the 
preliminary  parliament  will  be  chosen  by  the  Government 
and  the  Serbian  Skoupchtina.  They  must  not  necessarily  be 
the  deputies  of  the  Skoupchtina,  because  their  function  in  the 
preliminary  parliament  will  exceed  the  limits  of  their  mandate 
as  Serbian  deputies.  In  the  other  part  of  the  nation,  the 
inhabitants  of  former  Austro-Hungary,  the  national  organiza- 
tions which  have  formed  the  National  Council  of  Serbians, 
Croatians  and  Slovenes,  will  choose  their  delegates.  And  as 
for  Montenegro,  on  account  of  its  special  internal  situation, 
it  is  Skoupchtina  that  will  appoint  the  delegates  for  the  pre- 
liminary parliament. 

The  preliminary  parliament  thus  constituted  will  act 
until  the  convocation  of  the  Constituent  Assemblv.     The 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND   SLOVENES     107 

South  Slav  Ministry  will  be  formed  only  with  the  consent  of 
this  preliminary  parliament,  and  it  is  to  the  latter  that  the 
Government  also  will  have  to  give  account  of  its  actions. 
This  organization  of  the  public  executive  powers  is  the  best 
and  most  appropriate  to  the  circumstances.  It  safeguards 
the  principle  of  national  sovereignty,  at  the  same  time 
creating  a  stable  government,  provided  with  all  necessary 
power. 

The  Kingdom  of  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes  is  no 
longer  a  dream.  It  is  a  reality.  And  we  can  only  join  in 
the  enthusiastic  acclamations  which  have  greeted  the 
definite  formation  of  our  political  unity.  May  the  Kingdom 
of  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes  be  for  ever  happy  and 
glorious. 

December  16,  1918. 

Ill 

National  Frontiers. 

The  question  of  national  frontiers,  which  has  already 
been  mentioned  in  La  Serbie,  will  become  more  and  more 
interesting  to  all  friends  of  international  peace  and  justice. 
The  following  lines  were  written  to  clear  up  certain  points 
of  primary  importance,  and  on  which  there  can  be  no  two 
opinions. 

Politicians  and  journalists  eagerly  demand  that  the 
great  war  should  end  in  the  realization  of  the  principle  of 
nationalities.  Napoleon  III  and  Piedmont  made  Italian 
unity  by  opposing  to  the  former  diplomatic  regime  the  clear 
and  simple  idea  of  national  States.  This  principle  has  been 
called  a  clear  idea  falsified.  In  this  expression  the  criticism 
is  far-fetched.  The  principle  of  nationalities  is  a  natural, 
clear  and  sound  idea.  That  all  those  having  the  same 
national  conscience  should  form  one  State,  is  not  that  a 
conception  that  simplifies  many  an  international  relation  ? 

We  must  not  create  difficulties  by  asking  :  What  is  a 
nation  ?  The  French,  the  Italians,  the  Germans  have  a 
national  conscience ;  they  are  nations.  But,  it  will  be  asked  : 
What  are  empires  and  federations  like  Switzerland  ?  One 
often  exaggerates  a  pretended  difference  between  a  national 


108  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

estate  like  France  and  an  empire  like  the  British  Empire, 
uniting  so  many  individual  state  organizations.  The  con- 
tradiction is  not  well  founded.  The  British  Empire  is  the 
ingenious  association  of  five  democracies  which,  after  the 
war,  will  be  changed  into  a  federation  whose  character  will 
be  juridically  defined.  But  each  of  these  democracies  like 
Canada  and  Australia,  is  a  state  organization  having  its  own 
individuality.  The  British  Empire  is  to-day  already  de 
facto  an  association  of  states  independent  in  all  interior 
affairs.  After  the  constitution  of  the  British  federation,  the 
principle  of  nationality  will  also  be  settled  in  the  British 
Empire  ;  national  states,  and  over  these  states,  the  empire, 
the  federation.  Exclusive  of  this  federal  organization 
there  is  the  complexity  of  colonies  without  self-government, 
which  will  be  under  the  administration  of  the  Empire  and  no 
longer  of  the  United  Kingdom  as  to-day. 

The  objection  that  Switzerland  is  a  negation  of  the  principle 
of  nationality  may  be  refuted.  Switzerland  is  composed  of 
twenty-two  states  and  in  each  of  these  states,  except 
Valais,  Fribourg,  Berne,  Grisons,  there  is  only  one  nationality. 
The  cantons  are  national  states  but  the  federal  state  is 
international.  The  question  of  language  had  no  importance 
in  fixing  the  nationality.  It  is  thanks  to  the  division  between 
Germans  and  non-Germans,  provoked  by  the  great  war  and 
by  German  mentality,  that  a  problem  of  spoken  language  and 
contending  cultures  was  created. 

There  are  empires  of  the  old  regime  and  modern  empires. 
The  type  of  an  empire  of  the  old  regime  is  Turkey  and  Austria- 
Hungary.  In  both,  the  same  mixture  of  races,  the  same 
autocratic  will  that  does  not  allow  nationalities  to  dispose 
freely  of  their  destinies,  the  same  coercion,  the  same  sub- 
jection to  political  ends,  quite  foreign  to  the  national  life 
of  the  subject  nationalities.  The  autocratic  and  aristocratic 
regime  is  at  the  base  of  these  types.  But  here  is  the  type 
of  the  modern  empire,  the  Anglo-Saxon  type.  The  British 
Empire  accords  to  each  dominion  the  free  development  of 
all  its  political  forces.  It  is  a  union  founded  almost  on 
the  civil  contract.  There  is  no  coercion,  but  the  democratic 
commonwealths  are  free  members  of  the  world  empire. 
The   modern    empire   is   composed    of     organized    ethnical 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND   SLOVENES     109 

unities,  each  of  which  has  already  realized  at  heart  the 
principle  of  nationalities  ;  there,  you  do  not  see  the  chaos  of 
the  oriental  empires,  in  which  Austria-Hungary  must  be 
included.  It  is  these  false  empires  that  are  the  negation  of 
the  principle  of  nationality.  In  order  to  compromise  the 
principle  of  nationality,  these  false  empires  are  quoted. 
However,  there  is  a  more  dangerous  argument  to  be  answered. 
It  is  said  :  how  can  the  principle  of  nationality  be  realized, 
if  there  are  no  national  frontiers  separating  distinctly  the 
different  nationalities  ?  It  is  also  said  that  it  is  impossible 
to  create  truly  national  estates  without  committing  an 
injustice  towards  the  nationality  which  is  attached  to  the 
foreign  state.  This  is  a  serious  objection,  but  it  may  be 
overcome  more  easily  in  practical  life  than  in  theory.  Look 
at  the  ethnographical  map  of  the  Adriatic  coast.  The 
national  western  frontier  between  Jugoslavs  and  Italians  is 
a  fixed  line  which  has  not  undergone  any  change  during  the 
course  of  centuries.  Mr.  Colajanni,  the  venerable  leader 
of  the  Italian  Republicans,  mentioned  this  frontier  in  his 
speech  at  the  Republican  Congress  at  Naples.  He  set  forth 
his  point  of  view  which  is  in  contradiction  with  a  democratic 
policy.  Mr.  Colajanni  thinks  that  the  principle  of  nationality 
cannot  be  applied  in  a  mixed  country  where  the  national 
frontier  cannot  be  fixed.  In  this  case  geography,  history, 
political  events,  culture,  must  be  more  decisive  than 
superiority  of  numbers.  But  it  can  be  objected  that  there 
is  no  country  where  the  national  frontier  is  more  clearly 
indicated  than  in  Gorica-Gradiska.  There  is  no  mixing  of 
nationalities  there,  the  linguistic  frontier  being  so  strictly 
defined  that  the  peasant  on  one  side  of  the  frontier  does  not 
speak  Italian  and  his  neighbour  on  the  other  side  does  not 
understand  the  Slovene  tongue.  It  is  astonishing  also  that  a 
radical  democrat  like  Colajanni  should  deny  that  the 
superiority  of  numbers  should  be  decisive,  though  all 
democratic  institutions  are  founded  on  superiority  of 
numbers,  otherwise  we  would  have  to  abolish  universal 
suffrage.  From  the  Italian  point  of  view,  it  is  very  dangerous 
to  proclaim  the  hegemony  of  the  most  cultured  elements, 
because  in  the  bordering  Jugoslav  countries,  in  the  west, 
that  is  to  say  in  Gorica-Gradiska,  the  mass  of  the  Slovene 


110  SERBIA  AND  EUROPE 

people  is  much  better  educated  than  the  Italian  peasant, 
as  is  proved  by  the  statistics  of  the  illiterate.  Even  the  most 
cultured  Italians  have  but  a  very  imperfect  knowledge  of  their 
Jugoslav  neighbours.  It  has  been  declared  that  the  great 
war  is  a  struggle  between  Prussian  autocracy  and  democracy. 
But  there  is  no  more  distressing  fact  than  that  one  of  the 
great  belligerent  powers  should  have  nearly  forgotten  the 
plebiscitary  foundations  of  her  state.  The  quintessence  of 
the  modern  political  regime  is  each  nation's  right  of  self- 
determination  and  that  no  territory  can  be  under  a  foreign 
sovereignty  without  the  consent  of  the  population. 

Treitschke  said  in  1871  :  "  We  Germans,  knowing  Ger- 
many and  France,  know  what  is  good  for  the  Alsatians 
better  than  these  unfortunates  themselves.  .  .  .  Against 
their  will,  we  wish  to  restore  them  to  themselves  !  M  That 
is  the  German  point  of  view  expressed  very  forcibly.  Henri 
Hauser  in  his  Principle  of  Nationalty  has  well  defined  the 
difference  "  between  the  revolutionary,  democratic  French 
theory  of  the  consent  of  the  people  "  and  the  "  fatalistic 
Bismarckian  German  theory  of  the  right  of  great  agglomera- 
tions to  increase  their  territory.  .  .  ." 

The  Italian  generation  which  has  struggled  for  Italian 
unity  was  frankly  democratic.  It  knew  very  well  that 
general  consent  alone  can  be  the  base  of  the  unity  of  the 
nation.  But  plebiscites  have  not  been  organized  only  for 
the  Italian  provinces.  The  Savoyard  deputies  in  the  Pied- 
montin  Parliament  were  against  the  nationalist  Italian 
policy  of  the  Government  of  Piedmont ;  they  wished  to 
remain  Piedmont  in  in  i860  and  did  not  wish  to  become 
Italian.  But  the  Italians  did  not  prevent  Savoy  from 
expressing  the  popular  desire.  A  plebiscite  declared  the 
desire  of  the  Savoyards  to  become  French.  That  is  an 
example  of  a  plebiscite  organized  by  the  Italians  for  a 
population  that  was  not  of  Italian  race. 

It  is  a  great  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  plebiscitary  idea 
became  obsolete  at  the  end  of  last  century.  On  the  contrary, 
the  referendum  was  introduced  into  Switzerland,  into  the 
United  States,  and  we  may  suppose  that  it  will  soon  be  a  form 
of  legislation  in  all  the  democratic  states.  But  when  the 
referendum  has  been  adopted  for  the  minor  affairs  of  the 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND   SLOVENES     111 

state,  how  can  we  refuse  to  ask  the  nation's  opinion,  the 
fundamental  question  for  each  citizen,  when  it  is  a  question 
of  his  future  fatherland,  of  his  civic  existence. 

To  consult  the  people  is  particularly  indispensable  when 
the  population  of  the  country  and  the  nation  which  has 
occupied  the  country  are  of  different  races.  If  it  is  certain 
that  the  annexation  was  made  against  the  will  of  the  popula- 
tion of  foreign  origin,  the  plebescite  becomes  a  moral  duty 
for  the  governors.  Without  doubt  precautions  must  be 
taken  so  that  the  plebescite  may  be  the  true  expression  of 
national  sentiment. 

If  the  plebiscitary  regime  is  to  be  applied  in  countries 
of  mixed  nationality,  Italian- Jugoslav,  the  problem  must 
be  viewed  from  the  following  points  of  view  :  (i)  What  is  the 
territory  in  which  the  population  is  to  be  questioned  ?  (2) 
What  precuation  must  be  taken  in  order  to  ascertain  the 
political  opinions  of  the  population  in  normal  times.  (3)  What 
public  authority  is  to  intervene  to  organize  the  plebiscite  ? 

To  reply  to  the  first  question  it  must  be  stated  that  in 
the  past,  the  plebiscite  did  not  take  place  in  artificial  terri- 
tories formed  for  the  purpose.  Lombardy,  Venetia,  Savoy, 
these  are  well-defined  unities,  which  were,  in  the  course  of 
centuries,  under  the  same  influence  of  common  traditions. 
One  cannot  and  ought  not  to  form  new  unities  for  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  plebiscite.  For  example  :  the  Adriatic  coast, 
which  for  centuries  was  governed  by  the  same  laws,  had  the 
same  administration,  formed  the  same  economic  unity,  must 
not  be  divided.  The  plebiscite  must  be  applied  to  Gorica- 
Gradiska,  Trieste  and  Istria  together  as  one  administrative 
unity. 

Never  has  the  population  suffered  so  much  in  the  countries 
where  military  operations  are  in  progress  as  during  the  present 
war.  Evacuation  has  become  almost  a  natural  consequence 
of  modern  warfare.  By  evacuation,  the  true  ethnographical 
character  of  the  country  has  been  destroyed.  Nevertheless, 
there  are  towns  which  have  not  as  yet  been  the  theatre  of 
war,  like  Trieste,  whose  population  has  greatly  changed  since 
the  beginning  of  the  European  conflict.  A  plebiscite  exer- 
cised to-day  at  Trieste  would  give  an  overwhelming  Slovene 
majority  ;   on  the  other  hand,  the  country  of  Gorica  has  lost 


112  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

a  great  part  of  its  Jugoslav  population.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  nostalgia  will  cause  the  evacuated  population  to 
repatriate  themselves  as  rapidly  as  possible.  They  will 
return  to  their  devastated  fatherland.  But  if  a  considerable 
part  of  the  population  is  still  absent,  special  arrangements 
will  be  necessary.  As  basis  for  the  establishment  of  the 
register  of  the  citizens  who  will  be  entitled  to  take  part  in 
the  plebiscite,  the  electoral  register  of  the  last  elections  by 
universal  suffrage  must  be  taken.  All  the  citizens  who 
voted  at  the  last  general  elections  will  take  part  in  the  plebis- 
cite.    The  vote  of  absentees  must  be  facilitated. 

To  exclude  from  the  plebiscite  the  population  that  has 
entered  the  country  on  account  of  economic  necessities, 
would  be  a  very  arbitrary  proceeding.  How  can  one  prove 
to  what  extent  the  new-comer  is  attached  to  the  soil,  has 
made  it  his  own  ?  These  are  very  subjective  judgments 
and  the  worst  errors  may  be  committed.  It  is  one  of  the 
principles  of  a  just,  democratic  policy  to  facilitate  to  new- 
comers ways  for  becoming  citizens  of  their  new  country. 
The  democratic  regime,  industrialization,  modern  economic 
circulation,  demand  a  legislation  that  renders  it  possible 
for  the  foreigner  to  acquire  quickly  a  new  nationality. 

December  3  and  10,  1916. 

The  Corridor  to  Bohemia. 

I  read  with  the  greatest  interest  the  very  remarkable 
article  on  Austria-Hungary  that  Mr.  Marc  Dufaux  published 
in  the  issue  of  April  27,  1918,  of  your  courageous  paper. 
I  heartily  applaud  the  arguments  of  the  honourable  chief 
editor  of  La  Suisse.  Like  him,  I  esteem  that  "  the  European 
equilibrium  would  acquire  a  better  and  more  lasting  stability 
if  the  oppressed  diverse  nationalities  were  set  free." 

Allow  me  to  add  a  complimentary  argument  to  all  those 
developed  by  [Mr.  Marc  Dufaux  with  irresistible  logic. 
To  free  the  Slavs  of  Austria- Hungary  is  evidently  the  first 
act  to  accomplish  ;  to  unite  them  is  the  indispensable  final 
act  which  will  set  the  seal  on  their  independence  and  on  the 
peace  of  Europe.  This  end  can  only  be  reached  by  creating 
the   corridor  of  communication  that  I  have  imagined  and 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND   SLOVENES    113 

which  includes  the  territories  of  the  Comitats  of  Moson, 
Sopron,  and  Vas  and  Zala.  On  the  one  hand,  indeed,  this 
corridor  would  separate  Hungary  from  Austria,  on  the 
other,  it  would  permit  the  territorial  union  of  the  Czech 
countries  and  of  Jugoslavia. 

After  the  war,  economic  activity  will  revive  little  by 
little  and  the  Slavs  of  Austria  will  certainly  not  be  behind- 
hand in  endeavouring  to  revive  industry,  agriculture  and 
commerce.  Now  what  are  the  elements  indispensable  to 
this  revival  ?  Are  they  not  easy,  rapid  and  cheap  means  of 
communication  ?  In  what  situation  will  the  Southern  Slavs 
and  Czechs  be  placed  in  this  respect  ?  They  will  only  be 
able  to  communicate  through  Austria  and  Hungary  and  the 
difficulties  will  certainly  be  great  on  all  points.  The  Germans 
and  Hungarians  would,  no  doubt,  like  to  reserve  the  Southern 
Slav  trade  for  themselves.  They  will  not  allow  Slav  goods 
to  cross  their  territories  without  burdening  them  with  heavy 
duties  and  long  delays  in  transit  in  order  to  discourage  them. 
Thus,  Southern  Slav  trade  could  not  be  supplied  with  coal 
and  the  products  of  all  the  Czech  industries  which  it  lacks, 
without  passing  under  the  Caudine  Forks  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  tariffs  and  customs.  Jugoslavia  will  have, 
certainly,  every  facility  for  trading  by  sea  with  Italy,  France 
and  England.  But  of  the  Czech  products  which  might 
reach  her  easily  and  cheaply,  she  will  be  in  a  great  measure 
deprived. 

Already  the  corridor  is  traversed  by  numerous  branch 
railway  lines  and  two  main  lines  :  First,  the  line  from  Vienna 
to  Budapest  by  Grammat-Neusiedl  and  Gyor ;  second, 
the  line  from  Vienna  to  P£cuj  (Pecs)  passing  by  Wiener- 
Neustadt,  Sopron,  Szombathely,  Nagy-Kanizsa  (where  it 
joins  the  great  line  Budapest  to  Trieste,  by  Pragarje 
(Pragerhof),  Celje  (Cili),  and  Ljubljana  (Laibach),  then 
Mura-Keresztur  and  finally  Gyekenyes  where  the  junction 
of  the  line  Budapest  to  Rieka  by  Zagreb  takes  place. 

To  insure  an  independent  communication  between  the 
Czech  and  Jugoslav  countries,  it  will  then  be  sufficient  to 
utilize  the  existing  local  line  :  Pressburg  to  Szombathely 
passing  by  Parndorf,  Vulka  and  Sopron.  In  this  way  Press- 
burg will  be  in  direct  communication  with  Zagreb  and  with 

9 


114  SERBIA  AND  EUROPE 

the  Port  of  Rieka.  So  if  the  corridor  existed  it  could  be  used 
for  easy,  rapid  and  cheap  communication  between  the  Slavs. 
It  would  be  at  any  rate  a  way  of  escape,  when  Austro- 
Hungarian  interests  or  ill-will  threatened  to  render  the  others 
impracticable. 

I  believe  then  that  the  creation  of  the  corridor  must 
certainly  enter  into  the  essential  desiderata  of  the  Slavs  of 
Austria  and  I  trust  that  La  Serbie  will  follow  up  this  idea. 

May  ii,  1918.  Arthur  Chervin. 

The  Croats  and  Russia. 

The  entry  of  Roumania  into  the  world  war,  on  the  side 
of  the  Allies,  marks  a  fact  of  which  the  Latin  race  has  every 
reason  to  be  proud.  All  the  other  European  races  have  been 
divided  into  two  camps,  but  the  entire  Latin  race  fights, 
united,  in  the  same  camp.  We  Slavs  unfortunately  cannot 
say  as  much  for  ourselves.  It  is  true  that  the  circumstances 
and  political  conditions  in  which  we  find  ourselves  differ 
appreciably  from  those  of  the  Latin  peoples,  but  besides 
that  there  is  an  important  factor,  a  factor  which  cannot  be 
set  aside  :  our  enemies,  while  endeavouring  to  push  their 
way  through  our  homes  towards  world  domination,  have  done 
all  they  could  to  divide  us  in  spite  of  ourselves,  in  order  to 
subdue  us  more  easily.  They  succeeded  in  a  great  measure, 
thanks  to  the  power  they  exercise  over  millions  and  millions 
of  Slavs.     But  let  us  hope  it  will  be  for  the  last  time. 

To  be  able  to  emulate,  in  this  fine  quality  of  union,  the 
Latin  race,  guided  by  France,  beloved  of  all  conscious  and 
civilized  humanity,  and  who  in  this  war,  as  in  so  many  other 
circumstances,  has  proved  herself  equal  to  her  moral  power, 
we  must  first  of  all  know  one  another.  Our  enemies  do 
not  ignore  the  importance  of  this  fact  and  endeavour  at  all 
costs  to  prevent  our  doing  so.  For  years  past  they  have  done 
all  in  their  power  to  create  a  gulf  between  Serbians,  Croatians 
and  Slovenes  and  to  divide  them  not  only  politically,  but 
spiritually.  Politically  they  have  succeeded  in  dividing 
us  but  they  have  not  been  able  to  separate  our  souls  and  they 
will  never  be  able  to  do  so.  One  of  the  last  attempts  in  this 
sense,  made  through  the  intermediary  of  the  neutral  press, 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND   SLOVENES     115 

consists  in  stirring  up  the  hatred  of  Russia  against  the 
Croatians.  Our  enemies  know  very  well  that  an  attempt  of 
this  kind  in  relation  to  the  Serbians  had  no  result.  The 
Serbians  preferred  to  sacrifice  the  most  sacred  things  they 
had  in  the  world  ;  their  houses,  their  homes,  the  beloved 
soil  of  their  native  land,  and  to  disperse  into  the  four  corners 
of  the  world  rather  than  betray  Russia  and  her  Allies.  But 
they  think  it  will  be  easier  with  the  Croatians,  who,  brought 
up  in  the  culture  of  the  West,  for  the  most  part  Catholics 
and  having  no  independent  state  of  their  own  to  give  free 
access  to  their  opinions,  will  not  be  strong  enough  to  resist 
such  attempts.  The  aim  of  our  adversaries  is  only  too  clear. 
They  wish  to  separate  the  Croatians  from  the  Slovenes  and 
the  Serbians  ;  the  Serbians  and  the  Southern  Slavs  in  general 
would  be  weakened  by  it,  and  the  weakening  of  the  Southern 
Slavs  would  certainly  not  be  to  the  advantage  of  Slavism, 
the  most  powerful  rampart  in  the  world  against  German 
Imperialism.  But  this  manoeuvre  will  not  succeed  either ; 
Russia,  the  great  Slav  sister,  knows  to-day  what  she  has  to 
expect  from  her  little  Slav  brothers,  and  having  known  them, 
she  will  be  able  even  after  the  war,  to  judge  each  according 
to  his  merits. 

As  to  the  Croatians,  our  enemies  believe  that  Russia 
knows  the  Croatians  solely  from  the  fact  that  they  are 
fighting  to-day  in  the  ranks  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  army. 
But  they  are  hugely  mistaken.  Russia  has  had  occasion 
to  know  the  Croatians  well  before  this  war.  In  the  seven- 
teenth century  she  knew  the  Croatian,  Juraj  Krizanic, 
who  went  to  Russia,  the  country  that  symbolizes  Slav 
dignity  and  strength,  in  order  to  work  there  for  the  well- 
being  of  the  Slavs.  Russia  also  knows  Josip  Jurje  Stross- 
mayer,  the  greatest  Croatian  of  his  time,  who  had  numerous 
political  relations  in  high  Russian  spheres  and  who  went  to 
Moscow,  as  Catholic  Bishop,  on  the  occasion  of  the  millenary 
of  the  baptism  of  orthodox  Russians,  for  which  he  was 
reproached  later  publicly,  in  a  club,  by  the  Emperor  of 
Austria  in  person.  Russia  knows  equally  well  the  Croatian 
revolutionary  Eugene  Kvaternik,  who,  seized  with  the 
ardent  desire  to  see  Croatia  delivered,  solicited  the  aid 
of  the  Courts  of  France  and  of    Russia.     She  also  knows 


116  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

the  great  Croatian  poet,  Petar  Preradovic,  who,  though 
an  Austrian  General,  composed  odes  to  the  Slavs  and 
to  Russia.  She  will  remember  the  formal  opening  of 
the  Session  of  Sabor,  the  national  Croatian  assembly,  in 
1906,  when,  for  the  first  time,  the  Serbo-Croatian  coalition 
had  the  majority.  She  will  also  remember  its  senior  presi- 
dent, Dr.  Erazmo  Barcic,  a  lawyer  of  Fiume,  who,  in  his 
Parliamentary  opening  address,  pronounced  these  words : 
"  As  long  as  the  tread  of  Cossack  soldiers  has  not  resounded 
on  the  pavements  of  Vienna,  there  will  be  no  order  in  this 
country,  in  Austria-Hungary  .  .  .  !  "  And  the  present 
President  of  the  Serbo-Croatian  Coalition,  Dr.  Grga  Tuskan, 
added  immediately  after  :  "  And  I,  I  will  march  rifle  in  hand, 
against  Vienna."  Russia  also  knows  the  Croatian,  Antun 
Bubanovic,  who  left  all  his  fortune  to  the  Jugoslav  Academy 
at  Zagreb,  so  that  the  annual  revenue  derived  from  it  might 
be  given  as  recompense  to  the  Croatian  who  had  best  learnt 
the  Russian  language.  Russia  knows  very  well  that  almost 
every  year  the  Croatian  literary  society  "  Matica  Hrvatska," 
the  most  important  after  the  Jugoslav  Academy,  publishes 
some  translations  from  Russian  literature.  Russia  knows 
all  that  and  many  other  things  ;  she  knows  what  she  was 
and  what  she  is  for  the  Croatians.  From  the  dwelling  of  our 
greatest  men  down  to  the  hut  of  our  poorest  peasant,  the  name 
of  Russia  is  pronounced  everywhere  as  a  sacred  word,  as 
something  that  gives  meaning  and  import  to  the  national 
life  of  three  million  and  a  half  Croatians. 

That  is  why  this  sentiment  has  never  diminished,  even 
in  the  course  of  this  war  into  which  the  Croatian  people  has 
been  pushed  by  the  force  of  circumstances,  though  it  has  no 
place  there.  We  can  say  with  pride  that  no  word  has  ever 
been  pronounced  in  the  Croatian  Press  against  Russia  during 
this  war,  during  which  was  suppressed,  in  consequence  of 
orders  from  the  Hungarian  Government  and  at  the  suggestion 
of  the  military  authorities,  among  other  Croatian  papers,  the 
Hrvatski  Pokret,  central  organ  of  Serbo-Croatian  Coalition, 
which  has  a  majority  in  the  Croatian  Parliament  ;  this 
paper  was  forbidden  because  it  had  published  with  too  much 
"  reserve  "  the  news  of  the  victories  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
army.     They  also  suppressed  the  Hrvat,  central  organ  of  the 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND  SLOVENES     117 

Startchevic  party,  which  had  "  glorified  "  the  Serbian 
Army. 

Even  now,  in  time  of  war,  there  is  published  in  Croatia 
the  new  Croatian-Russian  grammar,  and  besides  lectures  in 
the  Russian  language,  "  Russian  evenings  "  are  organized 
in  the  Croatian  theatres.  The  Austro-Hungarian  authorities 
dare  not  interfere  for  fear  of  provoking  discontent  among 
the  population  already  exhausted  by  the  sufferings  of  the 
war.  And  recently,  in  the  Croatian  Parliament,  the  national 
deputy,  Stjepan  Radic,  President  of  the  Croatian  Agricultural 
Party,  expressed  himself  thus  :  "  Our  intellectuals  should 
learn  Russian,  as  it  is  a  world  language.  It  is  in  this  way 
that  people  grow  to  understand  each  other  and  that  culture 
progresses,  without  being  prejudicial  to  nationalism.  The 
Russians  supply  us  with  proof  of  this  and  they  can  serve  as 
a  model.  Although  the  joupanies  (former  Serbo-Croatian 
assemblies)  are  our  ancient  historical  institutions,  destined 
to  be  that  which  the  zemstovs  are  in  the  Russian  Govern- 
ments and  called  upon  to  act  politically,  socially  and 
economically,  they  are  to-day  corrupted  by  the  misdeeds 
of  Kuhen  Hedervary.  Through  geographical  conditions  and 
through  the  influence  of  civilization,  we  are  closely  united  to 
the  West  and  with  Russia  by  our  racial  sentiments ;  that  is 
why  we  believe  we  are  ripe  for  the  future." 

And  all  that  was  known  to  Russia  ;  all  the  efforts  of  the 
enemies  of  the  Slavs  to  do  the  Croatians  harm  in  the  eyes 
of  Russia,  will  be  in  vain.  Since  the  orthodox  Bulgarians,  of 
their  own  free  will,  have  stained  their  hands  with  the  blood 
of  the  Russian  liberator  ;  since  the  Czechs,  the  Poles,  the 
Croatians  and  the  Slovenes,  of  the  Catholic  Church,  have 
manifested,  within  the  bounds  of  their  liberty,  their  wish  to 
fight  under  the  banner  of  the  Czar  of  Russia  or  with  their 
Serbian  brothers,  of  the  Orthodox  church  ;  since  France, 
torch-bearer  of  European  western  civilization,  has  become  the 
most  intimate  ally  of  Russia — all  the  manoeuvres  attempted 
by  enemies  to  make  use  of  the  Catholicism  and  of  the 
western  culture  of  the  Croatians,  are  in  vain.  And  it  is  for 
that  that  we  Croatians  await  with  serenity  the  sentence  that 
will  be  pronounced  upon  us  by  the  holy  Slav  Russia,  at  the 
end  of  this  war,  from  which,  by  natural  logic,  the  allied  States 


118  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

of  the  Entente  will  issue  victorious,  of  which  there  is  no  longer 
any  doubt,  even  on  the  part  of  our  enemies.     And  in  agree- 
ment with  Russia,  on  this  question  as  well  as  on  all  the  others, 
there  is  noble  and  powerful  England,  whose  politicians  and 
publicists,  such  as  H.  Wickham  Steed  and    R.  W.  Seton 
Watson,  have  pleaded  before  European  public  opinion,  even 
before  this  war,  in  favour  of  the  Croatians,  and  there  is  also 
heroic  France,  of  whom  the  national  deputy  and  member  of 
the  Starcevic  party,  M.  Dragutin  Hrvoj,  said  at  the  time  of 
the  first  session  of  war  of  the  Croatian  national  Sabor  : 
"  Whatever  one  may  say  of  the  French  nation  and  in  spite 
of  the  antipathies  ready  to  be  forced  upon  us  in  this  time  of 
war,  it  is  yet  undeniable  that  it  is  the  nation  which  has 
always  been  the  torch-bearer  of  European  civilization.     If 
to-day  we  are  not  the  slaves  of  some  "  spahis,"  and  if  the 
whip  of  the  feudal  baron  no  longer  lashes  our  shoulders,  we 
owe  this  to  the  chivalrous  French  nation.     It  is  France  that 
has  fought  and  shed  torrents  of  her  noblest  blood  for  the 
rights  of  man,  for  individual  liberty,  for  the  right  of  re-union, 
for  liberty  of  speech  and  of  the  Press  !  "     And  it  is  upon  this 
France  that  we  Croatians  found  our  hopes  and  our  most 
ardent  desires  :    the  union  of  all  the  Serbians,   Croatians 
and  Slovenes  into  one  and  the  same  state,  free  and  indepen- 
dent,  under   the   glorious   sceptre   of   the    Karageorgevitch 
dynasty. 

October  8,  1916. 

The  Slovenes  :    A  People  Without  Culture  ? 

In  conformity  with  the  German-Austrian  method  of 
representing  a  people  upon  whom  they  desire  to  dominate, 
as  inferior  and  backward  from  the  point  of  view  of 
culture  and  civilization,  the  Germans  have  unceasingly 
depicted  the  Slavs  as  people  without  culture,  living  still 
under  primitive  conditions,  and  who  ought  therefore  to 
be  only  too  happy  that  the  Germans  with  their  great 
culture  should  reign  over  them,  as  this  domination  can  only 
be  beneficial  to  them.  In  employing  this  method,  the  Ger- 
mans wished  to  make  the  world  believe  that  their  domination 
over  the  Slavs  was  justified  from  a  universal  point  of  view. 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND   SLOVENES     119 

The  Germans  are,  however,  the  hereditary  enemies  of  the 
Slavs,  especially  of  the  Jugoslavs.  And  yet,  when  to- 
day a  great  number  of  newspapers  of  our  friend  and  ally, 
Italy,  employ  the  same  method  in  order  to  justify  their 
exaggerated  claims  on  purely  Slav  countries  by  an  entirely 
false  representation  of  the  conditions  in  which  the  Southern 
Slavs  live,  it  appears  to  us  rather  strange.  We  cannot 
help  protesting  against  these  mistakes  which  are  repeated 
daily  in  certain  Italian  papers,  which  depict  the  Jugoslavs 
as  rude  peasants  without  culture  and  without  civilization, 
as  people  come  down  from  the  mountains,  as  simple  tribes 
who  rejoice  when  one  tells  them  that  Saint  Mark  is  going 
to  return  among  them  to  reign  as  in  bygone  centuries  with 
justice  and  equity.  It  is  hoped  in  this  way  to  attribute 
to  the  imperialistic  pretentions  of  the  Italian  Nationalists,  a 
civilizing  mission  sent  to  a  people  that  has  such  great  need 
of  being  civilized.  Though  we  are  admirers  of  Italian  culture, 
we  cannot  help  replying  to  these  affirmations  by  a  simple 
assertion  of  the  facts.  That  is  our  right,  and  can  only 
serve  as  enlightenment  on  the  Italo- Jugoslav  question. 
Besides,  when  the  true  state  of  things  is  known,  it  will  be 
understood  why  the  Jugoslavs  insist  with  so  much  tenacity 
upon  the  unity  and  indissolubility  of  their  native  land.  It 
will  be  seen  that  everywhere  where  Jugoslavs  live,  they  are 
so  leagued  together  by  indissoluble  bonds  of  culture  and  com- 
merce, that  one  cannot  take  it  ill  if  they  are  not  inclined  to 
let  themselves  be  divided  up  and  separated,  if  they  wish  to 
live  their  independent  life. 

That  is  the  state  of  things  in  the  Slovene  countries,  which 
we  wish  to  set  forth  here  briefly,  keeping  to  simple  facts. 

The  Slovenes  are  the  most  western  fraction  of  the  Jugo- 
slavs and  their  number  is  one  million  and  a  half.  The  great 
majority  of  the  Slovenes  lives  in  Austrian  countries  :  in 
Carniole,  Southern  Styria,  Southern  Carinthia,  Gorice, 
Trieste  and  Istria,  where  they  number  1,252,334.  Of  others, 
more  than  100,000  live  in  the  Hungarian  comitats  touching 
Southern  Styria  ;  there  are  still  40,000  in  the  Italian  frontier 
province  of  Udine "  ;    the  remainder  is  dispersed  over  the 

1  That  they  exist  in  reality  in  this  country,  and  that  in  compact 
mass,    can   be    confirmed   by   consulting    no    matter    what    reliable 


120  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

United  States,  Germany  and  Egypt.  As  illustration  of  the 
present  state  of  Slovene  conditions,  we  would  state  only  a 
few  facts,  dry,  but  sufficient  to  give  an  idea  of  the  characteris- 
tics of  the  Slovene  nation. 

According  to  official  statistics  of  1910,  85*34  Per  cent,  of 
the  Slovene  population  know  how  to  read  and  write,  while 
their  neighbours  of  the  East,  the  Magyars,  can  only  reckon 
62  per  cent,  and  the  Italians  of  the  Kingdom,  62*40  per  cent. 
There  are  Italian  provinces  where  the  illiterate  amount  even 
to  85  per  cent.  Rome,  the  capital  of  Italy  itself,  counts  65 
per  cent.  l  However,  the  Slovenes  show,  in  their  most 
neglected  province,  Istria,  46*61  per  cent.,  and  23*26  per 
cent,  in  Carinthia,  subjected  continually  to  the  severest 
Germanic  rule,  while  in  Gorice  they  only  count  14*75  per 
cent.,  and  in  Trieste  12*86  per  cent.,  in  Carniole  12*46 
per  cent,  and  in  Styria  11*54  per  cent.  These  figures  reveal 
a  considerable  superiority  in  this  respect  of  the  Slovenes 
over  the  Italians  proper. 

The  standard  of  education,  too,  attains  a  relatively 
high  degree.  In  Carniole  there  is  one  higher  elementary 
school  pupil  out  of  258  Slovene  inhabitants,  while  in  Italy 
(if  one  keeps  to  the  figures  furnished  by  Mr.  Borghese)  the 
proportion  is  approximately  1  out  of  400. 

In  the  economic  domain  also,  the  Slovenes  have  obtained 
appreciable  results,  and  that  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  they 
are  for  the  most  part  farmers  (60-70  per  cent.)  and  that 
capitalism  is  not  yet  developed  in  the  same  measure  as  with 
the  great  European  nations.  According  to  reports  of  the 
Austrian  Central  Statistical  Commission,  there  were,  at  the 
end  of  1912,  952  Slovene  co-operative  societies  (in  Carniole 
424,  in  Styria  254,  in  Carinthia  36,  at  Trieste  and  in  the  neigh- 
ethnographical  map,  even  Italian.  We  will  quote  here  what  is  said  by 
the  Roman  paper,  77  Messagero,  in  an  article  of  its  Udine  corre- 
spondent :  "  How  many  people  in  Italy  knew  before  this  war  that  a 
Slav  people  lives  under  our  tri-colour  flag  and  under  our  laws,  on  our 
frontier  ?  .  .  .  This  Slav  population  of  40,000  souls  lives  on  territory 
that  extends  beyond  the  Nadisone  as  far  as  to  the  frontier  and  of  which 
the  soil  is  unfertile  and  unprofitable. "  In  describing  the  heroic 
exploits  of  a  battalion  of  Italian  Slovenes,  the  article  ends  with  these 
words  :  "  Slovenia  has  given  such  sons  to  Italy." 

1  Giovanni  Borghese  :  Modern  Italy,  Paris,  1913. 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND   SLOVENES     121 

bourhood  47,  in  Gorice  135,  in  Istria  56).  In  this  number 
there  were  in  1910,  543  co-operative  banking  societies,  512 
of  these  having  granted  the  same  year  46,604,845  crowns 
credit  and  included  164,954  members  (i-7th  of  the  whole 
Slovene  population).  In  1910  one  reckoned  274  Slovene 
agricutural  societies,  of  which  200,  who  have  published 
their  annual  statement,  had  21,312  members.  The  principal 
agricultural  society  of  Carniole  was  founded  in  1767  and 
next  year  it  will  be  able  to  celebrate  the  150th  anniversary 
of  its  foundation  :  its  work  has  been  so  useful  that  it  has 
increased  the  Slovene  national  wealth  by  a  hundred  and 
twenty  millions.  The  Slovene  co-operative  societies  belong- 
ing to  four  unions,  one  of  which  is  at  Laybach  (Lioubliana) 
comprised  in  1914,  591  co-operative  societies  (73  among 
them  being  Croatian,  four  in  Dalmatia  and  69  in  Istria)  with 
79,544,415  crowns  traffic  in  the  same  year.  The  other 
union,  also  at  Lioubliana  (Carniole)  counted  as  members  in 
1910,  177  co-operative  societies  ;  135  societies  formed  part 
of  the  third  union,  which  has  its  seat  at  Tzelye  (Cilli  in 
Styria)  and  80  belonged  to  that  of  Gorice.  At  Lioubliana 
there  exists  also  "  The  Economic  Union  "  with  a  traffic, 
during  the  year  1916,  of  70,158,538,780  Austrian  crowns. 

The  Slovenes  possess  besides  a  great  number  of  savings- 
banks,  with  a  considerable  capital.  Two  of  them  are  powerful 
banks  which,  by  means  of  national  capital,  extend  their 
operations  over  the  whole  Jugoslav  territory  of  Austria- 
Hungary.  The  first  of  these  is  "  The  Credit  Bank  "  of 
Lioubliana  (Laybach),  founded  in  1900,  with  branches  at 
Gorice,  Trieste,  Split  (Spalato,  Dalmatia),  Tzelovetz  (Klagen- 
furt,  Carinthia),  Tzelye  (Cilli,  Styria)  and  Sarayevo  (Bosina). 
In  1905  there  was  founded  at  Trieste  the  second  great 
Slovene  and  Croatian  bank,  the  "  Adriatic  Bank,"  with 
branches  in  Dalmatia  :  at  Metkovic,  Split,  Sibenik,  Zadar ; 
in  Istria  :  at  Opatija  (Abbassia)  and  at  Lioubliana  (Carniole). 
The  "  Adriatic  Bank  "  has  been  of  special  help  to  navigation 
on  the  cosats  of  Istria  and  Dalmatia,  and  has  founded  also 
the  great  Slovene  forwarding  and  storage  enterprise 
"  Balkan,"  with  seat  at  Trieste.  Recently  two  large  new 
Slovene  banks  have  been  founded  at  Lioubliana  :  the 
"  Illyrian   Bank"    (Iliska   Banka)    and   the    "Co-operative 


122  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

Bank."  While  the  Slovenes  have  developed  their  economic 
life  considerably  at  Trieste,  and  possess  an  important  bank, 
the  "  Adriatic  Bank,"  the  Italians  of  Trieste  have  not  a 
single  bank  and,  in  other  ways  also,  their  economic  situation 
is  inferior  to  that  of  the  Slovenes. 

As  the  Slovenes  have  attained,  in  spite  of  their  small 
number,  rather  a  high  degree  of  economic  development,  so 
that  they  have  been  able  to  extend  their  sphere  of  activity 
beyond  their  own  country,  so  also  their  economic  schools 
are  known  to  their  neighbours.  We  would  only  point  out 
that  one  single  private  commercial  school  at  Lioubliana 
counted  more  pupils  belonging  to  other  Jugoslav  countries 
(also  Serbia)  and  to  Italy  and  Austria,  than  Slovenes  of  the 
country  itself.  At  Lioubliana  there  exists  also  an  industrial 
school,  where  are  taught  all  branches  of  ordinary  and 
artistic  industry,  and  which  is  counted  among  the  most 
modern  of  Austria.  At  Trieste,  the  Slovenes  have  founded 
their  own  school  of  commerce  with  national  funds. 

In  their  tenacious  struggle  against  the  govermental 
system  and  Germanism,  the  Slovenes  have  been  able  to 
develop  a  relatively  considerable  material  and  spiritual 
strength.  And  it  is  especially  in  the  field  of  literature  that 
the  Slovenes  have  shown  a  capacity  and  a  vitality  which  can 
leave  no  doubt  as  to  the  future  of  the  Jugoslavs  to  any  one 
who  knows  them  thoroughly.  Though  a  nation  of  only 
one  million  and  a  half  souls,  they  had,  in  1912,  122  news- 
papers. Their  principal  daily  papers  (two  of  which  are  at 
Trieste)  have  each  from  10  to  15,000  subscribers.  These 
are  papers  which  appear  with  6  to  12  pages  in  the  form  of  the 
Corriere  della  Sera.  The  weekly  political  paper,  Domolioub, 
edited  exclusively  for  the  peasants  of  Carniole,  is  printed  in 
50,000  copies  ;  the  popular  paper  Slovenski  Dom  in  28,000  ; 
the  weekly  agricultural  paper  has  50,000  subscribers  in 
Carniole  alone,  etc. 

For  Belles-Lettres  also,  the  Slovenes  have  a  series  of 
publishing  firms  and  societies,  the  chief  being  at  Lioubliana, 
at  Gorice,  at  Tzelovetz  (Carinthia)  and  at  Tzelye  (Styria). 
The  "  Society  of  St.  Hermangoras  "  at  Tzelovetz  (Klagenfurt 
in  Carinthia),  founded  in  i860,  is  an  example  of  the  importance 
of  certain  of  these  societies  :    it  edits  annually  six  books 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND  SLOVENES     123 

printed  in  100,000  copies  each  ;  it  counted  in  1910,  85,789 
members.  Each  Slovene  family  receives  the  editions  of  this 
society. 

This  solidity  in  the  development  of  culture  among  the 
Slovenes  is  of  ancient  origin.  For  Slovene  literature  is 
ancient.  The  first  literary  epoch  of  this  nation  dates  from 
the  sixteenth  century  (epoch  of  the  Reformation)  and  the 
first  Slovene  books  appeared  in  1550,  at  the  same  time 
as  the  first  printing  press  was  founded  at  Lioubliana. 
The  writer,  Adam  Bohoric,  edited  as  early  as  in  1584  the 
first  vSlovene  grammar,  and  in  1592  there  appeared  also  the 
first  Slovene  vocabulary. 

When  in  1809  the  French  liberated,  although  it  was  for 
five  years  only,  a  part  of  the  Jugoslavs  from  the  Austrian 
tyranny  by  forming  the  Kingdom  of  Illyria  (Carniole,  a  part 
of  Carinthia,  Gorice,  Trieste,  Istria,  Croatia  in  part,  and 
Dalmatia)  with,  for  capital,  Lioubliana,  Slovene  literature 
developed  considerably,  and  has  gone  on  developing  up  to 
our  own  days. 

We  have  simply  shown,  in  mentioning  the  high  opinion 
the  Italian  Socialists  of  Austria  have  of  Slovene  literature 
and  economic  life,1  why  the  Slovenes,  like  all  the  Jugoslavs, 
are  of  opinion  that  they  have  the  right  to  live  an  independent 
national  life. 

November  12,  1916. 

The  Bosnia-Herzegovina  Factor  of  the  Monarchy. 
The  Austrian  Prime  Minister,  Dr.  Seidler,  declared 
recently  before  the  representatives  of  the  political  parties 
"  that  he  did  not  know  whether  the  South  Slav  State  would 
be  born  some  day.  It  is  not  an  impossibility,  but  it  is  not 
possible  to  speak  of  it  here,  because  the  matter  concerns  not 
Austria  alone,  but  also  Hungary  and  Bosnia.  I  do  not  wish 
either  to  consider  the  question  of  whether  certain  Austrian 
territories  could  be  united  to  that  State,  but  one  thing  is 
clear  enough  :  it  is  that  if  such  a  State  were  created,  one 
could  not  annex  to  it  all  the  parts  of  Austrian  territory 
separating  that  State  from  the  Adriatic  and  closely  united 
with  regions  speaking  German." 

1  See  La  Serbie  of  29  Oct.  :  "  La  Civilization  Slovene." 


124  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

One  sees  that  Austria  has  learnt  nothing  in  this  war. 
She  imagines  that  her  former  methods  of  deceiving  the 
Slavs  by  offering  them  a  few  crumbs  of  autonomy  and 
fictitious  liberties  and  independence  of  government,  could 
make  our  nation  swerve  from  the  road  it  has  entered  upon, 
fighting  with  all  its  might  for  its  complete  deliverance  and 
for  the  integral  union  of  all  the  Serbo-Croat-Slovenes 
into  a  single  independent  State,  but  not  for  a  single  instant 
will  Austria  succeed. 

In  order  to  amputate  our  national  territory  and  com- 
promise the  Jugoslav  unity  by  immoral  means,  so  as  to  be 
able  to  keep  our  nation  more  easily  in  the  Austro-Magyar 
bondage,  Mr.  Seidler  has  done  his  best  to  appeal  to  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  as  an  important  factor  in  the  creation  of 
this  Southern  Slav  State  such  as  he  imagines  it. 

We  Bosnians  are  not  accustomed  and  would  never  wish 
to  be  a  factor  of  any  kind  in  the  Habsburg  Monarchy.  Our 
consent  has  only  been  asked  when  it  was  necessary  to  give 
up  our  national  ideals  and  justify  the  twisting  round  of 
international  treaties  by  Austria-Hungary.  Instead  of 
giving  our  approbation,  we  have  always  protested. 

The  Constitution  granted  to  Bosnia  has  provided  for 
the  formation  of  a  special  body,  a  National  Council,  whose 
work  was  to  negotiate  with  the  Austrian  and  Hungarian 
Governments,  with  regard  to  the  situation  of  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina  in  relation  to  the  Monarchy.  However,  the 
National  Council  of  Bosnia  has  never  been  convoked,  neither 
by  the  Government  of  Vienna,  nor  by  that  of  Budapest.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  Governments  of  Vienna  and  Budapest 
have  never  deigned  to  reply  to  the  numerous  enquiries 
addressed  to  them  by  the  Council.  The  Minister  Burian, 
attacked  by  the  Delegations  because  of  his  policy  in  Bosnia, 
had  declared  :  "In  Bosnia  there  is  no  policy,  there  is  only 
administ  ration.' ' 

However,  to-day,  when  it  is  desired  to  paralyse  the 
national  movement  of  the  Jugoslavs,  aimed  at  their 
deliverance  from  the  Germano-Magyar  yoke,  they  try  to 
divide  our  nation,  and,  for  that  purpose,  appeal  to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  by  pretending  to  ask  its  consent  for 
a  new  combination  of  the  dualist  policy  of  Austria-Hungary. 


SERBIANS,   CROATIANS,   AND   SLOVENES     125 

We  suddenly  discover  that  we  are  an  "  important  factor," 
this  solely  with  the  object  of  flattering  us  in  order  that  we 
might  betray  our  national  cause.  This  division  of  the 
Jugoslavs  and  their  servitude  towards  the  Magyars  have 
already  been  taken  into  consideration  at  the  moment  of  the 
annexation. 

In  the  Imperial  Proclamation  addressed  to  the  nation, 
October  10,  1908,  this  is  stated  : 

"  But  the  first  indispensable  condition  for  the  establish- 
ment of  this  provincial  constitution  lies  in  the  preliminary 
creation  of  a  juridical  settlement  for  the  two  countries,  quite 
free  and  concise  from  any  ambiguity. 

"  For  this  reason  and  remembering  the  bonds  of  union 
which  existed  formerly  between  our  glorious  ancestors  on 
the  Hungarian  Throne  and  these  countries,  we  declare  our 
sovereign  rights  to  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  etc.  ..." 

The  Bosnians,  by  the  intermediary  of  Tcherviche-beg 
Miralem,  a  notable  Mussulman  of  very  prominent  position, 
have  already  protested  to  the  Diet  against  any  attempt 
at  a  constitutional  annexation,  as  they  knew  that  the  question 
of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  formed  part  of  the  Jugoslav  question 
and  that  partial  solutions  can  only  put  the  drag  on  our 
national  unity  ;  they  knew  also  that  never  within  the  frame- 
work of  the  Monarchy  would  it  be  possible  for  us  to  be  free. 

To-day  also,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Bosnian  Diet 
is  dissolved,  the  Bosnians  and  the  Herzegovinians  are  fimly 
united  for  the  purpose  of  conducting,  with  their  Southern 
Slav  chiefs  at  the  Parliament  of  Vienna,  a  vigorous  action 
with  a  view  to  liberating  their  country.  After  the  manoeuvre 
of  Mr.  von  Seidler  they  have  not  hesitated  to  act  in  oppo- 
sition, and  their  sentiments  may  be  summed  up  in  the  words 
pronounced  by  one  of  their  deputies:  "We  know  very 
well,"  said  he,  "that  a  great  Croatia,  such  as  Austria  offers 
us,  would  be  from  that  moment  at  the  mercy  of  the  Austrians 
and  the  Magyars.  We  Serbians  and  Croatians  reply  to  Mr. 
Seidler  with  the  same  indignation  and  with  the  same  energy 
as  the  Slovenes :  '  Never ! '  " 

Time  will  show  whether  the  imaginary  and  ridiculous 
historical  rights  of  the  Magyars  will  get  the  better  of  the 
earnest  will  of  a  nation  conscious  of  itself. 

June  15,  1918. 


CHAPTER   III 

THE    STRUGGLE   WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Succession. 

The  question  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  succession  found, 
from  a  theoretical  point  of  view,  a  solution  when  a  young 
prince  of  the  House  of  Habsburg  came  to  the  throne  and 
took  the  title  of  Charles  I.  The  death  of  Francis- Joseph, 
with  the  World  War  in  full  swing,  is  nevertheless  an  important 
event  of  which  the  consequences  will  lose  no  time  in  making 
themselves  felt  when  the  fate  of  the  Monarchy  is  to  be 
decided.  The  Emperor  Francis- Joseph  had  acquired  a 
possessive  title  to  the  countries  under  his  rule  and  during  his 
long  reign  he  had  succeeded  in  strengthening  his  dynastic 
rights.  The  possession  being  purely  a  matter  of  fact,  is  not 
subject  to  inheritance,  and  the  new  Emperor,  in  calling  on  his 
dynastic  rights,  can  only  support  them  by  the  out  of  date 
argument  of  Divine  Right  or  by  the  terms  of  ancient  consti- 
tutional charters  of  doubtful  value.  The  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy  remains  therefore  a  fact  and  not  a  right  and  it  is 
the  long  reign  of  Francis-Joseph  which  has  helped  to  give  it 
the  appearance  of  a  definitely  formed  State.  During  the  reign 
of  Francis- Joseph,  the  separatist  tendencies  of  the  subject 
peoples  were  repressed  and  one  heard,  even  in  disinterested 
circles,  that  Austria-Hungary  was  a  political  necessity.  After 
the  death  of  Francis-Joseph  the  respect  due  to  his  personality, 
the  scruples  which  that  might  provoke,  disappeared  com- 
pletely, and  one  can  face  more  clearly  the  question  of  the 
conservation  of  the  Monarchy. 

That  the  Austro-Hungarian  peoples  demand  their  liberty 
and  independence  is  a  notorious  fact  on  which  it  is  needless 

126 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      127 

to  insist.  Even  the  Hungarians,  those  faithful  servants  of 
German  imperialism,  would  be  glad  to  be  rid  of  the  German 
embrace,  on  condition,  it  goes  without  saying, — and  on 
that  point  all  Magyars  agree — that  their  power  over  the 
Southern  Slavs  and  Transylvanian  Roumanians  is  not  touched. 
As  to  the  Southern  Slavs,  Roumanians,  Czechs,  Slovenes 
and  Poles,  they  are  retained  by  force  within  the  boundaries 
of  the  Monarchy  and  only  await  the  first  chance  to  escape 
from  them.  It  is  in  the  name  of  the  principle  of  the  liberty 
of  all  peoples  that  the  oppressed  nations  of  Austria-Hungary 
demand  their  political  independence.  The  great  aims 
of  civilization,  for  which  the  Allies  are  fighting,  cannot  be 
realized  without  the  deliverance  of  the  Southern  Slavs,  of 
the  Czecho-Slovaks,  of  the  Roumanians,  and  of  the  Poles 
from  the  Magyaro-German  power  and  their  constitution 
as  independent  national  States.  The  speeches  on  the 
liberty  of  the  small  nations,  so  often  pronounced  by  the 
authorized  representatives  of  the  Allied  Powers,  are  not 
just  empty  phrases,  as  our  adversaries  affirm,  but  the  real 
political  programme  of  the  Allies.  The  present  struggle 
of  the  nations  is  a  struggle  between  two  contradictory 
principles  :  the  principle  of  liberty  and  right  and  that  of 
force  and  domination.  The  victory  of  the  Allies  will  there- 
fore be  the  dawn  of  a  new  epoch  in  the  life  of  humanity  and 
it  cannot  be  imagined  without  the  preliminary  settlement 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  question. 

These  moral  considerations  are  not  sufficient,  all  the 
same,  to  convince  the  masses  and  encourage  them  to 
struggle  to  the  end,  until  complete  victory  is  obtained. 
More  concrete  and  palpable  arguments  drawn  from  the  need 
of  defending  oneself  from  the  German  menace,  have  a  greater 
influence  on  the  mind  ;  and  if  we  consider  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  question  from  this  point  of  view,  we  arrive  at 
the  same  conclusion,  that  is  to  say,  that  the  break  up  of 
the  Monarchy  is  essential  if  we  really  wish  the  German  power 
to  be  broken.  The  evolution  of  Austro- Hungary  has  passed 
through  different  phases,  but  since  1866  she  has  been  nothing 
more  than  a  German  province.  Up  to  1866,  there  were 
two  German  Powers  :  Protestant  Prussia  and  Catholic 
Austria.     In  1866,  Austria,  defeated  by  Prussia  and  main- 


128  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

tained  by  her  at  the  same  time,  lost  her  place  as  an  Empire 
and  became  the  faithful  acolyte  of  Prussia  risen  to  the  rank 
of  German  Empire.  Bismarck,  instead  of  breaking  up  Austria, 
which  would  have  meant  liberating  over  twenty  million 
Slavs,  preferred  to  "  save  "  the  Monarchy,  suggested  to  it 
the  idea  of  dualism,  and  attached  it  bodily  to  the  German 
Empire.  In  this  way  Germany  obtained  an  allied  power, 
heterogeneous  in  every  way,  except  from  the  military  point  of 
view.  This  was  precisely  what  Germany  wanted,  as  has 
been  seen  during  the  present  war.  Germany  makes  great 
use  of  Austria-Hungary,  of  her  resources  in  men  and  material, 
and  has  plucked  the  fruits  of  the  policy  so  cleverly  pursued 
for  years  and  years. 

Bulgaria  and  Turkey  are  the  "  little  "  friends  of  Germany. 
The  principal  Ally  of  the  German  Empire  is  Austria-Hungary, 
who  adds  a  few  million  soldiers  to  the  German  power.  If 
Germany  is  to  be  got  at,  Austria-Hungary  must  be  separated 
from  her  and  one  cannot  separate  her  otherwise  than  by  the 
transformation  of  her  political  structure  and  the  formation 
of  independent  States.  Austria-Hungary,  as  she  was  after 
the  war  of  1866  and  the  Austro-Hungarian  agreement  of 
1867,  was  a  purely  German  combination,  formed  solely 
in  the  interests  of  Germany.  This  German  combination 
must  be  broken  up,  in  the  interests  of  Europe,  and  recon- 
structed in  agreement  with  the  aspirations  of  its  respective 
peoples  and  in  accordance  with  the  needs  of  a  new  Europe, 
pacifist  and  federal.  As  we  have  often  repeated  here, 
before  thinking  of  Germany  and  the  guarantees  to  be  required 
from  her,  the  Austro-Hungarian  problem  should  be  solved. 
It  is  the  logical  thing  to  do  and  political  necessity  demands 
that  it  should  be  done.  The  death  of  Francis-Joseph  has 
simplified  the  Austro-Hungarian  question  and  given  it  a 
more  concrete  form  and  the  victory  of  the  Allies  will  help 
the  peoples  of  the  Monarchy,  its  legitimate  heirs,  to  claim 
the  inheritance  which  belongs  to  them. 

December  3,  1916. 

Remember    Austria-Hungary  ! 

Among    the    prejudices    which    Europe    finds    hard    to 
relinquish,  there  is  one  of  great  significance  and  extraordinary 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      129 

resistance.  It  is  the  Austrian  prejudice.  Thirty  months 
of  sanguinary  struggle,  originally  provoked  by  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary,  have  not  yet  seriously  shaken  the  inter- 
national situation  of  the  Danubian  Monarchy,  nor  the 
deeply  rooted  fiction  of  its  pretended  moderate  action 
and  the  historical  necessity  of  its  existence.  And,  what 
is  still  more  strange,  neither  the  answer  of  the  Allies  to  Mr. 
Wilson's  Note,  nor  their  demands  drawn  up  with  absolute 
precision,  have  been  able  to  produce  an  appreciable  impression 
on  the  inert  minds  which  persist  in  cherishing  pre-war 
illusions.  People  whose  sympathies  are  manifestly  favour- 
able to  the  Entente  always  refuse  to  face  seriously  the 
question  of  the  dismemberment  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy  and  the  liberation  of  its  enslaved  peoples.  They 
consider  the  Allies'  reply  as  a  sort  of  platonic,if  not  Utopian, 
desire.  That  the  neutrals  should  remain  under  this  illusion 
is  perhaps  comprehensible,  but  when  the  publicists  of  the 
Allies,  especially  those  of  Italy,  base  their  political  concep- 
tions on  an  Austria  shorn  of  a  few  Adriatic  districts  in  favour 
of  Italy,  but  maintaining  her  position  as  a  great  Power, 
it  is  a  much  more  serious  problem  and  reveals  a  really 
disconcerting  state  of  mind.  M.  Gustave  Le  Bon,  who 
applies  himself  so  zealously  to  the  lessons  and  psychological 
consequences  of  the  war,  would  do  better  to  give  his 
attention  to  this  Austrian  obsession,  the  gravity  of  which 
should  not  escape  the  friends  of  a  lasting  Peace  in  a  regener- 
ated Europe. 

Yet  all  the  same,  the  truth  about  the  part  played  in  the 
German  plans  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  and  the 
danger  which  its  actual  constitution  presents  and  will 
continue  to  present  to  European  peace  and  liberty  in  the 
future,  is  very  clear  and  easy  to  understand.  The  whole 
attitude  of  Austria-Hungary,  since  the  foundation  of  the 
German  Empire,  proves  indisputably  that  she  is  but  the 
11  brilliant  second,"  as  Emperor  William  II  so  rightly  called 
her,  in  the  German  effort  to  conquer  the  world.  In  1870, 
when  some  innocent  people  thought  that  Austria  would 
seize  the  chance  to  escape  from  the  power  and  dictation  of 
Prussia,  the  Monarchy  made  no  move.  The  Austro-Magyar 
Agreement  of  1867,  concluded  under  the  auspices  of  Prussia, 

10 


ISO  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

produced  already  in  1870  its  effects.  Vienna  and  Buda- 
pest preferred  to  keep,  with  Germany's  help,  their  usurped 
power  over  the  Slavs  rather  than  march  against  Prussia  in 
order  to  defend  France,  a  democratic  country  and  the  cradle 
of  political  liberty.  In  1877-78,  the  fruits  of  the  Germano- 
Austro-Magyar  collaboration  make  themselves  yet  more 
apparent.  Without  receiving  a  blow,  Austria-Hungary, 
supported  by  Germany  and  encouraged  by  England,  insists 
on  the  occupation  of  the  Serbian  provinces,  Bosnia-Herze- 
govina, and  succeeds  in  securing  even  the  Sandjak  of  Novi- 
Bazar  and  in  preventing  the  union  of  the  two  Serbian  States, 
Serbia  and  Montenegro.  In  Berlin  they  rubbed  their 
hands  with  satisfaction,  whilst  the  non-Germanic  diplomats 
who  had  signed  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  imagined,  in  their 
blindness,  that  they  had  done  useful  work  for  the  peace  of 
Europe.  In  reality,  they  had  only  confirmed  the  Germanic 
Powers  in  their  oriental  aims,  which  constitute  the  first 
stage  towards  world  domination. 

The  events  of  the  last  few  years  have  brought  many  people 
to  their  senses  and,  to-day,  public  opinion  is  almost  unanimous 
in  admitting  Austrian  complicity  in  premeditating  the 
war  and  Austro-Magyar  servility  to  German  designs.  The 
Magyars  and  Austrians,  who  collaborated  efficiently  in  the 
realization  of  German  domination,  do  so  with  the  conviction 
that  they  also  will  have  a  prominent  place  amongst  the  rulers 
of  the  world. 

It  is  only  with  the  help  of  the  Germans  that  they  can 
keep  their  present  power  over  so  many  millions  of  Slav 
subjects,  and  their  devotion  to  the  German  cause  is  conse- 
quently very  comprehensible.  What  is  not  so  clear  is 
the  illusion  entertained  by  certain  publicists  and  politicians 
of  the  Allies,  who,  seeing  the  German  menace,  imagine  that 
a  durable  peace  can  be  obtained  by  leaving  Austria-Hungary 
as  it  is  and  with  its  present  constitution.  They  prefer  to 
shut  their  eyes  to  the  fact  that  the  Dual  Monarchy  exploits 
30  million  non-German  and  non-Magyar  subjects  and  forces 
them  to  support  a  cause  which  is  quite  foreign  to  them. 
They  do  not  want  to  see  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  question 
is  the  essence  of  the  German  question  and  that  the  whole 
edifice  of  German  world  politics  will  fall  to  pieces  like  a 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      131 

house  of  cards  the  moment  that  Austria- Hungary,  with  its 
50  millions,  disappearing  from  the  map  of  Europe,  will  have 
given  place  to  the  national  states,  animated  with  the 
democratic  spirit  and  determined  to  oppose  any  German 
invasion. 

We  do  not  wish  to  speak  of  the  principles  of  right, 
justice  and  morality.  We  do  not  wish  always  to  invoke  the 
sufferings  of  the  Slav  peoples  whom  the  Germans  grind 
under  their  heel.  We  do  not  appeal  to  sentiment ;  we  insist 
on  the  political  necessity  of  finishing  once  and  for  all  with 
this  dangerous  system.  For  there  are  moments  when  all 
principles  lose  their  value  for  those  responsible  for  the  fate 
of  the  masses.  Then  self-interest,  and  self-interest  only, 
decides  their  political  action.  And  it  is  of  vital  importance 
to  the  Allies  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  problem  should 
find  a  different  solution  to  that  suggested  by  the  Germans 
in  1867,  which  only  served  their  own  interests.  In  place 
of  the  Dual  Monarchy  where  the  Germans  and  Magyars 
divide  the  power  over  the  majority  of  the  inhabitants,  who 
are  mostly  Slavs,  national  states  must  be  erected.  They 
alone  can  guarantee  Europe  against  a  new  German  menace. 
It  is  illogical  to  think  of  Turkey  and  to  forget  her  European 
sister,  Austria-Hungary.  The  two  patients  should  be 
operated  on  at  the  same  time.  The  more  radical  the  opera- 
tion, the  greater  will  be  the  security  of  the  peace  of  Europe. 

March  4,  1917. 

Austria-Hungary    and    the    Entente. 

Diplomats  and  politicians  are  to-day  in  a  better  position 
than  soldiers  to  know  which  are  the  weakest  points  in 
the  enemy  front.  The  most  important  and  strongest  points 
in  the  enemy  fronts  are  in  the  north,  in  Central  Europe. 
The  Turkish  and  Bulgarian  fronts  certainly  display  tenacity. 
These  fronts,  reinforced  by  German  detachments  and  supplied 
by  the  German  war  factories,  still  resist  the  attacks  of  the 
Allies.  The  force  of  these  attacks  is  appreciably  diminished 
not  only  by  the  immense  distance  which  hinders  the  dispatch 
of  necessary  supplies,  but  also  by  other  difficulties  arising 
from  the  nature  of  the  ground,  the  climate  and  the  ethnical 


132  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

element  of  these  countries.  Between  these  two  extremities 
are  the  Austro-Hungarian  fronts  which  possess  a  special 
character.  The  peculiarity  of  these  fronts  is  the  result, 
first  of  all,  of  the  ethnical  composition  of  Austria-Hungary 
and  also  of  the  conflicting  aspirations  of  the  nations  composing 
that  Empire.  This  is  precisely  what  makes  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  fronts  the  weakest  of  all  the  imperial  fronts.  From 
the  military  point  of  view  this  has  already  been  incontestably 
proved  several  times  during  the  present  war.  All  the  same, 
Entente  diplomacy  has  not  known  how  to  back  up  the 
Allied  armies  in  a  useful  way  and  to  profit  from  this  weak- 
ness in  order  to  bring  the  war  sooner  to  an  end. 

For  those  who  have  followed  the  course  of  political 
events  in  Austria-Hungary  during  the  war,  it  is  not  difficult 
to  find  a  plan  of  action.  This  way  is  still  more  clearly 
indicated  by  the  Russian  Revolution.  In  spite  of  this, 
Entente  diplomacy  has  not  shown,  by  any  opportune 
act,  that  it  intended  to  exploit  the  new  state  of  affairs  from 
its  birth.  It  omitted,  not  only  to  solve  but  even  to  put  the 
Austro-Hungarian  question  before  the  leaders  of  the  Russian 
Revolution,  a  question  which  remains  the  Gordian  knot  of 
the  peace  of  Europe  and  of  the  whole  world. 

The  annihilation  of  Prussian  militarism  is  preached,  and 
Austria  seems  to  be  forgotten.  Preparations  are  made  to 
help  those  who  do  not  wish  to  be  helped  and  there  is  no 
hurry  to  give  assistance  to  those  who  ask  for  it  on  every 
occasion.  The  question  of  the  dethronement  of  the  Hohen- 
zollerns  has  been  considered  but  the  Habsburg  question 
is  not  insisted  on,  though  it  is  not  only  easier  to  solve  but 
is  to-day  a  flagrant  anachronism.  The  truest  Austrians 
and  most  ardent  Austrian  "  patriots  "  have  no  other  reason 
for  defending  the  existence  of  Austria  than  that  of  the 
Habsburg  Dynasty.  These  defenders  of  the  Austrian 
Empire  behave  as  if  we  lived  in  the  Middle  Ages  and  not 
in  the  twentieth  century,  in  the  period  of  modern  democracy. 
The  Russian  revolution  has  proclaimed  its  firm  intention 
to  assure  the  decisive  victory  of  democracy  in  Europe  and 
the  whole  world.  But  the  Entente  diplomacy  has  omitted, 
up  to  now,  to  explain  to  the  Russian  revolutionaries  that 
neither  the  victory  of  democracy  nor  a  just  and  durable 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      183 

peace  is  possible  in  Europe  as  long  as  absolutist  Austria- 
Hungary  exists  and  oppresses  foreign  nations. 

The  declarations  of  President  Wilson  and  the  United 
States  coming  into  the  war  side  by  side  with  the  Allies, 
should  have  stimulated  even  more  energetic  diplomatic 
action  in  favour  of  the  liberation  of  the  Slav  peoples.  It 
should  have  seized  the  opportunity  and  put  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  question  as  clearly  as  possible,  treating  it  in 
accordance  with  the  principles  announced. 

The  legitimist  dynasty  of  the  Habsburgs,  and  the  oppres- 
sive peoples  in  Austria-Hungary,  that  is  to  say  the  Germans 
and  the  Magyars,  are  concerting  in  broad  daylight,  under 
the  eyes  of  the  whole  world,  and  the  Entente  diplomacy 
gives  them  time  to  try  all  possible  remedies  in  order  to  save 
dying  Austria-Hungary. 

The  declarations  of  the  audacious  Czechs  and  intrepid 
Poles  and  Southern  Slavs  in  the  Austrian  Parliament,  the 
Polish  declarations  at  Cracovie  and  those  explained  to  the 
Croat  Parliament  at  Zagreb,  put  the  question  of  Austria- 
Hungary  and  the  Peace  of  Europe  with  all  the  lucidity  that 
can  be  desired.  That  was  more  than  a  month  ago,  and  the 
Entente  diplomacy  has  not  yet  found  the  opportunity  to 
consider  this  question  or  to  decide  it  in  a  manner  that  is 
in  accordance  with  the  great  principles  proclaimed  by  Mr. 
Wilson  and  the  Russian  Revolution.  Their  whole  action 
at  present  confines  itself  to  a  few  timid  declarations  by 
the  press  which  are  of  little  importance.  Hesitation  and 
nothing  but  hesitation,  is  not  exactly  compatible  with 
the  heroism  of  those  who  are  fighting  at  the  front  for  the 
great  principles  of  liberty  for  all  nations. 

Should  not  the  Allies  attend  more  closely  to  the  declara- 
tion of  the  Austrian  Slavs  ?  For  one  who  understands  the 
state  of  affairs  and  its  consequences,  it  is  clear  that  these 
same  Slavs  are  the  sincerest  and  the  strongest  Allies  of  the 
Entente  because  from  it  they  expect  their  freedom.  The 
Czechs  have  already  declared  that  they  will  take  no  part  in 
schemes  for  the  reoganization  of  Austria  and  that  they 
relinquish  their  demand  for  independence  to  the  care  of 
the  future  Peace.  Why  not  support  and  encourage  this 
movement  of  the  oppressed  peoples  ?     Is  it  incompatible 


134  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

with  the  principal  war  aims  of  the  Allies  ?  A  just  and  lasting 
peace  with  the  victory  of  democracy  in  all  States,  such 
is  the  final  aim  of  the  declarations  made  by  the  Allies. 
But,  neither  democractic  government  nor  a  lasting  peace 
is  possible  in  Europe  as  long  as  absolutist  Austria-Hungary 
and  militarist  and  conquering  Germany  exist,  the  only 
European  States  which  have  not  only  subjugated  foreign 
nations  but  have  used  them  in  order  to  trouble  the  peace 
of  Europe  and  threaten  the  liberty  of  other  peoples.  A 
Germany,  no  matter  how  militarist,  without  the  complicity 
of  Habsburg  Austria-Hungary,  could  never  have  gone  back 
to  her  old  trade  of  war.  That  is  indisputable.  So,  this 
accomplice,  this  "  brilliant  second "  of  Algeciras,  must 
be  abolished.  The  Austrian  question  is  of  the  first  import- 
ance and  no  one  can  stop  or  suppress  the  only  logical 
solution,  that  is  to  say  the  dismemberment  and  dissolution 
of  Austria-Hungary  with  all  its  consequences  resulting 
from  the  application  of  the  principle  of  nationality. 

July  29,  1917. 


More   Light   on   Austria-Hungary  ! 

Even  in  these  serious  times,  the  British  Parliament 
keeps  to  its  historic  traditions.  It  guards  jealously  its 
character  of  a  free  tribunal  where  the  representatives  of  the 
democracy  discuss  and  decide  the  policy  of  the  country. 
The  speeches  of  Messrs.  Buxton  and  Dillon,  M.P.'s,  and  Lord 
Robert  Cecil's  reply  to  the  questions  concerning  Serbia, 
the  Balkans  and  Austria-Hungary,  which  we  reproduce 
elsewhere,  confirm  once  again  the  high  reputation  of  British 
parliamentarism  and  its  frankness  in  the  treatment  of  all 
political  problems.  This  encourages  us  to  comment  on  the 
declarations  made  by  Lord  Robert  Cecil  in  the  same  frank 
and  loyal  spirit  that  has  always  distinguished  Serbian 
policy  towards  the  Allies. 

The  first  part  of  Lord  Cecil's  speech  deals  more  particu- 
larly with  Serbia  and  Great  Britian's  policy  towards  our 
country.  With  a  sincerity  which  impresses  all  Serbians, 
the  British  Minister  repeats  that  all  the  agreements  entered 
into  by  Great  Britain  with  the  Serbians  will  be  respected 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      135 

and  that  Serbia  will  receive  the  restitutions  and  reparations 
due  to  her  valour  and  the  sufferings  which  she  has  endured. 
As  to  the  scope  and  extent  of  these  reparations,  Lord  Cecil 
emphasizes  the  fact  that  just  as  it  was  Great  Britain's 
duty  to  support  France  in  her  demands  in  respect  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  so  must  Serbia  make  her  claims  and  Great  Britain 
will  support  them  without  reservation.  One  cannot  do 
otherwise  than  congratulate  the  British  Minister  on  these 
words  which  show  clearly  that  those  in  London  are  ready 
to  abandon  the  point  of  view,  held  up  to  now,  according  to 
which  the  Great  Powers  possessed  the  sovereign  right  to 
decide  the  fate  of  the  small  nations,  without,  sometimes, 
even  consulting  them.  For  Serbia  especially  it  is  a  well- 
earned  moral  satisfaction,  because  the  Serbian  opinions 
and  warnings,  so  numerous  and  logical,  were  rarely  listened 
to,  to  the  great  disadvantage  of  not  only  the  Serbian  nation 
but  the  Allies'  cause  in  general. 

The  second  part  of  Lord  Cecil's  speech  is  of  more  general 
interest  and  concerns  Austria-Hungary.  Lord  Cecil  agrees 
with  Mr.  Buxton  who  condemns  the  policy  requiring  the 
dismemberment  of  Austria-Hungary,  and  repeats  that  he 
also  considers  Germany  as  the  principal  enemy.  In  one 
respect  the  British  Minister  is  indubitably  right.  Germany 
is  the  principal  enemy  ;  that  is  agreed,  but  the  others  are 
her  weapons  and  cannot  only  be  termed  secondary  enemies. 
The  Allies  have  only  one  enemy  and  that  is  the  German 
block  reinforced  by  the  Turano-Turkish  block,  of  which 
Germany  is  the  head.  To  obtain  victory,  Germany  must 
be  conquered,  because  otherwise  all  the  terms  of  the  future 
peace  are  without  value.  But  in  order  to  disarm  Germany, 
the  Austro-Magyaro-Turano-Turkish  arm  must  be  ampu- 
tated. The  question  of  Austria-Hungary,  without  taking 
into  consideration  any  moral  obligation  to  deliver  its  peoples 
from  the  oppression  of  its  rule,  is  the  question  of  Germany, 
and,  as  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung  said  on  July  8th,  "  the 
present  war  was  provoked  and  waged  for  the  preservation 
of  Austria-Hungary  "  (see  La  Serbie  of  July  29th),  which 
means  that  the  German  defeat  should  bring  about  the 
dismemberment  of  the  Monarchy  and  the  check  of  the  Pan- 
German  plans.     There  should  be  no  doubt  on  that  point. 


136  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

Any  policy  of  the  Allies  tending  to  mantain  Austria-Hungary 
would  be  a  German  victory,  and  Serbia  would  be  the  first 
to  be  delivered  to  the  mercy  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  In 
spite  of  the  greatest  material  reparation  to  Serbia,  the  state 
of  affairs  would  be  the  same  in  the  end,  with  this  difference, 
that  the  resistance  of  the  Serbian  people  to  the  German 
menace  would  be  much  enfeebled,  the  sacrifices  made  up 
to  now  in  the  struggle  with  Germanism  having  consumed 
our  best  resources.  It  would  be  a  disastrous  result  not 
only  for  Serbia,  but  also  for  Italy,  France,  Great  Britain 
and  Russia.  We  refuse  to  think  that  Lord  Cecil  can  for 
a  moment  have  considered  as  acceptable  such  a  solution 
to  the  present  conflict. 
August  5,  1917. 

President  Wilson  and  Austria-Hungary. 

President  Wilson's  reply  to  the  Pope's  peace  Note  does 
not  mention  the  Habsburg  Monarchy,  but,  in  its  essentials, 
is  directed  as  much  against  Austria-Hungary  as  against 
Germany.  "  Americans  think  that  the  future  peace  should 
be  founded  on  the  rights  of  nations,  small  or  great,  who  should 
enjoy  equal  liberty  and  absolute  security,  and  with  whom 
no  one  may  dispute  the  right  of  self-government.  Such 
is  the  primary  basis  of  all  peace  conditions.  We  have  studied 
these  conditions  carefully  with  our  Allies.  We  are  deter- 
mined to  obtain  their  full  application."  These  words 
condemn  Austria-Hungary  first  of  all.  They  are  addressed 
to  Germany  because  Germany  represents  the  German  peril, 
and  with  the  destruction  of  German  militarism,  the  obsolete 
edifice  of  the  Habsburg  Monarchy  will  fall  to  pieces  of  its 
own  accord.  Mr.  Wilson  has  a  practical  as  well  as  a  logical 
mind  which  refuses  to  make  a  mountain  of  a  mole-hill. 
Vienna  and  Budapest  understood  him  without  difficulty 
and  in  spite  of  the  vague  hope  that  America,  in  not  expressly 
mentioning  Austria-Hungary,  thought  perhaps  to  spare 
the  Monarchy,  it  could  not  hinder  a  flood  of  insults  being 
hurled  at  President  Wilson  and  the  whole  of  America. 

President  Wilson's  Note  contains,  nevertheless,  an 
equivocal  passage  which  we  insist  on  making  clear  : 
"  punitive  indemnities,  the  dissolution  of  empires  and  the 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      137 

establishment  of  selfish  and  exclusive  economic  leagues, 
we  do  not  consider  to  be  a  proper  basis  for  a  durable  peace." 
We  have  wished  to  see  in  this  passage,  rejecting  the  idea  of 
the  dissolution  of  empires,  an  allusion  to  the  eventual 
preservation  of  Austria-Hungary.  Such  an  interpretation 
is  nevertheless  inadmissible,  first  of  all  because  of  the 
particular  place  occupied  by  the  passage,  which  is  devoted 
to  vindictive,  repressive  and  penal  measures.  President 
Wilson  decides  against  the  dissolution  of  an  Empire  simply 
for  penal  reasons  and  this  passage  can  only  refer  to  Germany. 
The  Austro-Hungarian  question  has  a  very  different  character. 
There  is  no  question,  in  this  case,  of  the  dissolution  of  an 
organism,  but  truly  the  deliverance  of  nations  from  a  hated 
yoke.  President  Wilson,  who  is  the  author  of  a  remarkable 
work  on  the  political  organization  of  the  European  States, 
and  who  knows  Austria-Hungary  very  well,  would  not  be 
capable,  we  think,  of  putting  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
on  the  same  footing  as  regards  dissolution.  Such  a  con- 
ception would  be  in  contradiction  with  the  general  principles 
of  his  Note  on  the  liberty  of  nations,  small  and  great.  How 
therefore,  can  the  liberty  of  the  Southern  Slavs,  the  Poles,  the 
Czecho-Slovaks,  the  Roumanians,  the  Ukrainians  be  obtained 
without  the  dissolution  of  the  Habsburg's  possessions  ? 

All  the  same,  our  interpretation  of  Mr.  Wilson's  Note 
has  two  faults.  To  begin  with,  Mr.  Wilson  is  influenced  by 
American  ideas  and  it  is  not  impossible  that  he  takes  into 
consideration  the  eventuality  of  a  transformation  of  the 
Dual  Monarchy  into  a  federal  Monarchy,  founded  on  the 
equality  of  nations.  The  example  of  the  United  States  of 
America  would  count  for  something  in  such  a  plan.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  America  has  not  yet  declared 
war  on  Austria-Hungary  seems  to  support  this  theory. 
We  find  two  faults — apparent  or  real  ? — in  the  American 
policy,  and  without  laying  further  stress  we  again  repeat  that 
the  Allies  must  decide  to  abandon  once  and  for  all  the  bad 
policy  of  compromise  with  the  Habsburg  Monarchy.  Those 
who  speak  of  the  rights,  liberty  and  independence  of  all 
nations  should  not  continually  ignore  a  state  which  is  the 
negation  of  all  these  principles. 

September  9,  1917. 


38  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 


An  Unnecessary  Function. 


The  decline  of  any  individual  or  collective  life  is  a 
melancholy  spectacle.  That  of  an  ancient  dynasty  still 
more  so.  To  the  sudden  realization  of  its  uselessness  is 
added  the  memory  of  its  august  traditions  and  the  painful 
regret  that  it  has  failed  in  its  mission.  Austria  has  been 
dying  ever  since  the  dawn  of  her  greatness.  She  was  doomed 
from  the  beginning  to  decay,  to  future  paralysis.  Mor- 
garten  and  Sempach  appear  at  the  very  opening  of  her 
historical  career.  From  the  first,  she  has  been  a  compromise. 
She  is  essentially  a  contradiction  of  the  principles  of  liberty 
and  independence  of  nations. 

Apart  from  the  visible  reason  for  existence,  the  result 
of  well-known  treaties,  another  invisible  and  incalculable 
force  supported  this  complex  construction.  On  one  side 
the  slavery  of  the  Christian  East,  on  the  other,  all  the  young, 
unstaple  nations  under  the  protection  of  her  imperial  cloak, 
of  no  particular  nationality  or  form,  as  if  they  were  in  an 
immense  historical  incubator. 

The  day  that  the  nations  of  the  Christian  East  took  up 
the  rudely  interrupted  work  of  their  national  spirit  and 
the  sap,  benumbed  by  the  Ottoman  might,  began  to  rise  in 
the  worm-eaten  timbers,  on  that  day  a  few  far-seeing  people 
discerned  the  first  cracks  in  the  Austrian  structure,  which, 
in  its  turn,  restrained  and  stifled  the  new-born  energies. 

This  structure  had  long  sheltered  young  liberty.  Grouped 
around  a  throne  from  which  the  Roman  ideas  had  not  yet 
been  banished,  these  young  nations  expanded  and  their 
development  was  able  to  take  place  almost  in  obscurity  and 
in  oblivion.  Without  the  protection  of  the  Holy  Empire, 
a  powerful  political  organization,  founded  on  a  rapacious 
and  conquering  race,  would  inevitably  have  stifled  these 
precious  and  indispensable  elements  of  the  social  and  har- 
monious progress  of  the  civilized  world.  But  unconsciously 
the  incubator  brought  about  its  own  destruction.  Eastern 
revolution  joined  hands  with  Western  evolution.  It  was 
no  use  Austria  having  built  up  a  personal  right  on  the 
foundations  of  the  rights  of  her  wards.  It  was  no  use 
Hungary,  Latin  in  former  days,  Christian  and  international, 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      139 

inventing  a  state  right  for  her  Touranian  race  on  the  remains 
of  the  liberties  of  the  confederated  nations.  Austria  and 
Hungary — the  latter  as  a  dynastic  department — had  seen 
their  day.  Henceforward  the  Monarchy  fought  only  to 
perpetuate  a  falsehood,  to  substitute  artificial  conditions 
for  life,  to  make  a  transitory  function  into  a  permanent 
one. 

Ever  since  the  immoral  triumphs  of  Radetzky  up  to  that 
other  General  who,  after  having  offered  his  sword  to  Serbia 
(what  a  symbol  !)  uselessly  attacked  the  avengers  of  the 
liberty  of  Democracy  in  the  Alps,  the  whole  history  of  the 
Austrian  House  is,  at  bottom,  just  a  stubborn  struggle 
against  a  historical  fact  as  irrevocable  as  the  regeneration 
of  Europe  after  the  monstrous  hecatombs  of  to-day. 

History  would  have  followed  her  procession  to  the  tomb, 
if  it  were  not  for  the  crimes  of  the  present,  the  systematic 
destruction  and  emasculation  of  whole  nations,  the  swinging 
of  innumerable  poor  human  beings  from  improvised  gallows, 
the  merciless  destruction  which  she  cynically  accompanies 
by  the  pastoral  concert  of  disarmament  and  arbitration  ! 

The  procession  cannot  be  formed.  History  cannot 
trouble  about  that.  She  can  only  note  that  massacres, 
coldly  ordered  and  savagely  executed,  are  the  paradoxical 
proof  of  the  uselessness  of  a  power.  The  spring  is  poisoned. 
In  reducing  the  problem  of  her  existence  to  the  simple  formula 
of  the  elimination  of  other  healthy,  young  and  vigorous 
organisms,  she  has  cried  aloud  the  confession  of  her  useless- 
ness. She  has  pronounced  the  fatal  word  :  the  one  will 
kill  the  other.  There  is  no  room  for  two  definite  forma- 
tions in  a  durable  and  pacific  foundation.  There  are  but 
two  things  in  opposition  :    the  cult  of  the  State  and  life. 

Federalism,  that  bait  offered  to  those  tired  of  the  war, 
is,  from  now,  converted  into  a  sort  of  centralization  of  the 
gallows.  When  the  veil  is  torn  aside  and  a  false  frontage, 
erected  by  those  same  mean  instruments  of  the  past  reign, 
shows  up  against  the  background  of  the  general  conflagration, 
it  will  be  seen  that  a  few  nations  have  been  crushed  and  that 
the  axis  of  future  aggressions  has  been  altered.  Artificial 
conditions  will  have  abolished  life,  and  falsehood,  reality. 
The   tumbril   will   have   passed   over   youthful   enthusiasm 


140  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

which  promised  the  regeneration  of  a  world  filled  with  joy 
and  hope. 

But  I  do  not  believe  even  in  the  frontage.  VI  do  not 
believe  in  any  transformation,  even  one  patronized  by 
Lammasch  or  a  Czernin.  I  firmly  believe  that  Austria's 
existence  is  unnecessary. 

Austrian  federalism,  if  it  could  be  realized,  would  only 
be  a  superfluity.  A  useless  creation,  an  old  machine  patched 
up,  an  out-of-date  force  which  might  in  other  days  have 
signified  balance  of  power ;  to-day — after  the  terrible 
demonstration  of  1914  unable  to  mean  more  than  an 
hindrance,  an  obstacle,  compression. 

Austrian  federalism  could  only  be  a  statu  quo  aggra- 
vated by  all  the  hatred,  all  the  destruction,  all  the  incom- 
patibilities, all  the  blasphemies  accumulated  during  this 
revolution  which  we  persist  in  calling  a  war.  Federalism 
was  impossible  in  the  best  days  of  a  divided  Germany ;  it 
could  not  exist  with  a  German  nation  that  has  given  ample 
proof  of  vitality  and  aggressive  power. 

The  systematic  destruction  of  the  Slav  people  between 
the  Danube  and  the  Adriatic,  the  ruins  heaped  up  on  the 
Save,  the  Morava,  the  Drave  and  higher  on  the  Vitava  and 
still  higher  on  the  Vistula,  are  they  then  the  prelude  of  a 
new  pacific  incarnation  of  a  House  of  which  history  has 
never  recorded  a  single  impulse  of  generosity,  of  liberality,  of 
pity  or  greatness  ?  Is  the  Imperial  Byzantine  cult  trans- 
mitted from  grand-uncle  to  grand-nephew,  a  symptom  of 
democracy  ? 

To  think  this  is  to  insult  the  new  forces  appearing  on  the 
horizon  proclaiming  themselves  ready  to  replace  the  fallen 
idol.  To  believe  this,  is  to  condone  the  vexations  suffered 
by  the  Four  Cantons,  the  horrors  of  Alba,  the  massacres 
of  Hanau.  It  bars  the  road  to  the  avengers  of  progress 
and  the  emancipation  of  the  nations. 

Disarmament  ?  But  Austria  could  not  do  without  a 
large  army !  Can  one  imagine  the  House  of  Habsburg 
condemned  to  look  helplessly  on  at  civilian  strife  and  the 
claims  of  irredentism,  which,  once  the  war  over,  would  again 
take  up  their  underground  work  which  is  but  the  inexorable 
result  of  a  law  of  attraction. 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      141 

No,  the  ancient  Monarchy  is  no  longer  capable  of  directing 
the  affairs  of  young  democracies.  Neither  its  personnel, 
nor  its  methods,  nor  the  mentality  of  its  princes,  nor  the 
prejudices  of  its  magistrates,  nor  the  pride  of  its  aristocrates, 
nor  the  German  oligarchy,  nor  the  Magyar  oligarchy,  nor 
its  past,  nor  its  present,  allow  it  to  erect  itself  on  the  door- 
step of  the  new  epoch  as  a  guarantee  of  equality,  as  a  regener- 
ating influence,  as  a  mediator  and  tutor  of  the  different 
nationalities. 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  gravest  danger  of  the  present 
time — political  and  military — is  precisely  this  attempt  to 
galvanize  a  political  organism  which  has  had  its  day.  The 
fatality  of  all  purely  accidental  combinations  overshadow 
the  whole  drama  of  the  tragic  reality  of  a  struggle  without 
quarter,  of  the  sanguinary  enterprise  undertaken  by  the 
sworn  enemies  of  Democracy,  to  save  the  M  brilliant  second." 

So,  the  partisans  of  a  "  regenerated  Austria  "  owe  us 
— after  the  experience  of  these  tragic  years — a  clear  and 
convincing  answer  to  our  question  which  embraces  all  the 
others  :  How  do  they  intend  to  reconcile  with  the  ruins 
of  this  war,  with  the  gruesome  manifestation  of  social  and 
political  powerlessness  of  the  ancient  Monarchy ;  reconcile, 
I  say,  the  existence  of  a  powerful  Austria  with  the  peace  of 
Europe  ? 

Austria  has  taken  it  upon  herself  to  answer  this  difficult 
problem.  To  me,  the  preservation  of  an  administration 
at  the  expense  of  the  genius  of  its  greater  nations  would 
be  but  an  ominous  gloomy  armistice.  Present  endeavours 
tend  merely  to  be  ridiculous,  based  on  an  acknowledgment 
of  the  terrible  futility  of  the  sacrifices  made. 

October  28,  1917. 

Austria-Hungary  and  the  Allies. 

The  Austro-Magyars  are  triumphant.  The  war,  which 
was  to  end  in  the  total  dispersal  of  the  artificial  monarchial 
regime,  takes  on  at  the  present  time  a  very  strange  aspect. 
The  Russian  question  is  discussed  at  Brest-Litovsk  under 
the  presidency  of  an  old  Turk,  whilst  the  fiftieth  anniversary 
of  the  Austro-Magyar  compromise  is  celebrated  in  Austria- 


142  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

Hungary.  After  the  elimination  of  the  only  Power  that 
troubled  it,  the  Monarchy  prepares  to  breathe  again  and 
continue  its  policy  of  slavery  and  conquest.  The  hour  of 
anguish  at  Vienna  and  Budapest,  where  the  lying  spirit  of 
conciliation  has  already  given  way  to  the  habitual  arrogance, 
is  past.  Why  not  ?  The  risky  game  played,  first  of  all 
with  the  convocation  of  Parliament  and  then  with  the 
Delegations,  seems  to  have  succeeded  admirably.  Europe 
remains  indifferent  to  all  the  declarations  and  all  the  terrible 
revelations  made  by  the  Slavs  to  Parliament  and  the  Delega- 
tions. Such  indifference  surprises  even  the  Germans  and 
their  Austro-Magyar  friends.  What  is  now  more  natural 
than  to  see  them  publicly  mock  the  most  legitimate  aspira- 
tions of  the  enslaved  peoples  ? 

The  Southern  Slavs,  the  Czechs,  the  Poles,  the  Ruthenians, 
have  declared  to  Parliament  that  they  will  no  longer  tolerate 
the  Germano-Magyar  domination  and  that  they  have  only 
one  desire  :  to  free  themselves  from  their  present  masters 
and  form  independent  States.  The  Allies,  who  profess 
to  be  fighting  for  the  liberties  of  all  nations  have  accepted 
this  significant  declaration  with  extraordinary  indifference. 
The  Slav  deputies  then  made  violent  accusations  against 
the  Monarchy,  proving  that  it  has  treated  its  Slav  subjects 
like  slaves  ^and  that  it  has  consequently  lost  all  moral  right 
to  speak  of  its  alleged  civilizing  mission.  And  the  Allies  ? 
They  do  not  even  wish  to  entertain  the  idea  of  interfering 
in  the  internal  affairs  of  Austria-Hungary  and  prefer  to 
ignore  the  atrocities  which  really  should  be  judged  by  an 
international  court. 

In  face  of  this  inconceivable  attitude,  the  Austro-Magyars 
became  bolder.  They  resolved  also  to  convoke  the  Delega- 
tions and  when  the  Slav  delegates,  with  admirable  courage, 
repeated  their  demands  for  liberty  and  independence,  the 
Magyars,  Tisza  and  Andrassy,  were  instructed  to  reply 
that  the  Monarchy  knows  only  one  nation  and  that  no  one 
will  be  permitted  to  attack  the  idea  of  duality.  Count 
Czernin  and  Chevalier  Seidler  repeated  this  declaration  ; 
and  the  Emperor's  speech  from  the  throne  to  the  Delegations 
contains  the  same  assurance.  The  Slav  deputies  are  not 
discouraged ;  they  publicly  denounce  the  falsification  of  the 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      143 

Russian  Maximalist  Government's  manifesto ;  they  demand 
that  delegates  from  the  different  nationalities  should  be 
sent  to  Brest-Litovsk  and  do  everything  in  their  power  to 
prevent  the  continuation  of  slavery. 

The  Austro-Germans  accuse  them  of  working  for  the 
Entente,  but  the  Entente  remains  deaf.  It  has  not  yet 
declared  itself  ready  to  grant  political  independence  to  the 
Slavs  of  Austria-Hungary  !  The  Allied  diplomats  talk  a 
lot  about  the  people's  right  of  self-determination  but  they 
have  not  reduced  this  noble  principle  to  a  concrete  political 
programme.  The  Slavs  of  Austria-Hungary  cry  aloud  in 
demanding  liberty  and  independence,  but  there  is  no  reply 
from  the  Allies  to  these  courageous  manifestations,  no 
encouragement  to  persevere,  no  promise  of  help.  One  could 
almost  say  there  is  the  reverse  when  reading  the  ambiguous 
phrases  employed  by  the  statesmen  of  the  Allies  when 
speaking  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  question  ! 

How  can  this  attitude  be  explained  ?  We  know  very 
well  that  the  German  power  is  not  yet  broken  and  that 
without  complete  victory  the  Slavs  cannot  be  snatched  from 
the  Germano-Magyar  grasp.  But  we  do  not  understand 
why  the  Allies  do  not  wish  to  call  to  arms,  in  the  struggle 
with  the  Germans,  these  same  people  on  whom,  according 
to  the  principles  generally  accepted  up  to  now,  they  are 
going  to  confer  liberty.  Why  do  not  the  Allies  state  their 
war  aims  clearly  in  recognizing  formally  that  they  mean  to 
establish  a  united  and  independent  Poland,  an  independent 
Czecho-Slovania,  an  independent  Serbia  united  to  her 
Serbo-Croat-Slovene  brothers  of  the  Monarchy,  a  Roumania 
united  to  her  brothers  of  Austria-Hungary  ?  Such  a  declara- 
tion would  have  immense  effect  and  would  put  an  end  to 
all  equivocal  ideas.  The  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary  would 
then  know  that  the  Allies  were  bringing  them  liberty  and 
would  redouble  their  energy  in  the  struggle  with  the  op- 
pressors. Even  the  recent  declarations  of  Lloyd  George  and 
Balfour  are  too  vague  to  produce  the  desired  effect.  And  as, 
once  Prussian  militarism  is  broken,  the  Allies  will  not  spare 
Austria-Hungary,  that  principal  pillar  of  Germanism,  then 
why  not  say  clearly  that  the  Allied  victory  will  bring  liberty 
and  independence  to  the  oppressed  Slav  peoples  ?     Vienna 


144  SERBIA   AND    EUROPE 

and  Berlin  have  the  impudence  to  dispose  of  Serbia,  Belgium 
and  the  other  invaded  countries.  Why  then  should  Paris, 
London  and  Washington  shrink  from  telling  the  Czechs 
and  Southern  Slavs,  for  example,  that  they  will  be  inde- 
pendent States  ? 

Or  else,  do  they  wish  to  preserve  Austria-Hungary  at 
all  costs,  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  its  peoples  ? 

December  30,  1917. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Austria-Hungary. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  has  given  to  the  delegates  of  the 
Labour  Party  a  long  explanation  of  the  reasons  for  which 
Great  Britain  and  her  Allies  are  fighting.  Speaking  more 
particularly  of  war  aims,  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  besides  the 
general  principles  which  guide  the  allied  nations  in  their 
struggle  with  Germanism,  also  indicated  a  few  concrete 
solutions  without  which  a  durable  peace  would  be  impossible 
in  Europe. 

The    British  Premier    expressed    himself,    as    usual,    in 
firm  and  simple  language.     Great  Britain,  he  said,  is  still 
resolved  to  prolong  the  war  until  these  three  essential  objects 
are  attained  :    (1)   the  re-establishment  of   the  sanctity  of 
treaties  ;  (2)  the  territorial  settlement  founded  on  the  people's 
right  of  self-determination,  that  is  to  say,  on  the  consent 
of  the  inhabitants ;  (3)  the  institution  of  an  international 
organism  limiting  the  burden  of  armaments  and  diminishing 
the  probabilities  of  war.     In  developing  and  justifying  this 
policy  of  the  Allied  countries,  Mr.   Lloyd  George  insisted 
most  of  all  on  the  second  point,  which  is  of  paramount 
importance.      "  The  times  of  the  Treaty  of  Vienna  are  very 
distant,"    he  said.     "  We  can   no   longer  leave  the  future 
of  European    civilization    to   the   arbitrary  decisions  of   a 
handful  of  negotiators  trying  to  guarantee  the  interests  of 
such  and  such  a  dynasty  or  of  such  and  such  a  nation.     The 
settlement  of  the  new  Europe  must  be  founded  on  principles 
of  reason  and  justice  which  guarantee  its  stability.     That  is 
why  we  think  that  government  by  the  consent  of  the  people 
should  serve  as  the  basis  of  all  the  territorial  settlements 
which  follow  this  war." 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY       145 

Yet  passing  from  these  principles  to  the  question  of 
their  application,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  expressed  an  opinion 
on  the  Austro-Hungarian  question  which,  although  formally 
conforming  to  the  principle  of  the  liberty  of  peoples  and 
their  right  of  self-disposal,  represents,  in  reality,  a  serious 
eclipse  in  the  general  policy  of  the  Allies.  Mr.  Lloyd  George's 
express  declaration  that  the  dismemberment  of  Austria- 
Hungary  is  not  part  of  the  Allies'  war  aims  is  in  flagrant 
contradiction  with  the  principle  established  at  the  beginning 
of  his  speech,  i.e.  that  the  territorial  settlements  in  Europe 
must  be  made  with  regard  to  the  wishes  of  the  respective 
nations.  What  aggravates  the  disastrous  effects  of  such  a 
declaration  respecting  the  oppressed  nations  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  is  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  has  made  a  very  debat- 
able distinction,  saying  that  an  independent  Poland  is  a 
necessity  for  Europe,  from  which  one  would  conclude  that 
according  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  an  independent  Czecho- 
slovakia or  Jugoslavia  would  not  be  in  the  interests  of 
Europe  ! 

It  is  also  to  be  noted  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  has  not  taken 
into  account  the  repeated  manifestations  of  the  representa- 
tives of  the  Slav  races  of  the  Monarchy,  unmistakable 
manifestations  concerning  the  ardent  desire  of  the  Slavs 
to  be  rid  of  the  Austro-Magyar  yoke.  If  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
thinks  that  the  effective  liberation  of  the  Slavs  is  compatible 
with  the  preservation  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  it  is  an  error 
of  which  the  consequences  may  be  incalculable.  To  suppose 
that  the  Austro-Magyars  will  consent  some  day  to  put 
themselves  on  the  same  footing  as  the  Slav  people  is  to  show 
a  dangerous  lack  of  comprehension  of  the  true  character  of 
the  Dual  Monarchy. 

What  interests  us  Serbians  most  is-  the  idea,  which  may 
also  have  suggested  itself  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  that,  after 
the  Russian  defection,  it  would  be  possible  to  look  to  a  re- 
generated Austria-Hungary  as  a  likely  Ally  for  the  struggle 
against  Germany.  The  error  of  1870  would  thus  repeat 
itself  and  instead  of  aiding  the  birth  of  national  States,  young, 
vigorous,  jealous  of  their  independence  and  resolute  adver- 
saries of  Germanism,  it  would  only  be  giving  new  life  to  a 
decayed  organism  which  is  destined  to  perish.     It  would  be 

11 


146  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

an  absolutely  useless  attempt,  because  Austria,  as  she  exists 
at  present,  is  incapable  of  any  sort  of  regeneration.  She  can 
only  last  as  long  as  her  bureaucratic  and  military  organiza- 
tion lasts,  founded  on  the  absolute  preponderance  of  two 
privileged  races,  the  Magyars  and  the  Germans.  To  touch 
these,  the  very  foundations  of  the  Austrian  idea,  means  that 
the  Monarchy  is  doomed  to  dissolution.  The  Serbians  are 
not  the  first  to  see  this.  The  Germans  and  the  Magyars 
know  it  even  better  than  we  do.  The  eminent  English 
publicist,  Mr.  Wickham  Steed,  after  having  studied  the 
Austro-Hungarian  problem  on  its  own  ground,  insists  above 
all  on  the  artificial  character  of  the  bonds  which  unite  the 
out-of-date  edifice  of  the  Habsburgs. 

If  Mr.  Lloyd  George  wishes  to  negotiate  with  the  Habs- 
burgs and  deliver  the  Slavs  of  the  Monarchy  to  their  mercy, 
his  allusion  to  the  preservation  of  Austria-Hungary  would 
have  a  practical  meaning.  But  as  any  idea  of  such  a  betrayal 
of  the  oppressed  peoples  is,  we  are  convinced,  completely 
foreign  to  the  British  Government,  we  fail  completely  to 
understand  this  passage,  which  reads  so  badly  in  the  speech 
of  a  man  in  whom  the  enslaved  peoples  place  all  their  hopes. 

January  12,  1918. 

The  Western  Democracies  and  the  House  of  Habsburg. 

From  the  latest  speeches  of  President  Wilson  and  Mr. 
Lloyd  George,  one  would  be  inclined  to  believe  that  the 
policy  of  conciliation  and  understanding,  which  the  two 
leaders  recommend,  could  only  be  realized  by  sacrificing 
the  Southern  Slavs,  to  whom,  this  time,  the  "  opportunity 
for  a  more  extensive  autonomous  development  "  is  promised. 
In  reading  those  portions  of  the  speeches  relating  to  the 
Austrian  Slavs  one  seems  to  live  again  through  the  night- 
mare of  the  days  which  preceded  the  conclusion  of  the  famous 
Treaty  of  Berlin,  when  the  former  enemies  came  to  an  agree- 
ment at  the  expense  of  the  Serbian  people,  to  the  detriment 
of  its  legitimate  aspirations.  Before  the  opening  of  the 
Congress,  the  fate  of  the  two  Serbian  provinces  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  was  sealed  by  the  secret  conventions 
passed  between  Great  Britain  and  Austria  (June  6,  1878) 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY       147 

and  Austria  and  Russia  (July  13,  1878).  That  was,  after 
the  annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  which  took  place  a 
few  years  before,  the  greatest  injustice  committed  during 
the  nineteenth  century.  This  injustice  weighed  heavily  on 
the  destiny  of  Serbia  and  on  the  conscience  of  Europe, 
on  whom  it  imposed  the  system  of  an  "  armed  peace,"  in 
force  ever  since.  It  is  in  this  injustice,  as  in  that  committed 
at  the  expense  of  France  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfurt,  that 
we  must  look  for  the  real  causes  of  the  war. 

During  a  certain  period  of  the  present  war,  it  really 
seemed  as  if  the  faults  of  the  past  would  never  be  repeated 
in  the  future.  But  it  would  be,  perhaps,  easier  for  a  camel 
to  pass  through  the  eye  of  a  needle,  than  for  Western 
statesmen,  even  those  the  most  gifted,  to  understand  certain 
political  problems  of  South-Eastern  Europe  and  to  compre- 
hend their  meaning  and  importance.  That  is  why  it  seems 
useful  to  us  to  note  here  the  danger  of  a  policy  of  which  the 
effects  will  lose  no  time  in  making  themselves  felt,  and  which 
imperils  the  very  existence  of  the  Southern  Slav  world. 
It  is  in  fact  the  question  of  the  future  of  all  the  Southern 
Slavs  whom  the  Austro-Germans,  before  the  war,  intended 
to  reduce  to  a  sort  of  political  isolation  and  whom  the  leaders 
of  the  Western  democracies  think  good  to  abandon  to  their 
fate. 

The  latest  speeches  of  the  leaders  of  the  Western 
democracies,  compared  with  the  preceding  ones,  shows  a 
notable  falling  back  in  respect  of  their  previous  undertakings, 
regarding  the  Slav  races  of  the  Dual  Monarchy. 

To  begin  with,  in  treating  the  Polish  question,  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  speaks  this  time  as  if  it  were  a  political  combination 
necessitated  by  the  international  situation  :  "A  free  and 
independent  Poland  must  be  created  in  order  to  maintain 
the  balance  of  power  between  the  West  and  Germany." 
The  principle  of  nationality  is,  therefore,  no  longer  invoked 
in  favour  of  the  restoration  of  this  civilized  country,  but  the 
out-of-date  principle  of  the  European  balance  of  power,  the 
same  reason^as  is  given  for  preserving  the  out-of-date  edifice 
of  Austria-Hungary  !  ! 

On  the  other  hand,  according  to  the  same  speeches,  the 
fate  of  the  Southern  Slavs  seems  to  be  sufficiently  guaranteed 


148  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

by  the  autonomy  which  it  is  hoped  to  obtain  for  them.  In 
reality,  most  of  the  Austrian  Slavs  have  long  possessed  their 
autonomy.  But,  this  word  does  not  mean  much  in  a  state 
like  Austria-Hungary  which  does  not  hesitate  to  tear  up  even 
international  Treaties  as  soon  as  they  become  irksome. 

Since  1868,  Croatia  possesses  the  famous  "  Nagoda " 
(agreement,  contract)  which  the  Magyars  concluded  with 
her  immediately  after  the  compromise  with  Austria,  despite 
which,  since  that  time,  the  history  of  Croatia  is  but  a  long 
series  of  illegalities  and  arbitrary  acts.  In  spite  of  the 
Nagoda,  Khuen  Hedervary,  who  governed  Croatia  during 
twenty  years  (1883-1903)  succeeded  in  making  this  "  autono- 
mous "  country  into  a  Hungarian  province,  the  worst  treated 
and  most  miserable  of  provinces.1  The  reign  of  oppression 
and  violence  which  he  inaugurated  there  was  only  surpassed 
by  that  of  the  government  of  Kallay  in  Bosnia. 

The  Serbians  of  Hungary  also  enjoyed  an  autonomy 
accorded  them  in  1848  at  the  time  of  the  revolution.1  But 
that  autonomy  only  lasted  as  long  as  the  House  of  Habsburg 
was  in  danger.  The  famous  compromise  (1867)  in  confirming 
the  hegemony  of  the  Magyars,  put  an  end  to  the  liberty  of 
the  Serbians  in  Hungary.  That  is  why  the  Southern  Slavs 
can  place  no  faith  in  the  attractive  promises  made  to  them 
on  all  sides. 

And  now,  when  they  talk  of  freeing  the  small  nations 
of  Asia  and  Africa,  and  the  provinces  of  Asia  Minor 
from  the  Turkish  yoke,  it  is  proposed  to  leave  the  Serbians 
and  Croats  in  the  hands  of  the  Magyars,  friends  and  brothers 
of  the  Turks  ! 

The  Southern  Slavs  are  now  invited  to  re-enter  the 
golden  cage  which  Austria  graciously  offers  them  at  the 
request    of   the   Allies.     Instead    of   freeing   the   oppressed 

1  E.  Dennis  :  La  Grande  Serbie,  page  155.  Bibliotheque  d'Histoire 
etde  politique.     Paris,  Librairie  Delagrave. 

*  See  the  edict  of  Francis- Joseph,  dated  Olmutz,  15th  December, 
1848.  The  Serbian  Grande- Duchy  "  Voivodina  "  whose  adminis- 
tration, independent  from  that  of  Hungary,  was  directly  under  the 
control  of  the  Imperial  Ministry,  was  only  created  later,  18th 
November,  1849,  and  the  Emperor  added  to  his  titles  that  of 
"  Serbian  Grande  Vo'ivode  "  which  he  still  enjoys,  though  the  Serbian 
Duchy  of  Hungary  ceased  to  exist  long  ago. 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY       149 

peoples  by  breaking  their  chains,  these  chains  are  to  be 
lengthened  and  strengthened.  What  a  strange  sight  it 
is  to  see  the  Western  democracies  trying  to  preserve  the 
possessions  of  the  House  of  Habsburg  at  the  price  of  the 
liberties  of  the  peoples  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  !  N 

To  the  principle  of  nationality,  to  the  rights  of  race, 
they  wish  to  oppose  the  old  rights  of  the  House  of  Austria, 
the  principle  of  the  balance  of  power  and  the  "  reasons  of 
state "  of  the  Magyars  !  To  the  descendants  of  King 
Zvonimir  and  of  the  Ban  Tvrdko,  to  the  peoples  with  a 
glorious  history,  a  past  of  several  centuries  and  an  advanced 
culture,  is  offered  "  autonomy  "  and  "  the  opportunity  of 
greater  development."  As  if,  in  our  times,  national  inde- 
pendence were  not  an  essential  condition  of  material  pros- 
perity ! 

As  to  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia,  which  has  lost  more  than 
a  quarter  of  its  population  in  this  war,  reduced  to  its  old 
boundaries,  separated  from  its  brothers  and  surrounded  by 
enemies,  it  cannot  long  exist  as  an  independent  State.  On 
the  road  to  the  East,  the  German  menace  will  now  only  find 
enslaved  Bulgarians  and  tame  Young  Turks. 

January  19,  1918. 

Can  Austria-Hungary  Exist  ? 

Austria-Hungary  is  in  a  precarious  position.  She  is 
struggling  against  a  situation  from  which  she  cannot  escape 
in  the  form  in  which  she  now  exists.  The  peoples,  conscious 
of  their  rights,  are  acting  on  her  like  a  corrosive  liquid, 
provoking  a  constant  uneasiness  which  it  is  no  longer  possible 
to  hide. 

The  question  is  to  know  whether  the  Habsburg  Monarchy 
is  able  to  prevent  the  complete  development  of  the  people's 
separist  tendencies  and  by  what  means  it  could  satisfy  the 
demands  of  its  races.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  questionable 
whether  the  millions  of  inhabitants  which  compose  the 
discontented  races  will  be  able  to  organize  their  national 
energy  in  order  to  oppose  successfully  their  oppressors. 

The  policy  pursued  by  the  Germano-Magyars,  all-powerful 
in  the  Dual  Monarchy,  has  caused,  for  centuries,  a  general 


150  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

discontent  and  has  fomented  the  idea  of  the  separation  of 
the  subject  races.  Reforms  and  innumerable  promises 
could  not  smooth  away  the  differences  which  existed  between 
masters  and  oppressed.  The  autonomies  so  often  promised 
no  longer  enter  into  the  possible  settlements  because  autonomy 
in  any  form  could  be  abolished  as  soon  as  external  dangers 
had  disappeared  as  has  already  so  often  been  the  case  in 
the  history  of  the  Monarchy.  Any  sort  of  Austrian  federa- 
tion would  satisfy  no  better  the  clearly  expressed  desire 
of  the  peoples  to  live  in  absolute  freedom. 

Consequently,  the  Monarchy,  that  is  to  say  the  Germano- 
Magyar  rulers,  know  very  well  that  a  constitutional  arrange- 
ment, an  internal  reconciliation  between  the  rulers  and  the 
oppressed,  is  impossible.  It  therefore  only  remains  to  employ 
coercive  measures  in  order  to  bring  the  peoples  to  their 
senses.  Nevertheless,  something  is  missing  if  the  reign  of 
the  bayonet  is  to  recommence.  That  iron  discipline,  that 
organization  which,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  enabled 
the  rulers  to  punish  the  suspected  peoples  in  tyrannical 
fashion,  no  longer  exists.  Something  is  now  changed.  The 
physical  and  moral  exhaustion  brought  about  by  four  years 
of  war  have  shaken  to  its  foundations  the  artificial  edifice 
of  the  Monarchy.  The  centrifugal  forces  of  the  oppressed 
peoples  are  awakened.  To-day  an  immense  chasm  separates 
the  oppressors  from  the  oppressed.  The  will  of  the  latter 
is  unanimous  and  awaits  the  opportunity  to  escape  from  the 
embrace  of  the  present  ruler. 

Effectively  the  organization  of  the  national  forces, 
especially  those  of  the  Southern  Slavs  and  Czechs,  is  being 
pushed  forward  with  feverish  energy.  In  the  Southern  Slav 
countries  the  movement  in  favour  of  the  union  of  all  the 
Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes,  including  those  of  Serbia 
and  Montenegro,  is  acquiring  revolutionary  proportions. 
An  Austrophile  paper  in  Croatia  thus  reluctantly  admits 
the  development  of  national  sentiment  :  "  The  Southern 
Slav  movement  has  spread  everywhere  with  such  force  that 
one  can  no  longer  see  or  hear  anything  but  Jugoslavism  and 
again  Jugoslavism.  The  Jugoslav  wave  rises  like  the  tide 
and  carries  all  before  it." 

In  truth,  the  wave   of    Southern  Slav  nationalism  has 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      151 

moved  those  who,  up  till  now,  have  remained  inactive  and 
even  hostile  to  this  idea,  and  is  making  progress  in  circles 
where  this  policy  was  not  familiar.  The  whole  mass  of  the 
people,  from  Catholic  priest  to  international  Socialist,  are 
ranged  in  one  camp,  that  of  national  independence,  free 
from  all  authority,  even  that  of  the  Habsburgs. 

In  Slovenia,  442  boroughs,  82,086  women,  15  departments 
and  35  societies  have  decided  in  favour  of  the  national 
programme.  The  same  national  plebiscite  exists  in  the 
other  Southern  Slav  countries.  Istria,  Dalmatia,  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina  and,  above  all,  Croatia  and  Slavonia,  raise  their 
voices  in  its  favour. 

In  Croatia,  the  university  students  and  even  the  school- 
boys, throw  themselves  into  the  political  arena  and  forward 
memoranda  signed  by  them  to  the  Southern  Slav  Club. 
The  wounded  in  the  military  hospitals  decide  in  favour  of 
national  union  and  assure  the  Southern  Slav  deputies  of 
their  unlimited  confidence  in  the  results  of  the  struggle 
which  they  are  waging  for  the  independence  of  the  Southern 
Slav  people.  The  Catholic  priests  with  their  bishops  at 
their  head  do  the  same. 

The  ranks  of  the  Southern  Slav  combatants  become 
thicker  every  day  and  constitute  a  formidable  organi- 
zation which  defies  the  bayonets  and  the  gallows  of  the 
Monarchy. 

The  following  words,  pronounced  at  a  Slovenian  assembly 
by  the  Mayor  of  the  capital  of  Slovenia,  Lioubliana,  Dr. 
Ivan  Tavtchar,  president  of  the  progressist  party,  show 
clearly  the  resolution  of  the  Southern  Slavs  : 

V  Although  there  have  already  been  too  many  hangings 
and  massacres  in  Austria,  we  fear  that  this  state  of  affairs 
is  beginning  again.  It  is  said  that  it  is  good  to  die  for  one's 
country,  it  is  not  less  honourable  to  die  for  one's  own  people. 
We  ask  the  Austrian  Prime  Minister  to  persecute  only  us, 
the  old  men,  who  have  not  much  longer  to  live.  In  enduring 
all  the  persecutions,  we  shall  think  :  What  matters  it  if  we 
fall,  the  people  will  live  for  ever  "  (Slovenski  Narod, 
February  4th). 

March  2,  1918. 


152  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

Austria-Hungary  and  the  Allies. 
A  few  reflections  ajter  Campidoglio. 

The  formidable  battle  raging  on  the  Western  front  will 
have  in  all  probability  immediate  effect  on  the  final  result 
of  the  war.  After  the  check  of  the  German  plans  it  will 
be  the  turn  of  the  Allies,  by  combining  all  the  means  necessary 
for  fighting  German  militarism  and  instituting,  after  much 
loss  of  blood,  new  international  conditions,  which  will  be  more 
durable,  more  just  and  more  normal.  Eliminating  Turkey  and 
Bulgaria,  whose  fate  offers  no  serious  difficulty,  these  two 
States  having  to  be  punished,  first  of  all,  for  the  conscious 
aid  given  to  Germanism,  and  then  rendered  harmless  in  the 
future,  there  only  remains  the  question  of  Austria-Hungary 
which  gives  birth  to  serious  controversy.  The  solution  is 
much  easier  to  find  in  that  which  concerns  Germany.  Having 
obliged  her  to  give  up  Alsace-Lorraine,  Prussian  Poland  and 
the  Danish  provinces,  the  coalition  of  the  Allied  nations  has 
only  to  examine  the  particular  conditions  under  which  a 
purely  German  Germany  could  be  admitted  to  the  organized 
League  of  Nations.  Here  the  fate  of  a  purely  German  Austria 
and  that  of  the  federated  States  of  the  German  Empire  are 
intimately  related,  which  renders  possible  a  variety  of  combina- 
tions, all  of  which  guarantee  the  peace  of  the  world.  The 
Austro-Hungarian  problem  is  nevertheless  more  complicated 
and  it  is  of  it  that  we  wish  to  speak  here,  always  assuming 
that  the  Allies  are  victorious,  which  we  not  only  consider  a 
certain  and  useful  event,  but  rather  a  logical  necessity. 

We  do  not  hesitate  to  utter  the  plain  truth  that  the 
Habsburg  Monarchy,  in  spite  of  all  that  is  happening,  is 
still  considered  not  only  as  an  international  unity  possessing 
its  rights  and  duties,  but  also  as  a  political  organization, 
having  its  particular  reasons  for  existence  which  are  much 
more  important  than  the  cries  of  the  enslaved  peoples, 
shouting  aloud  their  desire  for  liberty  and  independence. 
A  series  of  events  known  to  every  one  is  there  to  prove  it. 
During  the  whole  of  1917,  America  hesitated  to  declare  war 
on  Austria-Hungary  and  when  at  last  President  Wilson  had 
decided  to  make  war  on  Austria,  the  effect  of  this  declara- 
tion was  notably  diminished  by  the  formal  assurance  given 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      153 

in  his  latest  Note  by  Mr.  Wilson  himself  that  America  does 
not  intend  to  destroy  Austria-Hungary. 

That  which  Mr.  Wilson  has  publicly  proclaimed,  to  which 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  also  has  given  his  assurance,  are  not  merely 
opportune  declarations  limited  in  their  importance  because 
of  the  conditions  existent  when  they  were  made  and  the 
particular  person  who  made  them.  It  is  the  emancipation 
of  the  general  conviction  firmly  rooted  in  Old-European 
minds  of  Western  diplomacy  :  that  the  existence  of  Austria- 
Hungary  is  a  political  necessity  and  that  the  whole  problem 
of  the  Habsburg  Monarchy  rests  in  the  question  of  how  to 
arrive  at  a  more  modern  organization  of  this  complicated 
State.  As  long  as  Russia  existed  as  a  Great  Power,  France 
and  Great  Britain,  because  of  the  alliance,  considered  the 
Austro-Hungarian  question  as  an  affair  which  interested 
the  Russians  only.  The  idea  of  using  Franco-British  troops 
to  destroy  Austria-Hungary  never  seriously  entered  the 
heads  of  the  Entente  statesmen.  When,  in  1915,  the  Ser- 
bian Government  drew  the  attention  of  the  Allies  to  the 
necessity  of  righting  on  the  Save  and  the  Danube  and  requested 
that  Allied  troops  be  sent  to  the  Balkans,  the  principal  reason 
for  the  opposition  of  France  and  Great  Britain  to  the  Serbian 
point  of  view  must  be  looked  for  in  the  unwillingness  to  fight 
directly  against  Austria-Hungary.  And  Italy,  did  she  not 
negotiate  the  Treaty  of  London  with  the  idea,  accepted  it 
is  true  by  the  whole  Entente,  that  Austria-Hungary  would 
be  preserved. 

Not  only  the  responsible  leaders  of  the  Allies  but  also, 
and  above  all,  the  vast  circles  of  politicians  and  public 
men  in  all  Entente  countries  possessed  and  still  possess 
these  pro-Austrian  ideas.  To  doubt  their  good  faith 
would  be  unjust  and  useless.  In  order  to  fight  a  political 
conception  it  is  necessary  first  of  allAo  know  its  source 
and  extent.  As  to  the  latter,  it  is  immense  in  the  case 
of  Austria-Hungary  because  the  number  of  those  who 
have  declared  themselves  against  the  existence  of  Austria 
is  infinitely  small.  In  Great  Britain,  public  opinion  is 
generally  favourable  to  the  Habsburg  Monarchy.  The 
writings  of  Steed,  Seton  Watson,  A.  Evans,  Taylor  and 
others,  in  spite  of  the  competence  and  incontestable  authority 


154  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

of  their  authors,  have  not  yet  shaken  the  conservative  British 
psychology  which  is  hostile  to  the  destruction  of  an  ancient 
empire  with  an  ancient  dynasty  at  its  head.  The  great 
organs  of  the  British  Liberal  press,  are  all  favourable  to  the 
retention  of  the  Habsburgs.  The  Conservatives,  with  a 
few  exceptions,  profess  the  same  ideas.  In  France,  is  there, 
with  the  exception  of  the  Journal  des  Debats,  a  single  really 
anti- Austrian  organ  of  the  great  press  ?  Not  one.  The 
remarkable  works  on  Austria  of  Ch6radame,  Gauvin,  Jules 
Pichon,  Pierre  Bertrand,  Ch.  Loiseau,  E.  Fournol,  E.  Denis 
and  others  remain  up  till  now  without  great  influence  on 
French  public  opinion.  The  French  public  makes  a  difference 
between  German  and  Austrian  from  the  political  point  of 
view  and  almost  always  considers  the  latter  as  a  possible 
friend. of  to-morrow.  As  to  Italy,  neither  has  she  shown 
enough  energy  in  the  struggle  with  Austria  on  the  whole, 
and  it  is  only  lately  that  Italian  public  opinion  has  begun  to 
see  the  Austro-Hungarian  problem  in  its  true  light.  I  do 
not  mention  that  small  number  of  Italians  who  have  under- 
stood since  the  beginning  of  the  war  how  much  is  at  stake 
and  what  are  the  forces  in  question  ;  only  history  can 
judge  their  work  which  has  unfortunately  long  remained 
without  immediate  effects. 

The  origin  of  the  Austrian  mirage  is  therefore  deeply 
rooted  and  will  not  be  easily  destroyed  This  mirage  is 
founded  on  the  idea  that  some  day  Austria  will  cease  to  be 
the  ally  of  Germany  and  will  become,  more  likely,  her  rival. 
The  idea  itself  is  not  at  all  Utopian.  It  is  based  first  of  all 
on  history,  which  shows,  up  to  1866,  a  determined  rivalry 
between  Prussia  and  Austria  It  is  supported  also  by  the 
supposition  that  the  ancient  Habsburg  dynasty  could  not 
in  the  end  submit  to  the  supremacy  of  the  Hohenzollerns. 
The  diversity  of  the  nationalities  who,  being  in  majority 
anti-German,  might  some  day  end  by  throwing  off  the  German 
influence,  is  also  an  argument  in  favour  of  this  thesis.  That 
it  is  in  the  interests  of  France  and  Great  Britain  to  have  as 
an  ally  in  Europe  an  anti-German  Austria  is  irrefutable, 
and  since  the  Russian  defection  this  interest  has  become 
even  more  visible. 

To  Germany,  as  a  continental  force,  must  doubtless  be 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      155 

opposed  a  new  continental  force  and  it  is  not  surprising  at 
first  to  see,  in  Austria-Hungary,  this  balance  against  German 
power.  England,  in  spite  of  her  present  army,  will  remain 
a  naval  power  in  the  future  and  instead  of  counter-balancing 
the  continental  power  of  Germany  herself,  will  probably  prefer, 
partly  at  least,  to  put  a  reformed  Austria-Hungary  in  charge 
of  that  duty.  As  to  America,  besides  the  British  reasons 
which  she  also  shares,  there  is  that  political  mentality  favour- 
able to  the  federation  principle,  which  the  Americans  are 
ready  to  substitute  for  the  principle  of  nationality.  Federa- 
lism is  regarded  as  a  good  means  of  reconciling  the  national- 
ities and  bringing  them  all  under  the  same  roof.  Just  as 
nationality  is  a  natural,  psychological  principle,  so  is  federa- 
lism an  artificial  creation  but  its  practical  results  are  not  to 
be  disdained.  That  is  why  America  seems  to  see  in  the 
federalization  of  Austria  the  best  means  of  obtaining  the 
liberty  of  the  races  and  the  separation  of  the  Habsburg 
Monarchy  from  Germany. 

There  must  therefore  be  no  illusion.  The  Allied  powers 
still  count  on  the  preservation  of  Austria  and  the  mani- 
festation of  the  last  few  days  is  powerless  to  change  a  line 
of  thought  that  is  as  old  as  the  whole  European  political 
system.  An  understanding  of  the  nationalities  is  a  necessary 
achievement  but  it  will  not  move  the  Slav  masses  in  Austria- 
Hungary.  The  non-Magyar  and  non-German  people  must 
receive  formal  assurances  that  their  fate  will  no  longer  depend 
on  Austria  and  that  it  will  be  settled  according  to  their  wishes. 
Public  opinion  in  France,  Great  Britain,  Italy,  and  America 
must  also  examine  in  a  more  critical  spirit  the  arguments 
invoked  in  favour  of  the  Habsburg  Monarchy.  On  one 
hand,  the  official  policy  of  the  Allies  must  inscribe  on  its 
programme  the  deliverance  of  the  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary 
so  that  they  may  decide  their  own  fate.  On  the  other 
hand,  Allied  public  opinion  must  be  cured  of  its  illusion 
that  the  above-mentioned  elements  are  sufficient  to  change 
the  character  of  Austria,  externally  and  internally.  Austria 
will  remain  as  she  is  or  else  she  will  disappear  completely  in 
order  to  make  room  for  the  national  states  who  will  be  free 
to  federate  afterwards  if  they  wish  to  do  so.  Tertiam  non 
datur.     An  intermediate  solution  of  the  Austrian  problem 


156  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

is  an  impossibility.  That  is  why  the  Congress  of  Rome, 
which  means  a  step  forward  in  the  Austrian  problem, 
should  serve  as  a  warning  to  the  Allies.  The  preliminary 
understanding  realized  between  M.  Torre's  committee 
and  the  committees  of  the  different  oppressed  nationali- 
ties, is  too  delicate  an  achievement  to  be  able,  alone, 
to  change  the  pro-Austrian  mentality  of  numerous 
official  circles.  And  just  as  the  enslaved  races  of  Austria- 
Hungary  will  rejoice  on  learning  that  their  represen- 
tatives have  proclaimed  the  unity  of  the  views  held  by  them- 
selves and  the  Italians,  so  will  their  joy  and  resistance  be 
multiplied  ten  times  when  they  learn  that  Mr.  Wilson  and 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  no  longer  consider  the  existence  of  a  Habs- 
burg  Austria  as  being  in  the  interests  of  Europe. 

May  4,  1918. 

The  Federalization  of  Austria-Hungary. 

In  his  afticle  of  August  16th  entitled  :  "  The  Czech 
Nation,"  Mr.  W.  Martin,  political  editor  of  the  Journal 
de  Geneve,  explains  his  idea  of  the  reformation  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  State.  "  The  most  favourable  solution  of  the 
Austrian  problem,  as  of  the  Russian  problem,  for  all  the 
European  races  is  federalism.  All  the  Allies  and  even  those 
of  their  publicists  who  are  most  hostile  to  Austria-Hungary 
agree  on  that  point  but  they  think  that,  in  order  to  realize 
the  Union  of  the  races  of  the  Monarcny,  the  Monarchy  itself 
must  first  be  destroyed.  On  our  part,  it  seems  to  us  to  be 
simpler,  more  logical,  safer  and  shorter  to  invoke  the  aid 
of  the  man  who  is  the  greatest  supporter  of  federalism  in 
the  Empire,  the  Emperor." 

Mr.  Martin  forgets  that  in  their  conception  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  problem,  the  Allied  leaders  start  from  two  prin- 
ciples :  that  of  liberty  which  expresses  itself  by  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  right  of  peoples  to  decide  their  own  fate  and  that 
of  justice  which  expresses  itself  thus  :  no  negotiations  with 
the  enemy  are  possible  before  victory.  One  does  not  nego- 
tiate with  the  guilty,  one  judges  and  condemns  him.  As 
regards  the  Allies,  Austria  is  as  guilty  as  Germany.  Therefore 
the  fact,  which  seems  so  simple,  so  logical,  so  safe  and  so 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      157 

expeditions  to  Mr.  Martin,  who,  as  a  practical  man,  extols 
a  policy  of  compromises — does  not  appear  in  quite  the 
same  light  to  the  Allies  and  their  leaders.  They  prefer 
their  own  principles  to  the  Emperor  even  if  he  is,  as  Mr. 
Martin  says,  the  greatest  supporter  of  federalism. 

Mr.  Martin  appears  rather  behind  the  times  with  his 
principles.  They  are  really  those  of  the  fifteenth  century. 
He  even  says  that  the  Allies  are  fighting  for  the  balance  of 
European  power  !  As  to  the  principle  of  nationality,  which 
is  a  modern  principle,  Mr.  Martin  hardly  takes  it  into  account 
or  else  he  could  not  have  expressed  himself  as  follows, 
in  the  same  article,  on  the  Czech  nation  :  "  But,  it  will  be 
said,  in  all  this  you  are  forgetting  the  interests  of  the  Czechs  ? 
Not  at  all,  we  have  them  very  much  at  heart.  But  races, 
no  matter  how  valiant,  can  do  nothing  against  geography." 
This  is  not  only  the  contradiction  of  the  principle  of  nation- 
ality but  also  of  that  of  liberty  and  independence  on  which 
is  founded  the  existence  of  Switzerland  herself.  If  William 
Tell  and  the  heroes  of  the  Gnitli  had  had  the  same  ideas  of 
liberty  as  Mr.  Martin,  Switzerland  would  be  in  the  same 
condition  as  unfortunate  Bohemia.  Luckily,  there  were 
men  in  Switzerland  who  refused  to  accept  "  geographical  " 
reasons  without  discussion. 

The  Austrian  federalism  about  which  Mr.  Martin  makes 
so  much  fuss  is  a  pure  Utopia  because  everything  in  the  Dual 
Monarchy  conspires  against  it.  There  is  hardly  any  political 
factor  of  importance  except,  perhaps,  the  Emperor,  that 
is  not  opposed  to  it.  But  the  consent  of  the  confederated 
is  essential  to  federalism.  Nevertheless  all  the  peoples  of 
Austria-Hungary,  the  oppressed  as  well  as  the  privileged, 
resist  with  all  their  might  the  very  idea  of  a  federalist  reform, 
none  of  them  finding  it  to  their  advantage. 

First  of  all  there  are  the  Germans  of  Austria,  the  same 
who,  in  other  days,  prevented  the  first  attempt  at  conciliation 
of  the  nationalities  by  overthrowing  the  Badeni  Ministry 
in  1897. l  Their  House  of  Commons  has  just  voted  a  protest 
against  the  federalist  reform  in  view. 

Secondly,  there  are  the  Magyars  as  Mr.  Martin  himself 

1  Count  Badeni  decreed  the  Laws  of  5th  April,  1897  on  the  equality 
of  languages  in  Bohemia  and  Moravia. 


158  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

admits  in  his  article  of  August  12th,  on  The  Reformation  of 
Austria- Hungary.  Thirdly,  there  are  the  oppressed  nation- 
alties  :  the  Czecho-Slovaks,  the  Serbo-Croatians  and  Slovenes, 
the  Italians,  the  Roumanians,  and  Poles.  Mr.  Martin  should 
not  ignore  the  resolutions  of  Prague,  of  Zagreb,  of  Loubliana, 
nor  the  speech  of  the  Southern  Slav  deputy,  Tressitch  Pavit- 
chitch,  pronounced  in  the  Austrian  Parliament  on  February 
22,  1918,  and  that  of  the  Czech  deputy,  Dr.  Stransky,  made 
in  the  same  place  on  July  22,  1918.  There  are  not  a  "  few 
emigrants  "  but  the  real  leaders  and  most  authorized  repre- 
sentatives of  the  peoples  who  pleaded  for  the  separation 
of  the  nations  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  State,  and  this  in 
the  middle  of  the  Austrian  Parliament.  There  can  therefore 
be  no  doubt  concerning  the  will  of  the  peoples  of  the  Monarchy 
to  separate  and  constitute  free  and  independent  States. 
Their  desire  is  also  proved  by  all  the  resolutions  of  the  above- 
mentioned  Congresses  where  the  whole  organizations  of  the 
peoples  loudly  and  clearly  manifested  their  wishes.  Mr. 
Martin's  sophisms  and  paradoxes  prove  nothing  against  these 
facts.  Here  is  one  of  the  most  noticeable  :  "  The  Czecho- 
slovaks are  fighting  in  order  to  restore  an  eastern  counter- 
balance to  the  German  power.  It  would  be  truly  paradoxal 
if  their  efforts  should  end  by  depriving  Europe  of  the  counter- 
balance represented  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy." 
Therefore,  according  to  Mr.  Martin,  the  Czecho-Slovaks  are 
fighting  in  Russia  against  the  Austro-Germans  for  the  pre- 
servation of  Austria-Hungary  ! 

They  would  be  forging  their  own  chains  if  they  fought 
for  the  Allies.     That  would  be  a  paradoxical  fact  ! 

In  treating  the  question  of  Austrian  federalism,  we  have 
indicated  the  obstacles  of  an  internal  character.  But  there 
is  one  external  factor  which  must  be  reckoned  with,  that  is 
to  say,  the  alliance  of  Austria  with  Germany.  The  latter's 
opposition  should  be  taken  into  consideration  because,  what- 
ever Mr.  Martin  may  think,  Germany  will  never  resign  herself 
to  losing  such  an  important  ally  by  permitting  the  reorganiza- 
tion of  Austria-Hungary,  on  the  basis  of  a  federalism  founded 
on  equal  rights.  All  the  theories  by  which  Mr.  Martin  tries 
to  suggest  the  idea  of  a  secret  desire  of  Germany  to  see  her 
ally  ruined,  cannot  hold  good  against  the  fact  that  an  Austrian 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      159 

vassal  of  52  million  souls  would  always  be  more  useful  to 
Germany  than  a  dismembered  Austria  where  she  would  only 
dominate  a  part  of  the  Monarchy. 

In  rough  lines,  these  are  the  principal  characteristics 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  reforms.  A  federal  Austria  is 
therefore  a  political  impossibility  and  that  is  why  there  is 
hardly  an  honest  person,  not  even  in  Austria-Hungary,  who 
still  believes  in  the  realization  of  this  reform .  The  protagonists 
of  this  idea,  as  Mr.  Martin  justly  observes,  are  recruited 
exclusively  in  the  German  part  of  the  country.  This  is 
sufficient  to  put  any  sensible  man  on  his  guard  against  the 
plans  made  to  the  order  of  the  official  theorists.  Notwith- 
standing this,  Mr.  Martin  persists  in  lending  a  friendly  ear 
to  the  federalist  plans  of  the  Lamaschs,  the  Renners,1  the 
Redlichs,  etc.,  and  seems  to  believe  in  the  sincerity  of  their 
theories. 

A  good  Swiss  and  a  good  republican,  he  sings  in  praise 
of  the  Emperor  Charles  who,  according  to  him,  "  has  the  great 
merit  to  have  realized  the  gravity  of  the  problem  and  to 
have  seen  a  solution  for  it."  In  his  enthusiasm  for  the  young 
Emperor,  Mr.  Martin  goes  so  far  as  to  impute  to  the  unhesita- 
tingly young  sovereign  the  merit  of  an  intention  which  is 
dictated  to  him  exclusively  by  the  instinct  of  self-preserva- 
tion.    This  is  making  a  virtue  of  necessity. 

In  his  article  of  August  20th,  Mr.  Martin  sympathizes 
with  the  fate  of  the  young  Emperor  and  ends  by  these  words  : 
"  Whilst  Charles  I  defends  at  Spa  and  Strasbourg  the  inte- 
grity of  his  Empire  and  the  balance  of  European  power 
against  the  greed  of  Germany,  while  he  suffers  for  what  are, 
in  reality,  the  interests  of  the  Allies,  he  receives  nothing  on 
all  sides  but  kicks  and  invective.  This  spectacle  is  one  of 
the  saddest  and  most  moving  in  history  when  one  thinks  of 
the  interests  in  question,  compromised  by  a  war  prolonged 

1  The  Federalism  of  Renner  is  a  federalism  which  differs  very  much 
from  that  preached  by  Mr.  Martin.  Rentier's  federalist  theories  are 
expounded  in  his  work  entitled :  Selbstbestimmungsrecht  der  Nationen 
mit  Cesonderer  Anwendung  auf  Oesterreich  Ungarn,  19 18.  He  extols  a 
federal  system  tending  above  all  to  assure  in  the  future  Austro- 
Hungarian  State  a  predominance  of  the  Austrian  Germans.  The 
Germans  therefore  would  be  the  gainers  from  this  federalism  and  not 
the  Slavs  as  Mr.  Martin  thinks. 


160  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

perhaps  by  stubbornness,  and  of  what  a  Richelieu,  a  Talley- 
rand or  a  Bismarck  could  have  made  of  such  an  opportunity." 
While  Charles  I  sends  his  troops  to  fight  the  Allies,  Mr.  W. 
Martin  says  that  the  young  Emperor  "  suffers  for  what  are, 
in  reality,  the  interests  of  the  Allies."  Whilst  mangled 
France  bleeds  under  the  blows  which  she  has  received  in  a 
war  provoked  by  Austria,  and  whole  nations  groan  under 
the  oppression  of  Germany  and  her  Allies,  Mr.  Martin  deplores 
the  fate  of  the  young  sovereign  because  he  "  receives  kicks 
and  invective  on  all  sides."  Mr.  Martin  has  a  grievance 
against  the  Allies  for  having  brought  about  the  failure  of 
the  young  Emperor's  federalist  plans.  "  If  they  have  failed," 
he  says,  "it  is  because  they  met  with  two  insurmountable 
obstacles  :  the  hostility  of  the  Hungarians  and  the  Allies. 
The  Emperor  Charles  hoped  that  the  Allies  would  accept 
federalism  as  a  formula  of  conciliation  and  a  solution  to 
the  national  questions.  But  these  peace  offers  reached  Paris 
a  fortnight  too  late  and  this  slight  anachronism  has  com- 
promised the  whole  work." 

We  do  not  share  Mr.  Martin's  regrets  because  of  the 
"  compromised  work  "  because  we  do  not  see  what  good  it 
could  be  to  humanity  that  the  Slav  and  Latin  races  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  races  who  love  and  are  perfectly  worthy  of  liberty, 
should  be  under  the  domination  of  a  foreign  dynasty  and 
governed  by  a  sovereign,  himself  a  vassal  of  another  autocrat 
more  powerful  than  he.  Does  not  Mr.  Martin  himself  say 
of  him  :  "  Truly,  in  being  faithful,  Charles  I  has  no  choice. 
It  was  the  faithfulness  of  a  prisoner  to  his  gaoler." 

How  then  does  not  Mr.  Martin  see  that  the  young  Emperor, 
being  himself  deprived  of  his  liberty,  can  hardly  give  it  to 
others  ? 

The  Austro-Hungarian  problem  is  a  Gordian  knot  impos- 
sible to  untie,  therefore  it  must  be  cut.  Mr.  Wilson  will  cut 
it,  as  his  speech  on  Washington's  tomb,  July  4,  1918,  proves. 

September  14,  1918. 

A  Necessary  Settlement. 

The  Magyar  aristocracy  bestirs  itself,  after  having  brought 
its  people  to  the  verge  of  a  catastrophe  of  the  worst  order. 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      161 

Artfully  it  distributes  the  different  tasks.  Carolyi  against 
Tisza,  Apponyi  against  Andrassy.  Count  Apponyi  is  a  typical 
representative  of  these  Touranian  aristocrats,  brought  up 
by  the  Kalschberg  Jesuits,  a  master  of  French  and  English, 
very  charming  to  the  Europeans  and  who,  if  he  were  in  power, 
would  have  thought  of  nothing  more  urgent  than  the 
suppression  by  an  educational  measure,  more  turcico,  of 
the  freedom  of  the  educational  liberties  of  the  non-Magyar 
nationalities.  It  is  profoundly  deplorable  to  see  the  almost 
agonizing  interest  with  which  a  certain  portion  of  the  press, 
with  its  eyes  fixed  on  the  latest  news  from  Budapest, 
watches  the  speeches,  the  letters  and  the  programmes  of 
these  oppressors  of  the  people,  in  the  hopes  that  something 
might  come  of  them  which  would  prevent  the  complete 
fulfilment  of  the  destiny  of  a  backward  and  dismal  world. 

But  indeed  Mr.  Carolyi  would  like  to  shift  his  responsibility 
and  that  of  his  friends.  "  He  and  his  friends,"  he  says, 
"  followed  in  their  foreign  policy  "  (note  the  eternal  Magyar 
megalomania)  ' '  a  line  of  conduct  which  would  bring  about 
the  diminution  of  the  antagonism  between  the  European 
nations  and  a  conciliation  of  the  hostile  groups  of  Powers." 

You  have  read  aright  !  Count  Carolyi's  policy  "  would 
bring  about  a  diminution  of  the  antagonism  between  the 
European  nations  !  "  It  is  difficult  to  keep  cool  in  such  a 
tragic  hour  !  I  find  Count  Carolyi  a  thousand  times  more 
dangerous  than  Count  Tisza  who,  on  his  side,  has  but  one 
idea  :  to  step  into  the  shoes  of  the  German  Emperor  and 
go  to  Salonica.  Count  Tisza,  who  declares — to  the  frantic 
applause  of  the  House — at  the  very  moment  when  the  Russian 
wave  was  breaking  on  Czernowicz — that  after  the  war  "  one 
will  see  what  the  Hungarian  nation  has  done  for  the  position 
of  the  Monarchy  as  a  great  Power,"  and  is  therefore  nothing 
but  a  docile  instrument  of  German  Realpolitik. 

Carolyi,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  dangerous  dreamer  be- 
cause he  does  not  see  that  the'war  broke  out  simply  because 
his  efforts  and  those  of  his  peers  since  1868 — immediately 
after  Deak's  momentary  generous  offer — have  constantly 
tended  not  "  towards  a  policy  which  would  bring  about  a 
diminution  of  the  antagonism  between  the  nations"  but  to 
embitter  these  antagonisms  by  introducing  a  system  of  repres- 

12 


162  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

sions  and  conquests,  by  the  supremacy  of  one  race,  by  a 
closer  co-operation  with  the  block  formed  by  the  Central 
Empires  and  he  and  his  colleagues,  from  whom  he  would 
like  to  separate  in  articulo  mortis,  have  only  accelerated  the 
inevitable  movement  of  reaction  which  was  bound  to  be 
followed  by  the  collapse  of  an  edifice  founded  on  violence 
and  mystification. 

Only  the  Slavs  and  Roumanians  were  in  a  position  to  judge 
this  people.  The  inferior  race,  the  "  second  class  citizens," 
the  political,  social  and  economic  pariahs — these  are  the 
only  competent  judges,  the  advisers  to  whom  Europe  would 
never  listen,  whom  she  has  always  refused.  Ah  !  if  one  had 
only  listened  to  the  complaints  of  the  nationalities,  the  only 
people  who  foresaw  everything  !  But  no.  The  ambassadors 
had  smiles  and  considerations  only  for  the  hundred  personages 
who  occupied  the  front  of  the  stage.  Mr.  Roosevelt,  the 
great  President  of  the  great  democratic  and  federal  Republic, 
during  his  famous  tour  of  1907,  had  only  flowers  for  "  immortal 
Hungary,"  for  the  "  virtuous,"  "  chivalrous  "  generator  of 
a  great  progress,  at  the  very  time  when  a  funeral  pall  was 
spread  over  the  liberties  of  the  Croatians,  Serbians,  Slovaks 
and  Roumanians  entrusted  by  Divine  Providence  to  the 
chosen  people  of  St.  Stephen's  Crown.  And  who  has  for- 
gotten the  ecstacies  of  Mme.  Juliette  Adam,  before  the  altar 
of  the  "  Hungarian  Fatherland  " — there  were  no  others  ! — 
repeating  the  old  story  of  Kossuth  and  his  international 
band. 

These  are  the  sources  from  which  Europe  has  drawn 
her  knowledge  of  Hungary  !  And  that  is  why  one  fine  day 
she  was  surprised  by  this  new  enemy  who  had  only  ingratiated 
himself  with  French  and  English  Society  in  order  the  better 
to  drown  the  cries  of  his  victims. 

And  now  ?  Ask  Mr.  Carolyi.  How  does  he  intend  to 
regulate  the  future  condition  of  Hungary  ?  He  will  give 
you  the  same  answer  as  Mr.  Tisza,  Mr.  Apponyi,  Mr.  Polonyi, 
or  Mr.  Andrassy  or  any  other  Magyar  politician,  be  he 
noble  or  plebian  :  he  will  talk  about  the  right  of  the  Magyar 
Orszag,  the  reason  of  state  of  the  Hungarian  State,  the 
supremacy  of  the  Magyars,  the  only  M  political"  nation  of 
all  the  countries  of  the  Crown  of  St.  Stephen,  and  the  absolute 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      163 

supremacy  of  the  Budapest  Parliament.  If  he  conde- 
scendingly consents — because  after  all  the  Russians,  and  to 
day  the  Roumanians,  are  knocking  at  the  door — to  promise 
concessions  to  the  nationalists,  to  promise  universal  suffrage 
and  other  "  liberties  "  do  not  believe  him.  They  are  but  the 
promises  of  a  Young  Turk  at  bay,  broken  as  soon  as  they  are 
made. 

Separation  from  Austria,  the  integrity  and  independence 
of  Hungary  stretching  from  the  Carpathians  to  the  Save 
and  the  mountains  of  Transylvania — that  would  be  worse 
than  the  present  dualism  !  As  long  as  she  lived  with  Austria, 
the  Slavs  had  to  be  given  a  little  consideration,  if  only  for 
the  automatic  reasons  of  the  balance  of  power  between  two 
parts  of  a  whole.  Separated  from  Austria,  mistress  in 
all  the  countries  which  she  has  exploited  so  thoroughly,  it 
would  mean  the  reign  of  terror  of  the  worst  order.  It  would 
mean  delivering  the  Slav  populations  into  the  hands  of  the 
centralizing  system  of  the  Young  Turks,  of  those  whom 
Gladstone  has  qualified  by  the  scathing  remark  :  "  the  nega- 
tion of  God." 

Hungary  must  disappear  as  a  hypertrophical  formation 
founded  on  the  supremacy  of  one  race  over  all  others,  of  a 
race  of  five  millions  over  races  of  twelve  millions.  She  must 
return  to  her  ethnical  boundaries  since  she  has  not  known 
how  to  be  just  or  benevolent  to  others. 

Give  her  a  purely  commercial  opening  to  the  Sea,  inde- 
pendent of  her  authority,  and  let  her  leave  Europe  in  peace 
and  be  forgotten.  As  to  the  Magyar  people  we  wish  them 
the  conquest  of  complete  universal  suffrage  (not  according 
to  the  recipe  of  Carolyi-Apponyi-Andrassy),  and  also  deliver- 
ance from  the  yoke  of  an  aristocracy,  great  and  small,  and 
from  her  grotesque  imperialism  which  will  fall  to  pieces  with 
it  and  with  the  financial  supports  of  its  out-of-date  power. 

To  refuse  any  proposition  tending  to  separate  Hungary 
from  her  accomplices,  deport  the  leaders  of  the  aristocracy, 
convoke  the  cornices  on  a  basis  of  universal  suffrage,  install, 
under  control  of  the  Allies,  a  Magyar  government  for  the 
Magyars,  after  having  liberated  the  non-Magyar  peoples, 
that  is  the  great  social  and  political  task  which  historical 
laws  impose  upon  liberal  Europe. 


y 


164  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

The  alliance  with  the  Turks  and  Bulgarians,  the  part 
played  in  the  war,  the  fanaticism  and  cruelty  of  the  Magyar 
troops,  the  long  programme  entailing  the  barring  of  the 
road  to  justice  and  liberty,  should  they  not  have  opened 
even  the  most  refractory  eyes  ? 

Tell  us  what  are  the  fundamental  reasons  which  compel 
us  to  treat  Hungary  with  more  consideration  than  the  one 
founded  purely  and  simply  upon  her  national  right.  Tell 
us  what  reasons  relating  to  the  European  balance  of  power 
dictate  the  re-establishment  of  this  iniquity  erected  as  a 
State  !  She  has  lived  too  long  and  has  profaned  only  too  great- 
ly the  principles  of  ordinary  human  liberty,  and  spoilt  the 
life  of  so  many  innocent  races  who  are  nevertheless  full  of 
possibilities   and   productive   forces  ! 

In  settling  the  political  status  of  Hungary,  the  formation 
elsewhere  of  centres  of  disorders  and  decomposition,  the 
reproduction  of  carriers  of  infection  would  have  to  be  pre- 
vented by  sacrificing,  once  more,  a  few  nations  to  the  appetite 
of  others.  We  would  therefore  have  endured  the  great  war 
only  in  order  to  change  one  problem  for  another,  to  stop 
one  hole  and  open  another  ten  ? 

The  disposal  of  Hungary  as  at  present  constituted  appears 
to  us  therefore  to  be  the  rigorously  logical  crowning  act  of 
the  war  for  justice  and  the  liberty  of  the  different  races. 
To  consent  to  maintain  the  integrity  of  Hungary,  that  is  to 
say  the  integrity  of  an  oppressive  power  in  the  central  valley 
of  the  Danube  and  at  the  gates  of  the  East,  is  to  proclaim 
henceforth  the  failure  of  any  really  great  combinations, 
the  uselessness  of  any  effort,  the  permanence  of  the  causes 
which  provoked  from  afar  the  Great  War,  and  the  permanence 
of  the  danger  to  all  the  small  nations  of  Oriental  Europe. 

The  Budapest  Parliament,  that  parody  on  the  Parlia- 
ment of  Westminster,  should  no  longer  shelter  the  Magyar 
deputies.  A  temple  of  iniquity  and  reaction  whereas 
that  other  on  the  Thames  has  at  all  times  fostered  liberty 
and  had  the  courage  to  confess  its  faults  and  make  the 
necessary  amends — it  should  no  longer  be  a  torture-chamber 
for  the  Aryan  nations,  obliged  to  look  on — when  condescend- 
ingly admitted — at  debates  where  policy  is  decided  on  in  a 
language  which  they  do  not  understand. 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY       165 

The  moral  sense  of  the  society  engaged  in  this  supreme 
struggle,  the  interests  of  Europe  and  future  peace  will  only 
gain  thereby. 

October  29,  1916. 

The  Speeches  of  WekerlS  and  Tisza. 

The  speech  which  the  new  President  of  the  Council, 
Mr.  Alexander  Wekerle,  made  on  September  12th,  during 
the  first  session  of  the  Hungarian  Parliament,  constitutes 
a  vertitable  challenge  to  all  those  who  demand  liberty  for 
the  peoples  and  equality  for  all.  By  this  speech,  applauded 
by  the  whole  Chamber  and  accentuated  by  the  subsequent 
remarks  of  Count  Tisza,  the  Magyars  openly  separate  them- 
selves from  the  rest  of  the  world  by  taking  a  peculiar  and 
purely  Magyar  point  of  view. 

It  is  not,  of  course,  the  first  time  that  the  Magyars,  whose 
mentality  finds  some  difficulty  in  agreeing  with  European 
ideas,  display  manifest  symptoms  which  are  disquieting  for 
the  vitality  of  their  race.  Instead  of  being  grateful  for  the 
fact  that  Europe,  overlooking  their  Mongolian  origin,  has 
accepted  them  as  equals,  the  Magyars  wish  to  profit  eternally 
from  past  historical  circumstances  and  hold  in  their  power 
millions  and  millions  of  non-Magyars.  To  this  end  they  have 
invented  the  theory,  taught  to  every  new-born  Magyar,  that 
the  Magyar  power  can  only  subsist  by  reigning  over  a 
dozen  millions  of  non-Magyars.  The  other  races  ask 
nothing  better  than  to  free  themselves  from  the  foreigners, 
having  confidence  in  their  own  powers  and  capacity,  whilst 
the  Magyars  pretend  that  their  people  will  perish  if  her  power 
over  the  nationalities  which  she  has  enslaved  for  centuries 
is  taken  away.  And  whilst  the  other  nations  call  their 
State  national  when  it  is  exclusively  composed  of  members 
of  their  own  race,  the  Magyars  employ  a  contradictory  ter- 
minology. Their  present  State  is  national  according  to  them 
because  it  is  formed  of  several  nationalities  dominated  by 
the  Magyar  nationality.  If  the  non-Magyar  countries  were 
separated  from  Hungary,  such  a  Magyar  State  composed 
exclusively  of  Magyars,  would  be,  according  to  the  theories 
current    in    Hungary,    non-national,    because   the    Magyars 


166  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

would  then  have  no  subjects  to  oppress  !  The  recent  speeches 
of  Wekerle  and  Tisza  simply  reflect  this  strange  way  of 
thinking  which  the  Magyars,  with  unspeakable  effrontery, 
constantly  express  by  acts  in  every  branch  of  their  political 
life. 

"  The  aspirations  of  the  Austria-Slav  politicians,"  says 
Mr.  Wekerle,  u  in  view  of  the  constitution  of  independent 
Slav  States  within  the  Monarchy,  these  aspirations,  I  must 
reject  as  dreams,  first  of  all  because  they  cannot  be  applied 
to  Hungary  and  then,  above  all,  because  we  shall  see  that 
they  make  no  progress.  .  .  .  The  Austrian  laws  provide 
no  penalties  for  the  attacks  on  the  integrity  of  Hungary, 
and  it  is  a  very  grave  fault  which  we  are  trying  to  eliminate 
in  future  negotiations."  Count  Tisza,  speaking  after  Mr. 
Wekerle,  went  even  further,  mocking  openly  the  national 
sentiments  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Slavs.  "  What  is 
happening  in  Austria,"  said  Tisza,  "  are  strange  grotesque 
displays  of  the  ridiculous  symptoms  of  the  presumptuous 
mentality  of  people  of  no  importance."  If  to  this  one  adds 
Mr.  Wekerle's  express  statement  that  he  has  received  the 
formal  assurance  of  the  Sovereign  that  he  will  not  touch  the 
fundamental  basis  of  Austria-Hungary,  one  can  judge  what 
are  the  Magyar  and  Austrian  dispositions  in  view  of  a  peace 
by  compromise.  The  Magyars  are  not  so  clever  as  the 
Austrians  and  far  from  talking  about  the  conciliation  of  the 
peoples,  they  are  prepared  to  request  Austria  to  prosecute 
for  high  treason  any  Slav  manifestation  directed  against 
the  usurped  power  of  the  Magyar  rulers.  Whilst  Austro- 
German  circles  spread  rumours  of  peace,  a  new  Austria 
and  a  renewal  of  the  Monarchy,  the  Budapest  Chamber 
qualifies  the  Slav  demand  to  enjoy  the  most  elementary 
rights  of  a  civilized  people  as  a  "  grotesque  phenomenon  " 
and  a  '*  ridiculous  symptom." 

One  would  really  think  we  were  dreaming  when  we  read 
the  speeches  of  Wekerle  and  Tisza,  in  the  middle  of  the 
twentieth  century  and  in  the  very  centre  of  Europe  !  And 
to  think  that  there  are  serious  politicians  in  France  and 
England  who  have  still  a  warm  corner  in  their  hearts  for  the 
descendants  of  Arpad  and  their  ancient  regime  ! 

September  25,  1917. 


S 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      167 


The  Southern  Slav  Union  and  the  Magyars. 

The  question  of  the  Union  of  all  the  Southern  Slavs  in 
an  independent  State  is  one  of  the  essential  questions  which 
await  their  solution  by  the  war.  A  people  of  12  million  souls, 
split  up  into  numerous  provincial  administrations,  deliberately 
divided  by  different  legislations  with  the  aim  of  preventing 
their  natural  national  union,  demands  more  than  ever  to-day, 
before  the  world,  the  right  to  live  as  an  independent  State, 
free  from  all  foreign  influence  of  any  description. 

The  union  of  the  Southern  Slavs  :  Serbians,  Croatians 
and  Slovenes,  can  only  be  realized  to  the  detriment  of  the 
present  rulers,  Germans  and  Magyars.  It  is  not  surprising 
that  the  latter  should  throw  all  their  forces  in  the  balance  in 
order  to  retain  the  Slavs  whose  exploitation  affords  them 
many  advantages  at  little  cost.  They  see  in  the  constitution 
of  an  independent  Southern  Slav  State  an  attack  on  their 
ancient  privileges  and  that  is  why  they  lose  their  heads 
when  they  think  of  it. 

The  Magyars  demand  violent  measures  in  order  to  stop 
the  Southern  Slav  movement.  For  them  the  question  is 
negligible,  so  easily  do  they  think  to  get  rid  of  it.  Supported 
by  their  own  idea  of  a  national  state,  unitarian  and  Magyar, 
they  repudiate  any  idea  which  could  admit  of  any  change 
whatsoever  in  the  present  relations.  They  consider  the 
peoples  of  non-Magyar  race  as  tribes  incapable  of  a  civiliza- 
tion of  their  own  and  who  could  only  become  advanced 
peoples  by  the  aid  of  Magyar  civilization.  That  is  why 
they  reproach  the  Austrian  Government  for  its  alleged  feeble- 
ness in  respect  to  the  demands  of  its  peoples.  The  Magyars  say 
they  are  the  pillars  and  supports  of  the  Habsburg  Monarchy 
and  the  defenders  of  the  German  supremacy  in  Austria.  It 
is  not  unusual  to  hear  the  Magyars  say  that  the  centre  of 
gravity  of  the  Monarchy  should  be  removed  to  Hungary 
who  alone  has  still  the  necessary  power  for  the  violent  re- 
pression, if  it  must  be,  of  the  pretentions  of  the  non-Magyar 
and  non-German  peoples.  This  move  is  considered  necessary 
because  Austria,  with  her  hesitations  and  indecisions,  has 
created  such  internal  troubles  that  it  is  difficult  to  put  things 
in  order.     Austria  ventured — the  Magyars  say — to  promise 


168  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

a  few  concessions  to  her  peoples  and  this  has  provoked  the 
painful  disputes  from  which  she  suffers  constantly.  The 
Magyars,  worthy  disciples  of  their  German  masters,  demand 
an  iron  hand  for  these  criminal  agitations  !  No  sentiment 
and  no  romance,  when  it  is  a  question  of  governing  the  masses, 
"  the  peoples  without  history." 

Such  is  the  Magyar  programme  from  government  circles 
down  to  insignificant  writers.  In  his  programme  which 
he  submitted  to  the  Hungarian  Parliament  a  few  days 
ago,  the  President  of  the  Hungarian  Council,  Wekerle, 
declares  that  the  Hungarian  Government  will  tolerate  no 
attempt  on  the  integrity  of  the  territories  of  the  Crown  of 
St.  Stephen,  and  that  it  will  watch  that  no  change  should  be 
made  in  the  Dualist  system  of  the  Monarchy.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  demands  also  the  incorporation  in  Hungary  of 
Dalmatia,  a  purely  Slav  country. 

The  manner  in  which  public  opinion  received  the  minis- 
terial explanation  showed  it  to  be  in  perfect  agreement 
with  it.  There  are  only  temperamental  differences  in  the  way 
in  which  this  is  expressed.  According  to  some,  the  gallows 
should  be  the  instrument  for  stifling  the  voices  of  imper- 
tinent crowds.  Thus,  the  Budapest  paper  A  Nap,  speaking 
of  this  question,  holds  the  following  comforting  prospect 
before  our  eyes :  "  We  must  perform  the  cruel  duty  of 
hanging  on  the  nearest  tree  any  person  coming  here  from 
Austria  in  order  to  further  this  propaganda." 

The  Pester  Lloyd  on  its  side,  although  also  severe,  never- 
theless does  not  recommend  this  sort  of  punishment  for  the 
agitators.  V  Korosec  "  (the  leader  of  the  Southern  Slavs 
in  Austria),  says  the  paper,  "  has  dared  openly  to  demand 
the  amputation  of  Jugoslavia  from  the  Empire  of  St.  Stephen, 
in  order  to  form  a  great  united  and  independent  state, 
without  the  President  of  the  Austrian  Council  having  thought 
fit  to  protest  violently  against  such  audacity.  Can  the 
Hungarian  Prime  Minister  remain  inactive  in  the  face  of 
such  manifestations  ?  We  think  that  it  is  already  high  time 
to  put  an  end  to  these  extraordinary  manifestations  by  ener- 
getic action." 

In  the  face  of  this  anti-national  attitude,  the  Southern 
Slavs  as  well  as  the  other  peoples  of  Hungary  know  what 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY       169 

to  expect.  Never  on  any  account  can  they  expect  the 
Magyars  to  realize  their  just  national  desires.  The  Magyars, 
too  spoilt  by  Europe,  are  accustomed  to  dominate  others 
and  will  not  willingly  renounce  their  "  historical  rights." 
That  is  why  the  abyss  dug  between  Magyars  and  non- 
Magyars  is  only  passable  if  all  relations  of  subordination 
cease  to  exist  between  them.  And  the  day  that  this  takes 
place  the  foundations  of  a  durable  peace  will  be  laid  in  this 
corner  of  bloodstained  Europe. 

October  14,  1917. 

Michel  Carolyi  and  Oscar  Jaszi. 

The  Central  Powers  have  recently  sent  to  Switzerland 
two  Magyar  emissaries,  one  a  friend  of  the  Entente  and  the 
other  a  democrat,  whose  reputation  should  serve  as  a  letter 
of  introduction  for  eventual  conversations  with  the  Allied 
representatives.  Count  Michel  Carolyi  and  professor  Oscar 
Jaszi  have  been  given  by  Count  Czernin  the  mission  of 
explaining  to  the  Allies  that  honourable  peace,  without 
indemnities  or  annexations,  which  Vienna,  Budapest  and 
Berlin  talk  of,  without  ever  stating  its  precise  terms.  In  order 
to  illustrate  the  task  of  these  emissaries  of  diverse  titles, 
we  think  it  as  well  to  explain  once  again  their  political  creed 
which  is  such  as  to  inspire  the  greatest  suspicion. 

Count  Carolyi,  the  leader  of  a  section  of  the  independent 
party,  is  not  a  convinced  supporter  of  the  Austro-German 
Alliance.  Many  reasons,  which  it  is  useless  to  examine  here, 
made  him  incline  towards  the  Entente  and  he  has  never 
hidden  his  personal  sympathies  for  the  British  and  the  French 
whom  he  preferred  to  the  Prussians,  considered  by  him  as 
parvenus  from  the  worldly  point  of  view.  These  sympathies 
of  Count  Carolyi  for  the  Entente  Powers,  have  crystallized  in 
the  domain  of  foreign  policy  into  a  particular  conception, 
which  is  not  without  originality.  Like  all  the  Magyars, 
Count  Carolyi  considers  that  the  present  Hungary,  where  a 
Magyar  minority  strangles  a  non-Magyar  majority,  should 
subsist  in  the  future. 

In  order  to  assure  for  ever  this  power  of  the  Magyars  over 
the    non-Magyars,    Tisza,    Lukacs,    Andrassy,    F6jervary, 


170  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

Apponyi,  Hedervary,  Wekerle  and  other  magnates,  have 
joined  hands  with  the  Germans.  Dualism  was  the  means 
which  assured  supremacy  over  Transleithania,  leaving  Cislei- 
thania  at  the  disposition  of  the  Germans.  Two  minorities 
thus  possessed  themselves  of  all  the  power  and,  seconded 
by  powerful  Germany,  governed  by  sovereign  right  in  the 
Danubian  Monarchy. 

This  state  of  affairs  had  nevertheless  the  inconvenience 
of  placing  the  Magyars  in  international  questions  at  the 
mercy  of  Berlin.  Hungary  was  all-powerful  internally  and 
and  no  one  opposed  the  reign  of  violence  and  denationalization 
which  she  practised  towards  the  non-Magyars.  Prince 
Bismarck,  replying  to  the  complaints  of  the  Germans  them- 
selves in  Hungary,  recognized  that  Germany  had  a  superior 
interest  in  not  meddling  with  the  internal  affairs  of  Hungary. 
Because  in  return,  in  questions  of  foreign  policy,  Hungary 
was  completely  subject  to  the  wishes  of  Berlin.  Dualism 
has  proved  itself  to  be  a  very  convenient  instrument  for 
winning  over  the  Magyars  to  the  pan-German  plans.  Never- 
theless German  influence  weighed  heavily  on  the  Magyars, 
the  more  so  because  the  road  to  Berlin  passed  by  Vienna, 
and  so,  instead  of  one  master,  Budapest  had  two.  This 
explains  the  hatred  which  the  Magyars  have  always  had  for 
the  Germans,  hatred  born  of  the  powerlessness  to  separate 
from  them. 

Count  Carolyi  considered,  nevertheless,  that  Magyar'supre- 
macy  and  hegemony  in  Hungary  could  be  sold  at  a  higher 
price  to  the  Entente  Powers.  He  thought  that  for  reasons 
of  foreign  policy  the  Western  democracies,  France  and  Great 
Britain,  would  allow  themselves  to  be  persuaded  into  accept- 
ing and  recognizing  the  Magyar  power  over  the  Slavo-Rou- 
manian  majority,  if  in  exchange  Hungary,  alone  or  with 
Austria,  would  separate  from  Germany  and  join  the  Entente. 
The  presence  of  a  Czarist  and  absolutist  Russia  in  the  Entente, 
justified  to  a  certain  extent  the  idea  of  an  integral  Hungary 
entering  the  alliance  of  the  Western  democracies.  To 
help  the  realization  of  this  combination,  Count  Carolyi 
was  inspired  to  promise  a  democratization  of  Hungary  who, 
whilst  retaining  the  Magyar  supremacy,  would  have  at  least 
the  appearance  of  a  democracy.     This  was  not  a  bad  idea 


STRUGGLE    WITH    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY       171 

from  the  Magyar  point  of  view.  Hungary  would  be  preserved 
intact  and  German  influence  thrown  off.  The  European 
war,  suddenly  provoked  by  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary, 
did  not  allow  Count  Carolyi  to  give  a  more  concrete  form 
to  his  political  conception.  It  is  only  now,  after  the  check 
to  the  original  German  plans,  that  Count  Carolyi  decides  to 
return  to  his  idea.  The  visit  to  Switzerland  is  evidently  for 
this  end.  Before  the  war,  Carolyi  failed.  Will  he  be  more 
fortunate  to-day  ? 

The  answer  to  this  question  is  not  difficult.  First  of 
all,  the  ideas  concerning  the  independence  and  the  right 
of  all  peoples  to  dispose  of  themselves  have  developed  to 
such  an  extent  that  the  Entente  cannot,  without  dishonouring 
itself,  conclude  any  sort  of  agreement  with  the  Magyars 
which  delivers  the  majority  of  the  inhabitants  of  Hungary 
into  their  hands.  Secondly,  Germany  has  taken  root  more 
firmly  than  ever  in  Austria  and  Hungary  and  it  seems  im- 
possible that  these  two  powers  can  escape  from  the  German 
embrace  even  if  they  wish  to.  That  which  was  already 
difficult  before  the  present  war  has  become  almost  impossible 
to-day.  Finally  there  is  the  question  of  the  personal  con- 
fidence inspired  by  Count  Carolyi.  Before  the  war  he  was 
not  sufficiently  well  known.  The  war  has  obliged  him  to 
show  himself  in  his  true  colours.  There  is  no  action  in  his 
political  career  which  can  seriously  recommend  him  to  the 
Allies.  First  of  all,  as  Count  Tisza  says  in  his  paper  Igaz 
Mondo  (see  the  Journal  des  Debats,  September  10,  1917), 
Count  Carolyi's  party  energetically  supported  the  war 
with  Serbia  in  1914.  During  the  war  Count  Carolyi  has 
been  as  vague  as  possible  in  all  his  political  manifestations. 
His  famous  speech  to  the  electors  of  Czegled  last  December 
was  in  favour  of  the  preservation  of  the  Monarchy.  Pressed 
for  an  explanation  on  the  subject  of  the  liberty  and  indepen- 
dence of  the  subject  peoples,  Count  Carolyi,  in  October, 
expressed  the  opinion  that  territorial  questions  could  be 
referred  to  the  arbitration  of  a  tribunal,  adding  that  Austro- 
Hungarian  diplomacy  should  in  that  case  exploit  the  differ- 
ences existing  between  the  Allies  !  (see  the  Neue  Freie  Presse 
of  October  4, 1917) .  And  what  is  to  be  said  about  the  demand 
for  the  annexation  of  Serbia  made  by  Count  Carolyi  to  the 


172  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

Budapest  Parliament  on  September  14,  1917  ?  (see  La 
Serbie,  of  September  24,  1917).  And  also  his  strange  attitude 
after  the  fall  of  Tisza,  an  anti-democratic  and  reactionary 
attitude  ?  Nor  is  the  last  visit  of  Count  Czernin  to  Buda- 
pest nor  his  long  interviews  with  Count  Carolyi  before  his 
departure  for  Switzerland  of  a  nature  to  increase  his  prestige. 
Count  Carolyi  would  like  to  talk  of  peace,  but  this  peace, 
which  he  offers,  is,  when  all  is  said  and  done,  but  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  edition  of  the  German  peace. 

Professor  Oscar  Jaszi  is  an  amateur  in  political  affairs 
and  his  convictions  bear  the  stamp  of  his  sociological  theories. 
To  the  oppressed  peoples  of  Hungary,  Professor  Jaszi  says  : 
National  liberty  is  not  of  much  value.  What  is  essential 
is  to  live  in  a  political  and  social  democracy.  That  is  why, 
instead  of  fighting  the  idea  of  the  Magyar  State,  you  should 
yield,  remain  Hungarian  subjects  and  try  to  abolish  the 
oligarchy  of  the  great  Magyar  princes.  Before  the  war, 
Professor  Jaszi  may  have  been  popular.  The  great  ideas 
which  have  appeared  during  the  war  transforming  all  our 
conceptions,  have  nevertheless  not  even  touched  the  Magyar 
sociologist,  which  is  regrettable.  Jaszi  does  not  understand 
the  importance  of  the  present  struggle  and  remains  just  as 
he  was  before  :  a  Magyar,  uneasy  as  to  the  fate  of  ancient 
Hungary.  His  whole  creed  lies  in  his  ardent  desire  to 
preserve  the  territorial  integrity  of  his  country  !  The  visit 
to  occupied  Serbia  and  the  correspondence  published  in 
the  Pester  Lloyd — what  a  fall ! — have  notably  diminished 
his  authority.  His  recent  article  which  appeared  in  the 
Vilag  of  September  16th,  juggling  with  the  Southern  Slav 
question  by  proposing  the  union  of  all  the  Southern  Slav 
countries  to  Hungary,  has  succeeded  in  opening  the  eyes 
even  of  those  who  believed  in  this  last  and  only  Magyar 
democrat. 

Such  are  the  emissaries  whom  Austria-Hungary  has  sent 
to  Switzerland  to  preach  peace  ! 

December  2,  1917. 


CHAPTER   IV 

THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA 

I 

The  SerboBulgarian  Agreement  of  1912  and 
Austria-Hungary. 

The  Serbo-Bulgarian  agreement  of  1912  was  considered 
upon  the  whole  as  a  success  for  the  Entente,  which  had  been 
working  for  a  long  time  at  the  constitution  of  the  Balkanic 
bloc  and  the  solution  of  all  questions  relating  thereto, 
according  to  the  formula  :  The  Balkans  for  the  Balkan 
peoples.  Bulgaria  had  at  last  consented  to  this  political 
combination  which  did  away  on  one  hand  with  the  possi- 
bility of  Bulgarian  hegemony,  by  keeping  Bulgaria's  claims 
within  just  limits,  and  on  the  other  hand  made  this  fickle 
country  go  over  definitely  to  the  side  of  the  Entente. 
Mr.  Guechov,  the  former  Bulgarian  Prime  Minister  and 
one  of  the  authors  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  treaty,  has  in 
his  book,  The  Balkanic  Alliance,  given  the  history  of  the 
diplomatic  negotiations  which  have  resulted  in  the  alliance 
of  the  Balkan  peoples  against  Turkey.  On  reading  this 
book,  where  one  finds  also  the  description  of  semi-dramatic 
scenes  arranged  by  the  Bulgarian  diplomats,  such  as,  for 
instance,  when  Mr.  Risoff  urged  Mr.  Milovanovitch  not  to 
let  slip  the  favourable  opportunity  which  presented  itself 
in  consequence  of  the  offers  of  Sofia,  we  are  inclined  to  believe 
in  the  sincerity  of  the  Bulgarians  and  the  loyalty  of  their 
intentions.  The  only  object  of  the  Bulgarians,  according 
to  this  account,  was  to  deliver  Macedonia  from  the  Turkish 
yoke  and,  to  attain  this  end,  Bulgaria  concluded  a  treaty 
of  alliance  with  Serbia  and  bound  herself  even  to  defend  that 
country    against     any    Austro-Hungarian    aggression.     In 

173 


174  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

diplomatic  circles  of  the  Entente  they,  in  fact,  believed  in 
the  sincerity  of  the  Bulgarians,  and  in  spite  of  all  contrary 
signs  and  proofs,  this  faith  has  not  ceased  to  be  the  guide 
of  the  Entente  in  its  whole  attitude  towards  the  government 
of  Sofia. 

To-day,  when  we  throw  a  backward  glance  on  past 
events,  we  are  astonished  at  so  much  confidence  being 
shown  towards  a  people  who  did  not  even  take  the  trouble 
to  hide  their  double  game. 

Mr.  Milovanovitch,  who  conducted  the  negotiations 
with  Bulgaria  and  who  signed  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  treaty, 
and  his  successor,  Mr.  Pachitch,  have  always  had  a  certain 
feeling  of  distrust  towards  the  Sofia  government,  which 
acted  according  to  the  instructions  of  King  Ferdinand. 
An  agreement  with  the  Bulgarian  nation  was  always  possible 
and  realizable  as  long  as  Bulgaria  only  wished  to  safeguard 
her  own  interests.  But  doubts  existed  as  to  the  designs 
of  King  Ferdinand  who  was  notoriously  attached  to  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy.  However,  Serbian  statesmen 
did  not  hesitate  to  accept  the  Bulgarian  conditions,  which 
considerably  reduced  Serbian  claims  in  Macedonia.  In  view 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  menace,  Serbia  estimated  that 
Bulgarian  friendship  was  worth  the  cession  of  certain 
Macedonian  provinces.  If  we  add  further,  that  Bulgaria, 
before  concluding  the  treaty  of  alliance  with  Serbia,  had 
been  carrying  on  almost  simultaneously  analogous  negotia- 
tions with  Austria-Hungary,  which  had,  so  it  was  said, 
no  result  in  consequence  of  the  exorbitant  demands  of  the 
Danubian  Monarchy,  the  Serbian  hope  of  seeing  the  alliance 
with  Bulgaria,  cancelling  all  former  differences  of  opinion 
and  inaugurating  a  new  era  of  progress  and  prosperity  in 
the  two  allied  countries,  will  be  understood. 

But  this  hope  was  vain.  Bulgaria  only  wanted  to  make 
use  of  Serbia,  and  the  treaty  of  alliance  ought,  according 
to  Bulgarian  plans,  to  have  produced  effects  which  were 
not  expected  on  the  Serbian  side.  This  treaty,  the  clauses 
of  which  were  also  directed  against  Austria-Hungary,  was 
concluded  by  Bulgaria  with  the  definite  assent  of  the  Dual 
Monarchy. 

We  have  only  to  recall  to  mind  the  situation  in  the 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  175 

Balkans  in  1911  and  1912,  and  especially  Turkey's  difficulties 
at  home  and  abroad  and  the  Austrian  plans  of  expansion, 
which  aimed  equally  at  Turkey  in  Europe  and  Serbia,  in 
order  to  understand  the  character  of  the  secret  negotiations 
between  Austria-Hungary  and  Bulgaria.  The  Danubian 
Monarchy,  wishing  to  get  the  better  of  her  internal  diffi- 
culties and  the  incessant  trouble  between  the  different 
nationalities  under  her  protection,  seriously  thought  that 
the  best  means  of  galvanizing  the  Empire  was  to  obtain 
for  it  a  few  conquests.  An  Austro-Bulgarian  agreement 
against  Serbia  and  Turkey  was  not  difficult  to  realize  ;  only 
a  pretext  was  needed  for  going  to  war,  and  it  was  not  to 
be  found.  The  situation  in  the  Balkans  did  not  permit 
a  straightforward  game,  because  of  Russia  and  even  of 
Roumania.  An  ingenious  method  was  therefore  adopted. 
With  the  consent  of  Austria,  Bulgaria  would  conclude  a 
treaty  of  alliance  with  Serbia  and  attack  Turkey.  They 
would  incite  the  Serbians  against  the  Turks  and  this 
offensive  would  open  the  door  to  all  other  combinations. 
The  Austrian  General  Staff  had  no  great  opinion  of  the 
Serbian  army,  and  the  politicians  of  Vienna,  influenced  by 
this  opinion,  were  sure  that  the  Turks  would  be  easily 
victorious.  It  would  be  a  splendid  occasion  for  the  Austrians 
to  fly  to  the  help  of  the  Christians,  to  occupy  Serbia  and 
to  pacify  Macedonia.  Once  established  in  the  valleys  of 
the  Morava  and  the  Vardar,  the  Monarchy  would  very  well 
find  the  means  of  maintaining  its  position  there. 

This  game  could  not  remain  hidden.  We  find,  indeed, 
in  an  article  of  Mr.  Rene  Pinon,  which  appeared  in  the 
Revue  des  Deux  Mondes  (Vol.  xiii,  February  1,  1913), 
entitled  "  Austria's  part  in  the  genesis  of  the  great  Balkanic 
conflict,"  these  presumptions  expressed  with  almost  absolute 
precision.  Mr.  Pinon  affirms  that  an  agreement  between 
Vienna  and  Sofia  for  the  partition  of  influence  in  the 
Peninsula,  and  even  for  a  territorial  partition,  had  been  in 
the  air  for  a  long  time,  and  that  it  is  quite  possible  that  it 
may  be  realized.  However,  in  proportion  as  Serbia  freed 
herself  by  stubborn  effort,  from  economic  dependence  upon 
Austria,  as  she  constituted  an  army  and  a  government, 
another  solution  appeared,  of  which  the  formula  was  :   "  The 


176  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

Balkans  for  the  Balkan  peoples."  But  it  is  not  certain 
that  the  new  combination  was  not  mixed  up  with  some 
remnant's  of  the  other  combinations  which  just  a  short  time 
before  had  been  looked  upon  as  possible.  It  would  be  hard 
to  imagine  that  King  Ferdinand  had  not  made  sure  of  the 
goodwill  of  Vienna  as  well  as  of  Petrograd.  It  is  difficult 
to  know  if  there  existed  a  written  convention  between 
Bulgaria  and  Austria.  It  must  be  remembered  that  in 
June,  191 1,  the  great  Sobranje,  of  Tirnovo,  convoked  for 
revision  of  the  Constitution,  had  decided,  in  accordance 
with  the  wish  expressed  by  the  sovereign,  that  the  "  king 
should  represent  the  state  in  all  relations  with  foreign 
countries,"  and  that  he  can  conclude  treaties  without  the 
ratification  of  the  Parliament.  We  do  not  know,  therefore, 
what  agreements  may  have  been  concluded  by  Ferdinand, 
but  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  the  Balkanic  alliance  could 
have  been  formed  and  prepared  for  action  without  Austria's 
knowledge  of  it  ;  and  if  she  did  not  prevent  it,  it  is  because 
she  believed  it  in  her  own  interests  to  let  things  take  their 
course. 

Austrian  diplomats  believed  in  the  victory  of  the  Turks. 
The  opinion  most  favourable  to  the  little  Balkan  States 
was  that  the  Greeks  would  do  nothing,  that  the  Serbians 
would  be  beaten,  that  the  Bulgarians  alone  would  cut  a 
good  figure  and  would  have,  perhaps,  some  success  at  the 
beginning  of  the  campaign,  but  would  be  quickly  exhausted 
and  as  soon  as  the  Turkish  masses  of  troops  from  Asia 
Minor  would  appear  on  the  scene  they  would  be  driven 
back.  Mr.  Pinon  presumes  that  the  Bulgarians  themselves 
feared  this,  and  that  they  wanted  to  prepare  a  line  of  retreat. 
Austria-Hungary,  therefore,  believed  in  the  defeat  of  the 
Allies  or  that,  at  the  most,  the  Bulgarian  successes  would  be 
fleeting.  From  that  time  her  policy  was  decided  upon  : 
she  intervened  as  mediator,  she  compelled  the  belligerents 
to  make  peace.  In  case  of  need  her  troops  advanced  in 
the  valley  of  the  Vardar.  Peace  would  be  concluded  on 
basis  of  the  autonomy  of  Macedonia  and  of  Albania.  Austria 
kept  the  Sandjak  and  communicated  from  there  with 
Albania,  of  whom  she  obtained  the  protectorate. 
Macedonian  autonomy  was  organized  under  the  guardianship 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  177 

of  Bulgaria,  who  guaranteed  to  Austria  the  free  disposal 
of  commercial  routes  and  of  the  port  of  Salonica.  Serbia, 
eliminated  from  all  combination,  and  squeezed  up  between 
Bulgaria  and  Austria-Hungary,  should  continue  to  vegetate. 
This  plan  corresponded  practically  to  the  proposition  of 
Count  Berchtold,  on  the  decentralization  of  Turkey  in 
Europe,  that  is  to  say  on  the  formation  of  the  Turkish 
provinces  into  an  Albania  embracing  the  whole  of  the  old 
Serbia  and  placed  under  the  control  of  Austria,  and  a 
Macedonia  under  the  protection  of  Bulgaria. 

Mr.  Pinon,  in  writing  this  article,  considered  the  Austro- 
Bulgarian  agreement  as  a  measure  of  precaution  taken  by 
King  Ferdinand,  in  case  of  failure  in  the  campaign  against 
Turkey.  After  events  have  proved  clearly  that  Bulgaria 
indeed  counted  upon  a  Serbian  defeat,  and  the  Serbian 
co-operation,  which  she  obtained  by  the  treaty  of  1912, 
was  necessary  to  her  in  order  to  facilitate  the  Bulgarian 
victory  and  give  Austria  occasion  to  interfere.  The  astound- 
ing victory  of  the  Serbians  at  Koumanovo,  the  rapid  march 
of  the  Serbian  troops  through  the  provinces  of  the  former 
Serbian  kingdom,  the  passage  across  Albania  and  the  issue 
on  the  Adriatic,  after  the  great  victory  of  Monastir,  have 
upset  all  the  Austro-Bulgarian  calculations  and  set  at  naught 
all  their  plans.  What  has  Bulgaria  done  in  presence  of 
this  new  situation,  which  she  did  not  count  upon  ?  This 
is  what  we  shall  enquire  into  in  another  article. 

May  21,  1916. 

Austro-Bulgarian  Collaboration  in  the 
Balkan   Wars. 

Our  theory  that  Bulgaria  concluded  the  treaty  of  alliance 
in  1912  with  the  consent  of  Austria-Hungary  and  with  the 
manifest  intention  of  making  use  of  the  Serbian  co-operation 
in  favour  of  her  imperialistic  aims  and  those  of  the  Monarchy, 
is  confirmed  by  the  political  and  military  events  which  took 
place  in  the  course  of  the  Balkan  war.  The  Bulgarian 
diplomatic  action  contrary  to  the  said  treaty,  was  first 
revealed  by  the  journey  of  Mr.  Daney  to  Budapest,  a  few 
days    after    the    battle    of     Koumanovo.      Mr.    Guechov, 

13 


178  SERBIA  AND  EUROPE 

questioned  as  to  the  object  of  this  journey,  explained  that 
it  had  been  ordered  by  King  Ferdinand,  with  a  view  to 
averting  Austrian  opposition  to  the  final  settlement  of 
Turkey  in  Europe  and  rallying  Austria  to  the  Bulgarian 
cause.  This  declaration  of  the  Bulgarian  Prime  Minister 
does  not  quite  explain  the  mission  of  Mr.  Daney,  which  the 
Bulgarian  Government  had  planned  and  executed  without 
acquainting  its  former  Allies  of  the  whole  truth.  In  fact, 
the  Bulgarians  gave  to  the  Allies  the  difficulties  created  by 
Roumania  as  a  reason  for  this  journey  to  Budapest.  To-day 
one  knows  that  Mr.  Daney  had  been  commissioned  to  come 
to  an  understanding  with  the  Austrian  politicians  on  the 
new  conditions  of  an  Austro-Bulgarian  collaboration.  The 
Serbian  victories  had  completely  upset  all  the  plans  of 
Sofia  and  Vienna,  and  a  new  arrangement  was  indispensable 
on  account  of  the  great  and  quite  unexpected  change  which 
had  taken  place  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  One  understands 
now  why  Mr.  Daney  avoided  stopping  at  Belgrade  on 
returning  from  Budapest  ;  it  was  impossible  for  him  to 
confide  to  the  allied  Serbian  government  the  secret  of  his 
plot  against  Serbia. 

What  were  the  foundations  of  the  new  arrangements 
between  the  Austrians  and  Bulgarians  ?  The  situation  of 
the  Austrian  Government  was  then  very  difficult.  The 
Ballplatz  was  waiting  for  a  fresh  Serbian  defeat  which  would 
give  an  excuse  for  Austrian  intervention,  and  there  were 
the  Serbians  driving  back  the  Turks,  occupying  the  whole 
of  Old  Serbia  and  Macedonia,  the  Sandjak  of  Novi  Bazar 
and  Northern  Albania.  The  two  Serbian  kingdoms,  Serbia 
and  Montenegro,  could  at  last  join  hands,  the  foreign  barrier 
separating  them  being  removed,  and  the  Serbians  reached 
the  Adriatic,  where  they  breathed  the  sea  air  and  liberty 
gained  at  last.  How  to  prevent  the  Serbians  from  reaping 
the  fruits  of  their  victories  ?  A  war  against  Serbia  at  a 
moment  when  all  the  Southern  Slavs  were  rejoicing  at  the 
Serbian  victories  as  if  they  were  their  own  was  not  possible  ; 
it  would  have  entailed  the  general  war  for  which  the  Germanic 
Empires  wished  to  have  a  better  pretext.  It  was  decided, 
therefore,  to  try  to  hinder  the  growth  of  Serbia  by  diplo- 
matic  means ;    on   the   one   side,   every   possible  obstacle 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  179 

would  be  put  in  the  way  of  the  consolidation  of  the  Serbian 
conquests,  and  on  the  other,  encouragement  would  be  given 
to  Bulgarian  aspirations. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Balkan  war,  Austria-Hungary 
had  carefully  avoided  complying  with  the  proposal  of  Sir 
Edward  Grey  and  declaring  her  territorial  disinterestedness. 
The  hopes  of  an  eventual  occupation  of  the  Turkish  provinces, 
fostered  by  Vienna  in  expectation  of  the  Serbian  defeats 
which  were  considered  inevitable,  prevented  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  from  making  a  declaration  of  dis- 
interestedness rendering  such  combinations  impossible.  After 
the  Serbian  victories  the  Monarchy  profited  from  this  cir- 
cumstance and  made  some  objections  to  the  Serbian  conquests 
in  the  Sandjak  and  in  Albania.  All  at  once  the  Monarchy 
posed  as  defender  of  the  principle  of  nationality,  and  put 
an  absolute  veto  upon  the  Serbian  occupation  of  Albania. 
As  Albania  had  no  fixed  frontiers,  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  traced  out  its  boundaries  in  such  a  way  that 
this  imaginary  Albania  embraced  nearly  the  whole  of  Old 
Serbia.  One  knows  all  the  vicissitudes  of  that  Albanian 
comedy,  which  ended  at  last,  thanks  to  the  loyal  efforts  of 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  maintain  peace,  by  an  arrangement 
providing  for  the  constitution  of  an  Albanian  principality 
with  William  de  Wied  as  ruling  Prince.  The  Serbians  were 
turned  away  from  the  Adriatic  and  Albania  received  as 
sovereign  a  German  prince.  This  was  a  success  for  Berlin 
and  for  Vienna. 

The  Austrian  Government,  however,  attached  much 
greater  importance  to  the  Bulgarian  advance  towards 
Constantinople.  Bulgaria  wanted  to  profit  from  the  agree- 
ment with  Serbia  and  the  understanding  with  Austria 
Hungary.  The  original  idea  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  politi- 
cians in  concluding  the  treaty  of  alliance  in  19 12,  was  to 
deliver  the  Macedonian  provinces  from  the  Turkish  yoke 
But,  while  the  Serbians  were  thinking  sincerely  of  an  intimate 
collaboration  with  Bulgaria,  which  would  lead  later  to  more 
vast  and  more  useful  political  combinations,  the  Bulgarians 
thought  only  of  making  use  of  the  Serbian  armies  to  conquer 
the  whole  of  Turkey  in  Europe  and  share  it  with  Austria- 
Hungary.     The  attitude  of  the  Bulgarian  Government  and 


180  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

General  Staff  in  the  Turkish  campaign  proves  that  King 
Ferdinand  unquestionably  wished  to  take  Constantinople. 
The  changes  in  the  Serbo-Eulgarian  military  plans,  carried 
out  at  the  request  of  the  Bulgarians,  the  dispensation  from 
sending  100,000  men  into  Macedonia  accorded  to  Bulgaria, 
the  demand  for  two  divisions  and  for  Serbian  heavy  artillery 
for  the  siege  of  Adrianople,  all  that  revealed  the  Bulgarian 
plans  ;  namely,  to  leave  Macedonia  and  the  Serbians  alone 
for  the  moment  and  finish  with  the  principal  adversary, 
Turkey.  Once  at  Constantinople,  King  Ferdinand  thought 
he  would  easily  be  able  to  settle  matters  with  Serbia.  If  the 
Serbians  refused  to  give  up  Macedonia,  a  means  would  quite 
well  be  found  of  forcing  them  to  do  so. 

These  plans  were  approved  of  by  the  Austrians.  Bulgaria 
was  encouraged  by  Vienna  and  Berlin,  where  they  looked 
favourably  upon  the  advance  of  these  forerunners  of  the 
Germans,  and  in  spite  of  the  repulse  received  at  Tchataldja 
and  the  impossibility  of  forcing  the  Turkish  lines,  she  broke 
off  peace  negotiations  at  London  and  continued  the  struggle 
without  taking  into  account  Serbian  or  Greek  interests. 
But  the  forces  of  Bulgaria  alone  were  not  sufficient  to  vanquish 
the  Turks,  and  the  Bulgarian  army  remained  stationary, 
unable  to  advance  further.  Seeing  the  impossibility  of 
reaching  the  goal  so  ardently  desired,  King  Ferdinand 
profited  from  the  capture  of  Adrianople,  where  the  Serbian 
co-operation  was  of  immense  importance,  and  started  new 
peace  negotiations.  On  the  advice  of  Vienna,  Bulgaria 
decided  to  delay  the  Turkish  plan  and  to  turn  her  attention 
to  her  allies  in  order  to  snatch  from  them  the  fruits  of  their 
victories.  All  the  efforts  of  the  allied  diplomacy,  particu- 
larly of  Russian  diplomacy,  to  prevent  the  rupture  and  to 
arrive  at  a  settlement  of  the  question  of  sharing  the  con- 
quered territories  by  means  of  the  arbitration  of  the 
Russian  Emperor,  were  in  vain,  because  Bulgaria,  after  the 
failure  of  the  Constantinople  enterprise,  wished  to  have  at 
least  the  whole  of  Macedonia.  Eagerly  encouraged  by 
Austria-Hungary,  she  attacked  Serbia  and  Greece  in  the 
famous  night  of  the  20th  June,  1913,  but  the  affair 
failed  ignominiously.  Threatened  by  Bulgarian  aggres- 
sion, Serbia,  Greece  and  Roumania  had  come  to  an  under- 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  181 

standing  in  order  to  defend  their  common  interests,  and 
Bulgaria,  vanquished  and  powerless,  signed  the  Treaty 
of  Bucarest,  which  put  an  end  to  the  Bulgarian  danger. 

All  these  failures  taught  the  Germanic  Empires  that, 
in  spite  of  her  devotion  to  their  cause,  Bulgaria  alone  could 
do  nothing.  It  was  therefore  necessary  to  adopt  a  more 
serious  plan,  in  which  Germany  and  Austria  would  take 
a  direct  part.  Italy  was  sounded  (a  revelation  of  Mr. 
Giolitti)  in  order  to  be  sure  of  her  co-operation,  but  Italy 
refused  to  take  part  in  a  preventive  war.  Then  the 
Bulgarians  were  persuaded  to  become  reconciled  with  the 
Turks,  in  order  to  first  finish  with  the  Serbians,  because 
the  two  things  could  not  be  done  at  the  same  time.  This 
time  the  Bulgarians  were  more  prudent  and,  with  the  consent 
of  the  Austro-Germans,  they  attacked  the  Serbians  at  a 
moment  when  their  military  action  had  most  chance  of 
success. 

As  can  be  seen,  the  whole  Bulgarian  policy  is  really  only 
the  policy  of  Vienna  and  Budapest.  The  governors  of 
Sofia  adopted  the  Germanic  plans,  because  these  plans 
responded  best  to  their  political  conceptions.  Bulgaria  has, 
therefore,  for  a  long  time  been  in  the  position  of  a  servant 
of  the  Austro-Germans  and  her  present  attitude  is  simply 
the  continuation  of  a  series  of  acts  for  a  long  time  ignored 
by  Allied  diplomacy. 

May  28,  1916. 


Bulgarian  Imperialism. 

The  policy  of  Bulgaria  revealed  itself  and  reveals  itself 
still  to-day  as  a  national  policy,  a  policy  of  which  the  sole 
aim  appears  to  be  deliverance  from  the  foreign  yoke  and 
the  achievement  of  Bulgarian  national  union.  During 
more  than  thirty  years  Europe  has  believed  in  the  politicians 
of  Sofia  who,  cleverly  led  by  King  Ferdinand,  gave  them- 
selves out  as  the  champions  of  liberty  and  the  defenders  of 
the  oppressed  Slavs  and  martyrized  Christians.  The  true 
Bulgarian  aims  remained  hidden  for  a  long  time  and  it  was 
only  during  the  Balkan  wars  that  the  role  of  Bulgaria  in 
European  questions  was  brought  to  light.     It  was  only  then 


182  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

that  far-seeing  people  perceived  the  fundamental  error  of  the 
diplomacy  which  had  adopted  the  habit  of  treating  Bulgaria 
as  an  independent  Slav,  and  in  the  main,  Russophile  State. 
Bulgaria,  however,  revealed  herself  more  and  more  as  a 
satellite  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary,  whose  task, 
suggested  by  King  Ferdinand  and  freely  approved  and 
supported  by  Bulgarian  politicians,  was  to  push,  on  the 
east  side,  towards  Constantinople,  in  order  to  check  the 
Russian  tendency  to  have  a  free  issue  on  the  Black  Sea,  and 
on  the  west  side,  towards  the  Adriatic,  in  order  to  prevent 
Serbian  national  unity  and  lend  assistance  to  the  anti-Slav 
policy  of  Austria-Hungary.  Far  from  being  independent, 
Bulgaria  was  working  wittingly  and  consciously  for  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary,  hoping  to  become,  with  the  aid  of 
the  Germanic  Empires,  a  power  in  the  Balkans.  Instead 
of  carrying  on  a  Slav  or  Russophile  policy,  the  Bulgarians 
acted  rather  in  opposition  to  the  interests  of  Russia  and  the 
Balkan  nations,  only  taking  into  account  Austro-German 
interests,  which  they  were  pleased  to  consider,  at  Sofia,  in 
accordance  with  Bulgarian  interests. 

Such  a  disguised  policy  would,  in  order  to  succeed,  have 
had  to  be  carried  out  very  skilfully,  and  one  is  forced  to  admit 
that  the  leader  of  the  Bulgarian  policy,  King  Ferdinand, 
failed  neither  in  coolness  nor  in  ingenuity  in  hiding  his  secret 
plans.  The  Macedonian  policy,  for  instance,  while  serving 
anti-Slav  interests,  has  contributed  greatly  to  gain  sympathy 
for  Bulgaria,  in  giving  a  liberal  and  national  character  to 
Bulgarian  tendencies.  The  Bulgarians,  for  the  moment, 
humoured  the  Russians  and  were  implacable  only  against 
the  Serbians,  while  waiting  for  a  favourable  opportunity  of 
showing  their  cards  and  attempting  the  great  stroke.  This 
opportunity  presented  itself  at  the  time  of  the  Balkan  war, 
in  the  course  of  which  Bulgaria  did  not  even  take  the  trouble 
of  hiding  her  real  designs.  We  have  already  stated  what 
were  the  leading  principles  of  Bulgarian  policy  during  the 
Balkan  war,  and  if  we  come  back  to  the  subject  it  is  in 
support  of  our  theory  by  evidence  coming  from  a  side  where 
one  has  always  shown  sympathy  for  the  Bulgarians  and 
Bulgaria.     This  is  the  evidence  of  Mr.  Milioucoff. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  183 

international  peace  had  organized,  after  the  Balkan  wars, 
an  investigation  in  the  Balkans  in  order  to  establish  the 
causes  of  the  war  and  the  responsibility  of  certain  acts 
contrary  to  the  law  of  nations  and  to  justice.1  This  investi- 
gation was,  however,  not  a  real  investigation,  because 
Serbia  and  Greece,  having  no  confidence  in  the  impartiality 
of  one  of  the  members  of  the  Commission,  Mr.  Milioucoff, 
a  notorious  friend  of  Bulgaria,  refused  to  take  part  in  it, 
even  indirectly.  The  members  of  the  Commission  of  Investi- 
gation have  only,  therefore,  used  material  provided  by  the 
Bulgarians  and  their  work  was,  in  any  case,  of  a  one-sided 
nature.  That  is  why  the  conclusions  arrived  at  by  the 
Commission  must  be  considered  with  the  greatest  reserve, 
especially  as  regards  Serbia.  But  the  report  of  the  Com- 
mission, made  out  for  the  most  part  by  Mr.  Milioucoff, 
contains  certain  affirmations  which  it  may  be  profitable  to 
mention.  We  retain  the  right  of  speaking  later  on  of  the 
criticism  which  the  authors  of  the  report  have  kindly  made 
on  one  of  our  articles,  and  the  article  of  Dr.  Novacovitch 
on  the  clause  of  international  law,  rebus  sic  stantibus,  a 
clause  which  the  Serbian  Government  had  invoked  in  favour 
of  its  demand  for  the  revisal  of  the  treaty  of  alliance,  and 
we  content  ourselves  for  the  moment  with  quoting  the 
opinion  of  the  Commission,  that  is  to  say,  of  Mr.  Milioucoff, 
on  the  general  attitude  of  Bulgaria.  Bulgaria's  r61e  will 
be  more  apparent  after  reading  the  declarations  that  Mr. 
Milioucoff  himself  has  been  obliged  to  make. 

In  affirming  that  it  was  the  Serbian  army  that  delivered 
Macedonia  in  1912,  the  authors  of  the  report  wonder  where 
the  Bulgarian  army  was,  and  they  continue  thus  (p.  38)  : 
"  We  have  seen  that  on  the  eve  of  war  the  Bulgarian  General 
Staff  insisted  that  the  100,000  soldiers  who,  according  to  the 
treaty,  ought  to  have  fought  side  by  side  with  the  Serbians 
in  Macedonia  should  be  kept  free.  It  was  plainly,  first 
and  foremost,  an  imperious  strategical  necessity  to  defeat 
the  Turks  in  Thrace,  on  the  chief  battle  ground  of  the  war. 
But,  after  the  first  victories,  which  drove  back  the  Turks  at 

1  Investigation  at  the  Balkans.  Report  presented  to  the  directors 
of  the  Carnegie  Endowment,  by  the  members  of  the  Investigation 
Commission  (Paris,  1914). 


184  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

Kirk-Kilisse,  at  Lule-Bourgas,  at  Tchorlou,  at  Tchataldja, 
there  appeared  another  reason  for  continuing  the  war.  Here 
again  one  might  ask  oneself,  whether  it  was  a  war  of  liberation 
or  a  war  of  conquest  that  one  was  carrying  on."  Mr. 
Milioucoff  wonders  how  "  the  Bulgarians  did  not  see,  or 
rather  how  their  government  did  not  perceive  that  the 
occupation  of  Macedonia  by  the  Serbians  and  the  Greeks 
during  eight  months,  was  going  to  prevent  the  attainment 
of  the  real  object  of  the  war  :  the  unification  of  Bulgarian 
nationality  ?  "  In  reply  to  this  question  we  find  in  the 
report  the  following  assertion  : 

"  At  the  end  of  1912  there  were  already  two  policies  in 
Bulgaria  :  that  of  the  Cabinet,  and  that  of  people  who  were 
in  direct  contact  with  the  army.  If  the  ministers  wanted 
to  keep  strictly  to  the  terms  of  the  alliance,  General  Savov's 
circle  troubled  very  little  about  all  that.  The  Press  spoke 
much  of  that  circle,  of  the  desire  of  the  Czar  Ferdinand 
himself  to  make  his  triumphal  entry  into  Constantinople. 
What  is  unfortunately  certain  is  that  the  claims  went  on 
increasing.  It  is  evident  that  in  thus  widening  our  am- 
bitions, we  could  not  help  losing  sight  of  the  principal  aim 
of  the  war.  To  wish  to  take,  cost  what  it  might,  Adrianople, 
meant  risking  Macedonia.  To  ask  for  an  issue  on  the  Sea 
of  Marmara  meant  that  the  international  situation  was  no 
longer  understood." 

The  authors  of  the  report  have  tried  hard  to  explain  and 
even  to  excuse,  in  a  way,  Bulgaria's  policy.  It  was  not  a 
diversion  on  the  part  of  the  Bulgarians  to  try  to  take 
Constantinople  :  to  succeed  in  that  was  their  original  plan 
and  their  principal  war  aim.  With  the  consent  of  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Germany,  Bulgaria  sought  to  establish  herself 
at  Constantinople,  hoping  to  drive  back  the  Serbians  and 
Greeks  later  on  and  take  Macedonia  from  them  with  the 
help  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy.  Ulterior  events  are 
too  well  known  for  it  to  be  necessary  to  repeat  them  here. 
The  Bulgarian  policy,  of  first  vanquishing  the  Turks  in 
order  to  fling  themselves  afterwards  upon  the  Serbians,  was 
thwarted  completely,  and  the  attempt  of  Bulgaria,  in  June- 
July,  1913,  first  to  put  an  end  to  Serbia  and  Greece,  has 
not  succeeded  either. 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  185 

The  European  war  has,  however,  enabled  Bulgaria  to 
resume  the  struggle  under  much  more  favourable  conditions, 
but  it  has  forced  the  King  and  the  Bulgarian  politicians  to 
lay  aside  the  mask  and  side  openly  with  the  Germanic 
Empires.  The  Bulgarians  have  to-day  the  military  support 
of  the  Germanic  powers,  but  they  have  lost  all  contact  with 
the  Entente,  which  seems  no  longer  inclined  to  let  itself  be 
duped  by  the  trickery  of  Sofia  politicians.  That  is  why 
certain  Bulgarian  sections,  more  prudent  and  more  circum- 
spect, cannot  yet  entirely  approve  the  policy  of  the  present 
Government,  since  these  straightforward  situations,  where 
one  can  gain  all  but  also  lose  all,  are  contrary  to  their 
nature. 

July  9,  1916. 

The  Last  Defender  of  Bulgaria. 

'*  Russian  diplomacy  has  not  been  firm  enough  in  the 
maintenance  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  agreement  of  1912,  and 
thus  it  has  prepared  the  ground  for  the  present  war  and 
itself  appointed  Bulgaria  to  her  place  among  our  enemies" 
(Rietch  of  25th  July).  It  was  on  the  occasion  of  the 
retirement  of  Mr.  Sazanoff  that  Mr.  Paul  Milioucoff,  one 
of  the  heads  of  the  Russian  constitutional-democratic  party, 
pronounced  these  words,  which  sum  up  his  criticism  of 
Russia's  Balkan  policy  and  reveal  at  the  same  time  his 
constant  desire  to  exonerate  Bulgaria,  or  at  least  to 
lessen  her  guilt  and  responsibility  for  the  aid  she  has 
lent  and  is  still  lending  to  the  Germanic  Empires. 

The  personal  sympathies  of  Mr.  Milioucoff  for  Bulgaria  and 
the  Bulgarian  people  are  so  strong  that  they  prevent  him 
from  properly  judging  the  attitude  of  his  Fatherland  itself. 
Common  sense  refuses,  indeed,  to  accept  the  theory  of 
Mr.  Milioucoff,  to  admit  the  possibility  of  the  foreign  policy 
of  any  country  whatsoever  being  influenced  solely  by  the 
faults  and  blunders  of  a  third  party.  It  is,  therefore,  a  very 
superficial  way  of  thinking  to  judge  and  understand  the 
Bulgarian  policy  by  the  attitude  and  action  of  Russian 
diplomacy,  even  if  it  were  confirmed  that  this  diplomacy 
has  committed  the  faults  of  which  Mr.   Milioucoff  makes 


186  SERBIA   AND    EUROPE 

allusion.  In  reality  things  happened  quite  differently,  and 
the  only  fact  impossible  to  deny  respecting  Mr.  Sazanoff, 
is  his  goodwill  towards  the  Bulgarians,  his  earnest  desire 
to  meet  their  wishes.  One  can  think  what  one  likes  of  the 
policy  of  Mr.  Sazanoff,  but  no  one  can  seriously  pretend  that 
he  has  neglected  Bulgaria  and  her  interests.  And  yet 
Mr.  Milioucoff  has  the  courage  to  reproach  the  former  leader 
of  Russian  policy  for  having  nelgected  Bulgarian  interests ! 
After  all  the  Bulgarians  have  done  in  1913  and  1915,  and 
that  which  they  are  doing  still  to-day  in  putting  themselves 
at  the  service  of  Germanism,  one  would  be  more  right  in 
reproaching  Mr.  Sazanoff  with  having  been  too  indulgent 
towards  Bulgaria.  Mr.  Milioucoff  pretends  on  the  contrary 
that  he  was  not  indulgent  enough  ! 

It  is  known  that  the  Serbian  Government  had  asked, 
in  the  spring  of  1913,  by  reason  of  a  radical  change  in  the 
situation,  for  the  revisal  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  agreement 
of  1912.  The  Sofia  Government  showed  itself  hostile  to 
any  idea  of  revisal  of  the  said  treaty,  and  in  presence  of 
arguments  so  opposed  to  each  other  and  so  vigorously 
supported  by  the  two  countries,  the  only  logical  and  reason- 
able way  of  arriving  at  a  peaceful  solution  consisted  in 
calling  upon  the  arbitration  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia.  In 
the  Russian  diplomatic  documents  concerning  the  events  in 
the  Balkan  Peninsula  (August  1912  to  July  1913),  one 
finds  such  abundant  proofs  of  this  that  it  is  sufficient  to 
read  them  in  order  to  satisfy  oneself  immediately  that  the 
affirmations  of  Mr.  Milioucoff  differ  widely  from  the  true 
state  of  affairs.     Let  us  now  see  what  these  documents  say. 

Mr.  Sazanoff,  the  9th-22nd  April  1913,  addressed  to  the 
ministers  at  Sofia,  Belgrade  and  Athens  an  identical  telegram 
proposing  to  the  allied  governments  a  spontaneous  demob- 
ilization. This  proposal  was  not  accepted  by  Bulgaria, 
because  that  country  was  thinking  of  an  armed  encounter 
with  Serbia  and  Greece.  On  the  I5th-28th  April  Mr. 
Sazanoff  made  known  to  Mr.  Guechoff  that  "  the  Imperial 
Government  appears  very  uneasy  at  the  news  concerning  the 
extraordinarily  strained  situation  produced  by  the  question  of 
the  settlement  of  the  frontiers  between  Bulgaria,  Serbia 
and  Greece.  .  .  .  The  Bulgarians  should  by  no  means  lose 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  187 

sight  of  the  fact  that  an  armed  conflict  would  entail  the 
nullity  of  the  treaty  of  1912,  which  assured  to  the  Bulgarians 
some  rights  in  the  question  of  the  boundaries  of  Macedonia." 
He  particularly  recommended  an  interview  between  the  Allied 
Prime  Ministers,  which  would  do  away  with  all  difficulties. 
Sofia  replied  to  this  sincere  and  earnest  appeal  with  marked 
indifference.  The  21st  April-4th  May,  Mr.  Sazanoff  again 
gave  instructions  to  the  Russian  Minister  at  Sofia  to 
approach  the  Bulgarian  Government  with  a  view  to  arranging 
a  peaceful  agreement  with  the  Serbian  and  Greek  Allies, 
and  to  put  it  on  its  guard  against  the  false  friends  of  Bulgaria, 
who  ^ould  like  to  make  her  forsake  the  straight  path.  The 
same  failure  as  in  previous  cases  !  But  Mr.  Sazanoff  was 
still  confident  and,  on  the  3rd-i6th  May,  he  addressed  to 
the  Bulgarian  Government  a  long  letter  stating  clearly  the 
attitude  of  Russia  in  this  conflict.  This  document  proves 
Russian  loyalty  better  than  any  other  : 

"  Although  in  the  present  case  our  point  of  view  corres- 
ponds completely  with  Bulgarian  interests,  we  must  ack- 
nowledge that  Serbia's  desires  should  not  be  entirely  set 
aside  and  that  they  merit  some  attention  because  of  the 
ideals  and  political  interests  which  the  Belgrade  Government 
brings  forward.  ...  A  narrow  national  egoism  can  keep 
Bulgaria  within  the  domain  of  narrow  and  formal  inter- 
pretation of  the  treaty.  In  this  case  she  will  be  able  to 
conquer  a  little  more  territory,  but  she  runs  great  risk 
of  compromising  that  which  is  the  most  precious  in  the 
alliance  with  Serbia  :  the  fraternal  solidarity  which  has  been 
manifested  and  strengthened  by  the  treaty  .  .  .  The  false 
friends  of  Bulgaria  are  enticing  her  to  follow  one  road,  Russia 
invites  her  to  follow  another,  thus  sparing  her  a  mistaken 
and  perilous  choice.  .  .  .  Bulgaria  would  act  wisely  if  she 
accepted  certain  modifications  to  the  treaty  and  granted  a 
few  trifling  concessions.  ..." 

This  generous  advice  from  Petrograd  did  not  find  a 
better  welcome  at  Sofia,  where  preparations  for  an  attack 
against  Serbia  had  already  taken  concrete  form.  Mr. 
Sazanoff,  however,  renewed  with  his  telegram  of  the 
7th-20th  May  his  proposal  of  demobilization  or  of  reduction 
of  the  armies  to  a  quarter  or  a  third  of  the  effective  force. 


188  SERBIA   AND    EUROPE 

Mr.  Pachitch  accepted,  but  at  Sofia  they  refused.  The 
situation  became  more  serious  through  the  conclusion  of  the 
Bulgaro-Turkish  peace,  and  Mr.  Sazanoff  undertook  a  new 
step.  On  the  I3th-i7th  May  he  sent  to  Sofia  the  following 
telegram  : 

"  Russia,  not  wishing  to  admit  the  possibility  of  a  war 
between  allies  and  ready  to  put  the  responsibility  upon  that 
party  who  would  have  abandoned  pacific  means,  invites  the 
Bulgarian,  Serbian  and  Greek  Prime  Ministers  to  meet  at 
Petrograd,  in  order  to  fix  the  general  principles  which  will 
serve  as  basis  for  the  re-establishment  of  peace  and  the 
consolidation  of  the  Balkan  alliance."  Bulgaria,  not  wishing 
to  agree  to  this  proposal,  put  forward  conditions  which  were 
not  acceptable  to  the  Russian  Government.  Finally,  a  supreme 
effort  was  undertaken  by  Russia,  and  the  Emperor  of  Russia 
himself,  on  the  advice  of  Mr.  Sazanoff,  addressed,  on  the 
26th  May-8th  June,  a  pressing  telegram  to  the  reigning 
princes  of  the  three  countries,  inviting  them  to  have  recourse 
to  arbitration  as  provided  for  in  the  treaty.  The  evasive 
reply  which  King  Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria  sent  to  the  Czar 
showed  already  by  its  almost  arrogant  tone,  that  Bulgaria 
wanted  to  hear  nothing  of  the  Balkanic  Alliance  and  that 
she  had  chosen  another  path.  The  attack  on  the  Serbian 
positions  all  along  the  line,  in  the  night  of  the  29th 
June,  without  any  declaration  of  war,  was  the  Bulgarian 
reply  to  the  advice  of  Russian  diplomacy  to  come  to  an 
amicable  understanding  with  Serbia. 

The  Bulgarian  policy,  followed  during  the  reign  of  King 
Ferdinand,  has  to-day  become  clear  to  the  whole  world.  It 
was  with  the  support  of  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany  that 
Bulgaria  thought  to  create  for  herself  a  predominant  situation 
in  the  Balkans  and  become  the  advance  guard  of  the  Germanic 
advance  towards  the  Orient.  The  alliance  with  Serbia  was 
only  an  episode,  as  confessed  by  the  Bulgarians  themselves. 
This  opinion  is  also  confirmed  by  the  Bulgarian  attitude  in 
September  1915.  Serbia  was  ready  to  sacrifice  a  part  of 
her  territory  in  the  south  and  to  give  it  up  to  Bulgaria  if 
the  latter  would  march  against  Austria  and  Germany. 
Bulgaria  did  not  accept  this  generous  offer  because  the 
ideal  she  followed  was  Balkanic  hegemony,  absolute  pre- 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  189 

dominance  in  the  Balkans,  extension  to  the  three  seas, 
and  the  possession  of  Constantinople.  Mr.  Milioucoff  has, 
besides,  himself  affirmed  it  in  his  report  on  the  investigation 
of  the  Carnegie  Endowment,  of  which  we  have  spoken  here. 
And  yet  he  does  not  hesitate  to  declare  that  it  is  through 
the  fault  of  Russian  diplomacy  that  Bulgaria  associated 
herself  with  Germany  !  Fortunately,  Mr.  Milioucoff  is  the 
only  one  of  this  opinion  ;  according  to  the  general  Russian 
opinion,  the  allied  army,  which  is  preparing  to  invade 
Bulgarian  territory,  will  not  find  at  Sofia  innocent  people 
forced  into  the  arms  of  the  Austro-Germans  owing  to  Russian 
mistakes,  but  criminals  who  have  acted  with  premeditation. 
The  excuses  of  Mr.  Milioucoff  will  alter  nothing. 

September  10,  1916. 


Europe  and  Bulgaria. 

Concerning  Mr.  A,  Gauvain's  Book. 

Mr.  Auguste  Gauvain  has  just  collected  in  book  form  a 
series  of  articles  published  in  the  Revue  before  the  European 
war.1  In  the  introduction,  Mr.  Gauvain  recalls  to  mind  that 
before  1914,  M  positions  had  been  adopted,  intentions  marked 
out,  responsibilities  undertaken.  It  is  these  situations  which 
are  described  in  this  volume,  with  no  additional  touches, 
from  the  Agadir  affair  up  to  the  declaration  of  war  on  Serbia. 
These  studies  have  lost  their  interest  as  a  warning,  but  they 
have  kept  their  interest  as  enlightenment."  One  cannot  too 
highly  applaud  the  idea  of  the  illustrious  writer,  who  directs 
with  as  much  competence  as  authority  the  foreign  political 
chronicle  in  the  Debuts.  For  us  Mr.  Gauvain's  publication  has 
a  particular  interest  as  it  reminds  Europe  of  the  two 
aggressions,  Bulgarian  and  Austrian,  of  which  Serbia  was  the 
victim  in  less  than  one  year.  The  blows  received  by  Serbia 
struck  necessarily  also  at  Europe,  that  is  to  say,  that  part 
of  Europe  which  did  not  wish  to  accept  Germanic  domination. 
The  conflict  which  resulted  is  not  yet  terminated  and,  in 

1  Auguste  Gauvain:  L'Europe  avant  la  guerre:  L'Europe  en  191 1 — 
Apres  la  crise  marocaine ;  France  et  Allemagne — La  question  turque — 
La  ligue  Balkanique — Autriche-Hongrie  et  Serbie  (Paris,  Colin,  1917)- 


190  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

presence  of  an  irritated  Germany  and  a  disappointed  Austria, 
both  seeking  to  throw  the  responsibility  upon  the  Allies, 
it  is  well  from  time  to  time  to  remind  those  who  forget  them 
or  feign  to  ignore  them,  of  the  various  facts  of  the  great 
Austro-German-Bulgarian  premeditation.  We  expressly  add 
Bulgarian,  because  Bulgaria  has  been  from  the  beginning  an 
active  though  secret  associate  in  the  enterprise  prepared  by 
Berlin  and  Vienna.  The  article  of  Mr.  Gauvain  on  the 
Balkanic  alliances,  read  by  the  light  of  subsequent  events, 
makes  it  appear  more  than  likely.  As  to  ourselves,  con- 
vinced as  we  are  of  the  historical  truth  that  great 
decisions  are  not  taken  without  long  preparation,  we  cannot 
agree  that  the  Bulgarian  complicity  took  place  at  the  last 
moment  only.     Quite  the  contrary. 

The  history  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  alliance  of  1912  is 
very  instructive  and,  for  those  who  wish  to  penetrate  into 
the  mystery  of  Bulgarian  policy,  there  are  no  surer  methods 
than  to  proceed  to  a  critical  examination  of  this  alliance 
and  of  the  manner  in  which  the  Bulgarians  wished  to  make 
use  of  it.  The  idea  of  the  Balkanic  Alliance,  especially  of  the 
Serbo-Bulgarian  agreement,  was  suggested  and  upheld  by 
the  Bulgarian  Government  from  the  moment  when  the 
Bulgarian  General  Staff  had  ascertained  that  the  armed  force 
of  Bulgaria  was  insufficient  to  fight  against  the  Turks. 
This  is  a  fact  proved  by  authentic  documents.  The  Govern- 
ment of  Sofia  was,  therefore,  obliged  to  search  for  allies. 
What,  then,  more  natural  than  to  apply  to  Vienna  ?  Since 
1908  a  distinct  agreement  united  the  two  States,  whose 
inclinations  were  in  perfect  harmony.  Only  Austria  could 
not,  without  running  the  risk  of  provoking  a  general  conflict, 
adhere  openly  to  a  policy  aiming  at  the  dismemberment  of 
Turkey.  Vienna's  methods  did  not  accord  with  the  policy 
of  showing  one's  cards  openly.  That  is  why,  at  Vienna, 
they  advised  King  Ferdinand  to  go  and  make  terms  with 
Belgrade  and  Athens,  and  promised  him  all  necessary  support. 
However,  the  agreement  with  Belgrade  was  meant  only  to 
serve  as  a  screeen  in  provoking  the  conflict.  When  events 
would  have  taken  a  decisive  turn,  the  Monarchy  would 
intervene  and  then  one  would  proceed  to  the  execution  of 
the  principal  plan.     What  was  this  principal  plan  ?     Clever 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  191 

enough,  one  must  allow,  but  very  fragile  at  the  same  time, 
because  it  was  supposed  that  everything  would  come  to 
pass  in  compliance  with  the  forecasts  of  the  Ballplatz. 
Subsequent  events  have  shown,  however,  that  no  forecast  of 
Austrian  diplomacy  was  realized  and  that  in  this  affair,  as  in 
many  others,  the  Ballplatz  had  been  greatly  mistaken. 

In  order  to  understand  the  Bulgarian  plan,  we  must 
consider  the  facts  which  were  at  the  root  of  the  whole  foreign 
policy  of  Bulgaria.  One  of  these  facts  was  ascertained 
beyond  doubt  at  the  time  of  the  conclusion  of  the  Serbo- 
Bulgarian  agreement  of  1912  ;  of  the  other  there  were  only 
some  indications,  but  these  were  serious  enough.  At  first 
it  was  the  avowed  intention  of  Bulgaria  to  succeed  alone  to 
the  Turkish  Empire,  to  take  all  Macedonia,  all  Southern 
Albania,  Salonica,  Thrace  and  Constantinople.  With  one 
stroke  or  by  degrees,  alone  or  helped  by  her  neighbours, 
Bulgaria  aspired  only  to  the  realization  of  a  Bulgarian 
Balkanic  Empire,  stretching  to  the  three  seas  and  having 
for  capital,  Constantinople.  In  order  to  realize  this  dream, 
King  Ferdinand  and  the  politicians  of  Sofia  had  to  rely  on 
one  of  the  two  groups  of  powers  which  shared  the  power  in 
Europe  :  the  Triple  Alliance  or  the  Triple  Entente.  The 
choice  was  not  difficult  to  make,  because  Bulgarian  aims, 
inspired  by  an  imperialism  of  quite  a  Prussian  nature  and 
having  for  object  the  possession  of  Constantinople  and  the 
Straits,  could  not  find  a  favourable  welcome  either  at 
Petrograd  or  at  Paris.  As  to  London,  the  question  might 
be  doubtful,  but  England  was  not  inclined  to  play  the 
Bulgarian  game.  There  remained  only  the  Triple  Alliance, 
that  is  to  say  Germany  and  Austria- Hungary  which,  on 
their  side,  were  seeking  allies  in  order  to  achieve  the 
execution  of  their  Oriental  plans,  and  whose  eyes  were 
turned  towards  Sofia.  That  is  the  second  principal  fact, 
known  to-day,  but  only  suspected  before  the  Balkan  wars. 
An  alliance  of  Bulgaria  with  the  Central  Powers  was  then 
logical  from  the  point  of  view  of  Bulgarian  Imperialism, 
and  if  the  Bulgarians  took  too  long  in  proclaiming  it  publicly, 
it  was  because  they  had  to  overcome  a  great  many  scruples, 
especially  in  regard  to  Russia.  Of  the  fact  that  this  alliance 
was  concluded  well  before  the  Balkan  wars,  we  have  the 


192  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

authentic  confirmation  given  to  the  Hungarian  Parliament 
by  the  Prime  Minister,  Count  Tisza  (see  La  Serbie,  No.  23 
of  1916,  and  the  Neue  Freie  Presse,  of  the  22nd  September 
1916).  It  was  kept  secret  until  1915,  until  Bulgaria  openly 
joined  with  the  central  Empires. 

Judged  by  the  light  of  these  two  principal  facts  :  the 
aspiration  to  Balkanic  hegemony  and  the  private  alliance 
with  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria's  attitude,  at  the  time  of 
the  conclusion  of  the  Balkanic  agreements  in  1912,  appears 
strange  to  superficial  observers  who  cannot  understand  the 
eagerness  of  the  Cabinet  at  Sofia  to  bring  about  the  Balkanic 
alliance,  so  notoriously  contrary  to  the  interests  of  the 
German  expansion  in  the  East.  Mr.  Gauvain's  book,  written 
before  the  Balkan  war,  gives  information  that  clears  up 
this  purely  apparent  contradiction.  Others  have  supplied 
similar  explanations,  as,  for  instance,  Mr.  Rene  Pinon  in  the 
Revue  des  Deux  Monies  (1st  February  1913)  and  to-day 
one  may  look  upon  the  secret  plan  of  Bulgaria  as  completely 
laid  bare,  as  regards  the  Balkanic  agreements  and  their 
execution. 

The  agreement  she  had  concluded  with  Serbia  in 
February  1912  was  immediately  communicated  by  Bulgaria 
to  Austria,  asking  for  approbation.  This  was  not  refused 
because  Austria  hoped  to  profit  by  it.  Every  one  in  Austria- 
Hungary  believed  in  a  Serbian  defeat  in  the  war  with  Turkey, 
while  every  one  counted  upon  Bulgarian  victories.  The 
Government  of  Sofia  also  speculated  on  a  Serbian  defeat, 
but  it  also  considered  the  eventuality  of  Serbian  victories 
and  took,  in  consequence,  measures  to  weaken  the  result 
of  the  same.  Either  the  Serbians  would  be  beaten  and 
then  the  claims  of  Serbia  would  be  unrealizable,  or  else  the 
Serbian  armies  would  drive  back  the  Turks  and  then  the 
Bulgarians  would  march  upon  Constantinople  in  order  first  to 
put  an  end  to  the  Turks.  The  settlement  of  accounts  with 
Serbia  would  come  after  and  would  present  no  great  difficulty. 
With  the  help  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  it  would 
be  possible  to  paralyse  the  Serbian  successes  until  the 
final  issue. 

The  history  of  the  Balkan  war  is  known.  It  is  the  second 
hypothesis  which  was  realized  and  the  astounding  victories 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  193 

of  the  Serbians  enabled  the  Bulgarians  to  advance  towards 
Constantinople.  Austria,  disappointed  in  her  hopes,  did 
not  hesitate  to  impede  the  Serbian  successes  by  obliging 
Serbia  to  withdraw  from  the  Adriatic  and  by  calling  upon 
Bulgaria  to  fulfil  her  engagements  ;  that  is  to  say,  to  attack 
Serbia  and  deprive  her  of  the  glory  of  the  victories  gained 
in  the  Turkish  campaign.  Bulgaria  hastened  to  obey  and 
the  famous  attack  of  the  i6th-2C)th  June  1913  caused 
war  between  the  two  former  allies.  Bulgaria  was  beaten 
and  the  Austro-German  hopes  of  destroying  the  vital  force 
of  Serbia  were  for  a  time  thwarted.  But  Serbia  was  a  serious 
obstacle,  and  what  was  not  successful  in  1912-13,  was 
attempted  again  in  1914-15.  Bulgaria  again  played  her  part, 
but  this  time  under  much  more  favourable  conditions  and, 
under  the  concentrated  onslaught  of  the  German,  Austrian 
and  Bulgarian  armies,  Serbia  had  to  give  in,  paying  with 
her  best  blood  for  her  decision  to  live  free  and  independent. 
Bulgaria  obtained  fleeting  successes,  but  earned  a  by  no 
means  glorious  reputation.  The  book  of  Mr.  Gauvain  reminds 
us  of  the  action  of  the  little  country  which  has  done  so  much 
harm  not  only  to  Serbia  but  to  the  common  cause  of  all 
the  Allies. 

May  13,  1917. 

Bulgaria  and  the  Treaty  of  San-Stephano. 

The  Sofia  Press  has  just  celebrated  the  thirty-ninth 
anniversary  of  the  famous  Treaty  of  San-Stephano,  inter- 
preting as  usual  the  clauses  of  that  purely  artificial  project 
in  the  light  of  the  Utopian  aspirations  of  the  Bulgarian 
rulers.  We  beg  to  give  here  a  summary  of  the  international 
situation  of  that  time  and  to  present,  in  its  real  form,  the 
political  sentiment  of  the  Bulgarian  nation,  based  on  a 
treaty  adapted  to  circumstances,  and  which  never  went 
beyond  the  paper  on  which  it  was  written. 

In  1877,  after  vain  attempts  to  get  Turkey  to  make 
some  indispensable  reforms  in  her  European  provinces  and 
to  improve,  as  far  as  possible,  the  lot  of  the  Christian  popu- 
lation, Russia  declared  war  on  the  Ottoman  Empire.     In 

14 


194  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

this  war  the  Great  Powers  remained  neutral  and,  in  the 
Balkans,  out  of  four  semi-sovereign  States  (Serbia,  Monte- 
negro, Greece,  Roumania)  the  two  Serbian  kingdoms  joined 
Russia  and  entered  the  war.  Greece  did  not  move,  while 
Roumania,  not  being  able  to  obtain  the  guarantees  necessary 
for  her  neutrality,  came  to  an  agreement  with  Russia  and 
allowed  the  Russian  armies  to  cross  her  territory.  Bulgaria 
did  not  exist  as  a  State  and  the  Bulgarian  people,  this  famous 
people  which  the  Bulgarian  "  historians  "  are  discovering 
to-day  even  in  the  centre  of  Serbia,  gave  no  sign  of  life. 
In  April- June  fighting  went  on  in  the  proximity  of  the 
Danube  and  about  the  passages  over  the  stream.  The 
Russians  succeeded  in  crossing  it,  in  invading  what  is  now 
Bulgaria  and  driving  back  the  Turks  in  the  defiles  of  the 
Balkans,  where  the  fighting  continued.  The  Turks  took  up 
a  fortified  position  at  Plevna  and  a  war  of  siege  began  with 
the  assistance  of  a  Roumanian  army  corps  which  lost  more 
than  five  thousand  men,  paying  with  its  blood  for  the 
deliverance  of  the  Bulgarian  people.  Then  came,  in 
December,  the  surrender  of  Plevna,  the  passage  of  the 
Balkans,  by  the  Russian  armies  and  their  arrival  near 
Adrianople.  At  this  moment  Turkey  asked  for  peace, 
declaring  that  she  trusted  to  the  generosity  of  the  Russian 
Emperor.  The  protocol  of  Adrianople  fixed  the  peace  con- 
ditions :  the  independence  and  enlargement  of  Roumania,  of 
Serbia  and  of  Montenegro  ;  creation  of  a  principality  of 
Bulgaria  and  the  autonomy  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

Alarmed  at  these  Russian  successes,  England,  whose 
policy  at  that  time  was  not  the  same  as  it  is  to-day,  fearing 
a  considerable  growth  of  Russian  influence  in  the  Balkans, 
decided  to  send,  as  a  sign  of  displeasure,  her  fleet  into  the 
Dardanelles.  Russia  replied  by  threatening  to  enter  Con- 
stantinople. The  Anglo-Russian  conflict  was,  however, 
averted,  thanks  to  a  temporary  agreement.  The  Turks 
profiting  from  these  disagreements,  did  not  hurry  themselves 
in  the  execution  of  the  protocol  of  Adrianople,  but  sought  to 
delay  things.  The  Russian  Generalissimo,  the  Grand-Duke 
Nicolas,  transferred  his  Headquarters  to  San-Stephano, 
nearer  Constantinople  and  through  his  plenipotentiary, 
Count  Ignatieff,  forced  the  Turks  to  sign  the  preliminaries 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  195 

of  a  treaty,  called  later  the  Treaty  of  San-Stephano.  By 
virtue  of  these  preliminaries,  based  upon  the  clauses  of  the 
Adrianople  protocol,  the  new  principality  of  Bulgaria 
obtained,  besides  Bulgaria  properly  speaking,  Oriental 
Roumelia,  the  whole  of  Macedonia  and~even  a  part  of  Serbia. 
In  creating  such  a  Bulgaria,  Russia  meant  to  thwart  Austrian 
influence  in  the  Balkans,  believing  that  Bulgaria  would 
pursue  a.  Slav  and  anti-German  policy.  The  Great  Powers, 
England  and  Germany  in  the  first  place,  would  not  accept 
this  Turco-Russian  treaty,  seeing  in  its  effects  not  a  Bulgaria 
nationally  united,  as  Bulgarian  politicians  would  like  to 
make  ill-informed  people  believe,  but  an  artificial  creation 
destined  to  serve  the  interests  of  Russian  policy.  Russia 
was,  therefore,  obliged  to  go  to  Berlin  where  things  were 
arranged  otherwise.  The  prestige  of  Germany  and  the 
fear  England  had  of  Russia,  added  to  the  mistakes  of 
Russian  foreign  policy,  complicated  the  situation  still  more 

in  thelBalkans. 

■i 

Instead  of  creating  a  great  Bulgaria,  necessarily  Russophile, 
as  one  imagined  her — one  did  not  yet  know  the  Bulgarians, 
or  their  "  gratitude  " — the  Congress  of  Berlin  assigned  the 
two  purely  Serbian  provinces,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  to 
Austria  and,  as  to  Bulgaria,  she  was  formed  solely  of  Bulgarian 
territories  situated  between  the  Balkans  and  the  Danube. 
Oriental  Roumelia,  having  a  mixed  population,  received  a 
certain  autonomy  and  Macedonia  remained  under  Turkish 
domination.  But  the  fact  that  Macedonia  had  figured  in 
the  preliminaries  of  a  Turco-Russian  treaty,  as  forming 
part  of  Bulgaria,  has  elated  the  demagogues  of  Sofia  who, 
inspired  by  King  Ferdinand,  are  proclaiming  urbi  et  orbi 
that  it  is  here  a  question  of  a  purely  Bulgarian  province 
which  ought  to  belong  to  Bulgaria.  Taking  as  basis  a 
wrong  combination  on  the  part  of  Russian  diplomacy,  the 
Bulgarians  have  made  out  a  political  programme  which, 
under  the  guise  of  national  aspirations,  aims  at  larger  objects 
and  is  in  perfect  harmony  with  Germanic  interests.  The 
first  effect,  ardently  desired  by  Austria-Hungary  and 
Germany,  of  this  artificial  manoeuvre  of  Bulgarian  policy, 
was  the  inevitable  conflict  with  the  Serbians  for  whom 
Macedonia  represents  the  cradle   of  their  civilization   and 


196  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

the   most   natural   rampart   of  the  political   and   economic 
independence. 

The  project  of  San-Stephano  has,  therefore,  two  inter- 
pretations :  the  one,  historical,  true  and  founded  on  facts 
only  too  well  known  ;  and  the  other,  fantastical,  invented  by 
the  Bulgarians  in  order  to  hide  their  real  political  designs. 
If  the  Bulgarians  persist  in  demanding  a  Bulgaria  according 
to  San-Stephano,  justifying  this  imperialistic  claim  by 
non-existent  reasons,  that  ought  not  to  prevent  us  from 
affirming  that  the  so-called  Bulgarian  political  creed,  as 
reflected  in  the  application  of  the  Treaty  of  San-Stephano, 
rests  upon  fiction.  The  Treaty  of  San-Stephano  was  a 
Russian  political  combination  which  can  be  criticized  or 
defended,  but  which  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  Bulgarian 
national  aspirations.  This  treaty  gives  Bulgaria  no  right, 
either  political  or  legal,  and  above  all  no  ethnographical 
right  to  the  possession  of  Macedonia.  When  the  prelim- 
inaries of  San-Stephano  were  fixed,  Bulgaria  did  not  exist 
as  a  State,  so  that  she  could  not  take  part  in  this  treaty. 
It  was  not  the  Bulgarians  who  conquered  the  Turks  in 
imposing  upon  them  the  San-Stephano  treaty,  but  the 
Russians.  The  Bulgaria  of  San-Stephano  was  only  on 
paper  and,  what  is  of  most  importance,  it  was  not  the 
Bulgarian  hand  but  the  Russian  hand  that  had  sketched  it 
out.  That  the  Bulgarians,  to  whom  the  Russians,  after 
having  delivered  them  at  the  cost  of  immense  sacrifices, 
wished  to  give  a  predominant  situation  in  the  Balkans, 
and  to  entrust  to  them  the  guardianship  of  the  door 
to  the  East  in  face  of  the  Germanic  advance,  should  dare 
to  speak  to-day,  in  the  midst  of  war  with  Russia,  of  that 
Russian  liberality  and  to  hanker  after  it  all  the  same,  that 
is  a  Bulgarian  psychological  problem  which  it  is  beyond  us 
to  seek  to  understand. 

April  8,  1917. 

The  "  Indisputable  "   Bulgarian  Zone  in  Macedonia. 

The  treaty  of  alliance  between  the  Kingdom  of  Bulgaria 
and  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia,  of  the  29th  February  1912 
contains  no  mention  of  fixing  the  boundaries  of  the  terri- 


THE     POLICY     OF    BULGARIA  197 

tories.  These  boundaries  have,  however,  been  settled  in 
the  secret  annexe  of  the  29th  February  1912  of  which 
Article  2  is  composed  as  follows  : 

"  All  the  territorial  extensions  which  may  be  realized  by 
mutual  agreement  in  the  sense  of  the  first  and  second  articles 
of  the  treaty  and  of  the  first  article  of  the  present  secret 
annexe,  will  form  a  condominium  of  the  two  allied  states. 
Their  settlement  will  take  place  without  delay,  within  three 
months  at  the  maximum,  after  the  re-establishment  of 
peace,  and  on  the  following  basis  : 

"  Serbia  recognizes  Bulgaria's  right  to  the  territories  east 
of  the  Rhodopes  and  of  the  river  Strouma  ;  Bulgaria  recog- 
nizes Serbia's  right  to  those  situated  to  the  north  and  to  the 
west  of  the  Char-Planina. 

"As  to  the  territories  between  the  Char,  the  Rhodopes, 
the  iEgean  Sea  and  the  Lake  of  Ochrida,  if  the  two  parties 
are  convinced  that  their  organization  in  the  form  of  a 
separate  autonomous  province  is  not  possible  in  view  of 
the  common  interests  of  the  Bulgarian  and  Serbian  national- 
ities, or  for  other  reasons  having  to  do  with  home  or  foreign 
affairs,  these  territories  will  be  disposed  of  in  conformity  to 
the  following  stipulations  : 

"  Serbia  undertakes  to  raise  no  claim  regarding  the 
territories  situated  beyond  the  line  traced  on  the  attached 
map  and  which,  starting  from  the  Turco-Bulgarian  frontier, 
at  the  Mount  Golem  (to  the  north  of  Kriva  Palanka)  follows 
the  direction  from  the  south-west  as  far  as  to  the  Lake  of 
Ochrida. 

"  Bulgaria  undertakes  to  accept  this  frontier  if  H.M.  the 
Emperor  of  Russia,  who  will  be  asked  to  be  the  supreme 
arbitrator  in  this  question,  pronounces  himself  in  favour  of 
this  line. 

"  It  is,  of  course,  understood  that  the  two  contracting 
parties  undertake  to  accept  as  definitive  the  frontier  line 
which  H.M.  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  within  the  boundaries 
indicated  above,  will  find  corresponds  best  with  the  rights 
and  interests  of  the  two  parties." 

We  quote  according  to  the  texts  published  by  Mr.  Guechoff 
in  his  book,  L' Alliance  Balkanique  (Paris,  Hachette,  19 15), 
as  well  as  that  by  Balcanicus  in  his  book,   La  Bulgarie. 


198  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

Ses  ambitions,  sa  trahison  (Paris,  Colin,  1915).  They  are 
the  same  in  the  two  works  and  are  universally  recognized 
as  authentic.  Now,  it  appears  from  Article  2  which 
has  just  been  quoted,  that  the  indisputable  Bulgarian  zone 
embraces  the  territories  to  the  east  of  the  Rhodopes  and  of 
the  river  Strouma,  while  the  indisputable  Serbian  zone 
stretches  over  the  territories  situated  to  the  north  and  to 
the  west  of  the  Char-Planina,  of  the  Mount  Char.  The 
words  Bulgarian  and  Serbian  are  used  here  in  the  political 
sense,  because  the*  Serbo-Bulgarian  treaty  was  a  purely 
political  agreement  concerning  the  sharing  of  the  Macedonian 
territories. 

The  territories  between  the  Mount  Char,  the  Mount 
Rhodopes,  the  JEge&n  Sea  and  the  Lake  of  Ochrida,  formed, 
therefore,  the  real  object  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  disputes, 
and  one  may  call  them  disputed  territories.  Serbia,  then, 
did  not  make  any  claim  to  that  which  is  situated  to  the 
east  of  Rhodopes  and  of  the  river  Strouma.  Bulgaria 
relinquished  all  interest  in  that  which  is  situated  to  the 
north  and  to  the  west  of  the  Mount  Char.  The  real  object  of 
litigation  was  the  territory  situated  between  Char,  Rhodopes, 
the  iEgean  Sea  and  the  Lake  of  Ochrida.  This  territory 
was  divided  up,  by  the  terms  of  the  aforesaid  article,  into 
two  sections,  by  a  line  going  from  Mount  Golem  as  far  as 
to  the  Lake  of  Ochrida.  The  regions  to  the  west  of  this 
line  were  assigned  to  Serbia,  and  those  to  the  east  to 
Bulgaria.  Serbia  declared  that  "  she  undertook  to  raise 
no  claim  "  regarding  the  territories  situated  beyond  the 
mentioned  line  ;  Bulgaria  undertook  to  "  accept  this  frontier  " 
if  the  Russian  Emperor  declared  his  approval  of  it. 
Article  4  of  the  same  secret  annexe  stated  distinctly  that 
any  "  differences  which  might  arise  concerning  the  inter- 
pretation and  execution  of  any  clause  whatsoever  of  the 
treaty  and  of  the  secret  annexe,  will  be  submitted  to  the 
final  decision  of  Russia."  One  knows  that  Bulgaria  did 
not  wish  to  act  in  conformity  with  this  last  clause  of 
the  treaty  of  alliance  and  that  she  has  tried  to  oblige  the 
Serbians  by  force  of  arms  to  yield  up  to  her  territories  which 
should  not  by  rights  belong  to  Bulgaria. 

The   text   of    the   Serbo-Bulgarian   agreement   is,    then, 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  199 

clear.     It  was  a  political  agreement  and  all  its  stipulations 
are  of  a  political  nature.     The  Bulgarians,  however,  do  not 
hesitate  to  affirm  continually — Mr.  Radeff,  himself,  has  just 
done  so  in  his  last  communique — that :   (i)  The  indisputable 
Bulgarian  zone  is   situated  to   the  east  of  the   line  traced 
from  Mount  Golem  to  the  Lake  of  Ochrida,  while  in  reality 
and  according  to  the  terms  as  clear  as  they  are  precise  of  the 
treaty  of  alliance,  an  indisputable  Bulgarian  zone,  indisputable 
only  from  a  political  point  of  view  and  in  respect  to  Serbia, 
is  situated  to  the  east  of  the  Rhodopes  and  the  river  Strouma. 
(2)  The  Bulgarians  repeat  that  Serbia  has  acknowledged,  in 
this  treaty,  the  Bulgarian  ethnographical  character  of  all 
the  territories  situated  to  the  east  of  the  line  Mount  Golem- 
Lake  Ochrida,  while,  in  reality,  Serbia  only  undertook  to 
accept,  as  political  frontier,  this  line  which  has  nothing  to 
do    with    ethnography.     But,    admitting    even    that    any 
Serbian   Government   should   have    declared   in   a   political 
agreement    that    Macedonia   is    Bulgarian    from    an    ethno- 
graphical point  of  view,  such  a  declaration  would  have  no 
value  for  the  ethnography  of  the  Macedonian  regions.     It  is 
a  notorious  fact,  however,  that  the  Serbian  Government, 
in  signing  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  treaty  of  1912,  in  no  way 
solved    the    question    of    the    ethnographical    character    of 
Macedonia,  which  is  a  Serbian  country,  the  cradle  of  Serbian 
civilization  in  the  Middle  Ages.     When  the  Bulgarians  speak 
of  an  "  indisputable  Bulgarian  zone  "  and  of  the  "  Bulgarian 
character"    of   Macedonia,    distinctly   "acknowledged"   by 
the  treaty  of  191 2,  they  are  fully  aware  that  what  they  say 
is  exactly  the  opposite  of  the  truth. 

March  18,  1917. 

An     Article     from     Mir     on     the     Serbo-Bulgarian 
Treaty  of  1912. 

The  organ  of  the  national  party,  Mir,  of  which  the  chief 
is  Mr.  Guechov,  published  in  the  number  of  the  23rd  April 
a  statement  which  defends  the  policy  of  the  party  at  the 
time  of  the  Balkan  wars  of  1912-13.  Mr.  Guechov  is  one 
of  the  authors  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  treaty  and  it  is  not 
without  interest  to  read  the  explanations  furnished  by  Mir 


200  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

on  the  attitude  of  the  Bulgarian  Government  on  the  question 
of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  alliance.  These  explanations  show 
once  more  that  the  treaty  in  question  was  considered  by  the 
Bulgarians  as  an  expedient  and  not  as  the  basis  of  a  new 
Balkan  policy,  inspired  by  sentiments  of  concord  and  of 
mutual  concessions.     Mir  says  : 

"As  to  the  reproaches  made  that  measures  of  precaution 
had  not  been  taken  against  the  Serbians,  they  are  so  ill- 
founded  that  it  is  astonishing  that  reasonable  people  should 
address  them  to  us.  We  have  made  use  of  the  Serbians  in 
order  to  attain  our  object,  that  is  to  vanquish  the  common 
enemy  and  realize  our  own  ideal,  the  revival  of  the  Bulgaria 
of  San-Stephano.  From  the  beginning  of  the  action  nobody 
was  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  the  Serbians  were  jealous  of 
us.  But  what  could  one  do  ?  We  were  obliged  to  make 
war  on  Turkey,  and  we  had  no  choice.  Was  a  war  against 
Turkey  possible  without  the  co-operation  of  the  Serbians  ? 
Our  military  leaders  had  declared  that  it  was  not,  and  it 
would  have  been  very  unfortunate  if  people  incompetent  as 
regards  military  affairs  would  have  imposed  their  will.  It 
follows,  then,  that  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  alliance  of  1912 
has  not  been  the  cause  of  the  catastrophe  which  has  over- 
taken us.  On  the  contrary,  thanks  to  this  alliance  we  have 
been  able  to  deliver  Macedonia,  because  no  state  would  have 
helped  us  in  the  war  with  Turkey,  the  former  mistress  of 
Macedonia,  which  we  were  not  capable  of  delivering  all 
alone.  If  Macedonia  had  not  been  under  Serbian  domination 
it  would  not  have  been  possible  to  deliver  it.  We  repeat, 
therefore,  that  it  is  not  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  alliance,  but  the 
other,  the  Greco-Serbian  alliance,  which  has  brought  about 
the  catastrophe.  This  latter  alliance  would  have  prevented 
it,  if  all  our  adversaries,  that  is  to  say  all  the  other  political 
parties,  had  not  joined  together  in  order  to  render  impossible 
the  only  salutary  Bulgarian  policy  :  arbitration  with  Greece." 

May  12,  1916. 


The  Role  of  Bulgaria. 

The  tumultuous  debates  in  the  Hungarian  Chamber  and 
the  explanations  between  Count  Tisza  and  the  Opposition, 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  201 

with  regard  to  the  entry  of  Roumania  into  the  war,  have 
furnished  one  more  proof  that  the  confidence  of  our  enemies 
in  victory  is  quite  shaken,  and  that  even  the  most  coura- 
geous among  them  are  beginning  to  perceive  the  early 
collapse  of  the  Austro-German-Magyar  plan  to  bring  Europe 
down  on  its  knees  and  to  dictate  to  it  the  Germanic  will. 
These  debates  are  of  no  particular  interest  and  we  must 
not  attach  any  importance  to  the  subject  of  Hungary's 
future  attitude.  As  we  have  already  had  occasion  to  say 
here,  Hungary  is  firm  in  her  desire  to  support  the  German 
cause,  the  success  of  which  can  alone  guarantee  to  the  Magyars 
that  domination  over  the  non-Magyar  nationalities  which 
this  noble  nation  of  lords  looks  upon  as  the  essence  of  the 
Hungarian  State,  as  its  justification,  even.  But  though  not 
attributing  to  them  any  political  importance,  we  ought  to 
read  with  curiosity  the  reports  of  the  sittings  of  the  Hungarian 
Chamber,  where  our  enemies,  striving  against  difficulties 
ever  greater  and  greater,  allow  themselves  to  be  drawn  into 
compromising  declarations.  One  knows  that  Count  Tisza 
made  some  very  interesting  communications  regarding  the 
Austro-Italian  negotiations,  before  the  entry  of  Italy  into 
the  war.  He  has  also,  in  keeping  with  his  impulsive 
character,  slightly  raised  the  veil  which  covers  the  agreement 
of  the  Central  Empires  with  Bulgaria,  and  it  is  to  this 
declaration  concerning  the  Bulgarians  that  we  wish  to  draw 
the  attention  of  our  readers. 

In  the  sitting  of  the  5th  September,  Count  Tisza,  defending 
the  Austro-Hungarian  diplomacy  from  the  reproach  that  it 
had  done  nothing  to  avert  the  Roumanian  danger,  said, 
among  other  things,  this  (Neue  Freie  Presse  of  the  6th 
September,  Morgenblatt)  :  "  We  have  reckoned  with  the 
Roumanian  danger  and  the  necessary  measures  have  been 
taken  in  this  respect.  From  a  diplomatic  point  of  view, 
the  best  means  of  meeting  the  Roumanian  menace  was  the 
alliance  with  Bulgaria,  and  this  whole  action,  by  no  means 
easy  because  of  a  series  of  delicate  questions  which  had 
first  to  be  solved,  and  which  has  led,  in  its  final  result,  to 
the  union  of  Bulgaria  to  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
and  to  the  conclusion  of  the  Turco-Bulgarian  alliance,  is  to 
a   great    extent    the  work  of   our  diplomacy.     Roumania's 


202  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

entry  into  the  war  signifies  for  us  also  an  increase  of  strength, 
because  the  important  Bulgarian  reserves,  which  were 
rendered  immovable  by  the  undecided  attitude  of  Roumania, 
have  now  become  free,  and  that  is  why  each  of  us  must 
recall  to  mind  with  joy  the  negotiations  which  have  led  to 
our  alliance  with  Bulgaria." 

This  declaration  will  open  the  eyes  even  of  the  most 
obstinate  defenders  of  Bulgaria.  One  sees  that  all  the 
Bulgarian  phrases  about  a  "  national  war  "  are  only  bluff, 
that  Bulgaria  has  assumed  the  role  of  a  servant  of  Germany, 
and  that,  after  having  played  this  role  in  the  campaign 
against  Serbia,  she  is  about  to  play  it,  according  to  the 
words  of  Count  Tisza,  also  in  the  Roumanian  war.  The 
Bulgarian  cause  becomes  identified  then  with  the  Germanic 
cause,  and  to  strike  Bulgaria  is  to  strike  an  arm  of  Germany. 
If  there  are  people  who  do  not  wish  to  see  it,  so  much  the 
worse  for  them.  In  the  authoritative  circles  of  the  Allies 
they  know  very  well  how  much  faith  they  can  have  in  the 
Bulgarians  ! 

September  24,  1916. 

Bulgaria  in  the  Service  of  Germany. 

The  Bulgarian  Prime  Minister  has  just  returned  to 
Sofia,  after  a- prolonged  journey  in  Austria-Hungary  and  in 
Germany.  The  circle  of  Germany's  friends  being  very 
limited,  Berlin  finds  herself  obliged  to  have  recourse  to  the 
Bulgarians  and  to  ask  from  them  special  services.  While 
Mr.  Rizoff  was  sending  offers  of  a  separate  peace  to  Maxime 
Gorki,  Mr.  Radoslavoff  was  granting  to  the  Magyar-Austro- 
German  journalists  long  interviews,  full  of  optimism  and 
confidence  in  the  Germanic  strength  and  in  the  happy  issue 
of  the  war.  Meanwhile,  King  Ferdinand  was  receiving  in 
his  castle  at  Ebenthal,  in  Hungary,  the  Emperor  Charles, 
and  the  two  sovereigns  exchanged  the  highest  compliments. 
King  Ferdinand,  who  is  very  fond  of  decorations,  obtained 
this  time  the  Grande-Croix  de  l'ordre  de  Marie-Therese 
(the  Grand  Cross  of  the  Order  of  Marie-Theresia)  while  he 
conferred  upon  his  august  ally  and  friend  the  Bulgarian 
Cross  of  Valour.     The  sudden  changes  in  Greece  and  the 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  203 

expulsion  of  King  Constantine — a  bad  omen  for  the  King 
of  Bulgaria — had  disturbed  this  intimate  festival,  and  the 
Coburg,  anxious  at  the  new  aspect  of  the  Balkan  question, 
was  obliged  to  go  and  see  the  supreme  chief  of  Central  Europe, 
the  Kaiser  William,  and  to  ask  for  new  instructions,  for 
encouragement  and  for  promises  of  help,  not  only  financial, 
but  more  particularly  military.  Reassured  by  the  Emperor, 
he  went  off  to  Munich  to  pay  a  visit  to  the  King  of  Bavaria 
and  to  make  a  great  speech  consolidating  the  unseverable 
bonds  uniting  Bulgaria  to  Germany  and  to  Austria-Hungary. 

Such  is  Bulgaria  as  she  is  officially  and  publicly  known. 
The  other  side  of  Bulgaria,  that  is  to  say,  that  which  works 
under  the  mask  of  a  democratic  and  independent  Bulgaria, 
is  not  inactive  either.  Its  field  of  activity  is  not  limited  only 
to  neutral  countries  where,  as,  for  example,  in  Switzerland, 
the  Bulgarian  agents  and  emissaries  talk  of  a  pretended 
struggle  of  the  Bulgarians  for  "  national  unity  "  because  that 
is  the  fashion  now — but  it  stretches  even  into  the  allied 
countries.  The  repeated  efforts  of  some  Bulgarophile 
Frenchmen  to  propagate  the  idea  of  the  "  two  "  Bulgarias, 
were  suppressed  by  the  French  Press,  so  loftily  inspired  by 
justice  and  loyalty.  The  Bulgarians,  however,  were  not 
discouraged,  and  it  is  in  England  that  they  are  now  trying 
to  regain  former  sympathies.  Mr.  Noel  Buxton  has  met 
their  desires  half-way  and,  with  a  candour  rare  enough  with 
a  politician,  he  is  seeking  to  vindicate  the  descendants  of 
Kroum  and  to  make  the  English  public  believe  that  the 
Bulgarians  are  perfectly  right  in  killing  the  French,  the 
English  and  the  Russians — not  to  speak  of  the  Serbians — 
in  Macedonia  !  We  read  all  that  and  cannot  recover  from 
our  stupefaction.  Certainly,  the  Bulgarians,  in  spite  of  all 
the  odious  crimes  they  have  committed,  in  spite  of  their 
peculiar  sort  of  morality,  must  be  for  certain  people  a  most 
congenial  nation  ! 

Anyhow,  that  is  a  matter  of  taste.  What  is  more 
important  is  that  all  the  Bulgarians,  starting  from  the 
socialists,  and  finishing  with  the  notoriously  pro-German 
Stamboulists  of  Mr.  Radoslavoff,  not  neglecting  the  "  Russo- 
philes  "  of  Mr.  Guechoff  and  the  "  Democrats  "  of  Mr. 
Malinoff,  put  forward  as  the  essential  war  aims  for  Bulgaria 


204  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

claims  which  are  openly  part  of  the  Germanic  thesis. 
According  to  the  Bulgarians  themselves,  they  entered  the 
war  in  order  to  prevent  the  entry  of  Russians  into  Con- 
stantinople and  the  realization  of  Serbian  national  unity. 
These  two  aims  are  purely  Germanic,  because  neither  the 
question  of  the  Dardanelles,  nor  Serbian  national  unity, 
affect  the  Bulgarian  people  in  any  way,  and  the  possibility 
of  its  peaceful  development,  but  only  threaten  Pan-Germanic 
plans.  To-day,  Bulgaria,  by  the  mouth  of  her  Prime 
Minister,  declares  that  the  essential  war  aim  for  the 
Bulgarians  is  to  realize  a  common  frontier  with  Austria- 
Hungary,  to  establish  a  direct  and  uninterrupted  communi- 
cation between  Berlin,  Vienna,  Budapest,  Sofia,  and  Con- 
stantinople. While  the  other  nations  are  fighting  for  their 
liberty,  the  Bulgarians  declare  themselves  willing  to  hold 
out  to  the  end  in  support  of  German  imperialistic  schemes. 
And  they  all  say  so,  frankly,  without  embarrassment, 
without  hesitation.  Subjection  to  the  Germans  is  an  honour 
to  them;  the  words  "  Balkanic  Prussians  "  no  longer  express 
a  vague  comparison.  That  is  why  those  who  advise  our 
great  allies  to  come  to  an  agreement  with  Sofia  have  no 
need  to  take  the  Balkan  train  and  go  to  sound  the  little 
Germans  of  the  Balkans  ;  Berlin  is  much  nearer  ! 
July  I,  1917. 

The  Bulgarian  Suicide. 

In  the  Revue  des  Deux  Monies  (numbers  of  1st  October, 
1st  November  and  1st  December,  1916),  Mr.  Ernest  Daudet 
has  published  a  study  of  diplomatic  history  highly  inter- 
esting, entitled  "  The  Bulgarian  Suicide."  Under  the  modest 
form  of  "  Notes  and  Souvenirs,  1878-1915/ '  Mr.  Daudet  has 
sketched  out  the  whole  history  of  modern  Bulgaria,  since 
the  Congress  of  Berlin,  to  which  the  Bulgarian  State  owes 
its  existence,  up  to  our  own  days,  up  to  the  union  of  Bulgaria 
to  the  Central  Empires.  The  first  period  embraces  the 
reign  of  Alexander  of  Battenberg,  from  1878  to  1886,  until 
his  abdication,  and  the  second  extends  from  1886  up  to 
the  present  day,  the  time  occupied  by  the  reign  of  Ferdinand 
of  Coburg.     This  second  period  can  be  divided  into  two 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  205 

epochs  :    the  regime  of  Stambouloff,  from  1886  until  1894, 
and    the    regime    of    the    Prince-King    Ferdinand    himself. 
Mr.  Daudet  has  tried  to  show  in  a  few  lines  all  the  changes, 
so  numerous,  which  have  taken  place  in  the  Kingdom  of 
Bulgaria,  and  his  account,  though  compact  and  limited  to 
the  most  important  events,  holds  the  interest  of  the  reader 
to  the  end.     The  book  contains  some  unpublished  documents 
and  there  is  no  doubt  that  this  work  will  represent  a  valuable 
contribution  for  a  more  detailed  history  of  modern  Bulgaria. 
That  which  has  interested  us  particularly  in  the  work  of 
Mr.  Daudet,  is  the  outline  of  the  Bulgarian  policy  pursued 
during  the  latter  years,  since  the  proclamation  of  Bulgaria's 
Independence  in  1908,  up  to  our  own  days.     In  this  part 
of  his  work  Mr.  Daudet,  although  relating  events,  has  not 
failed  to  devote  his  special  attention  to  King  Ferdinand, 
the  sole  director  of  Bulgarian  foreign  policy,  and  to  give 
his  opinion  of  his  doubtful  attitude.     But,  and  it  is  here 
that  we  do  not  agree  with  the  illustrious  French  historian, 
this  opinion  of   King  Ferdinand,   formed,   apparently,   too 
much    under    the    influence    of    pre-war    ideas,    does    not 
take  sufficiently  into  account  the  attachment  of  Ferdinand 
of  Coburg  to  the  Germanic  cause,  which  is  the  basis  of  his 
whole  policy,  in  appearance  changeable  and  hesitating  and, 
in    reality,    most    decided    and    perfectly    consistent.     We 
find  that  Mr.  Daudet  attributes  more  importance  than  need 
be  to  a  pretended  "  independent  "  policy  of  King  Ferdinand, 
and  there,  where  one  can  clearly  prove  collaboration  with 
Austria-Hungary  and  Germany,  Mr.  Daudet  sees  only  the 
King  Ferdinand  hesitating,  uncertain  what  to  do.     An  in- 
stance of  this  is  presented  by  the  proclamation  of  Bulgarian 
Independence,  consented  to  no  doubt  by  Austria-Hungary 
and  which  ought  to  facilitate  the  annexation  of  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina  to  the  Monarchy.     The  account  of  this  event, 
given  by  Mr.  Daudet,  is  in  direct  opposition  to  information 
drawn  from  other  sources  and  which  confirm  positively  the 
Austro-Bulgarian   design   of    cancelling    certain  clauses    of 
the    Treaty  of   Berlin  of    their    own    accord   by   creating 
accomplished     facts.      Mr.     Daudet    maintains,     however, 
that  King  Ferdinand,  at  the  time  of  his  visit  to  Budapest, 
the    23rd    September    1908,    and    at    the    moment    when 


206  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

Francis-Joseph  had  already  composed  his  autograph  letter 
announcing  to  all  the  sovereigns  of  the  great  powers  the 
annexation  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina — proclaimed  29th  Sep- 
tember— has  avoided  making  even  an  allusion  to  his  own 
project  of  proclaiming  the  Bulgarian  independence  ! 

Nor  can  we  share  the  opinion  of  the  eminent  French 
writer  on  the  action  of  King  Ferdinand  before  and  during 
the  Balkan  war.  Although  the  Balkanic  alliance  was  under 
the  patronage  of  the  Entente,  King  Ferdinand  had  revealed 
the  secret  of  it  and  communicated  some  details  to  Austria 
and  Germany.  It  was  Mr.  Rene  Pinon  who  first  unveiled 
this  Bulgarian  trick,  designed,  in  his  opinion,  with  the 
object  of  deceiving  Austria  and  obtaining  her  neutrality  in 
the  conflict  which  was  in  preparation.1  In  reality,  King 
Ferdinand  wished  to  deceive  his  Balkan  allies  and  all  his 
plans  were  manifestly  laid  with  the  consent  of  Vienna  and 
Berlin.  The  proof  of  this  lies,  moreover,  in  the  fact,  remarked 
and  mentioned  also  by  Mr.  Daudet,  that  the  Bulgarian 
army,  instead  of  marching  into  Macedonia,  immediately  took 
a  direction  which  was  not  intended,  the  direction  of 
Constantinople.  And  it  was  not  "  the  fever  of  conquest," 
as  Mr.  Daudet  supposes,  which  urged  the  Bulgarian  King 
towards  Constantinople,  but  just  the  desire  to  open  up  for 
Germany  the  road  to  Bagdad  and  Asia  Minor  and  to  fore- 
stall the  Russians  at  Constantinople.  Germany  and  Austria 
wished  to  feel  that  Constantinople  was  in  safe  hands,  and 
they  sent  King  Ferdinand,  their  faithful  servant,  to  take 
in  "  his  "  name  but  for  "  their  "  account  possession  of  the 
Dardanelles.  He  found,  however,  that  he  had  taken  too 
large  a  bite,  even  for  the  immense  appetite  of  the  Bulgarians. 

The  final  judgment  of  Mr.  Daudet  is  borrowed  from  a 
diplomatic  report  made  out  by  a  man  who  was  well  acquainted 
with  King  Ferdinand.  In  this  report  it  is  maintained  that 
the  head  of  the  Bulgarians  abstained  from  declaring  himself 
for  the  one  or  the  other  group  of  belligerents,  waiting  to 
see  which  side  would  have  the  victory.  This  opinion  is 
evidently  the  outcome  of  previous  prejudices  with  regard 

1  See  in  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes  (vol.  xiii,  1  Feb.  1913)  article  of 
M.  Pinon:  "The  role  of  Austria  in  the  genesis  of  the  great  Balkan 
conflict." 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  207 

to  King  Ferdinand  and  it  is  indeed  necessary  to  combat  it 
and  not  to  let  it  gain  ground.  There  is  nothing  more 
prejudicial  than  errors  in  the  appreciation  of  the  political 
acts  of  our  adversaries.  It  is  known  to-day  that  King 
Ferdinand  was  always  the  ally  of  Austria-Hungary.  We 
have  authentic  confirmation  of  this  in  the  declaration  of 
the  Hungarian  Prime  Minister,  Count  Tisza,  made  before 
the  Hungarian  Parliament,  in  the  sitting  of  the  21st 
September,  1916,  and  in  which  stress  is  laid  upon  the 
ancient  date  of  the  Austro-Bulgarian  alliance  (see  in  the 
Neue  Freie  Presse,  of  22nd  September,  Morgenblatt,  the 
report  of  the  sitting  of  the  Hungarian  Parliament).  But 
there  is  another  proof,  still  clearer,  of  the  inaccuracy  of 
this  opinion.  King  Ferdinand  made  Bulgaria  march  against 
Serbia  and  the  Allies  precisely  with  the  object  of  preventing 
a  victory  of  the  Allies.  He  chose  the  most  favourable 
moment  for  the  execution  of  this  plan  and  succeeded,  in 
1915,  by  falling  upon  Serbia  from  behind  and,  in  1916,  by 
attacking  Roumania  under  the  same  conditions,  in  helping 
the  Austro-Germans  in  an  appreciable  manner.  We  have 
no  reason  either  to  diminish  or  to  enlarge  the  value  of  the 
Bulgarian  co-operation,  but  it  is  true  that  the  Bulgarian 
intervention,  coming  at  the  moment  when  Germany  called 
for  it,  has  considerably  facilitated  the  Germanic  plans  and 
designs.  And  King  Ferdinand  did  not  decide  upon  this 
intervention  just  at  the  last  moment.  It  had  already  been 
decided  upon,  in  principle,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  ; 
they  were  only  waiting  for  the  most  favourable  moment  for 
helping  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  in  the  realization 
of  their  plans. 

Mr.  Daudet  speaks  of  the  "  Bulgarian  suicide "  and 
we  cannot  but  approve  of  this  very  just  opinion.  The 
Bulgarian  nation  is  clearly  working  for  Germany,  who  is  in 
favour  of  the  little  nations  only  when  she  can  make  use  of 
them  for  her  own  ends.  Such  is  the  case  with  Bulgaria. 
But  we  must  state  that  the  Bulgarian  nation  is  not  conscious 
of  acting  against  its  own  interests  in  supporting  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Germany.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  persuaded 
that  it  is  fighting  against  "  enemies  "  in  attacking  the 
Russians,  the  French,  the  English  and  the  Serbians,  and 


208  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

this  is  a  fact  that  must  never  be  lost  sight  of.  Bulgaria  is  an 
enemy  of  the  Allies  and,  what  is  most  serious,  a  convinced 
enemy. 

January  14,  1917. 

The  Kaiser  at  Sofia. 

The  German  and  Bulgarian  sovereigns  have  just  exchanged 
at  Sofia  toasts  which  the  political  world,  surprised  at  this 
sudden  visit  of  the  German  Emperor  to  Bulgaria,  has  read 
with  particular  interest.  One  can  hardly  understand  why  the 
German  Emperor,  if  he  wished  to  confirm  in  a  solemn  fashion 
the  solidity  of  the  Germano-Touranian  compact,  needed  to 
make  the  journey  to  Sofia,  instead  of  going  to  Vienna  or  else 
to  Budapest,  which  would  have  been  more  natural.  The 
toasts  pronounced  in  the  Bulgarian  capital  have  shown, 
however,  that  the  visit  of  the  Kaiser  had  a  defined  object. 
It  is  meant  for  Bulgaria  alone,  and  one  will  look  in  vain  among 
the  words  of  the  Germanic  chief  for  any  mention  whatsoever 
of  general  war  aims.  There  is  only  the  vague  affirmation 
that  there  will  be  peace  again  "in  a  short  time,"  which  is 
also  intended  for  the  Bulgarians.  As  to  these  last,  they  may 
be  satisfied.  The  Emperor  William  has  renewed  the  promises 
he  made  to  them  in  1915.  In  presence  of  this  generosity, 
Messrs.  Guechoff  and  Malinoff,  those  so-called  "  Russophiles," 
were  anxious  to  express  to  the  Kaiser  their  gratitude  and 
their  unalterable  devotion.  If  it  only  depended,  then,  on 
Germany,  Bulgaria  could  be  sure  that  her  treachery  would 
be  largely  rewarded.  That  is  probably  the  reason  why  the 
Bulgarians,  in  spite  of  their  repeated  efforts  to  draw  nearer 
to  the  Entente,  still  believe  in  the  Germanic  victory.  The 
speeches  of  Sofia  are  there  to  prove  it. 

King  Ferdinand  referred  to  the  imperishable  memory  of 
the  visit  paid  by  His  German  Majesty  "  to  the  Bulgarian 
town  of  Nich,  recently  delivered."  He  affirms  that  "  the 
alliance  sealed  on  the  fields  of  battle  by  precious  blood  shed 
in  common  "  will  bring  to  the  two  nations  lasting  blessings 
for  the  epoch  of  peace,  for  which  Bulgaria  is  determined  to 
"  fight  until  the  decisive  victory."  "  I  particularly  wish  to 
give  the  assurance  that  all  the  Bulgarian  soldiers  will  remain 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  209 

faithful  to  their  allies  and  will  do  all  in  their  power  to  obtain 
the  decisive  victory.  .  .  .  The  brilliant  example  of  the 
German  people  will  always  serve  as  an  example  to  its  faithful 
Bulgarian  allies."  These  words,  pronounced  in  presence  of 
the  chiefs  of  all  Bulgarian  political  parties  and  approved  of 
by  all  the  Bulgarians,  certainly  satisfied  the  Kaiser.  That 
is  why,  in  his  reply,  he  laid  special  stress  upon  the  fact  that 
for  a  long  time  he  has  been  the  astonished  witness  of  the 
"  indefatigable  and  conscientious  activity  of  the  Bulgarian 
nation  in  attaining  the  object  in  view,  under  the  direction 
of  King  Ferdinand." 

M  Remembering  our  own  past,  we  feel  ourselves  closely 
related  to  the  young  and  strong  nation.  This  sentiment 
of  close  relationship  has  had  its  finest  confirmation  when 
Bulgaria  adopted  the  just  cause  of  the  Central  Powers.  .  .  . 
There  results  from  this  brotherhood  in  arms  a  steadfast 
fidelity,  against  which  all  the  efforts  of  the  enemy  break 
themselves  in  vain.  We  are  marching  hand  in  hand,  closely 
united.  I  hope,  "  concluded  the  Kaiser,"  to  see  Bulgaria 
happy  and  re-uniting  under  a  single  sceptre,  in  a  single 
powerful  union,  all  her  sons." 

These  speeches  reveal  nothing  new  to  us  Serbians.  A 
long  time  ago  we  knew  that  Bulgaria  was  nothing  other  than 
a  branch  of  Germany  and  if  we  have  had  to  suffer  most  from 
the  treachery  of  Sofia,  it  is  not  we  who  were  deceived  by  the 
Bulgarian  politicians.  The  allied  diplomacy,  blinded  by 
complete  ignorance  of  the  real  tendencies  of  Bulgaria,  has 
let  itself  be  made  a  fool  of  by  the  Orientals  of  Sofia,  and  we 
have  paid  the  cost  of  its  errors.  Again,  to-day,  Bulgaria  is 
repeating  the  same  game  with  the  United  States,  and  she  is 
going  to  carry  it  on  until  the  moment  when  Germany  will 
order  her  to  take  off  her  mask.  Washington  is  far  from 
Sofia  and  it  is  not  surprising  that  President  Wilson,  confused 
by  the  display  of  Bulgarian  false  nationalism,  hesitated  to 
put  an  end  to  an  ambiguous  situation. 

After  the  visit  of  Kaiser  William  to  Sofia  we  may  expect 
that  the  Bulgarian  Minister  at  Washington,  the  same  who 
declared  just  recently  that  the  Bulgarians  do  not  like  the 
Germans,  will  receive  his  passports.  Morality,  in  the 
name  of  which  Mr.  Wilson  has  succeeded  in  uniting  around 

15 


210  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

him  all  the  American  people,  demands  it.     When  one  has 
quarrelled  with  the  master,  one  does  not  speak  to  the  valet. 

October  21,  1917. 

The  Confessions  of  Mr.  Rizoff. 

Mr.  Demetere  Rizoff,  Bulgarian  Minister  at  Berlin, 
published  in  the  Vovxvaerts  of  8th  August,  a  new  reply  to  the 
articles  of  Mr.  Wendel,  member  of  the  Reichstag.  After 
having  referred  to  his  previous  arguments  in  favour  of  the 
Bulgarian  claims,  the  Bulgarian  Minister  has  judged  it 
necessary  to  set  forth  the  whole  foreign  policy  of  his  country. 
His  article  is  very  important,  not  for  his  repetition  of  the  usual 
Bulgarian  phrases  and  the  one-sided  and  incomplete  state- 
ment of  those  learned  men  who,  it  appears,  have  recognized 
the  Bulgarian  character  of  Macedonia — Mr.  Rizoff  refers  even 
to  a  testimony  of  Prince  Bismarck  ! — but  simply  because  of 
the  political  declarations  which  it  contains.  In  face  of  the 
repeated  efforts  of  certain  allied  political  personages  to 
procure  for  Bulgaria  a  particularly  favourable  treatment, 
now  or  else  at  the  end  of  the  war,  the  declarations  of  Mr. 
Rizoff  as  to  the  motives  and  tendencies  of  the  Bulgarian 
policy  constitute  valuable  evidence  upon  which  great  stress 
should  be  laid. 

u  Regarding  Bulgaria,"  says  Mr.  Rizoff,  "we  must  not 
forget  that  she  did  not  enter  the  war  in  order  to  defend  her 
previous  possessions,  which  no  one  threatened.  On  the 
contrary,  we  know  that  the  Entente  had  promised  to  Bulgaria 
some  territorial  concessions  as  the  price  of  simple  neutrality." 
Here  are  two  important  statements.  When,  in  October,  1915, 
Bulgaria  attacked  Serbia,  King  Ferdinand,  in  the  pro- 
clamation he  addressed  to  the  Bulgarian  people  and  to  the 
army,  said  that  Serbia  had  threatened  and  attacked  Bulgaria, 
and  that  he,  King  of  the  Bulgarians,  called  upon  his  faithful 
subjects  to  defend  the  country.  Last  year,  on  the 
occasion  of  the  anniversary  of  the  Bulgarian  mobilization, 
the  same  King  Ferdinand  said  the  same  thing  in  a  manifesto 
addressed  to  the  nation  :  "  Bulgarians  to-day  Bulgaria, 
with  the  aid  of  allied  troops,  has  succeeded  in  forcing  back 
the  Serbian  aggression  against  our  territory  ;  she  has  beaten 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  211 

and  broken  the  latter  power."  A  vulgar  falsehood,  affirms 
Mr.  Rizoff.  Nobody  has  threatened  Bulgarian  posessions. 
But  the  other  declaration  is  still  more  delightful.  The 
Entente  has  promised  to  Bulgaria,  as  the  price  of  her 
neutrality,  some  territorial  concessions,  namely,  in  Macedonia. 
May  our  French,  English  and  Italian  friends  take  note  : 
as  price  of  neutrality,  and  not  as  Bulgarian  land  !  That  is 
quite  different.  The  Bulgarians  still  declare  that  the  Entente, 
by  this  offer,  had  acknowledged  the  Bulgarian  character  of 
Macedonia.  Mr.  Rizoff  now  assures  us  that  it  was  only  an 
affair  of  political  bargaining.  Only  the  price  was  not 
sufficiently  large  for  Bulgaria.     Listen  to  the  following  : 

"  But  Bulgaria  could  not  remain  neutral,  nor  join  the 
Entente  powers.  She  felt  the  imperative  need  of  solving 
the  two  essential  problems  :  to  realize  her  national  unity 
and  to  prevent  Russia  from  installing  herself  at  Constanti- 
nople." Fine  phrases,  which  ring  false  when  one  compares 
them  with  the  facts  and  the  confessions  of  Mr.  Rizoff  himself. 
First  as  regards  Constantinople.  It  is  to-day  notorious  that 
Bulgaria  acted  as  a  tool  of  Germany  in  wishing  to  prevent 
the  Russians  from  entering  Constantinople.  If  Russia,  as 
mistress  of  Constantinople,  could  have  been  a  menace  to  any 
one,  it  would  have  been  more  likely  Roumania.  Bulgaria, 
in  spite  of  her  treacherous  attack,  had  obtained  by  the 
Treaty  of  Bucarest,  a  wide  access  on  the  iEgean  Sea,  and 
this  made  her  completely  independent  of  the  Dardanelles 
and  of  Constantinople.  The  establishment  of  the  Russians 
at  Constantinople  represented  no  danger  for  a  Bulgarian 
policy.  But  for  the  Germanophile  and  Germanic  policy, 
such  a  solution  of  the  Constantinople  question  was  the  death 
blow.  From  this  point  of  view  Mr.  Rizoff  is  undoubtedly 
right. 

As  to  the  famous  Bulgarian  "  national  unity,"  Mr.  Rizoff 
himself  tells  us  in  what  it  consists :  "  These  two  problems," 
he  continues,  "  could  not  be  realized  in  company  with  Russia, 
Serbia,  Roumania  and  the  Greece  of  Mr.  Venizelos.  That 
is  precisely  why  Bulgaria  has  united  herself  sincerely  and 
loyally  to  her  present  Allies.  She  understood  that  otherwise 
she  would  see  herself,  at  the  end  of  the  war,  surrounded  by 
Russia,  Serbia,  Roumania  and  Greece,  all  vastly  enriched, 


212  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

which  would  have  signified  for  her  in  future  the  position  of 
a  vassal."  There,  is  then  the  key  of  the  "  Bulgarian 
national  unity,"  there,  is  the  explanation  of  the  fantastic 
claims  of  the  Bulgarians  on  Serbian  Macedonia,  on  the 
Eastern  part  of  Serbia,  ingeniously  called  "  country  of 
Morava,"  on  Greek  Macedonia,  on  the  Doubroudja  and  the 
mouths  of  the  Danube.  Bulgarian  national  unity  consists 
simply,  according  to  the  authoritative  opinion  of  Mr.  Rizoff, 
in  preventing  the  realization  of  Serbian,  Greek  and  Roumanian 
national  unity.  The  Bulgarians  who  are,  next  to  the 
Albanians,  the  least  numerous  in  the  Balkans,  would  like 
to  enlarge  their  country  artificially  at  the  expense  of  their 
neighbours,  and  they  call  that  their  "  national  unity  !  " 

Mr.  Rizoff  has  carried  frankness  to  the  uttermost  limits. 
"  A  peace  by  compromise  is  impossible  before  one  of  the 
great  powers  is  crushed.  .  .  .  Each  Bulgarian  is  aware 
that  the  present  war  is  the  last  great  European  war  and  that 
Bulgaria  is  here  playing  her  last  trump." 

Sapienti  sat ! 

September  2,  1917. 

GUSTAVE   WEIGAND   AND    THE   BULGARIAN   CLAIMS. 

The  articles  of  Mr.  H.  Wendel  on  Macedonia  have  pro- 
duced a  great  sensation  among  the  Bulgarians,  and  provoked 
numerous  replies.  One  of  these  replies,  the  author  of  which 
is  Gustave  Weigand,  professor  at  the  Leipzig  University, 
is  particularly  interesting.  Mr.  Weigand  is  a  typical 
Bulgarian  agent  and  a  long  time  ago  he  put  himself  at  the 
disposal  of  Bulgaria.  His  speciality  is  the  study  of  the 
Macedonian  Roumanians  (Zinzares,  Aromounes).  As  soon  as 
the  Bulgarians  saw  G.  Weigand  come  into  the  Balkans,  they 
immediately  won  him  over  to  their  cause  and  charged  him 
to  propagate,  as  a  so-called  eye  witness,  Bulgarian  interests. 
Now  that  Mr.  Wendel  has  shown  the  absurdity  of  the 
Bulgarian  claims  on  Macedonia,  G.  Weigand  feels  himself 
obliged  to  uphold  the  adverse  theory.  As  reply  to  Mr. 
Wendel  he  has  written  in  the  Vossische  Zeitung  of  August  7th, 
an  article  entitled  "  Who  are  the  Macedonians  ?  "  We  can 
judge  of  this  reply  in  view  of  what  follows. 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  213 

Mr.  Weigand  says  :  M  Although  the  Macedonian  language 
may  contain  different  dialects  to  the  Bulgarian  language,  as 
well  as  certain  vocal  phenomena  which  resemble  more  the 
Serbian  than  the  Bulgarian  language,  the  character  of 
the  Macedonian  language  is  none  the  less  Bulgarian."  Now, 
the  Macedonian  language  can  in  no  way  be  taken  for  a 
Bulgarian  language.  The  best  proof  of  this  is  the  following 
argument  :  Under  the  Turkish  regime  the  Bulgarians  and 
the  Serbians  had  their  colleges  in  Macedonia.  The  Bulgarian 
colleges  had  preparatory  classes,  in  which  the  children  had  to 
pass  at  least  six  months,  in  order  to  be  able  to  follow  the 
college  courses  in  the  Bulgarian  language.  The  Serbian 
Colleges  had,  however,  no  need  of  these  preparatory  classes. 
Can  there  be,  with  regard  to  the  Macedonian  language,  a 
more  striking  argument  in  favour  of  the  Serbians  than  that  ? 

Mr.  Weigand  endeavours  also  to  demonstrate  the  Bulgarian 
right  to  Macedonia  because  of  the  foundation  of  Bulgarian 
schools  in  Macedonia  since  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  The  value  of  this  argument  is  very  well  shown  by 
the  fact  that  the  Bulgarian  schools  were  introduced  into 
Macedonia  only  since  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
while  Serbian  schools  have  never  ceased  to  exist  in  Macedonia 
since  the  Middle  Ages  up  to  our  own  days.  The  essential 
thing  is  that  the  Bulgarian  schools  were  created  by  Bulgarian 
propaganda  while  the  Serbian  schools  were  created  and  kept 
up  by  the  people  of  Macedonia  itself,  inspired  by  its  Serbian 
convictions  and  not  subjected  to  any  external  influence. 

Mr.  Weigand  refers  also  to  the  result  obtained  by  the 
Bulgarian  schools  in  Macedonia.  He  would  have  done 
better  to  have  shown  the  effect  of  the  Bulgarian  propaganda 
and  rule  of  terror,  which  have  not  only  created  Bulgarian 
schools,  but  have  converted  pure-blooded  Serbians  to  the 
Bulgarian  nationality.  The  following  example  shows  very 
well  to  what  a  point  Bulgarian  propaganda  and  terrorism 
were  carried  in  Macedonia  :  Some  time  before  the  creation 
of  the  Bulgarian  exarchate,  there  came  to  Macedonia,  as 
Serbian  master,  Djordje  Miletic,  brother  of  Svetozar  Miletic, 
representative  of  the  Serbian  nation  in  Hungary.  The 
Bulgarian  propaganda  and  rule  of  terror  forced  him  to 
declare  himself  Bulgarian.     To-day  his  son,  Ljubomir  Miletic 


214  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

(both  Serbian  names),  professor  at  the  Sofia  University,  is 
one  of  the  most  implacable  enemies  of  Serbia  !  It  is  this 
same  Ljubomir  Miletic  whom  the  Bulgarian  Government  has 
appointed  to  organize  in  Germany  a  series  of  conferences  in 
favour  of  the  Bulgarian  interests  in  the  Balkans,  and  whom 
Mr.  Weigand  knows  only  too  well.  And  so,  if  it  is  like  this 
among  the  intellectuals,  we  can  imagine  the  attitude  of  the 
common  people. 

As  to  the  last  argument  of  Mr.  Weigand,  there  is  no 
need  to  make  any  comment  regarding  it  ;  it  consists  in 
saying  : 

"  We  Germans  have  least  of  all  right  to  contest  the 
Bulgarian  rights.  Was  it  not  the  Bulgarians,  who  have 
been  the  only  ones  and  the  first,  in  the  course  of  this  terrible 
war  which  we  are  carrying  on  together  with  Austria-Hungary 
and  Turkey,  to  unite  themselves  with  us  and  to  show  thus 
before  the  whole  world  that  we  shall  issue  as  conquerors 
from  this  struggle  ?  It  is  for  this  reason  that  we  must 
endeavour  to  join  Macedonia  to  Bulgaria,  even  in  the  event 
of  a  peace  without  annexation  !  " 

If  Mr.  Weigand  had  put  this  argument  first,  the  object 
of  his  reply  would  have  been  much  clearer. 

November  26,  1917. 

II 

The  Bulgarian  Law  of  Nations. 

Every  nation,  says  Montesquieu,  has  a  Law  of  Nations  ; 
even  the  Iroquois,  who  eat  their  prisoners,  have  one.  They 
send  and  receive  embassies  ;  they  know  the  laws  of  war  and 
of  peace ;  "  the  evil  is,  that  this  Law  of  Nations  is  not  founded 
on  true  principles  "  (L' esprit  des  Lois,  page  8). 

If  Montesquieu  in  his  book,  by  which  he  has  become 
immortal,  takes  the  Iroquois  as  example,  it  is  because  at 
that  moment  he  probably  did  not  know  of  the  existence  of 
the  Bulgarians,  the  latter  being  at  that  time  the  slaves  of 
their  friends  and  allies  of  to-day,  the  Turks.  Otherwise, 
the  great  French  philosopher  would  not  have  taken  the 
trouble  to  seek  examples  beyond  the  continent  in  which  he 
lived. 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  215 

It  is,  however,  true  that  the  Bulgarians  do  not  eat  their 
prisoners,  which  does  not  prove  that  they  would  not  like 
to  do  so.  It  is  probably  because  they,  when  waging  war, 
scarcely  ever  give  quarter,  that  is  to  say,  they  kill  their 
prisoners  and  put  an  end  to  the  wounded.  And  that  is 
still  the  best  that  their  adversaries  can  expect  of  them,  as 
it  oftener  happens  that  they  mutilate  the  wounded  without 
killing  them,  leaving  them  to  their  fate  after  having  robbed 
and  completely  stripped  them.  In  the  previous  number  of 
La  Serbie  we  gave  the  names  of  unfortunate  Serbian  soldiers 
whom  they  had  subjected  to  such  tortures. 

We  Serbians  are  not  particularly  astonished  to  see  the 
Bulgarian  soldiers  transformed  into  butchers,  killing  off  their 
adversaries  after  the  combat  in  a  cowardly  and  cruel  manner  ; 
for  it  was  these  same  soldiers  who,  during  the  war  of  19 13, 
dealt  bayonet  thrusts  to  their  Bulgarian  comrades  seized 
with  cholera,  so  as  to  leave  them  afterwards  as  wounded  on 
the  battlefield,  where  the  Serbian  stretcher-bearers  came  to 
seek  them  and  carry  them  to  our  ambulances,  which,  in 
consequence,  became  hot-beds  of  epidemic. 

These  innate  instincts  of  cruelty  in  the  Bulgarian  soldiers 
are  cleverly  exploited  by  their  leaders.  According  to  the 
stories  of  prisoners,  related  in  La  Serbie,  they  take 
great  trouble  to  recount  to  the  Bulgarian  soldiers  all  sorts 
of  falsehoods  regarding  the  manner  in  which  the  Serbians 
treat  the  Bulgarians  who  give  themselves  up  as  prisoners. 
The  leaders  of  the  Bulgarian  army  do  not  cease  to  repeat  to 
their  soldiers  that  the  cruellest  fate  awaits  those  among  them 
who  may  be  taken  prisoner  by  the  Serbians.  In  stirring  up 
the  hatred  of  their  soldiers  by  means  of  lies,  they  then  try 
to  enrage  them  and  render  them  vindictive  and  cruel.  And 
it  cannot  be  said  that  they  have  not  succeeded  in  their 
design.  It  is,  therefore,  the  Bulgarian  leaders  whom  we 
make  chiefly  responsible  for  these  misdeeds  ;  for  they,  at 
least,  cannot  be  ignorant  of  the  essential  rules  of  the  Law  of 
Nations.  These  rules,  proclaimed  more  than  a  hundred  years 
ago  by  the  great  French  philosopher  whom  we  have  just 
quoted,  are  to  be  found  now  in  all  law  manuals  in  use  in 
the  army.  One  of  these  rules  states  as  follows  :  "  The  Law 
of  Nations  is  founded  naturally  upon  the  principle  that  the 


216  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

different  nations  ought,  in  time  of  peace,  to  do  each  other  the 
most  good,  and  in  time  of  war  the  least  harm  possible,  without 
injury  to  their  real  interests." 

Seeing  what  the  Bulgarians  are  doing  at  present,  one  can 
say  that  one  gains  nothing  by  being  born  nearly  two  centuries 
after  the  great  philosopher  proclaimed  these  principles  ;  it  is 
true,  however,  that  we  must  not  forget  it  was  a  French 
philosopher  who  proclaimed  these  principles,  which  the 
whole  world  has  since  adopted  as  its  own,  and  that  the 
Bulgarians,  the  successors  of  the  Turks  from  whom  they 
have  inherited  manners  and  morals,  do  not  consider  them- 
selves in  consequence  bound  down  to  the  doctrines  of  their 
enemies.  In  fact,  seeing  that  they  are  the  disciples  of  the 
Germans,  and  that  they  take  pride  in  the  title  of  "  Prussians 
of  the  Balkans,"  they  care  very  little  about  anti-German 
principles.  It  is  not,  therefore,  Montesquieu  who  should  be 
their  idol,  but  rather  Nietzsche,  for  it  is  not  in  the  cause  of 
right  that  they  are  fighting  to-day,  but  for  domination. 
And  the}'  are  not  seeking  to  conquer  in  order  to  preserve, 
but  in  order  to  destroy  and  ruin  the  conquered  countries. 
Might  and  cruelty ;  these  are  the  two  ruling  principles  of  their 
policy  and  of  their  life.  Bad  faith  and  falsehood  do  the 
rest  to  justify  all  their  misdeeds  and  all  their  abuses.  It  is 
sufficient  to  recall  to  mind  the  reason  given  by  their  Govern- 
ment in  order  to  justify  the  plundering  indulged  in  by  the 
population  of  their  capital  at  the  time  of  the  sacking  of  the 
Serbian  Legation,  after  the  invasion  of  Serbia.  It  was, 
according  to  the  Bulgarian  Government,  because  this  country 
had  ceased  to  exist  that  the  Bulgarians  thought  themselves 
authorized  to  plunder  the  Legation.  There  is  a  new  theory 
which  would  make  even  their  allies  blush.  The  Germans 
themselves,  when  they  carried  off  the  treasuries  of  the  Belgian 
banks,  did  not  dare  to  give  such  a  reason.  But  the  Bulgarians 
have  never  been  afraid  of  dishonour  when  material  advan- 
tages were  found  to  be  the  result  of  their  dishonest  actions. 
"  Traffic  in  honour  enriches  no  one,"  that  is  another  French 
proverb  with  which  they  have  nothing  to  do. 

It  is  probably  in  conformity  with  these  principles  that 
the  Bulgarian  Government  ordered  the  enrolment  of  Serbian 
subjects  in  the  Bulgarian  army,  as  well  as  the  confiscation 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  217 

of  the  property  "  left  without  owners,"  which  is  again  a 
Bulgarian  formula  for  the  appropriation  of  the  property  of 
enemy  subjects  absent  from  the  country. 

Given  the  special  character  of  the  Bulgarian  Law  of 
Nations,  which  is  shown  clearly  by  the  facts  we  have  just 
related,  we  are  curious  to  see  how  their  new  Minister  at 
Berne  will  succeed  in  his  relations  with  the  honourable 
members  of  the  Federal  Council,  by  whom  he  has  just  been 
accredited,  and  who,  in  reference  to  the  Law  of  Nations, 
still  hold  to  their  old  principles  proclaimed  by  their  Jean- 
Jacques  and  by  Montesquieu. 

November  5,  1916. 

The  Slavism  of  the  Bulgarians. 

To  the  Editor  of  the  "  New  Europe,"  London. 
Dear  Sir, 

The  doubtlessly  interesting  article  of  M.  Milan 
Curcin,  on  the  Bulgarians  and  Slavdom,  published  in  No.  48 
of  your  estimable  review,  contains  some  important  points 
which,  although  expressed  in  a  general  form,  represent 
only  the  personal  opinion  of  the  author  and,  I  may  add, 
a  false  one. 

I  do  not  speak  of  the  certainly  highly  inspired  author's 
desire  for  a  "  close  union  between  the  South  Slavs  and  the 
Bulgarians  " — a  merely  platonic  wish  devoid  of  all  practical 
value  both  in  itself  and  also  as  regards  the  person  of  M. 
Curcin,  who  is,  I  may  state,  no  politician  but  a  man  of 
science. 

As  Lecturer  of  the  German  language  and  German  literature 
at  the  University  of  Belgrade,  he  never  took  any  part  in 
political  matters  nor  contributed  in  any  way  to  the  forming 
or  determining  of  public  opinion  in  Serbia.  From  the 
responsible  political  circles  in  Serbia  he  was  as  distant  as 
any  simple  citizen,  and  his  present  profession  of  faith  in 
the  Bulgarian  problem  is  consequently  a  purely  dogmatic 
one. 

I  also  wish  to  place  M.  Curcin's  appreciation  of  Bulgarian 
qualities  on  its  true  level  and  to  state  that  the  "  progressive 
people  "  as  M.  Curcin  describes  the  Bulgars — who   possess 


218  SERBIA  AND  EUROPE 

all  these  positive  qualities,  some  of  which  are  lacking  in 
the  true  Slav  races  and  which  the  latter  should  have 
learned  from  the  Bulgarians,  such  as :  perseverance,  an 
industry  that  does  not  disdain  small  things,  discipline  and 
— as  a  result — the  faculty  of  organization — enjoyed  a  very 
different  reputation  before  the  revelations  of  M.  Curcin. 

The  assertions  of  M.  Curcin  are  neither  to  be  confirmed 
by  history  nor  by  the  testimonies  of  great  numbers  of 
travellers  who  have  studied  the  psychology  of  the  Bulgarian 
people.  It  is  indeed  a  notorious  fact  that  the  Bulgarians 
remained  under  Turkish  serfdom  long  after  the  liberation 
of  the  other  Balkan  peoples,  just  because  they  totally  lacked 
the  qualities  attributed  to  them  in  M.  Curcin's  article. 
Apathetic,  obedient,  respectful  of  brutal  force — they  did 
not  move  to  free  themselves  from  the  ignominious  Turkish 
domination. 

When  in  1877- 1878,  Russia  at  the  price  of  great  human 
sacrifices  liberated  the  Bulgarian  provinces,  the  Bulgars 
showed  no  excessive  enthusiasm  and  even  now  they  do  not 
realize  the  magnitude  of  the  Russian  sacrifice. 

Russian  officers  and  officials  laid  down  the  first  foundations 
of  the  political  and  economic  organization  of  the  new  State, 
and  if  Bulgaria  has  been  able  to  make  some  cultural  progress, 
it  is  mostly  due  to  the  work  of  the  Russians.  Modern 
Bulgarian  legislation  is  another  proof  of  the  lack  of  any 
specific  Bulgarian  idea  for  the  organization  of  the  State. 
What  the  Bulgars  excel  in,  is  docility  to  all  German  sug- 
gestions and  models,  and  the  mastery  of  dissimulation  of 
their  real  char  act  ersitics. 

It  would  take  very  long  to  recount  the  testimonies  of 
all  those  who  have  had  the  opportunity  of  penetrating  into 
the  mystery  of  Bulgarian  psychology  and  I  am  content  to 
quote  only  two  names  of  great  authority.  M.  Curcin 
probably  knows  the  very  instructive  book  by  Panoff,  The 
Psychology  of  the  Bulgarian  People  (Sofia,  1915,  In 
Bulgarian),  a  masterly  work  on  the  applied  national 
psychology.  In  this  book,  written  by  a  Bulgarian  of  repute, 
no  mention  is  made  of  the  high  qualities  quoted  by  M.  Curcin. 
The  other  competent  testimony  is  that  given  by  the  Bulgarian 
poet,    Konstantinoff,   in    his    famous    book,   Baja    Ganje, 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  219 

adduced  by  M.  Curcin  as  the  only  true  Bulgarian  literary 
work  of  great  value  which  vividly  portrays  the  Bulgarian 
with  his  Tartar  characteristics.  But  M.  Curcin  will  vainly 
have  to  seek  in  Baja  Gauge  for  confirmation  of  his  state- 
ments on  Bulgarian  qualities. 

M.  Curcin  has  made  another  political  statement  which  is 
likely  to  be  misinterpreted  :  "  During  the  Balkan  wars, 
before  the  unexpected  attack  on  the  Serbian  Army  by  the 
Bulgarians  in  June,  1913,  I  had  to  endure  angry  discussions 
and  to  live  through  bitter  hours  in  Skoplje,  then  the  Serbian 
Headquarters,  because  of  this  heretical  opinion.  Still  worse 
was  it  at  the  beginning  of  this  war,  in  Kragujevatz,  when 
I  urged,  contrary  to  the  opinions  of  my  best  friends,  that 
it  was  necessary  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  Bulgarians 
to  the  utmost  limit,  if  only  it  would  prevent  them  from 
taking  armed  action  on  the  side  of  the  Central  Powers." 
This  statement  may  seem  an  accusation  against  the  attitude 
of  the  Serbian  Headquarters,  and  it  must  be  explained — 
not  only  in  the  interest  of  M.  Curcin  but  especially  for  the 
sake  of  truth.  In  doing  so,  we  will  pay  homage  to  the 
loyalty  and  readiness  of  Serbia  in  191 3  to  accept  the  arbi- 
tration of  the  Czar  and  to  her  willingness  in  191 5  to  make 
some  important  territorial  concession  to  Bulgaria  in  Mace- 
donia, only  in  order  to  secure  the  intervention  of  this  country 
against  Turkey. 

If  M.  Curcin  now  speaks  of  his  "  angry  discussions  "  and 
"  bitter  hours,"  they  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  Serbian 
policy.  Mr.  Curcin  abuses  the  ignorance  of  the  English 
public  as  regards  his  personal  position,  by  representing 
things  as  if  he  had  been  a  participator  at  the  Serbian  Head- 
quarters in  the  decisive  hours  of  June,  1913,  and  August- 
September,  1915.  The  fact  is,  that  he  was  in  Skoplje 
attached  to  the  Provisioning  Department,  and  in  1915  he 
served  as  interpreter  and  guide  to  the  English  and  American 
missions  where  he  rendered  valuable  services ;  but  his 
duties  excluded  any  contact  with  the  responsible  factors  at 
Headquarters. 

It  must  also  be  remembered  that  the  Serbian  policy 
was  determined  by  Belgrade  in  1913  and  by  Nish  in  1915, 
where  the  Government  and  the  Parliament  in  plain  agreement 


220  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

had  declared  themselves  in  favour  of  an  "  entente  "  with 
Bulgaria.  In  both  cases,  after  these  votes,  the  Bulgarians 
attacked  Serbia  treacherously  and  behaved  like  true  Huns. 
M.  Curcin  personally  may  hope  for  a  "  close  union  "  with 
Bulgaria,  but  it  is  left  to  be  seen  whether  there  would  be 
any  more  Serbians  who  would  agree  with  him  in  this 
herostratic  attitude. 

Your  most  obedient    servant, 

L.  Marcovitch. 
January  19,  1918. 


The  Bulgarians  Described  by  Themselves. 

Of  all  the  belligerent  nations  it  is  incontestably  the 
Bulgarian  nation  which,  from  a  psychological  point  of 
view,  presents  the  greatest  variety.  There  is  no  nation 
about  which  such  diverse  and  contrasting  opinions  and 
judgments  circulate  as  the  Bulgarians. 

The  most  impartial  observer  finds  himself  quite  confused 
before  the  heap  of  contradictory  manifestations,  of  opposing 
tendencies  and  of  varied  sentiments  which  he  encounters  at 
each  step  in  Bulgarian  political  life.  The  world  war,  bringing 
about  the  open  union  of  the  Bulgarians  with  the  Germanic 
powers,  has  shattered  many  doubts  and  corrected  many 
judgments  as  to  the  character  and  intimate  aspirations  of 
this  Balkan  people.  But  former  presumptions  still  exist,  and 
even  recently  very  discerning  minds  have  been  seen  to  fall 
into  the  errors  of  the  past  and  accord  belief  to  the  declarations 
of  circumstances  made  by  certain  Bulgarians.  That  is  why 
the  book  of  Dr.  Victor  Kuhne  l  is  of  particular  interest,  as  he 
entirely  succeeds  in  establishing  the  fact  that  the  famous 
Bulgarian  cunning  exists  only  in  the  moral  sense  of  the 
word,  and  that  from  a  political  point  of  view,  the  Bulgarians 
have  always  pursued  and  are  still  pursuing  the  same  object  : 
the  realization  of  Bulgarian  hegemony  in  close  connection 
with  the  Germanic  plans  of  Central  Europe,  in  which  Bulgaria 
has  also  a  share. 

1  Les  Bulgares  peints  par  eux-mimes,  documents  and  commentaries 
collected  and  edited  by  Victor  Kuhne.  Preface  by  Aug.  Gauvain. 
(Paris-Lausanne,  Payot  1917.) 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  221 

The  Bulgarian  nation  speaks  a  Slav  language,  but  the 
physical  and  psychological  features  which  are  the  essential 
elements  of  the  ethnical  character  of  a  nation,  show,  without 
a  doubt,  its  Touranian  or  Mongolian  origin.     Having  shunned 
intercourse   with   Byzantine   and   Latin   civilizations,   from 
which  the  Serbians  have  profited  so  greatly,  the  Bulgarians 
have  been  too  slow  in  making  up  their  minds  politically. 
They  let  themselves  be  freed  by  the  Russians,  Roumanians, 
and  Serbians,  practice  at  first  a  policy  frankly  Russophile, 
and  later  on,  under  the  influence  of  King  Ferdinand,  form 
most   intimate   relations   with   Austria.     An   era   of   policy 
apparently  wavering  between  Vienna  and  Petrograd  follows, 
during  which  the  Bulgarians  achieve,  thanks  to  this  inten- 
tional duplicity,  some  appreciable  gains.     The  world  was, 
nevertheless,  shocked  at  the  tricks  played  by  Bulgaria  upon 
European  and  Balkanic  diplomacy.     In   1897,   to  the  sug- 
gestion of  a  Serbo-Bulgarian  ailiance  directed  against  Turkey, 
Bulgaria  replies  eagerly  in  the  affirmative  and  .  .  .  informs 
the   Sublime   Porte   of  the  project   for  the  price  of  three 
Bulgarian    bishoprics    in    Macedonia,    which    the    Turkish 
Government  immediately  granted.     In  1905,  the  plan  of  a 
Customs  Union  between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  is  made  public 
by  Sofia  in   order  to  give  pleasure  to  Vienna      In   1908, 
Sofia  and  Vienna  come  to  an  understanding  for  the  simul- 
taneous   declaration    of    the    annexation    of    Bosnia-Herze- 
govina and  the  independence  of  Bulgaria.     In  1912,  Bulgaria 
communicated  to  Austria  her  treaty  of  alliance  with  Serbia 
and  followed  the  advice  of  Vienna  for  frustrating  the  policy 
of  Balkanic  solidarity,  because  the  Bulgarians  do  not  wish 
to  collaborate  with  Balkan  nations  and  prefer  to  work  for 
Vienna  and  Berlin.     During  all  this  period  the  Bulgarian 
Press  does  not  cease  to  assert  its  Russian  sympathies,  its 
Slav  sentiments  and  its  devotion  to  the  great  democracies  of 
the  West. 

When  the  European  war  obliged  her  to  drop  the  mask, 
Bulgaria  unwillingly  accepted  this  new  situation,  so  little 
compatible  with  her  customary  practices.  That  is  why  the 
Bulgarian  Government  decided  to  continue  the  game.  In 
1913,  by  treacherously  attacking  the  Serbians,  who,  however, 
accepted  the  Russian  arbitration,  the  Bulgarians  gave  as 


222  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

reason  for  their  conduct  the  Serbian  "  treachery  !  "  In 
1915,  in  falling  from  behind  upon  the  Serbian  armies,  attacked 
in  the  north  and  the  west  by  .the  Austro-Germans,  they 
proclaimed  that  the  Serbian  attack  obliged  them  to  take  up 
arms  and  defend  Bulgaria  !  In  1912-13,  in  spite  of  the 
explicit  text  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  agreement,  designating 
as  "  disputed  zone "  all  the  territory  situated  between 
Mount  Char,  the  Lake  of  Ochrida,  the  iEgean  Sea  and 
Mount  Rhodopes,  the  Bulgarians  styled  "  indisputable " 
territory  all  that  which  the  Serbians  had  granted  to  them, 
and  "  disputable  "  all  that  which  they  had  granted  to  the 
Serbians  !  The  treaty  of  1912,  a  purely  political  agreement, 
provided  for  a  political  division  of  country,  but  the  Bulgarians 
constantly  repeat  that,  by  this  agreement,  the  Serbians 
recognized  the  Bulgarian  character  of  Macedonia  !  In  1915, 
the  Allies  had  offered  Serbian  Macedonia  to  Bulgaria  if  she 
marched  against  the  Turks.  The  Bulgarians  have  marched 
against  the  Allies,  and  yet  they  pretend  that  the  Allies 
have  promised  them  Macedonia  ! 

All  these  facts,  and  many  others,  have  decided  Dr.  Kuhne 
to  apply  a  special  method  to  the  examination  of  Bulgarian 
psychology,  and  in  his  book  there  is  an  imposing  collection 
of  Bulgarian  testimonies  and  arguments.  How  could  he, 
indeed,  proceed  otherwise,  seeing  the  Bulgarian  audacity  in 
denying  everything,  absolutely  everything.  The  forced 
recruitment  of  Serbians  is  a  typical  example  of  this.  The 
Bulgarian  papers  have  published  recruiting  orders.  The 
Serbian  Government  protests  and  the  Bulgarian  Legation  at 
Berne  replies  that  the  Bulgarians  have  every  right  to  recruit 
the  Serbians,  the  latter  not  being  Serbians  but  Bulgarians. 
(Journal  de  Geneve,  March  28th).  When  Geneva  and 
Lausanne,  indignant  at  these  inhuman  proceedings,  protest, 
the  same  Bulgarian  Minister  declared  in  the  paper  of  Mr. 
Debrit  that  it  would  be  abominable  "if  it  were  true  that 
the  Bulgarians  had  recruited  Serbians,  but,"  he  adds,  "  it  is 
not  true  !  "  We  refer  him  to  his  avowal  in  the  Journal  de 
Geneve  and,  thereupon,  the  Echo  de  Bulgarie  replies  that  it 
is  a  question  in  Serbia  of  an  administrative  measure  and  not 
of  recruitment  !  The  Prime  Minister,  Radoslavoff,  declares, 
however,  in  the  Neue  Freie  Presse  that  the  Bulgarians  are 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  223 

indeed  recruiting  Serbians,  but  that  in  Serbia  there  are  no 
Serbians,  but  only  Bulgarians  ! 

Mr.  Kuhne's  book  should  be  read.  It  was  the  duty  of  a 
neutral  to  dispel  the  artificial  clouds  with  which  Bulgaria 
loves  to  surround  herself  and  to  present  the  Bulgarians  as 
they  really  are,  as  they  show  themselves  to  be,  by  their 
thoughts  and  by  their  acts.  This  book  is  a  remarkable 
document  on  the  psychology  of  an  unbalanced  nation. 

July  15,  1917. 

A  Manifesto  of  the  King  of  Bulgaria. 

King  Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria  has  addressed  "  to  the 
Bulgarian  nation  "  a  war  manifesto  which  would  not  interest 
us  in  the  slightest  if  it  did  not  contain  one  very  characteristic 
passage,  savouring  remarkably  of  German  origin.  "  Bul- 
garians," says  King  Ferdinand  to  his  subjects,  "  to-day 
Bulgaria,  with  the  help  of  allied  troops,  has  succeeded  in 
driving  back  the  Serbian  aggression  against  our  territory, 
she  has  beaten  and  broken  this  latter  power  and  realized 
the  unity  of  the  Bulgarian  nation,  for  Bulgaria  is  mistress 
of  nearly  all  the  territories  to  which  she  has  historic  and 
ethnical  rights."  As  the  Germans  pretended  and  still  pretend 
that  they  have  been  attacked  and  that  it  is  a  defensive  war 
they  are  carrying  on,  so  the  King  Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria, 
who,  in  April,  concluded  a  formal  alliance  with  Germany  and 
Austria,  with  the  sole  object  of  attacking  Serbia,  affirms  in 
his  turn,  publicly,  that  the  Bulgarian  army  has  repulsed  the 
aggression  of  Serbia  !  That  a  sovereign  should  say,  in  a 
public  proclamation,  a  thing  which  is  distinctly  contrary  to 
the  truth,  shows  an  individual  psychology  which  will  not 
escape  the  notice  of  historians,  but  is  for  the  moment  of 
no  particular  interest.  The  matter  is  much  more  serious, 
however,  when  one  looks  at  it  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
"  Bulgarian  nation,"  to  whom  King  Ferdinand  addresses 
himself  in  his  manifesto.  This  nation  will  accept  "  the 
Bulgarian  truth  "  of  the  manifesto,  of  that  there  is  no  doubt, 
and  it  will  do  so  because  it  possesses  the  same  mentality  as 
its  King,  or  because  it  is  not  capable  of  forming  an  inde- 
pendent judgment  and  always  lets  itself  be  guided  by  its 


224  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

rulers.  A  third  explanation  is  not  possible.  Many  people 
admit  the  second  cause,  while  we,  on  the  other  hand,  give 
preference  to  the  first,  which  is  more  logical  and  more 
probable,  and  in  character  with  all  that  the  Bulgarians  have 
done  during  the  last  few  years. 

September  10,  1916. 

The  Bulgarian  Summer,   1915. 

The  recent  work  of  Mr.  Dunant  :  L'Ete  Bulgare,  1915 
(The  Bulgarian  Summer,  1915),  has  lately  been  the  object  of 
numerous  and  varied  commentaries  in  political  circles  in 
France.  In  view  of  the  conversations  which  Mr.  Dunant 
had  at  that  epoch  with  representatives  of  the  different 
political  groups  in  Bulgaria,  one  is  really  tempted  to  believe 
that  the  Allied  diplomacy  had  not  done  all  that  it  might 
have  done,  in  order  to  bring  Bulgaria  over  to  its  side,  that 
the  state  of  mind  which  was  prevailing  there  before  its 
intervention  was  already  propitious — if  one  had  known  how 
to  deal  with  it — to  a  sudden  change  in  favour  of  the  Entente. 

In  1915,  Mr.  Dunant  was  at  Sofia,  as  special  correspondent 
of  the  Temps.  The  doors  of  Bulgarian  statesmen  were 
opened  wide  to  him,  and  Mr.  Guechoff,  head  of  the  Narod- 
niaks,  and  Mr.  Malinoff,  head  of  the  democrats,  and  the 
Progressists  and  the  Radicals,  and  the  Agrarians,  all  these 
people  were  eager  to  communicate  to  Mr.  Dunant  the  ideas 
which  the  groups,  of  which  they  are  the  authorized  repre- 
sentatives, had  formed  regarding  the  question  of  war  and 
peace,  which  was  at  that  time  agitating  the  whole  Bulgarian 
nation.  Mr.  Dunant  presents  these  ideas  to  us  in  his 
remarkable  work.  All  the  Bulgarian  statesmen  belonging 
to  the  Opposition  appear  to  have  expressed  to  him  their 
horror  of  the  proposed  alliance  with  the  Central  Empires. 

We  do  not  intend  here  to  examine  thoroughly  Mr.  Dunant's 
book,  but  we  cannot  refrain  from  making  at  once  the  observa- 
tion that  Mr.  Dunant  has  not  had  the  necessary  time  for 
studying  the  psychology  of  the  Bulgarian  people,  of  its  chiefs 
and  leaders.  When  Mr.  Dunant  transmitted  faithfully  the 
words  of  a  Guechoff,  of  a  Malinoff,  or  of  a  Tsanoff,  he  had 
no  idea  that  behind  each  word  and  behind  each  act  were 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  225 

hidden  hypocrisy,  falsehood,  the  desire  to  attain  their  own 
particular  political  aims,  that  is  to  say,  power,  The  Bul- 
garian Opposition,  for  years  under  German  influence,  was 
imbued  with  the  Germanic  spirit  to  the  same  degree  as  the 
Government  itself.  It  is  inherent  in  the  Bulgarian  people 
to  adapt  themselves  easily  to  the  Germans,  as  the  Bulgarian 
and  German  people  live  and  move  among  the  same  ideas  of 
domination,  of  conquests  and  of  oppression.  In  my  book, 
Bulgaria  at  War,  I  have  written  the  following  lines  (page  22)  : 
"  In  Bulgaria,  any  Government,  were  it  the  very  best,  is 
resisted  stubbornly  by  the  Opposition  with  the  sole  object 
of  overthrowing  it  in  order  to  take  its  place.  The  Opposition 
is  always  fighting  against  the  ideas  of  the  Government, 
whatever  they  may  be,  and  adopts  without  hesitation  contrary 
ideas.  In.  1915  the  Bulgarian  Government  was  Germano- 
phile  ;  the  Opposition  declared  itself  Russophile.  If  the 
Bulgarian  Government  had  been  Russophile,  all  the  Oppo- 
sition would  have  been  ardently  Germanophile." 

In  our  opinion,  that  is  the  exact  expression  of  the  senti- 
ments which  have  guided  the  Bulgarian  Opposition  in  the 
struggle  against  the  Government  of  Mr.  Radoslavoff.  Besides, 
the  Bulgarian  Opposition,  when  it  saw  itself  incapable  of 
attaining  its  ends,  threw  aside  the  mask.  And  since  the 
Bulgarian  intervention  we  have  never  heard  of  one  word, 
one  act,  tending  to  prove  that  in  Bulgaria  there  are  people 
who  do  not  look  favourably  upon  the  alliance  with  Germany. 
On  the  contrary,  Mr.  Guechoff  and  Mr.  Malinoff,  as  well  as 
Mr.  Tsanoff  and  Mr.  Sakysoff,  the  right  as  well  as  the  extreme 
left,  profess  sentiments  of  sympathy  and  devotion  towards 
Prussia.  The  entire  Bulgarian  Opposition  supports  to-day 
the  policy  of  the  Czar  Ferdinand  and  his  Government,  and 
has  no  other  desire  than  that  of  seeing  the  French  and 
English  democracies  overthrown,  in  order  that  it  might 
accomplish  unopposed  its  designs  of  domination  and  conquest. 

In  speaking  of  crushing  Prussian  militarism,  we  should 
not  forget  Bulgarian  militarism,  equally  dangerous  and 
equally  fatal  for  the  security  and  tranquillity  of  Europe. 
The  Prussia  of  William  II  and  the  Prussia  of  the  Balkans 
deserve  the  same  fate. 

February  9,  1918. 

16 


226  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

Ferdinand  Replies  to  the  Pope. 

For  my  part,  I  find  the  reply  of  the  Czar  Ferdinand  to 
the  Pope  quite  delightful.  His  Bulgarian  Majesty  pretends 
to  uphold  any  proposal  that  is  not  in  opposition  to  "  the 
vital  interests  of  Bulgaria  and  its  unity."  Finally,  "  ani- 
mated with  the  desire  to  live  in  peace  and  in  harmony  with 
all  nations,"  His  Majesty  hopes  that  the  work  undertaken  by 
the  Holy  Father  "  may  be  crowned  with  the  most  brilliant 
success.  ..." 

And  while  the  truly  Christian  reply  of  Coburg  is  being 
transmitted  to  the  Press  by  all  the  telegraphic  agencies,  the 
propagandists — come  expressly  from  Sofia  in  order  to 
enlighten  this  good  Swiss  people  and  proclaim,  like  Mr. 
Alexandre  Kiprort,  the  truth  about  Bulgaria — are  setting 
forth  through  the  medium  of  the  Neue  Zurcher  Zeitung  of 
September  30,  1917,  what  the  Bulgarian  nation  means  by 
its  "  vital  interests  and  its  unity."  This  is,  first  of  all,  the 
cession  to  Bulgaria  of  the  whole  Dobroudja,  the  direct 
junction  with  the  great  railways  of  Western  Europe,  which 
necessitates  a  common  frontier  with  Hungary,  then,  the 
whole  of  Macedonia,  the  Greek  towns  of  Cavalla,  Seres  and 
Drama,  which  in  case  of  need  would  be  returned  to  King 
Constantine,  but  not  to  Venizelos,  finally  Salonica  inter- 
nationalized. There  is  what  one  calls  applying  law  and 
moderation.  In  short,  it  is  only  in  the  East  that  Bulgaria 
has  shown  moderation  and  there  only  because  it  was  imposs- 
ible for  her  to  annexe  .  .  .  the  Black  Sea  ! 

The  Bulgarians,  as  I  have  shown  in  a  recent  work,1  have 
a  mentality  which  it  is  difficult  for  Western  peoples  to  grasp 
in  its  entirety.  Thus,  according  to  circumstances,  national 
aspirations  increase  or  diminish  ;  and  so  the  Bulgarians 
affirm  sometimes,  that  they  are  Slavs,  sometimes  Touranians, 
related  to  the  Hungarians  and  Turks.  Periodically  they 
shower  the  most  filthy  insults  upon  France,  England  and 
Russia,  or  else  declare  sadly  :  "  Why  do  not  these  powers 
leave  us  in  peace  ?  WTiy,  they  have  done  everything  possible 
to  extend  their  front  as  far  as  our  country  ?  "  (Mir,  September 
7, 1919).    Sometimes  the  Bulgarians  proclaim  as  their  national 

1  The  Bulgarians  described  by  Themselves. 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  227 

ideal  the  Bulgaria  of  San-Stephano,  and  storm  against 
Bismarck,  who  opposed  its  creation ;  sometimes  they  declare 
that  "  it  is  a  real  good  fortune  for  Bulgaria  that  the  realization 
of  the  San-Stephano  project  was  prevented  by  the  inter- 
vention of  Germany,"  and  that  '*  independent  Bulgaria  has 
come  to  life  again  at  the  Berlin  Congress,  thanks  to  the 
defeat  inflicted  by  Bismarck  upon  Russian  diplomacy " 
(Narodni  Prava,  February  15,  1916).  Sometimes  Russia  is 
considered  as  the  liberator  and  protector  of  the  Bulgarians ; 
sometimes  they  write  :  it  is  "  a  legend  that  Russia  has 
liberated  us.  .  .  ."  Shall  I  speak  of  their  fraternizing 
with  the  Turks,  those  hereditary  enemies,  or  of  their  flirtation 
with  the  Greeks,  or  of  the  attitude  of  that  press  which, 
after  having  covered  with  abuse  "  Constantine,  the  enemy 
of  Bulgaria,  the  ridiculous  arch-strategist,"  glorifies  this 
same  Constantine,  whose  "  chivalrous  action,  of  antique 
splendour,  has  earned  for  him  the  admiration  of  all  high- 
minded  men"   (Echo  de  Bulgarie,  September  4,  1916). 

The  same  spirit  presides  in  all  the  Bulgarian  home  policy. 
Radoslavoff,  Tontcheff,  Ghenadieff,  Goudeff,  Liaptcheff, 
General  Savoff,  and  so  many  others  have  all  passed  through 
the  classic  ordeal,  which,  from  a  high  post,  leads  to  the  dock 
with  or  without  hard  labour,  and  which,  by  the  grace  of 
Ferdinand,  results  in  reinstatement  in  some  lofty  situation 
of  those  absolved  sinners  become  thus  the  most  faithful 
servants  of  Coburg.  In  a  country  where  an  Opposition 
party  can,  by  one  ballot,1  make  the  number  of  its  members 
go  up  from  4  to  170,  one  is  not  sure  of  remaining  Minister 
for  any  length  of  time  .  .  .  therefore  one  must  make  the 
most  of  it,  must  fill  one's  pockets  !  However,  these 
functionaries  of  capricious  morality  do  not  wish  to  show  a 
"  sinful  tolerance  and  mercy  towards  the  criminals  "  (the 
Roumanians),  they  wish  "  to  justify  their  reputation  of 
being  the  champions  of  the  ideals  of  humanity  "  (Narodni 
Prava,  September  13,  1916)  and  "  purify  the  Roumanian 
State  by  establishing  there  civilization,  real  civilization, 
resulting  from  work,  honour  and  virtue  ..."  (Balkanska 
Pochta,  September  15,  1916). 

1  The    Government    of   Radoslavoff,    which   to-day   possesses   the 
majority,  only  disposed  of  six  votes  before  it  came  into  power  in  19 13. 


228  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

They  pull  all  the  strings  indiscriminately,  they  play  all 
games  .  .  .  without  ever  paying,  they  employ  the  most 
diverse  means  provided  they  can  obtain  the  most  they 
possibly  can.  It  is  on  the  whole  the  Germanic  official 
mentality  adopted  by  a  whole  nation,  for,  alas  !  it  is  not 
only  the  rulers  who  think  and  act  thus,  the  whole  Bulgarian 
people  is  unfortunately  sanctioning  their  designs  and  sub- 
scribing to  their  actions  !  The  two  following  sentences  have 
seemed  to  me  marvellously  characteristic  of  certain  aspects 
of  the  very  peculiar  mentality  of  those  who  have  enriched 
our  language  with  the  word  "blackguard  "  (boulgre)  :  "To 
us,  the  good  aunt  is  the  one  who  gives  us  the  largest  cake  " 
(Corresp.  of  Sofia  to  the  Vossische  Zeitung,  January  7, 
1917),  and  "  All  means  are  justified  as  long  as  we  are  not 
vanquished  "  (Preporetz,  April  27,  1917). 

That  the  Bulgarians  desire  peace,  cannot  be  doubted  by 
any  one.  After  the  annihilation  of  Serbia,  they  considered 
their  national  unity  as  realized.  "  The  armed  Bulgarian 
nation  has  finished  its  task,"  wrote  the  semi-official  Narodni 
Prava  of  March  20,  1916.  Then  came  the  campaign 
against  the  Roumanians  and,  as  Dame  Fortune  deigned  to 
smile  upon  the  Bulgarian  arms,  the  realization  of  national 
unity  included  then  the  annexation  of  the  Dobroudja,  "  which 
was  formerly  the  cradle  of  the  Bulgarian  Empire,"  the 
Dobroudja  of  which,  previously,  they  did  not  speak  at  all. 
And  now  that  the  Greeks  are  a  fresh  enemy,  the  Bulgarian 
national  unity  cannot  be  realized  without  the  annexation  of 
a  part  of  the  Hellenic  territory,  with  Salonica,  "  Bulgarian 
Bethlehem  !  "  The  most  curious  thing  is  that  there  are  to 
be  found  Bulgarians,  ethnologists,  historians,  geographers, 
who  affirm,  proofs  in  hand,  that  Macedonia,  the  Dobroudja, 
or  Salonica,  or  any  other  coveted  territory  likely  to  be 
obtained  at  a  certain  moment,  is  the  cradle  of  Bulgarism. 
It  must  be  said  that  these  learned  men  have  a  dose  of  scientific 
spirit  inversely  proportional  to  their  incommensurable 
Chauvinism.  In  the  same  way  as  many  Germans  sincerely 
believe  that  their  country  is  carrying  on  a  "  defensive  war," 
most  Bulgarians,  brought  up  in  this  conviction,  are  sincere 
when  they  serve  out  to  you  these  "  official  truths."  As  to 
the  real  scientific  proofs  in  support  of  this  Bulgarian  con- 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  229 

viction,  there  is  no  conclusive  one  in  existence.  Recently, 
the  socialist  member  of  the  Reichstag,  Hermann  Wendel, 
a  man  who  knows  the  Southern  Slav  languages  and  who  has 
travelled  in  Macedonia,  published  on  the  Macedonian  question 
four  remarkable  articles  in  the  Vorwaerts  and  the  Arbeiter 
Zeitung,  entirely  setting  at  naught  the  arguments  of  the 
Bulgarian  Minister  at  Berlin,  Rizoff. 

The  official  ethnical  patrimony  (on  which  Sofia  bases  its 
peace  conditions)  is  therefore  only  a  conception  of  fossilized 
and  greedy  minds,  a  conception  which  science  will  never  be 
able  to  justify.  '*  Law,  moderation,  Bulgarian  unity  "  are 
only  hollow  words  without  definite  signification.  It  is 
comprehensible  that  Ferdinand,  '■  animated  by  the  desire  to 
live  in  peace  and  harmony  with  all  nations,"  hopes  that  the 
work  undertaken  by  the  Head  of  the  Church  "  may  be 
crowned  with  the  most  brilliant  success,"  since  in  the  Note 
of  the  Pope  no  allusion  is  even  made  to  the  restoration  of 
Serbia  ! 

October  14,  1917. 

Bulgaria  and  her  War  Aims. 

In  the  last  number  of  La  Serbie  we  gave  a  report 
of  a  sitting  of  the  Bulgarian  Sobranje,  in  which  we  spoke 
of  the  war  aims  of  Bulgaria.  We  see  from  it  that  Mr. 
Radoslavoff  proposes  nothing  less  than  to  reduce  Serbia  to 
one-third  of  her  territory,  keeping  two-thirds  for  Bulgaria — 
and  all  that  under  the  pretext  of  achieving  the  unity  of 
the  Bulgarian  nation,  a  ridiculous  and  imaginary  unity, 
seeing  that  Bulgaria  in  taking  possession  of  eastern 
Roumelia  in  1885,  and  of  Thrace  in  1913,  had  not  only 
put  the  finishing  touch  to  her  national  unity,  but  had 
exceeded  greatly  her  ethnographical  limits,  since  in  Thrace 
and  in  eastern  Roumelia  the  Bulgarians  form  a  tiny  majority. 

We  do  not  wish  to  deal  here  with  these  lusts  for  hegemony, 
we  limit  ourselves  simply  to  proclaiming  once  more 
Bulgarian  duplicity,  which  would  not  affect  us  at  all  if, 
unfortunately,  some  politicians  of  the  Allied  world  had  not 
let  themselves  be  taken  in  by  it. 

Every  time  the  Germanic  barometer  falls,  the  Bulgarians 


230  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

set  about  pretending  to  be  against  the  Germanophile  policy 
of  King  Ferdinand.  With  this  object  they  leave  nothing 
undone  in  order  to  produce  the  desired  effect.  The  "  Oppo- 
sition "  especially,  begins  to  work  in  conformity  with  the 
instructions  from  above.  And  artless  people  let  themselves 
be  duped  to  the  extent  of  pitying  this  poor  Bulgarian  nation, 
which  is  not  allowed  to  pursue  a  policy  dictated  to  it  by  its 
"  true  "  sentiments  ! 

But  as  soon  as  this  same  barometer  rises,  it  never  fails 
to  produce  its  attractive  effect  on  the  Bulgarians.  Thus  the 
success  procured  by  the  Bolshevists  for  the  Germans  has 
had  its  effects  upon  the  Sobranje.  The  heads  of  the  "  Oppo- 
sition "  had,  before  the  official  Council  of  the  Sobranje,  a 
prolonged  interview  with  President  Radoslavoff,  who  dis- 
tributed to  them  the  roles  to  be  played  in  the  official  Council 
when  the  war  aims  would  come  under  discussion.  Pastouhoff, 
socialist;  Malinoff,  democrate;  Theodoroff,  of  the  popular 
party;  Blagoeff,  Marxist  socialist — all  the  chiefs  agreed  to 
support  the  Germanophile  policy  of  the  Government.  But 
while  waiting  for  the  German  preparations  on  the  western 
front  to  end  in  a  second  Verdun,  the  Allies  should  frankly 
abandon  all  idea  of  separating  the  Bulgarians  from  their 
masters,  as  the  only  means  of  separating  them  is  to  beat  the 
latter. 

February  23,  191 8. 

Ill 

The  Question  of  Bulgaria. 

At  the  moment  when  the  great  American  Republic  is 
entering  the  war,  placing  at  the  service  of  the  Allies  its 
immense  material  and  moral  resources  ;  to  speak  of  Bulgaria 
and  the  Bulgarian  canker,  seems  indeed  attributing  to  this 
nation,  bursting  with  Prussian  pride,  a  value  and  importance 
which  it  does  not  possess.  However,  the  Bulgarian  problem 
has  not  ceased  to  occupy  people's  minds  these  last  days, 
especially  since  Mr.  Milioucoff,  a  notorious  friend  of  the 
Bulgarian  nation,  rose  to  power.  The  inveterate  prejudices 
of  certain  diplomats  and  journalists  regarding  Bulgaria  and 
her  foreign  policy,  continue  to  agitate  public  opinion  in  the 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  231 

Allied  countries.  This  incomprehensible  weakness,  while 
seriously  prejudicing  the  moral  authority  of  the  Allied 
powers,  is  made  use  of  by  the  Bulgarians  and  their  protectors 
at  Berlin,  with  the  object  of  raising  the  spirits  of  their  own 
nations.  But  we  can  do  nothing  to  change  it.  If  we  decide, 
nevertheless,  to  refer  again  to  the  Bulgarian  question,  already 
solved  for  us  in  October  1915,  when  Bulgaria,  in  spite  of 
the  offer  of  the  greater  part  of  Serbian  Macedonia,  fell  upon 
Serbia  from  behind,  at  the  most  critical  moment  of  the 
struggle  of  the  little  kingdom  against  the  Germanic  invasion, 
it  is  because  the  more  or  less  open  allusions  to  the  Serbian 
opposition  to  the  idea  of  a  separate  peace  with  Bulgaria, 
oblige  us  to  recapitulate  shortly  some  facts  established  long 
ago.  This  recapitulation,  let  us  hope,  will  cause  even  the 
most  incorrigible  Bulgarian  sympathizers  to  consider  the 
idea  of  a  sudden  change  in  Bulgaria  with  more  prudence 
and  more  dignity. 

The  true  policy  of  Bulgaria  was  clearly  delineated  after 
1903.  Until  the  accession  of  the  Karageorgevitch  in  Serbia, 
Germany  and  Austria  thought  they  could,  without  difficulty, 
subdue  the  little  Serbian  kingdom  and  win  it  over  in  one 
way  or  other  so  as  to  fit  in  with  the  Germanic  plans.  The 
firm  attitude  of  Serbia  and  her  energetic  opposition  to  the 
modern  form  of  bondage  proposed  to  her  upset  the  German 
projects.  These  found,  however,  in  Bulgaria,  a  most  warm 
welcome.  Bulgaria  easily  came  to  an  agreement  with  the 
Germanic  empires,  as  King  Ferdinand  had  brought  with 
him  the  ambition  to  contribute  to  the  creation  of  a  vast 
Germanic  world  empire,  where  he,  also,  would  have  an 
honourable  place.  As  grounds  for  the  agreement  were  not 
missing,  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  could  show  them- 
selves all  the  more  generous  in  their  promises  to  Bulgaria, 
since  it  was  a  question  of  the  only  defender  of  their  cause 
in  the  East.  In  the  Balkans,  in  fact,  only  the  Bulgarian 
nation,  cleverly  led  by  King  Ferdinand,  seemed  disposed  to 
support  Germany's  oriental  aims.  All  the  other  Balkan 
nations  were  less  sure,  and  as  to  Serbia,  far  from  wishing  to 
agree  to  the  German  plans,  she  was  thinking  rather  of  the 
deliverance  of  her  brothers,  obliged  to  submit  to  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  yoke      The  Bulgarian  friendship  was,  therefore, 


232  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

valuable  to  the  Central  Powers,  and  they  did  not  bargain 
over  the  price,  especially  after  the  numerous  proofs  of  sincere 
devotion  Bulgaria  had  given  to  the  Germanic  cause. 

The  political  events  of  the  last  few  years,  considered 
retrospectively,  show  the  Germano-Bulgarian  solidarity, 
manifested  more  than  once  under  circumstances  which 
exclude  any  idea  of  a  mere  occasional  and  passing  occurrence. 
In  1905,  Bulgaria,  after  having  concluded  a  secret  treaty  of 
customs  union  with  Serbia,  revealed  it  suddenly  before  the 
date  agreed  upon,  providing  Austria  with  the  opportunity 
of  exercising  an  economic  and  political  pressure  upon  Serbia. 
In  1908,  Bulgaria  approved  the  Austrian  project  of  annexing 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  and  proclaimed  at  the  same  time  her 
independence  in  order  to  mitigate  such  a  flagrant  violation  of 
the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  committed  by  the  Habsburg  Monarchy. 
In  1912,  King  Ferdinand  signed  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  agree- 
ment, but  did  not  delay  in  communicating  it  to  his  masters 
at  Berlin  and  Vienna,  and  obtaining  their  consent  by  per- 
suading them  that  Bulgaria  alone  would  profit  from  it. 
When  the  Serbian  victories  thwarted  her  plans,  Bulgaria, 
urged  on  by  Austria  and  by  Germany,  attempted  the  great 
stroke  of  the  i6th-29th  June  1913,  which  had  a  lamentable 
issue.  But  all  these  failures  only  stimulated  the  ardent 
desires  of  Bulgarian  politicians  to  realize  the  dream  of  a 
Balkanic  Empire,  so  temptingly  depicted  to  them  by  the 
Germans.  The  offer  of  Serbian  Macedonia,  made  by  the 
Entente  in  the  summer  of  1915,  was,  therefore,  a  much  too 
meagre  present  for  the  Bulgarian  appetite,  grown  accustomed 
to  the  idea  of  a  large  slice,  consisting  of  the  whole  Balkan 
Peninsula. 

The  Serbians,  after  so  much  suffering,  would  have  no 
wise  objected  to  a  peace  with  Bulgaria,  concluded  according 
to  the  general  principles  contained  in  the  common  reply  by 
all  the  Allied  Governments  to  the  Note  of  President  Wilson. 
This  formula,  accepted  by  the  Serbian  Government,  is  very 
clear  and  corresponds  entirely  with  Serbia's  desires.  Let 
Bulgaria,  therefore,  repair  the  harm  she  has  caused  to  us  and 
to  our  Allies ;  let  also  the  verdict  be  uttered  with  regard  to 
the  crimes  committed  by  the  Bulgarians  and  let  necessary 
guarantees  be  demanded  against  further  aggressions.     Such 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  233 

must  be  the  basis  of  a  peace  with  Bulgaria.  Serbia  has 
never  thought  of  annihilating  the  Bulgarian  nation.  She 
has  given  numerous  proofs  of  her  peaceful  and  even  friendly 
intentions  with  regard  to  this  semi-Slav  and  semi-Mongolian 
nation,  which  proceeds,  at  the  very  moment  when  she  is 
weaving  intrigues  for  peace,  to  the  systematic  destruction  of 
the  Serbian  population.  It  is,  therefore,  not  the  fault  of 
Serbia  if  Bulgaria  is  working  with  all  her  might  for  Germany 
and  if  she  represents  a  dangerous  thorn  in  her  path.  Gentle 
methods  are  here  out  of  place  ;  it  is  rather  by  a  radical 
operation  that  one  must  pull  out  this  thorn  and  get  rid  of 
a  troublesome  enemy. 

April  15,  1917. 

Bulgaria  and  the  Serbian  Point  of  View. 

Vain  would  be  the  victory  if  the  German  leaders  should  go  unhung 
or  unshot  .  .  . 

Letter   of   Mr.    Richard    H.    Edmunds,    Editor   of    the 
Manufacturers  Record,  in  the  Times,  4th  July,  19 18. 

The  change  of  ministry  at  Sofia  has  given  rise  to  the 
supposition  that  Bulgaria's  policy  has  been  completely 
reversed.  From  a  practical  point  of  view  it  is  an  understood 
thing  that  Bulgaria  will  never  separate  from  Germany,  and 
that  any  discussion  on  that  sub j  ect  would  be  superfluous .  But 
as  in  certain  circles  they  persist  in  calculating  for  a  fresh 
Bulgarian  treachery,  it  seems  worth  while  to  us  to  state 
clearly  the  Serbian  point  of  view.  The  material  advantages 
of  a  Germano-Bulgarian  rupture  would  be  appreciable, 
but  the  moral  side  of  the  question  is  a  very  delicate  matter. 
If  we  leave  out  Greece,  there  is  the  question  of  Roumania 
and  Serbia  to  be  considered,  these  two  States  having  been 
attacked  by  Bulgaria  without  any  provocation  and  at  a 
moment  when  they  were  making  very  favourable  offers  to 
these  same  Bulgarians  with  a  view  to  getting  them  to  decide 
to  march  against  the  Turks  and  the  Austro-Germans.  The 
Bulgarian  case  with  respect  to  Serbia  is  made  still  worse 
by  two  special  circumstances  ;  first,  the  Bulgarians  are  old 
offenders,  the  attack  of  1915  being  a  new  edition  of  that 
of  1913.  Then,  the  Bulgarians  are  not  satisfied  with  invading 
the    Serbian   territory,    they   have   set    about    assassinating 


234  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

systematically  all  that  which  is  Serbian,  and  in  this  rage  of 
destruction  and  de-nationalization,  have  shrunk  neither 
from  what  is  ridiculous  nor  from  what  is  monstrous.  The 
Bulgarians  have  rendered  themselves  ridiculous  in  pro- 
claiming that  not  only  Southern  Serbia,  the  old  Serbia, 
or  Macedonia,  was  Bulgarian — an  affirmation  that  might  be 
maintained  seeing  the  laborious  and  skilful  propaganda  of  the 
numerous  Bulgarian  agents — but  that  the  whole  of  oriental 
Serbia,  as  far  as  the  Morava,  was  a  Bulgarian  country, 
inhabited  by  Bulgarians  !  That  which  is,  however,  more 
important  is  that  they  have  committed  monstrosities  in 
wishing  to  kill  not  only  the  name,  but  the  soul  of  the  Serbian 
population  in  the  occupied  regions.  A  pure  and  simple  return 
to  the  statu  quo  ante  appears  therefore  a  moral  impossibility. 
The  New  Europe  said  the  other  day  that  Great  Britain 
in  the  arrangement  of  the  Balkans  will  be  guided  neither  by 
sentiment  nor  by  resentment.  Justice  for  all.  This  formula 
does  not  affect  the  principal  question,  that  of  the  responsi- 
bilities. One  cannot  say  as  much  of  the  opinion  of  certain 
American  circles,  where  it  is  admitted  that  the  realization  of 
her  Southern  Slav  aspirations  might  decide  Serbia  to  yield 
up  to  Bulgaria  vast  territories  in  Macedonia.  In  1915,  one 
might  consider  the  question  from  such  a  point  of  view  ; 
in  1918  the  problem  presents  itself  in  a  different  fashion. 
It  is  no  longer  a  question  of  atoning  for  interference,  but  of 
deciding  the  mode  of  making  amends  for  a  crime  already 
committed.  The  fact  of  repentance  alone  does  not  acquit  one 
of  the  crime  committed.  "  There  is  no  legislation  which 
assures  impunity  to  robbers  by  the  simple  restitution  of  that 
which  they  have  stolen,"  said  Mr.  Louis  Barthou,  alluding 
to  Bulgaria,  in  his  letter  of  September  1,  1916,  addressed 
to  the  Journal  des  De'bats !  This  truth  still  preserves  its 
value  and  it  indicates  the  direction  to  follow  for  the  solution 
of  the  Bulgarian  problem,  on  condition  of  course,  that  the 
Bulgarians  furnish  proofs  of  their  repentance.  International 
penal  law  is  also  searching  for  the  real  culprits.  The 
restitutions  demanded  by  Serbia  must  not  necessarily  deal 
a  blow  at  the  Bulgarian  nation.  They  apply  only  to  the 
real  culprits. 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  235 

In  1912,  Serbia  had  to  sacrifice  to  the  ideal  of  Balkanic 
solidarity  an  important  part  of  the  former  Serbian  Empire. 
The  deceptions  of  1897,  1905  and  1908  have  not  destroyed 
our  hopes  of  seeing  Bulgaria  come  to  her  senses.  This  has 
been  facilitated  for  her  by  large  concessions,  which  ought  to 
decide  her  to  practice  a  Balkanic  and  Bulgarian  policy. 
The  events  of  1912-13  have  shown  afresh  that  Bulgaria  did 
not  abandon  her  own  aims  and  that  she  was  anxious  to  serve 
Germany.  In  1915,  a  last  attempt  was  made,  but  it,  also, 
was  of  no  use.  Voluntarily  and  deliberately,  Bulgaria  had 
taken  the  part  of  Germany,  in  basely  attacking  Serbia  from 
behind.  "  Nobody  threatened  us,  and  nobody  forced  us  to 
fight,"  wrote  Mr.  Guechoff  in  Mir,  of  July  3,  1918.  We  know 
what  followed,  and  we  know  the  tragedy  of  the  Serbian 
retreat,  a  heroic  retreat,  imposed  by  the  Bulgarian  attack. 
Where  is  the  man  who  could,  in  presence  of  these  facts, 
return  simply  to  the  state  of  things  in  1915  ?  Where  is  the 
man  who  would  dare,  in  presence  of  violated  Belgium,  to 
think  of  a  peace  with  Germany  that  would  not  insist  upon 
the  necessary  restitutions  and  reparations  ?  Who  is  the 
statesman  who  would  accord  to  the  Bulgarian  crime  a  pardon 
without  conditions  ? 

The  Serbian  point  of  view  in  the  Bulgarian  question  is 
not  of  a  territorial  order.  The  words  of  Lord  Northcliffe 
that  "  the  Allies  would  lose  all  right  to  be  considered  the 
champions  of  human  liberty,  if  they  did  not  support  Serbia, 
if  they  did  not  see  to  it  that  justice  is  done  to  her,"  are 
exactly  our  programme.  First  of  all  punishment  for  the 
massacre  of  the  Serbians,  for  the  atrocities  committed  in 
Serbia,  and  then  terms  of  compensation.  This  is  the 
primordial  condition  of  any  agreement  with  Bulgaria.  On 
this  point  all  Serbians  are  unanimous. 

August  3,  1918. 

The  Two  Peace  Treaties  of  Bucarest. 
(1913  and  1918.) 

On  June  22,  1913,  the  Bulgarian  Government,  directed 
by  Mr.  Daneff,  had  a  communique  published,  saying  that 
the  Bulgarian  Cabinet  had  decided  to  submit  the  disagree- 


236  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

ments  with  Greece  and  Serbia  to  the  arbitration  of  the 
Czar  of  Russia,  and  that  the  Prime  Minister  Daneff  was 
going  to  Petrograd  with  this  object. 

On  June  27th,  in  the  Serbian  Parliament,  Mr.  Pachitch 
had  made  a  long  statement  saying  that  the  Serbian  Govern- 
ment accepted  the  arbitration  of  the  Czar  of  Russia.  Just 
three  days  after  this  declaration,  the  Bulgarian  army,  by 
order  of  its  commander-in-chief,  attacked  Serbia  and  Greece, 
in  the  night,  treacherously,  and  without  any  declaration 
of  war.  The  fight  was  violent  but  short,  and  the  Bulgarian 
aggressor,  after  the  failure  of  his  plan,  asked  for  peace. 
The  four  Balkanic  States,  equally  threatened  by  the  pro- 
German  policy  of  the  rulers  of  Sofia,  hoped  that  Bulgaria, 
after  the  failure  of  this  servile  policy,  would  come  to  her 
senses,  and  that  she  would  cease  to  serve  the  interests  of 
Vienna  and  Berlin,  to  adopt  instead,  like  her  neighbours, 
the  policy  of  Balkan  solidarity,  a  policy  which  essentially 
excludes  the  hegemony  of  any  one  power.  In  order  to 
facilitate  this  change  of  policy,  the  four  allies  had  at  once 
accepted  the  demand  of  the  King  of  Bulgaria  that  hostilities 
should  cease,  not  wishing  to  expose,  by  a  triumphal  entry 
of  their  armies  into  Sofia,  the  Bulgarian  nation  and  its  king 
to  a  humiliation,  which  might  afterwards  render  more  difficult 
the  reconciliation  desired. 

Guided  by  the  same  considerations,  the  Balkanic  allies 
during  the  peace  negotiations  at  Bucarest,  displayed  towards 
Bulgaria  remarkable  clemency  and  indulgence.  One  asked 
from  the  Bulgarians  no  indemnity,  no  reparation.  Serbia  did 
not  even  ask  for  the  Serbian  parts  of  the  Kingdom  of  Bulgaria. 
The  Greeks  consented  to  southern  Thrace,  with  the  port 
of  Dedeagatch  being  attributed  to  Bulgaria,  although  these 
territories  are  inhabited  by  Hellenes.  Obtaining  nearly  all 
eastern  Macedonia,  with  a  wide  outlet  on  the  iEgean  Sea, 
Bulgaria  could,  without  difficulty,  support  the  rectification  of 
the  frontier  in  Dobroudja  in  favour  of  the  Roumanians. 
In  an  economic  sense,  independent  of  the  Dardanelles, 
considerably  enriched  by  the  fertile  Thrace,  Bulgaria,  in 
spite  of  her  treacherous  attack,  issued  with  an  increase  of 
territory,  and  the  obtainment  of  other  still  more  important 
advantages  depended  only  upon  herself.     All  that   Serbia 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  237 

and  democratic  Europe  asked  of  the  Bulgarians  was  that 
she  should  practise  a  Bulgarian  policy,  that  is  to  say,  should 
oppose  the  return  of  the  Turks  to  Europe  as  well  as  the 
Germanic  advance  towards  the  East.  The  Bulgarians 
preferred,  however,  to  do  the  contrary. 

In  1914  the  Government  of  Mr.  Pachitch  had  not  lost 
hope  of  winning  Bulgaria  over  to  the  policy  of  Balkanic 
unity,  and  his  overtures  to  the  Bulgarians,  in  autumn,  1914, 
of  which  the  Echo  de  Bulgarie  itself  spoke  the  other  day, 
had  manifestly  this  object  in  view.  In  1915,  Serbia,  cured 
of  this  delusion,  did  not  cease  to  warn  the  diplomacy  of  the 
Allies,  so  that  it  might  not  believe  in  the  promises  of  the 
Bulgarians,  but  consider  rather  the  acts  of  Sofia.  It  was 
wasted  effort.  Serbia  was  attacked  by  Bulgaria  at  the  most 
critical  moment  of  her  history,  when  the  two  Germanic 
Empires  were  assailing  her  on  the  north  and  west,  in  order 
to  break  down  the  Serbian  barrier  which  closed  to  them  the 
route  to  the  East.  Serbia  succumbed,  but,  astonishing 
fact,  the  delusion  regarding  Bulgaria  remained  still  as  strong. 
The  events  preceding  the  Roumanian  intervention  in  August, 
1916,  have  shown  it  in  a  convincing  fashion. 

While  Simon  Radeff  at  Bucarest,  and  Radoslavoff  at 
Sofia,  were  fostering  the  credulous  Roumanian  diplomacy  in 
the  delusion  that  Bulgaria,  in  exchange  for  the  promise  of  a 
few  advantages,  would  look  on  unmoved  at  the  advance  of 
the  Roumanian  army  in  Transylvania,  the  Bulgarian  General 
Staff  was  preparing,  according  to  the  instructions  of  the 
German  General  Staff,  a  sudden  attack  against  Roumania. 
The  same  trick  unfolded  itself  as  in  1915  with  Serbia,  with 
the  only  difference  that  the  Bulgarians  succeeded  this  time 
in  deceiving  not  only  the  Allies  but  also,  and  particularly, 
the  Roumanians  themselves.  Roumania,  in  spite  of  all  the 
reverses  she  had  undergone,  might  have  rallied  if  the  treachery 
of  the  Maximalists  had  not  obliged  her  to  capitulate. 

The  Bucarest  document  of  1918,  compared  to  the  Bucarest 
Treaty  of  1913,  is  very  instructive.  In  1913,  the  Balkanic 
allies,  settling  their  own  fate,  sought  to  establish  equilibrium 
among  them  and  thus  satisfy  the  vital  interests  of  each 
nation.  In  1918,  it  is  the  Germanic  powers  who  impose  a 
state  of  things  in  conformity  with  their  own  interests.  Bulgaria 


238  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

herself,  in  spite  of  all  the  joyful  cries  of  the  Bulgarian  press, 
has  played  a  by  no  means  enviable  role  at  Bucarest.  The 
port  of  Const anza  is  declared  German,  the  Danube  will  receive 
the  German  war-ships,  not  to  speak  of  the  German  commercial 
penetration ;  Austria-Hungary  reserves  the  right  of  con- 
structing a  canal  through  Bulgarian  territory  ;  Bulgaria 
yields  up  to  Germany  the  two  rich  mines  of  Bor  and  Pernik 
(to  be  noted  that  this  latter  mine  is  situated  in  Bulgaria 
proper,  and  not  in  the  conquered  Serbian  regions  !)  and  over 
and  above  this,  the  Bulgarian  Government  undertakes 
definitely  and  unconditionally  to  pay,  whatever  may  be  the 
issue  of  the  war,  the  price  of  the  orders  placed  in  Germany, 
of  which  the  value  amounts  to  two  milliard  levas,  as  well  as  for 
those  placed  in  Austria,  amounting  to  four  hundred  million 
crowns.  When  we  add  to  this  the  scandalous  clauses  con- 
cerning Roumania  and  her  exploitation,  we  can  see  without 
difficulty  that  the  whole  Bulgarian  policy  is  animated  by  a 
sole  desire,  by  a  sole  principle:  to  work  for  Germany,  to 
work  for  Austria-Hungary. 

The  Bulgarian  fables  of  their  "  national  unity  "  are  all 
the  more  odious  on  seeing  the  servility  with  which  the 
Bulgarians  sell  their  own  skin  to  the  Germans.  The  Bucarest 
Treaty  is,  for  Roumania,  a  forced  capitulation,  but  a  capitu- 
lation which  is  by  no  means  final,  still  less  dishonourable. 
For  Bulgaria,  however,  the  deed  of  Bucarest  signifies  a 
moral  surrender,  a  decline  from  the  rank  of  an  independent 
State  to  become  an  Austro-German  province.  At  the  time 
of  the  final  settlement  of  Balkanic  questions  Europe  and 
America  will  certainly  take  into  account  the  facility  with 
which  the  Bulgarian  nation  accepted  the  mercenary  role. 
It  is  to  be  hoped  also  that  the  Balkanic  nations,  having 
learned  a  lesson  from  what  happened  between  1913  and  1918, 
will  be  able  to  avoid  in  the  future  the  errors  for  which  they 
have  paid  so  dear  ! 

May  18,  1918. 


Bulgarian  Canossa. 
The  Touranian  collapse  is  almost  complete.     Bulgaria  has 
already  capitulated,  soon  it  will  be  Turkey's  turn.     The  pen 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  239 

of  the  journalist  has  hardly  been  able  to  follow  the  impetuous 
march  of  the  Allied  army  on  the  Salonica  and  Palestine 
front.  Each  day  we  learn  some  new  success  against  the 
routed  Bulgarian  army.  From  Prilep  to  Veles,  from  Veles 
to  Ystip  and  to  Kotchane,  from  there  to  Scoplie  and  to 
Kustendil !  From  victory  to  victory  the  Allies  are  arriving 
triumphally  at  the  gate  of  the  Bulgarian  capital.  The 
sound  of  the  triumphs  of  the  Allied  armies  has  made  the 
culprits  of  Sofia  tremble.  The  prisons  opened  to  let  out 
Stamboliski,  the  only  one  who  dared  to  brave  the  anger  of 
the  "  Czar,"  and  the  Bulgarian  delegates  immediately  set 
out  for  Salonica — the  Canossa  of  the  Bulgarians.  Ferdinand 
of  Coburg  fled  to  Vienna.  Never  was  punishment  so  prompt, 
never  justice  so  triumphant. 

We  Serbians  will  be  the  last  to  be  surprised  at  the  sudden 
collapse  of  the  Bulgarian  "  power."  Knowing  its  character, 
we  have  never  exaggerated  its  value.  The  sudden  collapse 
of  the  Bulgarian  army  is  due  not  only  to  military  causes. 
A  country's  force  of  resistance  depending  not  upon  its  extent, 
not  upon  the  strength  of  its  army,  not  upon  the  number  of  its 
population,  but  upon  the  moral  qualities  which  a  nation  ought 
to  possess,  we  never  attributed  an  excessive  importance  to 
the  momentary  successes  of  Bulgaria,whose  approaching  end 
we  awaited  with  certain  assurance.  For  it  is  by  its  force  of 
character,  by  the  purity  of  its  moral  ideal,  by  the  attachment 
of  its  citizens  to  this  ideal,  in  short,  by  its  degree  of  conscience, 
that  one  estimates  the  value  of  a  nation,  and  it  is  upon  all 
these  conditions  that  its  destiny  depends. 

The  new  Bulgaria,  born  from  the  Russian  victories  of 
1876-1877,  completed  by  the  territories  since  taken  from 
its  neighbours,  represented  only  an  agglomeration  of  varied 
ethnical  elements.  These  diverse  elements  had  neither  a 
common  conscience  nor  the  moral  affinities  indispensable  to 
the  formation  of  a  durable  governmental  and  national 
unity. 

And  so  the  collection  of  elements  constituting  the  recent 
Bulgarian  "  Empire,"  like  that  which  formed  the  former  one, 
carried  in  itself  the  germs  of  disintegration.  As  long  as 
success  lasted,  the  heterogeneous  elements  of  which  Bulgaria 
was  composed,  held  together — and  yet  at  the  price  of  what 


240  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

efforts !     But  with  the  first  reverse  of    fortune,  everything 
gave  way  as  at  the  touch  of  a  magic  wand. 

Bulgaria,  at  the  time  of  its  origin,  was  only  a  barbarous 
State,  whose  domination  was  purely  political  and  military, 
so  she  never  took  root  in  invaded  countries,  leaving  behind 
her  only  desolation  and  ruins.  Her  position  as  a  State  was 
always  provisional,  and  never  anything  more  than  temporary. 
It  is  known  that  the  Bulgarians,  who  got  a  footing  in  the 
Balkans  at  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century,  were  a  Turkish 
tribe.  This  element  was  reinforced  by  three  successive 
migrations  of  Mongolian  tribes  (Petchegnegues,  Koumanes  in 
the  eleventh,  and  Tartars  in  the  thirteenth  centuries). 

These  elements,  which  succeeded  in  conquering  the 
territories  of  Bulgaria  by  penetrating  as  far  south  as  Mace- 
donia, subjugated  the  native  Slav  populations,  without  ever 
succeeding  in  getting  these  elements  to  resemble  them. 
They  came  rather  to  resemble  those  whom  they  had  con- 
quered, the  latter  being  superior  in  culture  to  their  conquerors. 

The  edifice  of  the  Bulgarian  State,  built  upon  sand, 
trembled  from  its  foundations.  The  character  of  the 
Bulgarian  people  was  not  of  the  sort  to  increase  confidence  in 
the  solidity  of  this  edifice.  Far  too  materialistic,  it  lacked 
moral  basis.  The  Bulgarians,  who  have  always  been  lacking 
in  principle,  looked  upon  politics  as  a  game,  as  a  speculation, 
never  as  a  mission.  Again  this  time  they  have  played  high 
and  they  have  lost.  They  staked  nothing  less  than  their 
honour.     It  is  now  a  question  of  withdrawing  the  stakes. 

The  only  thing  the  Bulgarians  cared  about  in  this  war 
was  to  find  themselves  on  the  side  of  the  strongest.  As  soon 
as  they  perceived  that  Germany  was  no  longer  the  strongest, 
they  decided  to  capitulate  in  order  to  obtain  the  right  of 
appealing  to  the  generosity  of  the  Allies. 

Their  latest  ambition  was  to  betray  Germany,  making  a 
separate  peace  at  least  six  months  before  the  latter.  Events 
took  them  by  surprise  and  upset  their  plans.  Beaten  hollow 
and  obliged  to  capitulate,  they  now  congratulate  themselves 
upon  having  at  least  concluded  peace  six  days  before  their 
Turkish  allies  and  six  weeks  before  the  Austro-Germans. 
On  the  whole,  that  is  always  so  much  gained. 

Pillage  and  massacre  was  their  way  of  making  war,  just 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  241 

as  duplicity,  hypocrisy  and  falsehood  were  their  political 
aids  and  means  of  governing.  The  Bulgarians  were  never 
sincere,  except  when  they  were  telling  lies,  and  the  Allies 
have  done  well  to  take  real  precautions  against  a  possible 
"  change  "  of  opinion. 

The  fall  of  the  Bulgarian  "  Empire,"  brought  about  by  the 
latest  victories  of  the  Serbians  and  the  Allies,  is  the  symbol 
of  a  new  life  of  liberty  and  progress  in  the  Balkans. 

October  7,  1918. 


Some  Remarks  on  the  Future  Serbo-Bulgarian 
Relations. 

The  Balkanic  question  only  presents  difficulties  in  regard 
to  the  Bulgarian  problem.  The  solution  of  this  problem  will, 
however,  be  easier  if  one  keeps  to  realities  and  abandons 
for  ever  the  illusion  of  being  able  to  do  in  the  Balkans  what 
has  up  to  the  present  been  impossible  to  accomplish 
in  other  parts  of  Europe,  those  parts  which  are  not  Balkanic 
and  which  call  themselves  civilized.  In  the  same  way  as  the 
"  Civilized  "  are  not  all  so  in  the  same  degree,  so  the  Balkanic 
people  present  themselves  under  different  colours.  Employ- 
ing the  happy  formula  of  Mr.  Jean  Finot  who  has  divided 
Europe  up  into  two  different  camps  :  "  Civilized  "  against 
"  Germans,"  the  Balkanic  nations  claim,  also,  to  differ  in  a 
marked  fashion  from  the  Bulgarians,  with  whom  they  have 
nothing  in  common,  except  geographical  frontiers.  This 
truth,  so  simple  and  so  natural,  does  not  suit  the  political 
amateurs  who  wish  to  apply  the  same  measure  to  all  the 
peoples  in  the  Balkans,  and  who  admit  no  distinction.  There 
are  even  in  the  Allied  countries  a  few  Bulgaro-maniacs  who  are 
inclined  to  make  a  distinction  in  favour  of  the  Bulgarians. 
The  Balkanic  problem  cannot,  however,  be  treated  in 
uniform  fashion.  In  the  Balkans,  as  everywhere  else, 
there  are  nations  with  whom  one  must  be  very  careful  and 
whom  it  is  well  to  keep  at  a  certain  distance.  That  is  the 
case  with  the  Bulgarian  nation.  The  general  sentiment  of 
the  Serbians  with  regard  to  the  Bulgarians  is  not  hatred, 
but  rather  a  sort  of  aversion.  The  Serbians  refuse  to  become 
friends  with  a  nation  which  has  known  so  well  how  to  exercise 

17 


242  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

its  calling  of  butcher.  Those  who  have  suffered  in  Belgium, 
in  the  North  of  France  and  in  Alsace-Lorraine  will  under- 
stand us.  It  is  for  them  to  understand  us,  and  with  that 
we  are  satisfied. 

In  the  political  domain  we  notice  a  tendency  to  conform 
to  actualities  as  they  stand  after  these  four  years  of 
war.  The  Serbian  relation  to  the  Bulgarian  question  is, 
indeed,  exactly  the  same  as  that  of  the  Allies  in  regard  to 
Germany,  Austria  and  Hungary.  That  is  to  say  :  first 
the  winding  up  of  the  war  and  then  the  reconstruction  of 
the  world.  Before  speaking  of  our  future  relations  with 
Bulgaria,  we  must,  therefore,  take  measures  in  regard  to  that 
country  for  atonement,  restitution  and  reparation,  corres- 
ponding to  the  acts  committed  during  the  war.  The  question 
of  atonement  is  the  first  which  comes  up.  First  of  all, 
atonement  for  the  premeditated  attack  against  Serbia  in 
1915.  Bulgaria's  attack  against  Serbia  and  the  Allies  is, 
in  our  opinion,  one  of  the  most  odious  acts  of  the  war. 
Deliberately  and  guided  solely  by  the  desire  to  destroy  and 
assassinate,  Bulgaria,  whom  nobody  was  threatening,  threw 
herself  into  the  furnace.  She  also  has  had  her  war,  not 
"  fresh  and  joyful,"  but  cunning  and  treacherous.  She 
was  offered  Serbian  territories  in  Macedonia  in  order  to  win 
her  over  to  the  Allies'  cause  ;  it  was  useless.  Bulgaria, 
body  and  soul,  formed  part  of  the  Germanic  block.  And  she 
has  shown  herself  worthy  of  her  masters  in  Berlin. 

It  is  quite  natural  that  we  should  put  first  the  question 
of  atonement.  The  Germans  have  molested  Cardinal  Mercier  ; 
the  Bulgarians  have  assassinated  the  Serbian  Archbishop 
Vitchentie.  The  Germans  have  ill-treated  the  Allied  prisoners ; 
the  Bulgarians  have  designedly  starved  the  Serbian  prisoners. 
According  to  the  testimony  of  the  Balkanic  correspondent 
of  the  Times  (number  of  September  29th),  M  without  the 
shadow  of  a  doubt  the  most  abominable  type  of  slavery 
known  to  modern  or  ancient  history  has  been  practised 
extensively  during  this  present  war  by  Bulgaria." 

The  Germans  have  deported  the  Belgians ;  the  Bulgarians 
have  deported  the  Serbian  population,  and  53,000  deported 
Serbians  have  never  returned  to  their  homes. 

The  Bulgarians  have  recruited  the  Serbian  population, 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  243 

have  delivered  up  young  Serbian  girls  to  the  Turks,  have 
razed  to  the  ground  entire  villages.  All  these  acts  must 
have  been  ordered  by  some  one.  Whether  he  is  called 
Ferdinand,  Radoslovoff,  Tontcheff,  Guechoff,  or  any  other 
"  off,"  does  not  alter  the  moral  obligation,  the  absolute  and 
imperative  obligation  of  the  Allies  to  demand  atonement. 
Let  all  the  culprits  come  before  the  High  Court,  all,  without 
exception,  the  great  and  the  small  !  Let  us  seize  the 
archives  of  Sofia  and  discover  the  criminals.  It  is  surprising 
that  this  has  not  already  been  done.  As  to  the  reparations 
and  restitutions,  impartial  commissions  will  see  to  the 
details.  Bulgaria  has  enriched  herself  at  the  expense  of 
Serbia.  It  is  a  question  of  taking  back  from  her  that  which 
she  has  carried  off  and  of  making  her  pay  for  that  which  she 
has  destroyed. 

A  few  Bulgarians  launched,  immediately  after  the 
capitulation,  the  idea  of  a  Balkanic  Confederation,  in  the 
hopes  of  saving  that  which  could  be  saved  after  the  failure 
of  the  pro-Germanic  policy.  Knowing  that  the  Allies  will 
no  more  oblige  Serbia  to  yield  up  to  Bulgaria  a  part  of  her 
national  territory,  Bulgaria  has  changed  her  tactics  :  she 
now  asks  for  a  Balkanic  Confederation  and  she  will  certainly 
demand  that  a  part  of  Serbia  and  Greece  may  be  constituted 
under  the  name  of  Macedonia,  a  name  purely  geographical 
and  dating  from  the  epoch  when  there  were  no  Slavs  at  all 
in  the  Balkans.  Bulgaria  hoped  also  to  prevent,  by  this 
arrangement,  the  union  of  the  Serbians,  Croatians  and 
Slovenes,  and  to  contribute  indirectly  to  the  conservation 
of  Austria-Hungary  ;  a  game  as  childish  as  transparent. 
Propose  to  a  Belgian  a  confederation  with  Germany,  and 
you  will  see  what  he  will  answer  you.  A  confederation 
entails  always  a  certain  community  of  a  moral  and  psycho- 
logical sort.  Is  a  confederation  between  France  and  Germany 
possible  ?  There  is  everything  to  separate  the  Serbians  and 
the  Bulgarians  and  it  is  a  cruel  irony  to  speak  of  a  Serbo- 
Bulgarian  confederation  at  the  very  moment  when  we  are 
in  the  act  of  finding  out  all  the  horrors  committed  by  the 
Bulgarians  in  occupied  Serbia.     What  blasphemy  ! 

Before  the  Balkan  wars  and  before  the  European  war, 
we   had    two    interests   in   common    with    the   Bulgarians  : 


244  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

the  first  common  interest  was  to  deliver  our  unredeemed 
brothers  from  the  Turkish  yoke.     The  second  was  to  defend 
ourselves  together  from  the  Austro-German  penetration  in 
the  East.     To-day  Turkey  is  set  aside  and  Austria-Hungary 
no  longer  exists.     The  Germanic  danger  is  not  completely 
abolished,  but  the  Bulgarians  are  the  last  who  could  help 
us  against  the  Germanic  advance.     The  Balkanic  wars  and 
the  world  war  have  proved  this  in  an  indisputable  fashion. 
We  concluded  with  Bulgaria,  in  1912,  a  treaty  of  alliance 
in   order   to   deliver   Macedonia   from   the   Turkish  regime. 
While   we   acted   loyally,   the   Bulgarians,   who   wished   to 
make  use  of  the  Serbian  co-operation  for  her  imperialistic 
aims  and  who  did  not  expect  our  victories,  had  done  every- 
thing in  order  that  we  might  be  beaten  by  the  Turks.     It 
is  proved  to-day  that  the  Bulgarian  Government  had  acted 
in  full  accord  with  Austria  and  according  to  the  instructions 
received  by  her  from  Berlin  and  from  Vienna.     The  treach- 
erous attack  of  the  29th  June,  1913,  against  the  Serbians  and 
the  Greeks,  was  decided  upon  and  executed  by  the  Bulgarians 
on  the  advice  of  Austria-Hungary.     And  in  1914  Bulgaria 
tried  to  enter  formally  into  the  Triplice  as  has  been  revealed 
by  the  Lerchenfeld  report  to  those  simple  people  who  believed 
still  in  the  "  national  "  character  of  the  Bulgarian  policy. 
When  we  shall  have  seized  and  published  other  documents, 
especially  those  of  Sofia,  we  shall  then  have  a  clear  conception 
of  this  servile  nation  who  worked  for  the  King  of  Prussia. 
Then  it  will  be  better  understood  why  we  Serbians  have  no 
wish  for  any  but  the  most  strictly  necessary  relations  with 
Bulgaria.     Nothing  unites  us  and  everything  separates  us. 
Which  means  that  our  future  relations  must  be  regulated 
in  the  same  fashion  as  with  any  other  State  to  which  we  are 
indifferent. 

That  which  is  essential  is  to  preserve  the  Kingdom  of 
the  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes  from  a  fresh  Bulgarian 
attack.  The  same  measures  of  precaution  as  will  be 
taken  in  regard  to  Germany,  must  be  taken  also  in  regard  to 
Bulgaria.  A  Bulgaria  rendered  incapable  of  attacking  her 
neighbours,  that  is  what  the  Balkanic  States  must  demand 
in  the  first  place.  Any  reconciliation  beyond  the  strictly 
necessary  relations  is  to-day  impossible  between   Serbians 


THE    POLICY    OF    BULGARIA  245 

and  Bulgarians.  New  generations  may  think  otherwise. 
But  for  us  who  have  witnessed  the  massacre  of  our  innocent 
population,  we  cannot  defile  the  memory  of  our  dead  by 
arrangements,  not  only  contrary  to  our  sentiments,  but 
perfectly  useless.  Bulgaria  has  chosen  her  path,  we  have 
chosen  ours.  We  are  Serbians  and  intend  to  remain  so. 
They  are  Bulgarians,  let  them  remain  so. 

January  20,  1919. 


CHAPTER    V 

SERBIA    AND    ITALY 

I 

Italy  and  the  Southern  Slav  Question. 

The  article  by  M.  Torre  on  the  Southern  Slav  question, 
published  in  the  Corriere  delta  Sera  and  reproduced  in  extenso 
in  the  fifth  number  of  La  Serbie,  deserves,  because  of  its 
moderation  and  academic  style,  a  reply  from  the  Serbian 
side.  M.  Torre  speaks  as  a  public  man  and  independent 
politician  and  his  moderation  is  the  more  remarkable  because 
Italian  official  personages  have  not  always  shown  the  same 
reserve  in  their  speeches  and  political  declarations.  While 
to  the  honourable  Mr.  Barzilai,  a  present  minister,  for  ex- 
ample, the  free  representatives  of  the  Southern  Slav  nation 
are  "  irresponsible  agents,"  the  honourable  M.  Torre  ex- 
presses, on  the  contrary,  his  admiration  for  "  the  energy, 
activity,  ardour  and  faith  of  the  Southern  Slav  patriots." 
This  difference  of  tone,  in  spite  of  the  resemblance  between 
the  political  views  of  the  two  statesmen,  renders  possible 
an  objective  discussion  which  is  in  the  common  interest 
both  of  Serbians  and  Italians. 

In  M.  Torre's  article  there  are  two  distinct  parts  :  the 
explanation  of  the  actions  of  the  Southern  Slav  Committees 
and  of  French  and  English  friends  in  favour  of  the  union 
of  all  the  Southern  Slavs  in  one  independent  State,  and 
the  reservations  on  the  principle  of  this  movement  made 
on  the  Italian  side.  In  that  which  concerns  the  first  part 
of  the  article,  we  will  confine  ourselves  to  saying  that 
M.  Torre's  argument  gives  the  impression  that  in  Italy 
the  Southern  Slav  movement  in  favour  of  union  is  considered 
simply  to  be  the  work  of  the  Southern  Slav  Committees  in 

246 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  247 

Paris  and  London.  It  is  the  habit,  in  Italy,  to  put  in  the 
first  place  the  Southern  Slav  Committees  and  to  insist  on  their 
action  in  favour  of  the  Southern  Slav  aspirations.  This  way 
of  thinking  and  of  treating  the  Southern  Slav  problem 
generally  leads  the  Italian  leaders  and  politicians  to  un- 
justifiable conclusions  on  the  subject  of  the  alleged  Italophobe 
propaganda.  The  Southern  Slav  Committees  working  for 
the  deliverance  of  the  Croatians,  Slovenes  and  Serbians 
from  foreign  power  and  their  union  in  an  independent  State, 
only  express  the  unanimous  desire  of  all  the  Southern  Slavs 
to  be  some  day  free  from  all  foreign  influence.  Their 
patriotic  action  could  not  but  be  approved  of  in  Italy,  a 
liberal  and  democratic  country  which  has  passed  through 
similar  crises  and  difficulties  before  realizing  its  national 
union.  Therefore,  if  the  Southern  Slav  movement  is  judged 
from  this  point  of  view,  the  only  one  which  is  just  and 
objective,  the  misunderstandings  which  can  seriously  harm 
Italo-Slav  relations  to  the  great  detriment  of  both  peoples 
would  be  avoided.  We  are  under  the  impression  that 
M.  Torre  has  not  been  able  to  avoid  entirely  the  Italian 
errors  on  the  subject  of  the  character  and  true  nature  of 
the  Southern  Slav ,  desires  and  that  he  also  attributes  to 
the  action  of  the  Southern  Slav  Committees  the  tendencies 
which,  in  reality,  are  but  the  reflection  of  the  movement 
of  the  Southern  Slav  populations  in  favour  of  liberty. 

"  The  problem  of  Italo-Slav  relations  in  the  Adriatic 
cannot  be  solved  on  the  simple  basis  of  statistics,  on  the 
basis  of  external  facts.  It  is  a  deeper  and  more  profound 
problem  which  cannot  be  solved  without  taking  history  and 
Italian  culture  into  account  and  seriously  considering  the 
future  peace  of  the  Adriatic. 

"  The  problem  is  essentially  political  in  the  widest  con- 
ception of  the  term.  The  French  and  English  public  men 
who  exert  an  influence  on  public  opinion  cannot  hope  to 
solve  it  by  comparison  with  one-sided  standards  which  do 
not  take  into  account  the  aims  for  which  Italy  went  to  war 
and  by  virtue  of  which  she  will  be  an  important  factor  of 
European  peace." 

We  also  consider  the  problem  of  Italo-Slav  relations 
to  be  a  political  problem  in  the  general  sense  of  the  term, 


248  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

but  we  cannot  approve  of  the  point  of  view  adopted  by  the 
honourable  Italian  publicist  that  the  whole  question  is  an 
essentially  political  one.  On  the  contrary,  for  the  Serbians 
and  Southern  Slavs  as  a  whole,  it  is  a  question  of  their 
national  liberty  and  political  independence.  The  realization 
of  Southern  Slav  union  and  the  creation  of  an  independent 
Southern  Slav  State  in  the  immediate  neighbourhood  of 
Italy,  must  necessarily  attract  the  attention  of  Italian 
politicians  but,  in  order  to  conciliate  Italian  and  Slav  interests 
and  ensure  their  complete  harmony,  it  must  not  be  thought 
that  the  best  way  would  be  to  prevent  the  union  of  the 
Southern  Slavs.  That  union  is  our  political  creed,  and, 
supposing  that  it  can  be  realized,  it  must  be  arranged  in 
such  a  way  that  it  harmonizes  with  the  legitimate  interests 
of  Italy.  The  future  peace  of  the  Adriatic  will  depend  on 
the  development  of  Italo-Slav  relations.  If  these  relations 
are  founded  on  an  amicable  entente,  on  respect  of  the 
principle  of  nationality  and  the  protection  of  the  vital 
interests  of  both  countries,  there  should  be  no  reason  to 
fear  an  Italo-Slav  conflict.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the  new 
arrangement  depends  on  purely  political  considerations, 
in  contempt  of  the  principle  of  nationality  and  the  express 
will  of  the  Slav  population,  it  would  be  an  artificial  solution 
which  would  inevitably  be  the  cause  of  new  conflicts. 

A  policy  of  friendly  relations  is  based  not  on  words, 
but  on  certain  material  facts  which  constitute  its  firm 
foundation,  and  on  what  facts  can  an  Italo-Slav  friendship 
be  founded  if  not  on  the  absolute  respect  of  the  independence 
of  both  nations  and  the  agreement  of  the  principal  leaders 
of  their  respective  policies  ?  These  are  the  essential  con- 
ditions of  Italo-Slav  harmony,  and  we  do  not  see  any  other 
means  of  ensuring  a  perfect  understanding  between  the 
two  peoples  who  have  every  advantage  to  gain  by  under- 
standing and  helping  one  another.  The  Italian  and  Southern 
Slav  theses  are  not  necessarily  opposed  to  one  another.  We 
hope  for  our  national  unity,  and  we  expect  from  Italy  not 
only  the  recognition  of  this  desire,  but  also  effective  help 
in  view  of  its  realization.  The  Italians  have  not  yet  clearly 
stated  their  programme,  but  there  is  one  point  which  may 
be  considered  as  essential,  that  is  the  establishment  of  abso- 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  249 

lute  Italian  maritime  supremacy  in  the  Adriatic,  which 
would  also  help  to  guarantee  the  economic  interests  of 
Italy.  To  compare  these  two  tendencies  and  examine  them 
conscientiously  and  fairly,  is  to  arrive  at  the  conclusion 
that  Southern  Slav  national  unity  does  not  necessarily 
affect  Italian  maritime  supremacy  and  that,  vice  versa,  the 
establishment  of  Italian  supremacy  in  the  Adriatic  can  be 
guaranteed  without  prejudice  to  Southern  Slav  unity. 

M.  Torre  says  that  it  appears  to  him  that  the  English 
and  French  public  men  look  upon  the  future  Jugoslavia 
as  a  Power  which  will  limit  and  act  as  a  brake  on  the  power 
of  Italy,  and  which,  in  fact,  will  substitute  itself  by  right 
to  the  Habsburg  Monarchy  as  regards  his  country.  M.  Torre 
says  that  this  is  a  mistaken  idea  ;  to  be  correct  he  should 
reverse  the  question  and  consider  as  a  mistake  any  Italian 
plan  which  would  lead  to  the  substitution  of  Italy  to  Austria 
as  regards  the  Southern  Slav  countries.  If  the  Allies  succeed 
in  breaking  the  Austro-German  power,  and  in  reconstructing 
Europe  on  the  basis  of  equality  and  liberty  of  the  nations, 
we  will  not  be  able  to  speak  of  "  substitution  "  of  power 
either  on  the  Italian  side  or  on  that  of  the  Slavs,  but  of  the 
attribution  to  Italy,  Serbia  or  Jugoslavia  of  the  provinces 
which  ethnically  and  morally  belong  to  them,  that  is  to 
say  by  the  wishes  and  express  will  of  the  inhabitants.  This 
basis  of  Italo-Slav  agreement  is,  according  to  our  idea,  the 
only  one  capable  of  starting  the  future  relations  between 
the  two  countries  on  the  road  to  perfect  harmony. 

June  18,  1916. 

The  Nationalists  and  the  Last  Italian  Crisis. 

Among  the  groups  which  have  brought  about  the  fall 
of  the  Salandra  Ministry,  the  Nationalists  occupy  a  prominent 
position,  and  their  grievances  were  specially  directed  against 
the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs.  It  was  blamed  for  not 
having  insisted  on  the  legitimate  wishes  of  the  Italian  people 
as  represented  by  the  Nationalists.  It  is  known,  however, 
that  the  Italian  Nationalists  have  lost  all  touch  with  true 
nationalism  and  have  become  the  most  ardent  of  imperialists. 
Their  aims  go  almost  beyond  the  limits  of  political  common 


250  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

sense.  But  it  would  be  a  great  mistake  to  treat  their  Press 
campaign  as  a  negligible  quantity.  It  is  sufficient  to  cast 
a  glance  on  the  Italian  Press  in  general  and,  more  particularly 
on  the  political  literature,  which  by  itself  is  worthy  of 
respect  because  of  the  number  of  its  publications,  in  order 
to  acquire  the  certitude  that  their  arguments  are  accepted 
and  quoted  everywhere. 

One  cannot  but  admire  this  handful  of  representatives 
in  the  Italian  Parliament,  aided  by  a  few  authors  and  clever 
propagandists  who,  spurred  by  the  ambition  to  accomplish 
the  impossible,  wish  to  regenerate  their  country  by  giving 
it  the  power  of  which  they  dream.  Neither  can  one  but 
admire  the  frankness  and  courage  with  which  one  of  the 
most  celebrated  Nationalist  writers,  Mr.  Francesco  Coppola, 
tells  the  Italian  people  a  very  disagreeable  truth  :  "  Really," 
he  writes,  "  to  our  great  misfortune,  our  resurrection  has 
been  very  easy,  and,  except  for  a  small  but  heroic  Italian 
aristocracy,  we  owe  it  more  to  others  than  to  ourselves. 
We  got  Northern  Italy  through  the  French  war,  Southern 
Italy  through  the  cowardice  and  weakness  of  the  Bourbons  ; 
Rome  through  the  Prussian  victories  over  France  in  1870  ; 
Venice,  to  the  shame  of  our  defeat,  through  the  victories 
of  the  Prussians  over  the  Austrians.  To  these  means  of 
formation  of  our  unity  and  independence  is  doubtless  due 
the  moral,  cultural  and  political  decadence  of  the  Italian 
nation  during  the  last  few  years."  Italian  patriots  are 
therefore  approaching  great  problems  of  all  descriptions, 
and  are  struggling  "  to  free  their  country  from  the  morbid 
sentimentality  which  made  it  fear  war  and  the  humility 
which  made  it  doubt  the  possibility  of  waging  it."  It  is 
notorious  that  it  is  the  Nationalists  who  have  largely  con- 
tributed to  making  Italy  break  with  Austria  in  order  "  to 
wage  the  war  of  her  redemption  and  regeneration."  But 
the  Italian  Nationalists  cease  to  inspire  admiration  as  soon 
as  they  make  their  demands  for  compensation  for  the  first 
real  Italian  effort. 

Before  Italy  declared  war  on  Austria,  the  Italians 
explained  the  reasons  which  the  Italian  people  had  for  taking 
up  arms,  in  these  words  :  "  the  sacred  egoism  of  Italy 
cannot  and  must  not  confine  itself  to  irredentism,  to  the 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  251 

taking  of  Trent,  Trieste,  Istria  and  Dalmatia.  Beyond  the 
problem  of  irredentism  is  that  of  the  Adriatic  ;  beyond  that 
of  the  Adriatic  is  the  Mediterranean  problem  ;  beyond  the 
Mediterranean  problem  is  the  question  of  world  policy  which 
will  find  its  solution  at  the  end  of  the  war,  which  Italy 
cannot  and  must  not  allow  to  be  solved  in  her  absence. 
Italy  is,  and  must  be  still  more  so,  a  world  Power.  .  .  .  The 
egoism  of  Italy  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  Italian  im- 
perialism. " 

The  Nationalists'  appetite  for  vast  conquests  did  not 
diminish  after  Italy  declared  war.  They  were  still  occupied 
with  the  great  Mediterranean,  African,  Asiatic  and  world 
problems.  That  of  the  Adriatic  is  out  of  the  question. 
Supremacy  in  the  Mediterranean  is  the  starting  point.  But, 
seeing  that  events  do  not  promise  them  much  hope  of  an 
early  realization  of  their  imperialistic  desires,  they  began 
the  struggle  with  the  Salandra-Sonnino  Ministry.  Although 
Italian  irredentism  was  represented  in  this  Ministry  by 
Mr.  Barzilai,  the  Nationalists  accused  it  of  want  of  energy 
and  even  of  having  betrayed  the  sacred  interests  of  the 
Italian  people.  In  the  meeting  of  the  representatives  of 
the  Nationalist  Party  at  Rome,  on  June  14th,  the  president 
declared  "  that  the  old  Ministry  was  not  capable  of  accom- 
plishing the  task  given  to  it,  that  is  to  say  of  attaining  all 
the  national  and  imperialistic  war  aims.  .  .  .  Also  the 
Salandra  Cabinet's  international  policy  appears  to  be  the 
perfect  antithesis  of  the  concrete  programme  which 
the  Nationalists  had  announced  to  the  country  and  in  the 
Chamber."  A  motion  was  unanimously  passed  approving 
the  conduct  of  their  Parliamentary  representatives  in  voting 
against  the  Ministry  and  its  foreign  policy. 

In  Italy  everybody  does  not  share  the  Nationalist  opinions. 
There  are  some  politicians  who  try  to  moderate  their  ex- 
cessive desires,  in  particular  with  regard  to  Italian  supremacy 
in  the  Mediterranean,  which  hurt  both  the  feelings  and  the 
interests  of  the  other  allied  nations.  But  as  regards  the 
question  of  the  Adriatic  and  the  possession  of  its  eastern 
coast,  those  who  oppose  the  Nationalists'  ideas  are  so  few 
in  number  that  their  voices  are  drowned  by  those  who  agree 
with  the  Nationalists  on  this  point.     Also,  very  often  even 


252  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

in  those  quarters  which  depreciate  the  excessive  greed  of 
the  Nationalists,  the  arguments  invoked  in  their  publications 
and  in  the  Press  are  quoted  in  order  to  justify  the  Italian 
claims  to  the  eastern  Adriatic  coast.  These  reasons  have 
also  been  evoked  in  publications  which  have  appeared 
outside  Italy  and  which,  at  first  sight,  do  not  seem  to  have 
been  made  with  a  view  to  propaganda. 

Absolute  supremacy  in  the  Adriatic  with  the  tacit 
possession  of  its  eastern  coast,  is  the  point  on  which  all 
Italians  and  all  Italian  political  parties  agree  :  the  soldiers 
claim  them  in  order  to  ensure  the  security  of  Italy  against 
peoples  who  are  already  worn  out  and  weak  ;  those  who 
imagine  that  Italy  is  going  to  take  the  place  of  Germany 
and  Austria  in  the  Balkans,  from  the  economic  and  com- 
mercial point  of  view  in  order  to  assure  their  economic 
conquests  ;  the  Catholics  in  order  to  make  them  a  barrier 
against  the  alleged  orthodox  Russian  and  Serbian  avalanche 
which  threatens  Catholicism  already  shaken  on  the  Adriatic 
coast.  Albania  has  already  been  appropriated,  the  coast 
of  Epirus  is  disputed  by  the  Greeks  and  Italians.  Dalmatia 
and  Istria  are  considered  as  future  provinces  of  Italy. 
The  leader  of  the  Republican  Party,  M.  Barzilai,  is,  in  this 
matter,  in  complete  agreement  with  the  Republican  party. 
The  leader  of  the  Reformist-socialist  party,  M.  Bissolati,  a 
member  of  the  present  Cabinet,  fought  against  the  National- 
ists in  1914  and,  by  his  articles  in  the  Secolo  on  the  Dalmatian 
question,  raised  a  storm  in  the  Italian  Press.  All  the  same, 
it  is  precisely  in  his  party  paper,  the  Azione  Socialista,  after 
he  joined  M.  Boselli's  Cabinet,  that  some  articles  on  Dalmatia 
appear,  referring  to  her  as  a  future  Italian  province  and 
not  differing  in  the  slightest  to  those  of  the  Idea  Nazionale. 
Quite  recently  the  Rome  correspondent  of  the  Journal  de 
Geneve,  usually  well  informed,  speaking  of  the  Boselli 
Ministry,  said  :  "  Union  of  all  the  national  energy  in  order 
to  pursue  the  war  to  the  end,  that  is  to  say  the  complete 
realization  of  all  the  national  claims  in  Europe  and  the 
East." 

But  according  to  the  most  recent  declarations  of  Italian 
politicians,  the  possession  of  Dalmatia  is  no  longer  a  national 
aim  but.  a  political  weapon  against  the  new  Serbian  State, 


SERBIA    AND     ITALY  253 

founded  on  the,  alleged  necessity  of  re-establishing  political 
equilibrium  in  the  Balkans  which  would  be  broken  by  the 
excessive  development  of  Serbia  after  the  war. 

An  Italian  deputy,  the  Duke  Giov.  Ant.  Colonna  Di 
Cesar o,  has  just  published  in  L'Ora  delta  Antologia  (June  i, 
1916)  an  article  entitled  "  L'ora  della  Quadruplice  nei 
Balcani,"  in  which  he  asserts  the  necessity,  for  Italy  and 
Russia  (!)  of  avoiding  the  formation,  in  the  Balkans,  of  a 
homogeneous  nation ;  that  is  to  say  Greater  Serbia  which, 
as  a  consequence,  would  throw  the  other  small  States  into 
the  arms  of  Austria  !  He  preaches  in  favour  of  a  separate 
peace  between  the  Allies  and  Bulgaria  whose  friendship  in  the 
future  is  necessary.  It  would  naturally  follow  that  Bulgaria 
would  keep  what  she  has  conquered  in  Macedonia  because 
that  is  the  way  to  prevent  Serbia  from  becoming  "  danger- 
ously powerful." 

July  9,  1916. 

Italy  and  the  Adriatic  Question. 

The  historical  reasons  in  favour  of  an  Italian  Dalmatia, 
so  often  quoted  by  an  abundant  Italian  literature,  are  well 
known.  In  spite  of  their  constant  repetition,  we  esteem 
them  to  be  far  from  a  serious  proof  that  the  Italian  aspirations 
to  Dalmatia  are  justified.  They  all  try  to  arrive  at  the 
conclusion  that  Italy  possesses  a  historical  right  to  Dalmatia. 
At  the  same  time,  it  is  forgotten  that  the  principle  by  virtue 
of  which  a  historical  right  to  a  country,  without  regard  to 
its  national  character  and  the  will  of  its  inhabitants,  is  not 
a  right  but  a  fiction,  a  creation  of  the  Middle  Ages,  due  to 
historiographical  courtesans  who  invented  the  genealogy  of 
their  sovereign  and  the  theories  as  to  the  origin  of  the  peoples, 
in  order  to  justify  the  conquests  and  aspirations  founded 
on  might  and  not  on  right. 

Why  should  this  historical  right  of  Italy  to  Dalmatia 
exist  ? 

If  it  is  because,  in  days  gone  by,  the  Romans  reigned 
over  Dalmatia  and  the  Italians  of  to-day  consider  them- 
selves to  be  the  legitimate  heirs  to  all  that  Rome  possessed 
in   ancient   times,   why   only   claim   Dalmatia  ?     Why   not 


254  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

claim,  in  virtue  of  the  same  right,  three-quarters  of  the  Balkan 
Peninsula,  the  whole  of  the  borders  of  the  Mediterranean, 
and  more  still  ? 

If  it  is  because  the  Romans  in  a  few  centuries  succeeded 
in  Romanizing  the  ancient  Dalmatian  population,  the  Romans 
as  well  as  all  this  Romanized  population,  have  disappeared 
in  virtue  of  the  great  law  of  gradual  historical  evolution. 

If  it  is  because  the  Venetians,  up  to  the  beginning  of 
the  fifteenth  century,  protected  a  few  Dalmatian  towns  and 
islands  and  the  Doges  had  the  title  of  Dux  Dalmatice, 
why  not  accord  the  same  right  to  the  modern  Greeks,  the 
successors  to  the  Lower  Empire,  and  to  the  modern  Hungar- 
ians, the  successors  to  ancient  Hungary,  who  reign  effectively 
over  Dalmatia  ?  Why  not  accord  this  right  to  the  Italian 
provinces,  to  all  the  Princes  who,  in  the  list  of  their  titles, 
possess  that  of  ruler  of  these  provinces,  formerly  states  ? 

If  it  is  because  Venice,  an  aristocratic  and  conquering 
republic,  profiting  by  the  misfortunes  of  the  monarch, 
Ladislas  of  Naples,  who  was  not  very  happy  in  his  claims 
to  his  historical  right  to  Dalmatia,  supplanted  him  in  this 
right  by  buying  from  him  a  few  towns  and  islands  for  the 
sum  of  one  hundred  thousand  ducats,  why  not  recognize 
the  actual  possession  of  the  countries  outside  the  kingdom 
peopled  by  Italian  elements,  by  those  who  are  their  owners 
by  right  of  purchase,  by  treaties  or  by  marriage  ? 

If  it  is  because  the  Venetian  Republic  had  under  its 
domination  Dalmatia  peopled  by  a  non-Italian  population 
and  reigned  over  it  as  if  it  were  a  colony,  against  the  will 
of  its  people,  why  not  recognize  this  same  right  of  Spain  to 
Lombardy  and  Southern  Italy,  of  the  Popes  to  the  States  of 
the  Church,  of  the  Turks  to  the  Balkans,  including  Roumania 
and  Hungary  up  to  Pressburg,  etc.? 

If  it  is  because  many  stones,  the  remains  of  Roman 
monuments  and  ruins  are  to  be  found  in  Dalmatia — Joseph 
Lavallee  gave  the  answer  a  hundred  and  fourteen  years  ago, 
speaking  of  the  palace  of  Diocletien  at  Spalato  :  "  I  do  not 
recognize  the  titular  ownership  which  such  and  such  a 
people  claims  to  the  monuments  of  antiquity.  No,  the 
monuments  which  it  has  bequeathed  to  us  do  not  belong 
to  any  one  people  in  preference  to  another  ;   a  nation  whose 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  255 

due  it  is  to  satisfy  the  eternal  law  that  everything  has  an 
end,  does  not  appoint  privileged  heirs  to  its  glories  at  the 
time  when  it  finds  itself  about  to  disappear  from  the  face 
of  the  Earth  ;  it  leaves  the  ground  which  it  occupied  either 
to  the  conquerors  who  have  taken  it,  or  to  Nature  who 
claims  it  ;  it  is  repeopled,  or  remains  a  desert,  as  human 
interests  ordain  ;  but  whatever  the  fate  reserved  for  the 
position  which  it  occupied  in  the  world,  the  monuments 
which  it  founded  are  a  heritage  which  belong  to  no  one, 
because  they  belong  to  all.  ...  It  is  to  posterity  that  the 
nations  who  quit  the  lists  leave  the  records  which  survive 
them  ;  and,  for  the  nations  which  have  ceased  to  exist, 
posterity  does  not  mean  one  people  but  all  people."  l 

As  much  can  be  said  for  the  Customs  offices,  barracks 
and  prisons  established  by  the  ancient  Republic  of  Venice 
in  the  Dalmatian  towns. 

As  to  the  nobility  and  bourgeoisie  in  Dalmatia,  they 
were  not  Italian  in  the  last  few  centuries  either  as  a  whole 
or  by  majority.  The  native  Dalmatian  nobility  has  been 
precisely  the  greatest  opponent  of  Venetian  policy  and  the 
vehicle  of  anti-Italian  and  Slav  political  ideas,  this  causing 
the  government  of  the  Republic  to  attempt  to  exterminate 
it  systematically.  We  are  able  to  show  irrefutable  proof 
of  this  by  the  official  acts  of  the  ancient  Republic  of  Venice. 

But  why  continue  to  enumerate  other  facts  of  no  im- 
portance on  which  the  Italians  try  to  found  their  historical 
right  to  Dalmatia,  when  the  Italian  people  themselves  have 
denied  the  value  of  this  fictitious  right  and  realized  their 
unity  by  fighting  against  it  ?  The  national  risings  and  the 
wars  of  the  years  1848,  1859,  i860,  1866  and  1870  are  nothing 
but  a  struggle  against  this  fictitious  right  to  which  the 
Italian  people  opposed  their  will.  And  again  to-day,  the 
Italians  deny  its  value  when  it  concerns  countries  situated 
outside  the  kingdom,  inhabited  for  the  greater  part  by  an 
Italian  population.  To  this  right  they  oppose  the  will  of 
the  Italians  oppressed  by  the  foreigner,  to  be  united  to  the 
mother  country.  Why  do  they  now  invoke  this  right  as 
regards  Dalmatia,  inhabited  by  a  non-Italian  population  ? 

1   Voyage  pittoresque  et  historique  de  I'lstrie  et  de   la  Dalmatie,  etc. 
Paris  an  X  (MDCCCII,  pp.   177-178.) 


256  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

This  fictitious  right,  invoked  in  the  interests  of  countries, 
without  regard  to  the  character  of  their  populations,  may 
be  harmful  to  the  Italians,  even  from  the  point  of  view  of 
practical  policy.  To  mention  an  example  :  if  it  were  regarded 
as  the  principle  governing  all  questions  of  this  sort  at  the 
future  peace  conference,  Italy  would  be  deprived  of  Trent 
and  Trieste,  the  direct  cause  of  her  participation  in  the  war. 
For,  from  the  historical  point  of  view,  Austria  has  a  better 
right  than  Italy  to  the  possession  of  Trent  and  Trieste. 


Another  right,  the  right  of  nationality,  should  serve  as 
a  basis  for  the  solution  of  this  question.  The  same  right 
which  the  Italians  invoke  for  Trent  should  also  be  invoked 
for  Dalmatia.  This  right  does  not  issue  from  the  Middle 
Ages  but  from  the  French  Revolution.  The  Middle  Ages 
knew  this  principle  :  the  people  belong  to  those  who  own 
the  soil.  It  was  the  epoch  of  right  founded  on  genealogy 
and  supported  by  brute  force.  The  great  Revolution  gave 
first  place  to  the  man  and  made  him  the  sovereign  of  the 
ground  on  which  he  lives.  If  this  principle  has  not  become 
general  and  has  not  been  able  to  be  realized  everywhere 
where  it  was  applied  to  the  masses  it  is  because  right  has 
not  been  able  to  vanquish  brute  force.  All  the  same,  the 
principle  remains  :  the  soil  belongs  to  the  people  by  whom 
it  is  inhabited.  And  the  people,  become  the  principal  factor, 
have  succeeded,  after  a  great  struggle,  in  gaining  the  right 
to  choose  by  themselves  and  for  themselves  the  regime 
which  they  desire.  The  unity  of  the  Italian  people  is  founded 
on  this  principle,  which  now  permits  them  to  claim  the 
countries  where  Italian  is  spoken  which  are  still  under  foreign 
domination  in  virtue  of  historical  right  supported  by  force. 
Italy  used  this  first  right  in  i860,  and  by  the  people's 
will,  by  plebiscite,  she  obtained  the  countries  over  which 
others  possessed  a  historical  right,  but  she  did  not  get 
Savoy  and  Nice  for  which  she  invoked  her  historical 
right. 

To  put  the  Dalmatian  question  on  the  basis  of  the  principle 
of  nationality  is  to  demand  justice  for  the  people  who  live 
there,   the   Serbo-Croatian   people.     And  that   is  not   since 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  257 

yesterday  but  since  twelve  hundred  years  ago,  without  a 
break.     During  this  time  they  had  their  national  states  and 
they  were  under  foreign  domination.     With  a  national  and 
political  conscience  already  very  strongly  developed  in  the 
tenth  century,  this  being  in  advance  of  all  other  people, 
they  undertook  the  struggle  for  the  nationalization  of  the 
Catholic    Church,    demanding    that    divine    service   should 
be  held  in  the  national  language.     From  the  fifteenth  to  the 
twentieth   century  they  suffered  under  the   most   difficult 
political   and  economic   conditions,   keeping  their  national 
conscience  and  setting  the  example  to  the  other  fractions 
of  the  divided  people.     Their  native  land  is  Dalmatia  for 
which  they  have  struggled  against  non-national  regimes  and 
external  enemies  ;   and  their  enemies  gained  more  from  this 
struggle  than  they  did.     It  is  in  this  land  that  they  created 
their  local  and  historical  traditions,  bound  to  the  soil,  tradi- 
tions which  the  Italians  do  not  possess.     The  whole  country 
is  steeped  in  their  blood,  and  in  their  blood  they  have  written 
their  history.     They  have  been  tortured  and  persecuted, 
deprived  of  justice  and  instruction.     In  spite  of  this  they 
have  created  their  own  national  literature  which  has  become 
the  common  property  of  all  the  Serbo-Croatians,  and  which 
forms  one  of  the  finest  chapters  of  the  Serbo-Croatian  history 
and  literature.     They  have  given  to  humanity  savants  and 
artists,  whom  people  have  tried  to  steal  from  them  in  this 
time  of  heroic  struggle  for  Dalmatia.     It  is  true  that  these 
savants  employed  the  literary  language  of  the  epoch,  which 
was  Latin,  as  did  other  savants  of  the  same  period  ;    as 
to  the  artists,  they  made  their  living  abroad  but  not  one 
renounced  his  Slav  nationality.     The  Serbo-Croatian  people 
lived  under  the  most  difficult  conditions  but  became  numeric- 
ally stronger  and  stronger,  absorbing  even  its  opponents. 
They  became  stronger  because  of  the  vigour  of  their  race 
and  by  force  of  events  which  no  one  had  the  power  to  prevent. 
To-day  the  Italians  who  live  on  Dalmatian  soil  are  in  the 
proportion  of  35  to  1,  whereas  the  Italians  in  the  purely 
Italian  countries  outside  the  kingdom,  at  Trent  for  example, 
are  in  the  proportion  of  27  to  1  as  regards  the  Germans. 
They  do  not  impose  its  historical  right  which  the  Middle 
Ages  created  for  it,  but  the  right  which  results  from  their 

18 


258  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

uninterrupted  existence  on  this  soil  during  twelve  hundred 
years  and  its  continuous  development. 

The  principle  of  the  people's  will  is  also  indicated  for 
the  solution  of  questions  of  this  description  by  Professor 
Giuseppe  Ricchieri.1  The  application  of  this  principle  to 
Dalmatia  is  justified  by  all  the  above-enumerated  facts. 

It  is  in  the  interests  of  the  two  peoples,  Italian  and 
Southern  Slav,  to  put  this  question  in  a  justifiable  fashion 
and  to  solve  it  impartially.  The  two  peoples  will  gain 
equal  advantages  from  its  just  solution,  and  that  at  a  not 
distant  date  as  well  as  in  the  remote  future.  An  unjust 
solution  would  cause  more  harm  to  the  Italians  than  to 
the  Southern  Slavs.  At  first,  the  Italian  Nationalists — who 
deny  the  principle  of  nationality  by  professing  imperialism — 
would  think  their  wishes  were  satisfied  ;  but  the  future 
will  show  that  the  far-seeing  Italians,  who  base  their  reasoning 
on  historical  and  sociological  laws  and  on  the  principle  of 
right  and  justice  and  who  consider  the  solution  desired 
by  the  Nationalists  as  harmful  to  the  State  and  to  the  Italian 
people  itself,  are  right.  Professor  Ricchieri  expresses  himself 
thus :  "  And  the  aspirations  which  must  be  opposed  are 
the  infatuations  of  the  so-called  Nationalists  who  declare 
every  extension  of  their  nation  to  be  legitimate,  no  matter 
by  what  means  it  is  obtained,  even  if  it  is  prejudicial  to  the 
rights  of  other  people.  The  liberal  democratic  principle  of 
nationality  has  justice  for  foundation  and  peace  and  common 
welfare  as  its  supreme  aims  ;  the  nationalist  aspirations, 
exaggerations  and  deviations  of  national  feeling,  are  but 
the  old  instincts  of  oppression  which  perpetuate  the  causes 
of  strife  between  nations."  2 

August  20,  191 6. 

Italy  and  Serbia. 

To  the  Editor  of  "La  Serbie.  " 
Sir, 
In  the  number  of  La  Serbie  which  appeared  on  July  9th 
which  I  had  not  previously  seen,  I  note  the  following  state- 

1  Biblioteca  della  Universita  Popolare  Milanese,  La  Guerre  Mondiale 
Milano  1915,  pp.  121,  123,  124). 

2  La  Guerre  Mondiale,  pp.  123-124. 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  259 

ment  :  "  The  leader  of  the  Socialist-reformist  party,  M. 
Bissolati,  a  member  of  the  present  Cabinet,  opposed  the 
Nationalists  and  the  Jingos  in  1914  and,  by  his  articles  in 
the  Secolo  on  the  Dalmatian  question,  raised  a  storm  in 
the  Italian  Press.  At  the  same  time  it  is  precisely  in  his 
party  paper,  I'Azione  Socialista,  after  he  joined  M.  Boselli's 
Cabinet,  that  the  articles  on  Dalmatia  which  differ  in  no 
way  from  those  of  the  Idea  Nazionale,  appear." 

If  the  author  of  this  statement  was  better  acquainted 
with  Italian  political  life  and  read  the  Azione  Socialista 
regularly,  he  would  know  that  it  did  not  only  publish  articles 
in  favour  of  the  conquest  of  Dalmatia,  articles  which,  for 
that  matter  are  due  to  a  journalist  of  no  reputation,  but 
that  it  has  also  published  articles  which  are  contradictory 
to  the  Nationalist  thesis,  signed  by  a  well-known  authority, 
M.  Gennaro  Mondaini,  professor  of  Commercial  History  at 
the  Ecole  Superieure  de  Commerce  at  Rome.  Besides,  the 
Azione  Socialista  adopted  an  attitude  favourable  to  M. 
Mondaini's  thesis  in  its  edition  of  July  1st,  that  is  to  say 
a  week  before  La  Serbie  published  the  statement  made  by 
its  correspondent. 

Here  is  the  declaration  made  by  the  editor  of  the  Socialist- 
reformist  paper  : 

"  We  wish  once  more  to  affirm  the  belief  of  our  Party, 
which  condemns  any  territorial  conquest  which,  without 
justification  by  geographical  or  ethnical  reasons,  would 
hurt  the  legitimate  national  aspirations  of  other  peoples. 
This  particularly  in  the  case  of  the  Adriatic  which  should 
neither  be  a  lake,  more  Austrian  than  Italian,  as  it  is  at 
present,  nor  an  Italian  lake  from  which  the  other  peoples  of 
its  borders  would  be  politically  excluded,  but  a  sea  over 
which  Italy,  guaranteed  against  all  danger,  can  exert  her 
economic  and  civilizing  influences  in  full  agreement  with 
all  the  populations  of  the  eastern  shore. 

M  We  insist  on  this  point  of  view  not  only  that  the 
contrary  opinions  expounded  in  this  same  paper,  in  signed 
and  personal  articles,  may  lead  no  one  to  mistake  the  opinion 
of  the  great  majority  of  the  party,  but  also  in  order  that 
our  party's  line  of  action  when  peace  is  restored,  may  appear 
as  the  fruit  of  our  party's  convictions." 


260  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

As  to  M.  Bissolati,  no  one  has  any  right  to  accuse  him 
gratuitiously  of  having  changed  his  programme. 

His  articles  in  1914  on  the  necessity  of  recognizing  the 
rights  of  the  Slavs  in  Dalmatia  only  provoked  a  storm  in 
the  teacup  of  the  Imperialist  Press.  The  Secolo,  the  great 
Milan  democratic  paper,  since  November,  1914,  pronounced 
itself  distinctly  in  favour  of  M.  Bissolati's  thesis  ;  and  since 
then  it  has  never  wished  to  change  its  views.  And  the 
supporters  of  M.  Bissolati's  thesis  are  far  from  being  so  few 
as  La  Serbie's  correspondent  states. 

The  truth  is  that  there  is  in  Italy  a  group  of  Imperialists 
which  covets  Dalmatia  just  as  the  extreme  Nationalists 
amongst  the  Southern  Slavs  claim  Trieste,  Gorizia,  Pola  and 
even  Udine  !  Iliacos  intra  tnuros  peccatur  et  extra.  But  this 
excess  on  the  part  of  Italian  nationalism  meets  perhaps  with 
more  energetic  opposition  in  Italy  than  the  excess  of  Southern 
Slav  nationalism  meets  with  amongst  the  Southern  Slavs. 

General  public  opinion  in  Italy  leaves  it  to  the  govern- 
ment. The  best  proof  of  this  state  of  affairs  is  given  by 
the  great  national  paper  of  Milan,  the  Corriere  delta  Sera,  which 
has  a  circulation  of  600,000  copies  and  which  has  never  taken 
up  arms  for  or  against  the  Adriatic  imperialistic  thesis.  Under 
these  circumstances,  the  Serbian  moderate  party  and  the 
Italian  moderate  party  should  agree  to  take  common  action. 

False  information  of  the  kind  furnished  by  La  Serbie  of 
July  9th,  can  only  serve  one  end  :  render  this  common 
action  impossible,  by  making  the  Serbians  believe  that  all 
Italians  have  lost  their  heads,  by  paralysing  the  action  of 
the  Serbian  moderate  party  and  by  bringing  about,  as  a 
reaction,  the  weakening  of  moderate  Italian  tendencies  to 
the  advantage  of  the  imperialistic  agitations. 

La  Serbie,  which,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  does  not  belong 
to  the  Southern  Slav  extreme  Nationalist  group,  should  apply 
itself  to  the  prevention  of  these  misunderstandings  which 
can  only  render  the  greatest  services  to  Germany  and  Austria. 

Thanking  you  for  your  hospitality,  please  accept,  Sir, 
the  assurance  of  my  highest  esteem. 

G    Salvemini, 
Professor  of  History  at  the  University  of  Pisa, 

Pisa,  September  11,  1916. 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  261 

The  reply  of  the  Editor  of  "La  Serbie." 

Professor  Salvemini  may  rest  assured  that  his  declaration 
with  respect  to  the  small  amount  of  influence  which  the 
Nationalist  imperialists  possess  in  Italy,  will  be  received  with 
great  satisfaction  in  Slav  circles.  The  perfect  harmony 
between  the  two  neighbouring  and  allied  nations,  for  which 
we  are  loyally  working,  will  be  all  the  more  easily  realized 
if  the  chauvinistic  elements  are  deprived  of  all  serious  con- 
sideration. The  whole  attitude  of  La  Serbie  in  this  delicate 
question  proves  that  it  will  do  nothing  which  might  com- 
promise Italo-Slav  relations.  And  I  may  add  that  the 
efforts  made  by  M.  Salvemini,  in  view  of  a  Serbo-Italian 
entente,  from  the  publication  of  his  pamphlet  Guerra  o 
neutralita,  of  which  I  have  spoken  to  the  Serbian  public 
with  the  greatest  gratitude  (see  the  Serbian  review  Delo, 
of  April  i,  1915)  down  to  his  latest  articles,  are  not  forgotten 
by  the  Serbians.  They  are  valued  all  the  more  by  us  that 
the  number  of  those  in  Italy  who  share  M.  Salvemini's 
opinions  is  unhappily  still  relatively  small. 

That  the  majority  of  Italians  leave  the  solution  of  these 
questions  to  the  government  is  all  very  well.  But  in  order 
to  arrive  at  an  entente  cordiale,  the  respective  governments 
must  be  assisted  to  find  a  way  to  perfect  reconciliation  and 
to  banish  pernicious  influences  which  could  be  brought  to 
bear  on  their  members  by  exclusive  minds.  The  victory 
of  the  Allies  will  create  a  new  situation  and  in  order  to  make 
the  two  peoples  appreciate  the  value  of  their  mutual  friend- 
ship and  understand  the  grave  prejudices  from  which  they 
would  both  suffer  in  case  of  separation — we  must  talk  and 
talk  reasonably  like  Professor  Salvemini,  or  M.  Mondaini, 
in  his  remarkable  article  on  "  Adriatic  Imperialism  "  which 
we  will  discuss  in  our  paper  without  delay. 

September  24,  1916.  L.  Marcovitch. 

Italy,  Serbia  and  the  Adriatic. 

(A  Southern  Slav  reply  to  M.  Salvemini' s  letter.) 

The   letter    of   the    distinguished    Professor    of    Modern 
History  at  the  University  of  Pisa,  M.  Gaetano  Salvemini, 


262  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

published  in  No.  21  of  La  Serbie,  though  showing  the  highly 
conciliatory  and  healthy  spirit  of  moderation  of  its  author, 
contains,  nevertheless,  certain  statements  which  are  inaccurate 
and  which  should  be  noted  and  rectified.  M.  Salvemini 
writes  :  "  The  truth  is  that  there  exists  in  Italy,  a  group 
of  Imperialists  which  covets  Dalmatia  just  as  the  extreme 
Nationalists  amongst  the  Southern  Slavs  claim  Trieste,  Gorizia, 
Pola  and  even  Udine  !  Iliacos  intra  muros  peccatur  et  extra. 
But  this  excess  on  the  part  of  Italian  nationalism  meets 
perhaps  with  more  energetic  opposition  in  Italy  than  the 
excess  of  Southern  Slav  nationalism  meets  with  amongst 
the  Southern  Slavs." 

But  it  seems  to  us  that  the  distinguished  professor,  in 
expressing  this  opinion,  is  not  well  enough  aware  of  either 
the  extent  of  the  Southern  Slav  aspirations  or  the  character 
of  the  territories  of  reciprocal  competition  between  Italians 
and  Southern  Slavs.  Even  the  most  extreme  of  extreme 
Southern  Slavs  have  never  claimed  Udine.  Here  is  evidently 
a  misunderstanding  caused  by  certain  Southern  Slav  ethno- 
graphical maps,  in  which  a  small  corner  of  the  Kingdom 
of  Italy,  to  the  north  of  Udine,  has  been  included  in  the 
territory  where  the  Southern  Slav  language  is  spoken.  But 
this  only  affirms  an  actual  fact  which  is  universally  known, 
that  there  is  also  a  small  group  of  Southern  Slavs,  composed 
of  34,000  Slovenes,  within  the  actual  frontiers  of  Italy.  This 
fact  is  recognized  even  in  Italian  statistics,  and  is  also 
marked  in  all  the  Italian  and  German  ethnographical  maps 
of  any  scientific  value.  But  there  is  a  difference  between 
the  objective  recognition  of  the  existence  of  a  small  centre 
of  Southern  Slav  population  in  the  Kindom  of  Italy  and 
a  claim  to  the  territory  which  it  inhabits.  And  I  may  say, 
defying  any  statement  to  the  contrary,  that  no  Southern 
Slav  party  or  politician  has  ever  dreamt  of  claiming  any 
part  whatever  of  Italian  territory,  even  if  it  is  inhabited  by 
Southern  Slavs. 

In  that  which  concerns  the  other  aspirations  of  the  two 
races,  there  is  no  comparison  between  the  Italian  desires 
as  regards  Dalmatia  and  the  Southern  Slav  claims  to  Trieste, 
Gorizia  and  Pola.  The  Italian  element  in  Dalmatia  includes 
2*8  per  cent,  of  the  population  (610,669  Southern  Slavs  as 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  263 

against  18,028  Italians),  whilst  the  Slav  element  at  Trieste 
includes  29*81  per  cent.  (118,959  Italians  as  against  59,319 
Southern  Slavs),  at  Gorizia  37*11  per  cent.  (14,812  Italians 
as  against  10,866  Southern  Slavs)  and  at  Pola  25  per  cent. 
(25,043  Italians  as  against  8,417  Southern  Slavs).  It  is  to 
be  noted  that  this  numerical  relation  between  the  Italians 
and  Southern  Slav  populations  at  Trieste,  Gorizia  and  Pola 
reflects  only  the  ethnographical  conditions  in  the  towns 
themselves  and  not  in  the  districts  of  the  same  names. 
Further,  the  Italians,  in  their  claims  do  not  restrict  them- 
selves to  coveting  the  towns  alone  but  also  wish  to  possess 
the  districts  and  even  the  whole  provinces.  And  here  the 
numerical  proportion  changes  in  favour  of  the  Southern 
Slavs.  Thus,  in  order  to  ensure  possession  of  the  town  of 
Trieste  which  is  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  Southern  Slav 
territory,  the  Italians  claim  not  only  the  Slovene  coast  from 
Monfalcone  to  Trieste,  but  also  the  whole  plateau  of  Karst 
(Carso),  including  two  purely  Southern  Slav  districts  with 
a  population  of  45,000  souls.  If  these  45,000  Southern 
Slavs  are  added  to  the  59,319  of  the  town  of  Trieste,  a  popu- 
lation composed  of  104,319  Southern  Slavs  and  118,959 
Italians  is  contained  for  the  whole  territory.  For  Gorizia, 
the  result  is  still  more  favourable  to  the  Southern  Slavs, 
for  its  district,  which  is  also  coveted  by  the  Italians,  contains 
a  population  of  70,061  Southern  Slavs  and  only  2,765  Italians, 
which  gives  for  the  whole  territory  a  population  of  80,927 
Southern  Slavs  and  17,577  Italians  in  all.  For  Pola,  in  adding 
the  district  population  to  that  of  the  town,  the  following 
result  is  obtained  :  38,108  Italians  as  against  24,697  Southern 
Slavs.  It  should  be  remarked  that  the  Southern  Slav  popu- 
lation is  composed  in  the  majority  of  peasants,  that  is  to 
say  small  proprietors  of  land,  who  are  the  steadiest  element 
in  the  region. 

What  is  the  consequence  of  these  figures  and  facts  if 
not  that  these  regions  are  inhabited  by  almost  the  same 
numbers  of  Italians  and  Southern  Slavs,  and  that  the  two 
races  have  equal  right  to  claim  possession  ?  It  is  for  the 
representatives  of  the  two  peoples,  Italian  and  Southern 
Slav,  and  the  respective  governments,  to  settle  the  question 
by  an  amicable  and  equable  agreement.     But  before  this 


264  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

agreement  is  concluded,  before  even  the  first  exchange  of 
views  between  the  representatives  of  the  two  peoples  takes 
place,  the  Italians  cannot  take  possession  of  the  regions 
of  Trieste,  Gorizia  and  Pola,  treating  the  Southern  Slavs, 
who  claim  the  same  rights  to  these  territories  as  extreme 
Nationalists,  equal  to  the  Italian  Imperialists  who  covet 
the  possession  of  Dalmatia,  a  province  where  the  Southern 
Slav  and  Italian  populations  are  in  the  proportion  of  97  to 
2* 8  per  cent. 

But  as  it  is  a  question  of  comparisons,  we  also  could  make 
one  which,  better  than  any  other,  shows  by  what  kind  of 
moderation  the  two  opposing  parties  are  animated  in  their 
territorial  disputes.  M.  Salvemini,  in  his  interesting  letter, 
quotes  as  an  example  of  moderation,  Professor  Mondaini's 
article,  published  in  the  Azione  Socialista  of  July  1st.  In 
fact,  this  article,  written  with  remarkable  competence  and 
knowledge  of  the  subject,  is  animated  by  such  a  spirit  of 
justice  and  conciliation,  that  one  could  easily  believe  that 
the  agreement  between  Italians  and  Southern  Slavs  would 
soon  be  arranged  if  M.  Mondaini's  opinions  were  also  those 
of  Italian  government  circles.  But  M.  Mondaini,  who  is 
nevertheless  one  of  the  most  moderate  Italian  publicists, 
insists  that  the  future  frontier  of  Italy,  Serbia  or  Jugoslavia 
should  be  that  of  the  Roman  Empire  of  Augustine's  time. 
It  would  follow  the  Arsa,  a  small  river  of  eastern  Istria  and 
would  include  within  the  Italian  frontiers  the  town  and 
province  of  Gorizia,  that  of  Trieste  (with  the  surrounding 
territory)  and  three-quarters  of  the  province  of  Istria,  which 
would  consequently,  mean  the  annexation  of  a  Southern 
Slav  population  of  364,000  souls  by  Italy.  That  is  the 
smallest  programme  proposed  by  moderate  Italians,  Professor 
Salvemini  among  others.  Let  us  now  consider  the  proposals 
made  by  the  Southern  Slavs  whom  M.  Salvemini,  in  his  letter, 
calls  "  extreme  Nationalists."  These  Southern! Slavs,  as  the 
utmost  of  their  aspirations,  claim  the  Southern  Slav  section 
of  population  of  the  province  of  Gorizia  with  the  town 
(leaving  the  Italian  section  with  Gradisca  and  Monfalcone 
to  the  Italians),  Trieste  and  the  whole  of  Istria,  that  is  to 
say,  a  territory  which,  besides  a  population  in  majority 
Slav,  contains  also  284,325  Italians,  which  they  also  wish 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  265 

to  include  in  the  future  Southern  Slav  State.1  In  comparing 
these  two  programmes,  it  is  seen  that  the  moderate  Italians 
covet  364,000  Southern  Slavs  whilst  the  "  extreme  Southern 
Slav  Nationalists  "  wish  to  include  only  284,325  Italians  in 
their  State.  This  leads  to  an  astonishing  conclusion  :  that 
the  extreme  Southern  Slav  elements,  in  their  greatest  claims, 
are  more  moderate  than  the  moderate  Italians  in  their  most 
limited  programme. 

M.  Salvemini  also  names  the  Milan  Secolo  in  his  letter 
as  one  of  those  papers  which  do  not  approve  of  the  Italian 
imperialistic  aims  in  Dalmatia.  "  It  adopted  from  1914," 
he  writes,  "  M.  Bissolati's  thesis  and  since  then  has  never 
wished  to  change  its  views."  We  regret  that  we  are  unable 
to  say  the  same  of  the  controllers  of  the  great  democratic 
paper  of  Milan,  because  we  have  found,  since  the  month 
of  November,  1914,  and  more  particularly  in  the  edition 
of  the  Secolo  of  May  8,  191 5,  some  remarks  which  are  any- 
thing but  friendly  to  Serbia  and  the  Southern  Slavs.  This 
is  what  the  Milanese  paper  wrote  :  "If  the  Serbians  succeed 
in  including  the  Croatians  within  their  frontiers,  they  will 
become  too  powerful  and  we  should  consider  every  possibility. 
It  is  better  for  us  to  support  two  other  nations  (the  Croatians 
and  Albanians)  and  thus  divide  the  imperialistic  Serbian 
block  and  reduce  it  to  its  proper  dimensions,  for  it  is  better 
to  have  two  small  States  as  neighbours  than  one  State  which 
includes  them  both.  With  an  Albania,  anti-Slav  par  ex- 
cellence, on  one  side,  and  a  Catholic  and  anti-Serbian  Croatia 
on  the  other,  we  would  establish  advantageous  equilibrium 
in  the  eastern  Adriatic,  dividing  the  Slav  forces,  which  have 
too  many  tendencies  to  grow,  but  few  to  unite."  Since  then, 
we  have  not  been  able  to  read  anything  in  the  great  demo- 
cratic paper  of  Milan,  excepting  M.  Salvemini 's  articles, 
which  could  make  us  believe  that  it  does  not  approve  of 
the  aims  of  Italian  Imperialists  as  regards  the  possession  of 
the  Adriatic  provinces. 

M.  Salvemini  writes  that  in  Italy  it  is  "  an  imperialistic 

group  which  covets  Dalmatia."     If  it  is  so,  if  it  is  really 

only  the  Imperialists  who  make  this  claim,  why  not  proclaim 

it  inyull|daylight  ?     Such  a  fact  could  only  produce  the 

1  See  the  Southern  Slav  Programme,  p.  24,  Paris,  1916. 


266  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

most  desirable  consequences.  We  do  not  doubt  that  there 
are  great  numbers  of  reasonable  people  in  Italy  who  recognize 
that  it  is  not  possible,  in  the  twentieth  century,  in  the  very 
heart  of  Europe,  to  found  colonial  dominations  in  opposition 
to  the  rights  of  humanity  and  nature  itself,  because  that 
would  be  doubting  the  common  sense  of  the  Italian  nation. 
We  regret  only  that  these  just  and  sensible  people,  except 
for  a  few  rare  exceptions — M.  Salvemini  is  one  of  them, 
and  we  are  willingly  grateful  for  his  noble  efforts — remain 
silent,  not  daring  to  express  their  opinions  aloud.  Thus  the 
field  is  left  clear  for  the  political  dilettanti  disguised,  to 
quote  M.  Mondaini's  expression,  in  "  national  clothing,"  who 
benefit  greatly  from  the  fact. 

To  struggle  against  the  imperialistic  agitations,  that  is 
the  great  and  difficult  task  imposed  on  all  Italians  who  have 
any  common  sense.  The  Southern  Slavs  ask  for  nothing 
better  than  to  find,  on  the  Italian  side,  men  who  see  things 
in  their  true  light  and  who  would  be  prepared  to  discuss 
with  them  the  questions  which  interest  the  two  peoples, 
without  preconceived  ideas  and  parti  pris.  The  Southern 
Slav  representatives  did  not  begin  their  action  in  Rome  by 
accident,  and  it  is  not  their  fault  either  that  an  agreement 
between  Italy  and  Serbia  was  not  concluded  before  Italy 
entered  the  war.  Many  questions  which  at  present  agitate 
Italian  and  Southern  Slav  public  opinion,  would  not  even 
have  presented  themselves  and  M.  Salvemini  would  not 
have  had  the  chance  of  reproaching  the  Southern  Slavs 
with  always  preaching  the  programme  of  their  most  ex- 
aggerated aspirations.  In  any  case,  what  has  been  neglected 
in  the  past  can  be  accomplished  now  or  in  the  near  future. 
That  depends  solely  on  the  Italians  and  their  government. 
The  Southern  Slavs  did  not  open  the  debate  and  it  is  not 
for  them  to  close  it. 

October  8,  1916. 

■ » 

The  Illusions  of  an  Italian. 

Facts  relating  to  the  Southern  Slav  Union. 

One  of  the  great  obstacles  to  the  settlement  of  the  Serbo- 
Italian  difficulties  consists  in  the  superficial  or  else  false 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  267 

conceptions  of  numerous  Italian  publicists  relating  to  the 
tendencies  of  the  Southern  Slav  Union.  The  notorious  fact 
that  the  three  sections  of  our  nation,  although  politically 
divided,  form  an  inseparable  whole,  animated  by  the  same 
feelings  and  aspirations  and  the  same  will  to  develop  without 
restraint — this  same  fact  is  not  yet  recognized  by  many 
Italians.  It  is  therefore  not  surprising  that  Italian  publica- 
tions are  full  of  alleged  disputes  between  Serbians,  Croatians 
and  Slovenes,  whilst  the  Southern  Slav  national  conscience, 
unique  and  inseparable,  gives  evident  proof  that  our  people 
may  be  politically  dismembered  but  can  never  be  ethno- 
graphically  divided. 

What  is  most  curious  is  that  it  is  always  foreigners  who 
want  to  persuade  us  that  we,  the  Serbians,  Croatians  and 
Slovenes,  do  not  form  a  single  ethnical  group  but  rather 
three  different  peoples.  Until  the  great  European  war,  it 
was  Austria  who  refused  to  admit  the  national  Southern 
Slav  union,  and  who  employed  geographical  or  historico- 
political  terms  in  order  to  dissimulate  the  truth  about  the 
union  of  our  race.  And  when  one  reads  the  Austrian  news- 
papers and  publications,  one  finds  Bosnians,  Montenegrins, 
Herzegovinians,  Croatians,  Dalmatians,  Serbians  and  Slovenes 
and  by  this  diversity  of  names  the  illusion  of  diversity  was 
formed.  To-day  it  is  the  Italians  who  try  to  convert  and 
separate  us.  Austria  had  a  special  interest  in  dividing  her 
races  in  order  to  subjugate  them  all,  but  Italy,  nationally 
united  and  democratically  organized  Italy,  what  interest 
can  she  have  in  trying  to  divide  a  people  conscious  of  its 
national  unity  ?     That  is  what  we  cannot  understand. 

A  grotesque  example  of  the  strange  conceptions  which 
certain  Italian  publicists  have  about  the  Serbians,  and  the 
Southern  Slavs  generally,  is  given  by  M.  Francesco  Bianco 
in  his  article  "  Serbia  and  Jugoslavia,"  published  in  the 
Tribuna  of  October  31st.  We  would  have  to  write  a  whole 
book  in  order  to  reply  to  this  mass  of  inexactitudes,  of  falsi- 
fications of  facts  and  false  representations  of  Southern  Slav 
aspirations.  But  that  is  unnecessary.  It  is  sufficient  to 
quote  a  few  statements  of  this  Italian  publicist  in  order  to 
show  the  absurdity  of  his  arguments  and  the  conclusions 
to  which  they  lead. 


268  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

M.  Bianco  finds — what  indulgence  ! — that  no  one  could 
contest  the  existence  of  Serbia  as  a  special  national  unit 
with  its  own  traditions,  but  that  Jugoslavia  is  only  a  fantastic 
combination  devoid  of  the  elements  of  union.  For  him, 
Serbia  is  the  product  of  M  oriental  civilization,  whereas  the 
Croatians  and  Slovenes  are  old  '  European  '  peoples,  brought 
up  on  western  civilization.  The  Serbians  are  a  young  nation 
full  of  vitality  and  if  they  effected  their  union  with  the 
Croatians  and  Slovenes  they  would  run  the  risk  of  being 
ruined  by  Jugoslavia  !  That  is  why,"  Mr.  Bianco  concludes, 
"  Jugoslavia  is  '  a  harmful  and  impossible  thing.' ' ' 

It  is  not  a  case  here,  this  noble  Italian  tells  us,  of  the 
principle  of  nationality  but  of  the  "  superior  interests  ?  of 
the  whole  of  Europe.  If  the  Southern  Slav  union  were 
realized,  Serbia  would  be  sacrificed  to  Zagreb  and  Ljubljana  ; 
she  would  become  a  "  hinterland  "  of  Croatian  and  Slovene 
oligarchies !  The  "  good "  Serbian  people,  composed  of 
"  shepherds  and  ploughmen,"  would  be  exploited  by  the 
Croatian  and  Slovene  bourgeoisie  and  would  represent  a 
"  danger  to  Europe."  On  the  contrary,  if  Serbia  remained 
in  the  Balkans  and  continued  to  exist  as  an  "  oriental  State  " 
possessing  "  another  kind  of  civilization,"  she  would  progress 
and  the  peace  of  Europe  would  be  preserved  ! 

After  this  introduction,  M.  Bianco  passes  to  his  essential 
arguments.  "  Jugoslavia,"  he  says,  "  is  the  means  of  uniting 
Serbia  to  Austria-Hungary,  of  attaching  her  to  the  Habs- 
burgs."  That  is  the  essence  of  the  Southern  Slav  problem  ! 
Serbia,  as  a  Balkan  country,  would  gravitate  towards  the 
Entente  Powers,  but  Jugoslavia  would  try  in  any  case  to 
obtain  the  support  of  the  Central  Powers  !  And  that  would 
be  the  end  of  Serbia.  According  to  this  strange  theory, 
it  would  follow  that  the  Allies  should  prevent  the  union  of 
the  Southern  Slavs  and  oblige  Serbia  to  remain  in  the  Balkans 
and  turn  her  eyes  towards  the  jEgean.  That  is  the  only 
way,  M.  Bianco  assures  us,  of  assuring  the  peace  of 
Europe  ! 

There  is  one  point  in  this  theory  which  is  not  very  clear, 
to  which  we  draw  attention  without  comment.  If  Serbia 
must  remain  in  the  Balkans  and  renounce  the  fundamental 
idea  of  her  whole  evolution  :    to  realize  the  union  of  her 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  269 

oppressed  brethren,  what  is  to  be  done  with  the  eight  million 
Southern  Slavs  of  Austria-Hungary  ?  Must  they  be  left  in 
the  Magyaro-German  power  or  must  they  be  given  to  another 
power,  Italy  for  example  !  Even  when  it  is  a  question  of 
such  extraordinary  things  one  should  be  thorough  and 
develop  one's  idea  fully.  M.  Bianco  would  therefore  do 
well  to  explain  himself  on  this  point  in  order  to  allow  us  to 
understand  exactly  what  are  his  ingenious  ideas. 
December  3,  1916. 


A  Reply  to  the  President  of  the  League 
"  Pro  Dalmazia  Italian  a." 

To  the  Editor  of  "  La  Serbie." 

My  Dear  Editor, 

Does  it  not  seem  to  you  that,  in  his  declarations  to  the 
Matin  the  excellent  Due  Colonna  di  Cesaro  appears  to  have 
forgotten  a  fact  of  some  importance  :  the  war  ?  .  .  .  Because 
this  war — even  if  it  is  a  defensive  one — which  was  imposed 
on  us  by  a  purely  feudal  and  territorial  conception  of  the 
Teutonic  race,  has,  in  the  mind  of  the  Allies,  the  liberation 
of  nations  and  not  the  division  of  territories  for  its  supreme 
object.     For,  if  it  were  otherwise,  we  should  all,  instead  of 
fighting,  acclaim  the  Emperor  William  and,  in  agreement 
with  him,  throw  ourselves  into  the  slaughter.     "  To  imitate 
Germany  to-morrow,  is  it  not  to  absolve  her  of  yesterday  ?  " 
It  is  a  member  of  the  French  Cabinet,  M.  Marcel  Sembat, 
who,  even  to-day,  asks  this  question  in  a  masterly  article 
on  Belgium.     And,  in  our  turn,  we  ask  it  of  all  those  who — 
and  it  is  another  of  M.  Sembat's  definitions — against  the 
Germans,  wish  to  act  as  the  Germans. 

This  "  Ligue  pro  Dalmazia  "  in  Italy  is  very  pretty, 
what  I,  for  my  part,  would  call  an  institution  founded  for 
the  culture  and  propagation  of  venerable  historical  customs. 
Moreover,  it  should  be  known  what  the  principal  party 
concerned  think  of  it,  the  Dalmatian  people—that  is  to 
say,  600,000  democratic  Slav  souls,  of  which  a  small  minority 
of  about  ten  thousand  souls,  of  which  hardly  a  thousand 
are  of  Italian  origin — would  like  to  dispose,  after  the  fashion 


270  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

in  which  the  Russian  proprietors  disposed  of  the  "  dead 
souls  "  in  days  gone  by  ! 

Because,  I  fear  greatly  for  the  "  Ligue  pro  Dalmazia  " 
and  its  excellent  president,  that  this  people,  which  well 
deserved  that  the  Italian  Premier  should  bow  to  its  blue 
and  gold  flag  at  Milan,  I  fear  lest  this  people  should  think 
that  the  "  Ligue  pro  Dalmazia  "  is  directed  against  its  soul 
and  that  it  carries  in  the  folds  of  its  flag,  inscribed  in  charac- 
ters di  colore  oscuro  the  device  "  Ausrotten  I  '•'  which 
Bismarck  hurled  against  the  Poles.  For  the  Dalmatian 
people  follow  another  track  to  that  of  the  gentlemen  of  the 
Ligue,  and  means  to  conquer  its  own  liberty  after  this  war 
and  not  to  part  with  it  for  the  benefit  of  a  new  foreign  master. 
It  means — I  regret  it  for  the  sake  of  M.  di  Cesaro — to  imitate 
the  Roumanians  of  Transylvania  and  the  Slovaks  of  Hungary, 
who,  caring  little  for  the  foreign  cultural  and  geological 
strata,  the  orographical  altitudes,  the  flora  and  fauna  which 
separate  them  from  their  co-nationals,  are  trying  to  unite 
with  them  and  to  breathe  open  air,  after  so  many  centuries 
of  territorial,  political  and  dynastic  gaol. 

Ah  !  if  Italy  would  only  remember  her  own  pain,  her 
intolerance  of  the  injurious  term  "  geographical  expression  !  " 
If  she  would  say  to  the  Dalmatian  people,  in  unison  with 
the  other  great  liberal  peoples  :  "  Tolle  grabatutn  tuum  et 
ambula  \ — Take  up  thy  bed  and  walk  !  "  the  Dalmatian 
people,  as  you  know,  my  dear  Editor,  would  not  have  to 
be  told  twice,  that  people  which  on  its  Procrustian  bed  was 
the  first  to  circulate  the  idea  of  union  which  inspires  the 
battalions  in  the  Dobroudja  and  in  Macedonia. 

Dalmatia  does  not  pay  much  attention  to  the  leagues 
for  the  resurrection  of  the  old  regime.  She  does  not  wish 
to  be  a  subject  for  industrial  and  archaeological  vivisection. 
She  is  not  Tripoli  or  any  other  colonial  territory  to  be  cut  up 
and  served  hot  on  the  table  of  the  imperialists  a  la  Treitschke 
or  a  la  Reventlow.  She  is  a  Slav  province,  proud  and  con- 
scious of  her  national  personality.  She  also  wishes  to  enjoy 
the  right  to  live.  And  it  is  the  only  right  which  she  will 
invoke  on  the  morrow  of  the  Allies'  victory. 

Yes,  of  the  victory.  For  we  only  dream  of  that 
great  day,  of  the  harmony  of  that   great   coalition  which 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  271 

has  bled  for  the  last  thirty  months  in  the  supreme  struggle 
against  a  hegemony  which  has  a  territorial  and  dynastic 
basis. 

And  we  will  be  delighted,  yes,  delighted  I  say,  if  our 
differences,  which,  for  that  matter  could  only  be  on  questions 
of  detail,  were  adjourned  till  that  radiant  to-morrow. 

But,  as  this  •'  God's  truce  "  is  not  wanted,  it  is  permitted 
to  oppose,  modestly  but  energetically,  to  the  "  right  "  and 
"  necessities  "  of  the  Due  di  Cesaro,  the  right  and  necessity 
of  our  movements,  free  of  all  restraint,  in  close  union  with 
the  other  martyrs  of  our  race  ! 

I  will  take  good  care  not  to  imitate  the  Due  di  Cesaro 
in  his  arguments  of  the  Bethmann-Hollweg  type.  I  only 
ask  how  the  terrible  vision  which  he  evokes  of  the  dangers 
which  menace  Italy  from  a  coast  belonging  in  spe  to  a  young 
and  weak  State  can  be  reconciled  with  a  new  political  status 
of  Eastern  Europe  without  Austria,  and  if  his  ideas  are  not 
slightly  out  of  date  since  the  great  war,  or  if,  perhaps  they 
believe  in  the  existence  of  an  Austrian  Empire  even  after 
our  victory  ! 

To  this  fundamental  need  of  satisfying  our  national 
egoism  even  the  "  carbide  and  cement  industries  "  must 
bow  !  Industries — be  it  simply  remarked,  for  the  analysis 
of  M.  di  Cesaro's  declarations  would  lead  me  too  far — which 
are  only  Italian  for  a  small  part,  and  have  been  partially 
ceded  by  the  Italians  themselves  to  the  Viennese  capitalists 
in  order  to  assure  the  flow  of  the  profits  into  the  coffers  of 
the  Austrian  Navy,  whilst  the  only  independent  and  richly 
developed  industry  in  Dalmatia — conveniently  forgotten  by 
M.  di  Cesaro — is  the  industry  of  navigation,  the  great  resource 
of  the  country,  of  which  the  capital  is  entirely  Slavo-Dalmatian 
(the  Rismondo  Company  is  not  Dalmatian  but  Istrian,  and 
the  Rismondo  who  fell  on  the  Carso,  was  not  a  Dalmatian 
but  an  Istrian  of  Rovigno)  in  close  commercial  contact 
with  the  British  and  independent  of  all  Austrian  in- 
fluence. 

The  Due  di  Cesaro  wishes  to  invoke  the  testimony  of 
Talleyrand  and  Napoleon  in  support  of  his  thesis. 

Very  well,  neither  the  Emperor  nor  his  Foreign  Minister 
ever  aspired  to  the  possession  of  Dalmatia  as  a  means  of 


272  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

assuring  the  existence,  purely  nominal  for  that  matter,  of 
the  "  Kingdom  of  Italy."  On  the  contrary,  Napoleon 
occupied  Dalmatia  in  order  to  conquer  Constantinople,  to 
settle,  for  France's  benefit,  the  Eastern  question,  to  subjugate 
the  Balkans,  a  far-seeing  policy  of  which  Dalmatia  was  the 
first  military  and  even  diplomatic  stage. 

M.  di  Cesaro's  evocation  gives  a  striking  proof  of  this 
fact,  that  Napoleon  always  considered  Dalmatia  as  a  politically 
oriental  country.  By  the  formation  of  the  "  Illyrian  (not 
the  '  Italian  ')  Provinces,"  he  only  accentuated  this  policy 
of  which  Dalmatia  was  to  be  both  the  bridge  and  the  pivot. 
Later  on,  Illyria  was  effectively  part  of  the  "  Kingdom  of 
Italy  " — to  satisfy  the  inherent  need  of  Napoleon's  genius 
for  administrative  simplification — but  the  Emperor  never 
ceased,  up  to  1813,  to  see  in  Dalmatia  the  road  to  the  East, 
the  road  to  Byzantium. 

This  road  is  no  longer  sought  by  way  of  Dalmatia. 

Constantinople's  fate  is  decided  ;  we  heard  it  yesterday 
from  the  mouth  of  the  Premier  of  the  Russian  Empire  him- 
self. As  to  my  country,  it  is  another  question  altogether  : 
the  realization  of  the  Serbian  federal  union,  preached  in 
Italy  by  Mazzini  and  Tommasco  with  such  enthusiasm  and 
incomparable  lucidity. 

The  Due  di  Cesaro  has  only  his  illustrious  compatriot 
to  blame  for  it,  he  who  was  one  of  the  great — perhaps  the 
greatest — architects  of  Italian  union.  Mazzini,  for  his  part, 
did  not  believe  that  leagues  for  the  conquest  of  Dalmatia 
were  necessary  for  Italy's  welfare.  On  the  contrary,  he 
attributed  to  her  the  moral  presidency  of  a  Jugoslavia 
embracing  the  whole  Adriatic  coast  from  Fiume  to  Cattaro. 
Therefore  it  is  not  we  who  have  preached  this  programme 
in  Italy.  But  it  is  very  true  that,  at  the  present  time,  Mazzini 
would  be  strongly  suspected  of  pro-Austrianism  and  even 
accused  from  the  Ministerial  benches  in  the  Italian  Chamber 
of  having  illicit  relations  with  the  secret  funds  of  Vienna 
and  Budapest  ! 

I  beg  you  to  accept,  my  dear  Editor,  the  assurance  of 
my  most  devoted  sentiments. 

Louis  de  Voinovitch. 

Paris,  December  6,  1916. 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  278 


Italy  and  Serbia. 


The  causes  of  disagreement  between  Italy  and  Serbia 
lie  in  the  difference  of  point  of  view  relating  to  the  division 
of  the  territory  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  ;  also, 
partly,  in  the  position  and  fate  of  Albania  and,  consequently, 
in  the  position  which  Italy  wishes  to  take  in  the  future  in 
the  Adriatic. 

The  Serbian's  view  of  this  question  is  clear  and  simple. 
Serbia  desires  and  insists  that  all  the  countries  inhabited 
by  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes,  people  of  the  same 
origin,  the  same  sentiments  and  the  same  tongue,  should 
unite  in  one  free  State.  Such  is  also  the  desire  of  the  whole 
Serbo-Croat-Slovene  people,  and  they  have  given  indubitable 
proof  of  it  through  the  mouths  of  its  authorized  representa- 
tives. The  Serbo-Croat-Slovene  people  desires  to  unite  in 
a  single  State,  not  because  of  Imperialistic  tendencies,  but 
for  psychological,  cultural  and  economic  reasons,  being 
convinced  that  it  is  able  to  develop  fully  its  intellectual 
and  economic  aptitudes  only  in  its  own  State  in  which  will 
be  united  all  the  members  of  our  people  of  three  names. 

As  the  principal  reason  of  her  participation  in  the  world 
war,  Italy  invoked  the  principle  of  nationality  and  of  all 
her  nation  in  one  State.  But  it  appears  that  she  had  still 
two  other  reasons  which  also  dominate  her  policy  in  the 
present  war.  The  two  facts  which,  besides  the  principle 
of  nationality,  appear  to  decide  Italian  policy  are  the 
imperialistic  leanings  of  a  certain  number  of  politicians  and 
the  illusion  of  a  future  Serbian  danger. 

When  the  Italian  Government  decided  on  action,  popular 
feeling  in  Italy  was  not  everywhere  unanimous.  That  is 
why  it  was  necessary  to  show  the  people  the  greatest  possible 
results  which  the  war  could  bring  and  prove  to  it,  by  actual 
facts,  the  guarantees  which  the  war  would  furnish  to  Italy 
for  her  economic  progress  and,  above  all,  for  her  future 
political  and  military  prestige.  In  Italy  it  was  thought 
that  these  results  could  be  attained  only  if  Italy,  in  her 
treaties  with  the  Allies,  made  sure  of,  beyond  the  purely 
Italian  regions  of  Austria-Hungary,  other  regions  which  did 
not  ethnically  belong  to  Italy.     For  this  Italy  had,  above 

19 


274  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

all,  to  think  of  Istria  and  Dalmatia.  The  reason  why 
Italy  specially  claimed  these  two  regions  is  not  doubtful. 
Besides  the  desire  of  expansion  which  would  naturally  find 
satisfaction  in  the  near  future,  the  Italian  Government  let 
itself  be  guided  in  this  direction  by  the  nationalist  and 
chauvinistic  current  in  Italy,  which  believed  that  the  fact 
that  the  Venetian  Republic  had  reigned  there  in  other  days 
and  that  Italian  civilization  has  always  exerted  a  great 
influence  on  this  region,  was  a  justification  for  Italian 
aspirations  to  Istria  and  Dalmatia. 

Besides  these  nationalist  and  chauvinistic  tendencies, 
there  was  the  opinion  that  such  a  solution  of  the  Istrian 
and  Dalmatian  question  would  also  satisfy  Italian  interests 
in  another  direction,  perhaps  the  more  important.  Such 
a  solution  would  have  very  appreciably  weakened  the  future 
Serbo-Croat-Slovene  State  and  would  have  assured,  accord- 
ing to  the  Italian  military  and  political  experts,  not  only 
excellent  strategical  bases  and  frontiers  in  an  eventual 
conflict  between  Italy  and  Jugoslavia,  but  also  Italian 
supremacy  in  the  Adriatic  for  all  time. 

Mr.  Seton- Watson,  the  well-known  English  publicist  and 
politician,  has  on  several  occasions  called  attention  in  his 
articles  to  the  fact  that  the  battle  of  Kumanovo  has  created 
a  different  view  of  the  new  history  of  Europe.  Mr.  Watson 
explains  that  the  battle  of  Kumanovo  has  shown  Austria- 
Hungary  the  extraordinary  power  of  Serbia  which  nobody, 
and  above  all,  not  the  Austro-Hungarian  military  and 
political  specialists,  suspected.  It  was  then,  for  the  first 
time  in  Austria-Hungary,  that  the  danger  represented  by 
the  unexpected  strength  of  Serbia  was  seen,  principally 
because  of  the  Serbian  national  aspirations  to  the  countries 
included  in  the  Habsburg  Monarchy,  whose  peoples  them- 
selves hoped  for  the  realization  of  the  Southern  Slav  Union. 
All  that  happened  after  the  battle  of  Kumanovo  only  served 
to  confirm,  in  the  minds  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  military 
and  political  specialists,  the  certitude  of  Serbia's  strength 
and  the  great  danger  which  could  threaten  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy  from  this  direction.  That  is  why 
authorized  Austro-Hungarian  factors  were  determined  to 
suppress  this  danger  as  soon  as  possible. 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  275 

But  if  the  battle  of  Kumanovo,  and  all  that  followed  has, 
so  to  speak,  betrayed  the  Serbian  danger  to  Austria-Hungary, 
it   appears   that   Italy  also   was   much   astonished   by   the 
Serbian  strength.     Italian  political  and  military  circles  seem 
to  have  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  Italy  also  could  at 
some   time   be   threatened   from  this   direction.     But   this 
Serbian  danger   appeared  to  Italian   statesmen  to  be  still 
very  far  away,  and  when  Austria-Hungary,  immediately  after 
the  peace  of  Bucarest,  wished  to  make  a  cowardly  attack 
on  Serbia,  Italy  chivalrously  refused  to  become  the  accom- 
plice of  such  a  crime.     But  the  phantom  of  the  Serbian 
danger  already  existed  in  the  imagination  of  Italian  soldiers 
and  statesmen.     This  fear  of  the  Serbian  danger  to  Italy 
is   completely  without   foundation,   not   to   say  ridiculous. 
Italy,  who  will  come  out  of  the  war  nationally  united  and 
greater  than  ever,  will  be  so  strong  on  land  as  well  as  on 
sea,  that  she  will  have  nothing  to  fear,  with  her  fifty  million 
inhabitants,  her  powerful  fleet  and  numerous  army,  from 
Jugoslavia,  a  State  which  under  the  most  favourable  con- 
ditions will  only  have  twelve  million  inhabitants,  broken  by  war 
and  persecution,  with  whole  regions  destroyed  and  uncivilized, 
a  State  with  almost  no  army  and  completely  without  a  fleet. 
Political  combinations  are  not  and  cannot  be  established 
for  a  hundred  years,  but  for  half  a  century  at  the  most. 
During  such  a  lapse  of  time  circumstances  change  the  usual 
order  of  things  in  so  many  different  ways,  that  it  is  impossible 
to  make  any  serious  and  probable  combinations  of  longer 
duration.     For  that  reason,  it  is  not.  done.     All  the  same, 
I  am  convinced  that  there  is  not  a  single  person  in  Italy 
who  seriously  believes  that  the  Southern  Slav  State,  because 
of  the  position  in  which  it  will  inevitably  find  itself  after 
the  war,  could  become  a  serious  rival  to  Italy  under  any 
circumstances,  for  several  decades  to  come.     But  even  if 
we  admit  this  eventuality,  although  it  is  impossible,  will 
Italy,  who  would  then  be  seriously  threatened  by  Jugoslavia, 
be  unable  in  this  case  to  find  allies  in  sufficient  numbers 
among  the  neighbours  of  Jugoslavia,  who  would  see  in  her 
a  danger  greater  than  Italy  and  who  will  always  be  disposed 
to  assist  whoever  should  wish  to  contribute  to  the  weakening 
of  Jugoslavia? 


276  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

For  Italy  should  understand  that  in  taking  the  Slav  regions 
she  would  necessarily  make  us  her  opponents.  Under  such 
circumstances,  friendship  between  our  peoples  could  never 
be  established.  In  this  case  Italy,  without  being  obliged, 
would  have  an  enemy  who,  otherwise,  could  always  be  her 
friend  and  sincere  and  faithful  ally.  Italy  would  betray 
the  principle  of  nationality  for  which  she  herself  has  fought 
and  which  she  has  also  inscribed  as  a  device  on  her  banner 
in  the  present  war. 

Strategical  positions  cannot  serve  as  an  argument. 
I  admit  that,  in  certain  exceptional  cases,  the  possession 
of  particular  places  having  a  universal  character,  may  be 
accorded  to  a  foreign  power  for  strategical  reasons  ;  these 
concessions  can  only,  in  this  case,  relate  strictly  to  certain 
places  but  these  strategical  positions  can  in  no  case  include 
whole  regions.  In  this  case,  it  is  no  longer  a  question  of 
strategical  positions  but  of  imperialism  and  colonial  and 
imperialistic  policy.  Such  a  policy  would  make  Italy  a 
new  Austria  in  the  Balkans  with  all  the  attributes  possessed 
by  the  latter  and  which  have  gained  for  her  a  position  and 
a  fate  which  nobody  should  envy  and  Italy  less  than  any 
other.  For  that  matter,  the  value  of  strategical  points  in 
general  has  been  shown  to  be  nil  in  the  present  war,  because 
the  States  which  demanded  and  obtained  strategical  positions 
lost  them  in  a  few  days,  while  other  non-strategical  positions 
resisted  much  better. 

The  principal  enemy  of  the  Italian  people  is  in  the  north, 
and  this  enemy  no  matter  how  much  he  is  weakened  by  this 
war,  will  always  be  strong  enough  to  constitute  a  danger 
to  Italy.  In  the  struggle  against  this  enemy,  Italy  will 
not  easily  be  able  to  find  Allies.  In  this  question,  never- 
theless, the  interests  of  the  Italian  and  Serbian  people  are 
identical  and  will  always  be  identical.  If  Italy  succeeds 
in  understanding  that,  by  abandoning  pretentions  without 
foundation  to  the  Serbo-Croatian  and  Slovene  regions,  all 
disputes  with  Jugoslavia  would  be  avoided,  she  will  be  laying 
the  sure  foundations  of  a  firm  and  lasting  alliance  with  the 
Serbian  people.  For  friendship  and  alliance  with  the  Serbian 
people  will  be  Italy's  most  important  strategical  advantage. 

February  23,  19 18. 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  277 

II 

The  Congress  of  the  Oppressed  Nationalities. 

The  Congress  of  the  nationalities  oppressed  by  Austria- 
Hungary  which  was  held  at  Rome  has  just  completed  its 
labours.  The  results  are  all  the  more  important  because 
they  are  obtained  at  a  moment  when  the  Habsburg  Monarchy 
threatens  the  Czecho-Slovaks  and  Southern  Slavs  internally, 
in  order  to  break  the  will  of  the  martyred  peoples,  resolved 
to  conquer  their  liberty  and  independence  by  any  means 
in  their  power,  whilst  externally  it  tries  to  sow  confusion 
and  holds  up  the  illusory  possibility  of  an  Austrian  peace. 
To  all  these  intrigues  the  Rome  manifestation  is  a  counter 
attack,  worthy  of  the  peoples  who  repulse  with  disdain  the 
fallacious  suggestion  of  a  national  autonomy  in  the  frame- 
work of  the  Monarchy. 

The  importance  of  the  congress  of  Rome  is  doubled  by 
the  fact  that  Italy  has  placed  herself  at  the  head  of  the 
oppressed  peoples,  and  organizes  a  new  struggle  of  which 
the  motto  is  :  liberty  for  all  peoples,  respect  of  their  right 
of  self-disposal  and  close  alliance  for  the  struggle  against 
the  common  enemy. 

The  Congress  of  Rome  adopted  the  following  resolution  : 
"  Private  relations  between  Italians  and  Jugoslavs  will  be 
founded  henceforth  on  the  recognition  of  the  Southern  Slav 
union  and  independence,  of  vital  importance  to  Italy,  just 
as  the  achievement  of  Italian  national  union  is  of  vital 
importance  to  the  Southern  Slavs.  The  two  nations  under- 
take to  settle  any  eventual  territorial  controversy  on  the 
basis  of  the  right  of  peoples  to  decide  their  own  fate,  in  such 
a  way  as  not  to  oppose  the  vital  interests  of  both  countries, 
as  they  are  defined  when  peace  is  signed.  The  minorities 
which  remain  included  in  foreign  territories  will  obtain 
freedom  of  language  and  of  culture  and  the  safety  of  their 
moral  and  economic  interests  will  be  assured." 

The  importance  of  the  resolution  which  was  adopted  is 
illustrated  by  the  words  spoken  by  Mr.  Orlando  at  the  recep- 
tion of  the  Delegates.  Mr.  Orlando  said  that  the  Italo-Slav 
understanding  is  founded  on   common  suffering  and  that 


278  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

there  exists  no  serious  cause  of  disagreement  when  the 
respective  conditions  necessary  for  the  existence  of  each 
of  the  two  nations  are  honestly  and  sincerely  examined. 
As  to  the  ethnical  groups  who  shall  be  included  in  foreign 
territory,  it  is  right  that  indispensable  guarantees  should 
be  given  for  their  development  within  the  bounds  of  the 
State,  to  which  they  are  assigned  by  the  reciprocal  necessities 
of  existence.  This  declaration  by  Mr.  Orlando  signifies  the 
formal  adhesion  of  Italy  to  a  new  policy,  founded  on  the 
principle  of  the  liberty  of  nations,  and  even  without  a  closer 
examination,  it  can  be  said  that  the  basis  of  the  agreement 
to  be  concluded  by  the  competent  governments  and  submitted 
to  the  Peace  Conference,  is  found.  In  this  direction  we 
must  work  more  energetically — this  first  stage  which  is  to 
serve  as  the  starting  point  for  more  intimate  relations  and 
contact  between  the  Italian  politicians  and  publicists  on 
one  side,  and  the  Serbo-Croat-Slovenes  on  the  other. 

All  the  same,  one  should  not  stop  at  these  generalities. 
The  courtesies  exchanged — necessary  as  preliminaries — are 
not  sufficient.  It  is  desirable  that  the  questions  interesting 
the  two  nations  should  be  treated  in  an  amicable  fashion 
and  with  the  help  of  all  men  capable  of  contributing  to  a 
successful  result.  The  Congress  of  Rome  was  a  happy 
improvisation  of  international  importance,  but  its  decisive 
results  depend  on  a  loyal  and  intensive  effort. 

As  to  our  paper,  its  editors  and  collaborators  will  be 
glad  to  see  realized  that  which  they  have  preached  since 
the  month  of  May,  19 16.  They  will  greet  with  joy  the 
beginning  of  a  new  era  for  Italo-Slav  relations,  hoping  that 
the  present  action  will  develop  and  become  more  concrete, 
in  order  to  cut  the  roots  of  any  new  attempt  at  vain  dis- 
cussions of  useless  controversies. 

In  closing,  we  wish  again  to  state  that  Serbia,  who  has 
always  rejected  separate  peace  offers  and  refuses  thus  to 
sacrifice  her  brethren  of  Austria-Hungary,  sees  with  satis- 
faction that  her  national  policy  is  in  complete  agreement 
with  that  of  Italy.  The  revelations  recently  made  by  the 
Emperor  Charles  eloquently  prove  a  high  and  heroic  ideal 
the  Serbian  people  pursues,  in  refusing  all  offers  of  an  egoistic 
character. 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  279 

The  Congress  of  Rome  infuses  new  and  more  luminous 
hopes  within  the  breasts  of  all  Serbians. 

Long  live  Italy  !  Long  live  Serbia  !  Long  live  the  future 
Jugoslavia  ! 

April  20,  1918. 


La  Questione  Dell'Adriatico 

A  cura  della  Libreria  delta  Voce,  di  Firenze,  nella  collezione 
La  Giovine  Eur  op  a,  recent  emente  e  uscito  un  pregevolissimo 
volume  di  300  pagine  su  La  questione  dell' Adriatico  di  G. 
Maranelli  e  G.  Salvemini,  con  prefazione  di  Umberto  Zanotti- 
Bianco. 

Sulla  questione  adriatica,  sul  problema  della  Regione  Giulia, 
sui  rapporti  italo-slavi,  che  e  sempre  lo  stesso  problema, 
studiato  e  prospettato  a  seconda  dei  gusti  indivuduali,  di 
passioni  politiche,  di  cognizioni,  soprattutto  di  prevenzioni, 
furono  scritti  tanti  volumi  da  formare  una  biblioteca. 

Pero,la  maggior  parte  di  simili  pubblicazioni,  contribuirono 
ad  arruffare  anziche  chiarire  il  problema  dell' Adriatico.  E, 
seppure  in  Italia  da  tempo  si  sentisse  l'urgente  necessita  di 
pubblicazioni  che  informassero  e  illuminassero,  non  solo 
l'opinione  pubblica,  nel  senso  piu  largo  della  parola,  ma  anche 
pubblicisti  ed  uomini  politici,  che  vanno  per  la  maggiore, 
nessuno  ha  saputo,  voluto  od  osato  assolvere  questo  difficile 
compito,  perche  implicava  studi  sereni  e  virtu  civiche,  per 
affrontare  Tostilita  dell'opinione  pubblica  educata  e  cullata 
nell'errore. 

In  Italia,  non  conoscevano,  e  le  cose  si  saranno  di  poco 
migliorate,  le  nostre  questioni.  Gli  studiosi  di  cose  nostre 
erano  pochi,  piu  letterati  che  uomini  politici.  Nel  folto  della 
mischia  delle  lotte  nazionali,  si  vive,  ardenti,  appasionate, 
spesso  cruenti,  mai  serene,  le  preoccupazioni  dei  contendenti 
erano  di  dare  colpi  piu  spessi  e  piu  sodi,  o  di  pararli,  e  di  gridare 
forte  alia  reciproca  sopraffazione,  angheria  o  persecuzione, 
per  cointeressare  alia  lotta  gli  spettatori  di  oltre  confine. 

In  Italia  la  questione  nazionale  era  conosciuta,  all'- 
ingrosso,  dal  motto  :  "  Trento  e  Trieste,"  e  della  divisa  : 
"  L'italianita  martire  da  Trieste  a  Cattaro."  II  grosso  del 
pubblico  italiano  venne  sorpreso  dalla  guerra  con  mentalita 


280  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

piena  di  preconcetti,  di  errori  e  purtroppo  ignara  dello  stato 
delle  cose.  La  guerra  pose  la  questione  adriatica,  piu 
complessa,  piu  difficile,  piu  delicata  che  mai,  sul  tapeto, 
indissolubilmente  legata  alia  questione  nazionale  jugoslava, 
vale  a  dire,  ad  un  grosso  problema  di  politica  europea,  al 
quale  ben  pochi  sono  preparati,  e  dal  modo  in  cui  verra 
risolto  dipendera  la  pace  dell'Europa  e  Tavvenire  d'ltalia. 

Non  e  piu  in  discussione  il  mal  conosciuto  problema  che 
riguardava  soltanto  V Italia  e  i  suoi  immediati  vicini,  gli 
slavi  di  Treste,  del  Goriziano,  d'Istria  e  di  Dalmazia, 
bensi  un  problema  che  interessa  e  coinvolge  la  fortuna 
avvenire,  in  uguale  misura,  dell' Italia  da  una  parte  e  degli 
jugoslavi  dall'altra  :  dalle  Alpi  all'Egeo,  dall'Adriatico  al 
Danubio.  II  problema  s'amplia  e  si  complica,  e  non  va 
trattato  ne  con  metodi,  ne  con  mentalita  da  periodo  elettorale, 
ne  come  una  questione  di  priorita  linguistica  sulle  tabelle  delle 
stazioni  ferroviarie  o  in  pretura  urbana. 

I  ferravecchi  dei  diritti  storici,  i  luoghi  comuni  delle  pigrizie 
mentali,  i  gesti  eroici  da  adolescenti  devono  cedere  il  posto 
a  serene,  reali  ed  eque  valutazioni,  a  concetti  superiori  e  a 
interessi  ben  vagliati  e  ben  compresi.  II  momento  e  grave, 
le  risoluzioni  assennate  che  si  prenderanno  dovranno  attestare 
la  maturita  dei  due  popoli  che,  nell'intesa  sincera,  cordiale 
e  fraterna,  dovranno  inaugurare  un'  era  nuova  non  solo 
per  se  ma  anche  per  FEuropa.  L'accordo  non  e  impossibile, 
ne  dovrebbe  essere  difficile,  tanto  piu  che  non  vi  sono  interessi 
materiali  in  giuoco,  ma  sentimentalita  e  suscettibilita  da 
rassicurare,  errori  ed  artificiosita  da  eliminare.  L' Italia  o 
cedera  alle  passioni  e  tentazioni  imperialistiche,  o  agevolera  il 
parto  doloroso  di  un  popolo  martoriato  per  averlo  amico  e 
all'avanguardia,  in  difesa  della  propria  e  comune  esistenza. 

E  con  questi  concetti  e  sincera  disposizione  d'animo 
che  abbiamo  scorso  le  pagine  de  "La  questione  dell'- 
Adriatico." 

"  La  Voce,"  ancor  prima  della  guerra,  si  distingue  va 
nello  studio  coscienzioso  dei  problemi  che  interessavano 
l'avvenire  d'ltalia.  Scoppiata  la  guerra,  gli  uomini,  certo 
un'eletta  schiera  di  studiosi,  chiaroveggenti,  con  squisito 
spirito  d'equita  e  senso  di  responsabilita,  perseverarono 
neU'invidiabile  tradizione,  e,  con  civismo  superiore,  seppero 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  281 

mettersi  in  opposizione  a  piu  popolari  fini  di  guerra,  opporne 
di  meno  popolari,  ma  nobili,  equi  e  piu  coisonni  alle  tradizioni 
del  Risorgimento  italiano. 

Parallela  all'azione  giornalistica  fu  l'azione  della  Libreria 
delta  Voce  che  diede  lavori  di  alto  pregio  come  L'irredentismo 
adriatico  del  mite  e  compianto  Angelo  Vivante  ;  come  il 
volume,  modesto  di  molle,  ma  denso  d'idee  e  di  fatti,  ma 
vibrante  di  fede  patria  e  d'equita  nazionale,  La  Dalmazia, 
del  valente  direttpre  Giuseppe  Prezzolini,  e,  infine,  come 
La  questione  dell' Adriatico  di  Maranelli  e  Salvemini,  sempre 
minuti  e  coscienziosi  indagatori  storici  e  patrocinatori  di 
cause  sante. 

La  questione  dell' Adriatico  e  libro  che  non  si  pud  de- 
centemente  presentare  al  pubblico  che  scrivendone  uno  di 
eguale  molle,  ne  di  tanto  ci  sentiamo.  E  non  e  nemmeno 
nostra  intenzione  di  fame  una  recensione.  Oggi  abbiamo 
voluto  soltanto,  in  affrettati  cenni,  dar  expressione  ai 
sentimenti  che  ci  suscito  la  lettura  di  questo,  e  in  appresso 
diremo  il  pensier  nostro  su  cio  che  potrebbe  ostacolare  o 
agevolare  l'accordo  nostro  con  la  grande  Nazione  italiana 
Frattanto  sentiamo  l'obbligo  di  esternare  la  sincera  nostra 
riconoscenza  a  nome  di  tutta  la  nostra  Nazione,  per  lo 
spirito  che  su  tutte  le  pagine  aleggia  e  perch  e  i  compilatori 
del  libro  si  diedero  fatica  di  studiarci  senza  preconcetti  per 
conoscerci  bene,  e  perch&  i  risultati  delle  proprie  indagini 
e  il  libero  convincimento  che  ne  trassero,  vollero  portare  a 
conoscenza  del  pubblico  italiano. 

II  libro  contiene  inevitabili  lacune  e  defficenze  che  noi 
accentueremo  e  vi  si  soffermeremo,  non  per  passione  polemica, 
bensi  per  amore  di  maggior  luce,  piu  completa  conoscenza 
dell'essere  nostro,  e  per  partecipare  e  invogliare  alia  discussione 
quanti  sono  compresi  della  necessita  di  gettare  basi  sane  e 
percid  durature  al  fraterno  accordo  italo-jugoslavo. 

II  libro  £  un'ottima  fonte  d'informazioni  per  i  digiuni  e 
per  i  politici  che  da  orecchianti  trattano  i  rapporti  italo- 
jugoslavi ;  contiene  un'analisi  di  tutti  gli  aspetti — notizie, 
dati  e  cifre — del  problema  jugoslavo  e  delle  questioni  a  questo 
connesse  ;  ma  soprattutto  contiene  un  programma,  si  mette 
sulla  via  maestra  che  conduce  alia  meta  prefissasi  e  offre 
una  base  alia  soluzione  del  problema  che  agita  e  preoccupa 


28  2  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

gli  animi  dei   due   popoli,   cointeressati  e  conviventi   sull'- 
Adriatico. 

fe  per  questo  pregio  capitale  del  libro  che  noi  deploriamo 
che — come  avverte  lo  scrittore  della  prefazione — delle  idee 
esposte  intendono  essere  responsabili  i  due  soli  autori. 

Juillet  27,  1918. 

The  Treaty  of  London  and  the  Pact  of  Rome. 

The  Treaty  of  London  of  April  26,  1915,  like  all  treaties 
in  general,  affects  the  contracting  parties  only.  In  what 
measure  this  treaty  could  be  modified  in  the  light  of  events 
which  have  taken  place  since  its  conclusion,  according  to 
the  principle  of  international"  law  rebus  sic  stantibus,  we 
cannot  judge.  It  is  a  question  which  directly  concerns  the 
powers  who  have  put  their  signature  to  the  treaty  in  question. 
What  concerns  us,  whose  territories  are  also  the  object  of 
transactions  contained  in  the  Treaty  of  London,  is  to  know 
precisely  what  is  the  exact  meaning  of  this  diplomatic 
document  to  which  almost  all  Italy,  official  and  non-official, 
clings  to-day.  The  recent  Conference  of  the  three  contracting 
Powers  probably  occupied  itself  also  with  the  question'  of 
the  application  or  non-application  of  the  Treaty  of  London, 
but  nothing  definite  is  known  of  its  results.  The  Italian 
Press  appears  lost,  which  is  the  result  of  the  bitter  discussion 
waged  round  these  two  antipodes  :  the  Treaty  of  London, 
which  is  a  secret  treaty,  concluded  behind  the  back  of  the 
most  interested  nation,  the  Serbo-Croat-Slovene  nation,  and 
the  Pact  of  Rome,  a  public  treaty  concluded  not  by  the 
governments  but  by  the  authorized  representatives  of  the 
public  opinion  of  the  respective  peoples. 

The  Treaty  of  London  has  no  authority  over  Serbia  or 
the  recently  constituted  Kingdom  of  the  Serbians,  Croatians 
and  Slovenes.  This  Treaty  has  no  authority  over  America, 
or  Japan,  or  Greece  or  any  other  Allied  country  except 
France  and  Great  Britain.  If  there  were  not  America, 
Mr.  Sonnino's  position  at  the  Peace  Conference  would  be 
very  simple.  The  presence  of  America  with  the  whole 
weight  of  her  principles  and  her  material  influence,  takes 
away  all  its  creative  force  from  the  Treaty  of  London.     In 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  288 

virtue  of  this  Treaty,  Great  Britain  and  France  are  obliged 
to  support  the  Italian  claims,  as  stated  in  the  Treaty  of 
London,  at  the  Peace  Conference.  But  the  war  has  raised 
other  questions  even  more  important  than  territorial  ones, 
and  it  will  certainly  not  be  to  Italy's  advantage  to  do  without 
the  help  of  America,  of  Great  Britain,  of  Japan  and  of  France 
simply  in  order  to  realize  the  Treaty  of  London.  Arguments 
of  this  nature  will  not  fail  to  be  opposed  to  Italian  firmness. 
On  the  other  hand,  if,  as  regards  the  Italian  Government, 
the  Treaty  of  London  is  not  officially  replaced  by  the  Pact 
of  Rome  in  respect  of  the  Southern  Slav  territories,  neither 
is  this  Government  free  of  all  obligations  to  the  nationalities, 
more  particularly  to  the  Serbo-Croat-Slovene  people.  In  the 
first  place,  the  action  for  the  convocation  of  a  congress  of 
the  nationalities  in  Rome  was  personally  directed  from 
behind  the  scenes  by  the  President  of  the  Italian  Council. 
Mr.  Orlando's  Government  saw  signs  of  a  serious  movement 
in  Italian  democratic  circles  against  Mr.  Sonnino's  policy 
which  had  led  to  concrete  negotiations  with  a  few  Serbians 
and  Croatians  who  were  sincere  friends  of  an  entente  cordiale 
with  Italy.  Moreover,  England  and  France  exerted  all  their 
influence  in  Rome  in  favour  of  a  change  of  front  in  respect 
of  the  Southern  Slavs.  This,  and  other  considerations  of 
a  military  character,  decided  the  Italian  Government  to 
place  itself  at  the  head  of  a  new  movement  favourable  to 
the  Southern  Slavs.  Mr.  Albertini  in  agreement  with 
Mr.  Orlando  and  supported  by  his  old  collaborator,  Mr.  Torre, 
and  by  his  present  Rome  correspondent,  Mr.  Amendola, 
succeeded  in  a  few  days  in  starting  the  work  of  conciliation 
which  the  Italian  democrats  wished  to  accomplish  without 
delay  and  without  considering  the  Government.  The 
Albertini-Orlando  initiative  created  a  new  situation,  and 
the  prospect  of  seeing  Italy  extricated  from  the  blind  alley 
to  which  Mr.  Sonnino's  policy  invariably  led  her,  decided 
the  Italian  democrats  to  accept  this  arrangement  and  leave 
the  official  politicians  the  task  of  completing  the  work  which 
they  had  begun  independently  of  the  Government.  Professor 
Salvemini  alone  could  not  reconcile  himself  to  seeing  the 
people  who  treated  the  Southern  Slavs  as  Austrian  agents, 
and  who,   only  a  few  months  before,  had  prevented  the 


284  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

Marquis  of  Viti  di  Marco  from  speaking  in  the  Chamber, 
drowning  his  voice  with  furious  cries  of  "  Jugoslavo  !  Jugo- 
slavo  !  "  put  themselves  at  the  head  of  a  movement  in  favour 
of  the  Italo-Southern  Slav  Entente.  Mr.  Salvemini,  with 
his  usual  courage,  did  not  shrink  from  stating  almost  publicly 
his  distrust  of  these  "  convertiti."  He  was  right,  as  the 
recent  declarations  of  the  Due  di  Cesaro  in  the  Giornale 
d' Italia,  saying  that  he,  the  Due  di  Cesaro,  would  never 
have  taken  part  in  this  movement  if  it  had  meant  abandoning 
Italian  claims  in  any  way,  show.     That  at  least  is  sincere. 

All  the  same,  the  Congress  of  Rome,  with  its  intelligent 
decisions,  produced  an  enormous  effect  in  Austria-Hungary. 
The  Prime  Minister,  Orlando,  at  the  reception  of  the  delegates, 
had  expressed  his  approval  and  satisfaction  at  the  decisions 
arrived  at.  And  in  order  to  clear  the  situation,  Mr.  Orlando 
declared,  in  a  conversation  with  Mr.  Pierre  Ouirielle  of  the 
Journal  des  DSbats,  textually  as  follows :  "  The  famous 
Treaty  of  London  ?  Oh  !  That  is  very  simple.  When  it 
was  negotiated  and  concluded,  it  was  aimed  at  an  enemy, 
Austria,  against  whom  it  was  necessary  for  Italy  to  be 
guaranteed  as  fully  as  possible.  As  regards  a  friendly 
Southern  Slav  State,  the  situation  is  changed M  (see  the 
Journal  des  DSbats  of  April  25,  1918).  Exactly  the  same 
assurance  was  given  to  the  author  of  these  lines  when  he 
visited  Rome  in  February  and  April.  And  it  was  added 
that  the  Treaty  of  London  represented  for  Italy  and  us 
Southern  Slavs  a  safeguard  against  the  eventuality  of  a 
British  and  French  policy  friendly  to  Austria.  "  If  Italy, 
we  were  told,  renounced  the  Treaty  of  London,  France  and 
Great  Britain  could  make  peace  with  Austria-Hungary." 
Theoretically,  the  argument  was  not  without  value  at  that 
time.     To-day  it  is  turned  against  Italy. 

All  those  who  took  part  in  the  Congress  of  Rome,  under- 
stood that  the  Treaty  of  London  had  no  longer  any  value, 
and  that  the  future  relations  between  Italy  and  the  Kingdom 
of  the  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes  would  be  regulated 
on  basis  of  the  Campidoglio  resolutions.  Messrs.  Albert 
Thomas,  Franklin-Bouillon  and  Wickham-Steed,  who  are  not 
directly  interested  and  who  took  part  in  the  Congress  of 
Rome,  are  ocular  witnesses  of  this  fact.     That  Italy  should 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  285 

still  insist  on  the  Treaty  of  London  is  a  grave  mistake  from 
the  Italian  point  of  view.  This  throws  a  very  strange  light 
on  the  whole  Italian  policy  and  obliges  us  to  take  precautions 
in  our  turn. 

The  Peace  Conference  may  accept  the  Italian  claims, 
but  we  very  much  doubt  that  this  will  be  for  the  benefit 
of  the  Italian  people.  Our  land  can  be  taken  by  force, 
but  we  cannot  be  prevented  from  treating  Italy  as  a  usurper 
in  the  future.  In  the  economic  and  cultural  as  well  as  in 
the  political  domain,  we  are  strong  enough  to  counteract 
the  wrong  which  would  be  done  to  our  people.  We  cannot 
allow  strategical  safeguards  against  us,  a  pacific  people  ; 
neither  do  we  allow  the  annexation  of  our  territory  on  the 
pretext  that  Great  Britain  or  some  other  power  had  at  one 
time  occupied  such  and  such  a  country. 

Southern  Slav  public  opinion  approves  the  Pact  of  Rome. 
It  thinks  that  the  Italians  would  be  acting  more  loyally 
if  they  openly  declared  that  they  do  not  wish  to  adhere  to 
it,  as  the  Giornale  d'ltalia  has  done,  instead  of  supporting 
the  inadmissible  thesis  that  the  Pact  of  Rome  and  the  Treaty 
of  London  can  both  retain  their  vigour.  We  do  not  doubt 
that  Mr.  Orlando  and  Mr.  Sonnino  personally  can  very  well 
agree  on  the  subject  of  Italian  policy.  But  the  Treaty  of 
London  and  the  Pact  of  Rome  are  at  opposite  poles.  One 
or  the  other,  but  not  both  at  the  same  time  !  Italy  must 
choose,  and  choose  as  quickly  as  possible.  Any  misunder- 
standing compromises  the  moral  situation  and  irremediably 
threatens  our  future  relations,  to  the  great  disadvantage 
of  Italy  and  the  Serbo-Croatian  Slovene  Kingdom. 

December  16,  1918. 


Quo  Vadis  Italia  ? 

The  occupation  by  Italy  of  the  Southern  Slav  sea  coast 
in  Istria  and  the  Dalmatian  coast  is  more  than  a  crime,  it 
is  a  mistake. 

In  order  to  understand  Italy's  present  attitude  and  the 
mentality  of  her  leaders  one  must  follow  the  evolution  of 
Italian  mentality  during  the  last  fifty  years.     Even  before 


286  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

entering  the  Triple  Alliance,  Italy  had  strayed  from  the 
path  traced  by  the  founders  of  her  union. 

Those  in  power  ceased  to  be  inspired  by  the  spirit  of 
Mazzini,  Cavour,  Victor  Emmanuel  and  Garibaldi  and  turned 
towards  other  idols  representing  in  Europe  the  imperialistic 
policy,  the  policy  of  brute  force  which  was  wrongly  named 
the  "  realist  "  policy.  Bismarck  and  Kalnoky,  Tisza  and 
Andrassy,  were  then  taken  as  models  by  Italy.  And  thus 
Italy,  the  country  of  Cavour  and  Mazzini,  only  a  few  years 
after  Magenta  and  Solferino,  watched  with  indifference  the 
crushing  of  this  same  France  which  had  helped  her  to  realize 
her  union.  But  this  policy  of  sacred  egoism  only  attained 
its  climax  when  Italy  entered  the  Triple  Alliance.  Imperial- 
istic madness  then  took  possession  of  this  Southern  country, 
which,  following  the  example  set  by  Austria  after  1848, 
astonished  the  world  by  its  ingratitude  when  Crispi's  plan 
was  known.  It  was  a  question  of  a  sudden  attack  on  France 
in  order  to  bleed  her  once  more  for  the  benefit  of  Germany 
and  her  allies.  This  plan  was  denounced  by  Bismarck 
himself,  who  profited  from  it  to  compromise  Italy  definitely 
and  thus  obliged  her  definitely  to  take  up  a  position  on 
his  side. 

Crispi's  deplorable  policy  ended  sadly  with  the  Abyssinian 
defeat,  which  nearly  ruined  the  country,  morally  and 
economically. 

The  Tripoli  expedition  was  one  of  the  last  vestiges  of 
this  imperialistic  policy.  Thanks  to  the  efforts  of  the  new 
generations,  Italy  abandoned  the  Triple  Alliance  and  went 
over  to  the  side  of  the  Powers  which  were  supporting  the 
principles  to  which  Italy  owes  her  birth.  But  then,  even 
in  this  supreme  hour,  the  attitude  of  this  country  was  wanting 
in  nobility,  action  being  preceded  by  a  bargain  known  as 
a  "  parrechio,"  and  followed  by  another  known  as  the  Pact 
of  London.  Thus,  Italian  action  lost  much  of  its  moral 
value. 

An  alliance  with  predatory  powers  during  thirty  years 
is  not  to  be  practised  with  impunity.  .  .  .  One  generally 
borrows  the  mentality  of  those  whose  society  one  frequents. 
It  was  so  in  Italy's  case.  It  is  also  her  just  punishment. 
The  principles  of  Mazzini  and  the  time  of  the  Risorgimento 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  287 

were  forgotten  in  order  to  remember  that  of  the  Rome  of  the 
Caesars  and  the  republic  of  His  Serene  Highness  of  Venice. 

The  bad  faith  of  certain  Italian  politicians  recalls  that 
of  the  Austrians  and  Germans.  The  theories,  doctrines  and 
methods  are  the  same.  Our  readers  will  remember  the 
doctrines  professed  by  the  younger  Andrassy  in  respect  of 
the  "  necessary  "  annexations,  a  doctrine  of  which  we  have 
spoken  in  recent  issues  of  La  Serbie.  Andrassy  made  therein 
a  distinction  between  so-called  political  annexations,  which 
are  made  in  view  of  domination,  and  those  called  strategical, 
which  are  made  with  a  view  to  "  conservation."  Andrassy 
concluded  that  the  latter  are  not  at  all  imperialistic  !  In 
this  way  he  justified  all  the  Austrian  annexations  and  con- 
quests before  the  war.  For  we  others  who,  with  President 
Wilson,  recognize  the  principle  of  the  people's  right  of  self- 
disposal,  we  consider  as  illegitimate  all  annexations  contrary 
to  this  principle,  no  matter  what  their  object  may  be. 
According  to  us,  only  what  is  just  is  legitimate,  and  there 
is  no  justice  in  oppression.  The  Italians  now  evoke  against 
the  Southern  Slavs  the  same  reasons  which  their  own 
oppressors  advanced  in  other  days  (reasons  of  strategical 
necessity  and  historical  right)  in  order  to  justify  the  occu- 
pation of  the  Adriatic  sea  coast,  which  is  inhabited  by 
Southern  Slavs.  In  short,  they  treat  the  latter  as  enemies 
against  whom  "  it  would  be  as  well  to  assure  and  to  secure 
guarantees  !  "  How  can  this  strange  phenomenon  be  ex- 
plained ? 

It  must  be  recognized,  however,  that  everybody  in  Italy 
does  not  approve  of  this  policy.  A  group  of  intellectuals, 
few  in  number,  but  strong  in  faith  and  in  the  sincerity  of 
their  convictions,  have  opposed  the  disguised  imperialism 
of  the  new  Italy  since  the  beginning.  They  understood  that 
to  make  enemies  for  one's  country  where  one  could  make 
friends  is  not  rendering  it  good  service.  They  implored  the 
leaders  in  Rome  not  to  create  a  new  Carthaginia  beyond  the 
Adriatic.  No  attention  was  paid  to  them.  An  absurd 
campaign  was  undertaken  against  the  oppressed  nations  of 
Austria-Hungary  while  war  was  being  waged  against  the 
Monarchy.  The  Southern  Slavs  were  accused  of  having 
sold    themselves    to    Austria.     Everybody    was    slandered, 


288  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

even  the  editor  of  La  Serbie,  who  was  pretty  roughly  handled 
in  the  Italian  Jingo  Press.  This  policy  was  one  of  the  causes 
of  the  Caporetto  disaster.  Then  there  was  a  change  of 
tactics,  and  the  Congress  of  Rome  and  the  brilliant  mani- 
festations of  Campidoglio  were  arranged.  On  that  occasion 
Mr.  Orlando  gave  his  explanation  of  the  real  meaning  of 
the  Treaty  of  London,  of  which  the  integral  execution  would 
not  be  insisted  upon,  according  to  him,  if  Austria  were 
dismembered.  The  result  was  not  long  delayed.  It  was  the 
victory  of  the  Piave  won  partly  by  the  help  of  Austrian 
Slavs.  For  it  was  the  latter  who  furnished  information 
respecting  the  movements  and  positions  of  the  Austrian 
army.  A  Czech  division  even  fought  in  the  Italian  ranks. 
And  when  this  policy  had  borne  its  fruit,  the  Italian  leaders, 
taking  advantage  of  their  country's  patriotic  delirium, 
encouraged  it  to  conquer  the  Southern  Slav  territories  in 
contempt  of  the  principle  of  nationality.  But  one  cannot 
advertise  certain  principles  and  at  the  same  time  work 
against  them.  And  do  not  tell  us  that  it  is  in  virtue  of  the 
principle  of  nationality  that  the  Italians  have  occupied 
Fiume,  Abazzia  and  other  Southern  Slav  localities. 

Everybody  remembers  how  the  Mayor  of  Abazzia  greeted 
the  two  Excellencies  of  the  Triple  Alliance  at  the  time  of 
the  Marquis  of  San  Giuliano's  interview  with  Count  Aerenthal. 
Was  it  in  Italian,  in  German  or  in  Magyar  ?  No,  it  was  in 
Serbo-Croatian.  That  was  the  best  way  to  show  them  that 
they  were  not  at  home  in  that  country. 

If  the  Italians  wish  their  flag  to  be  honoured  as  a  symbol 
of  liberty  they  must  not  plant  it  where  it  could  symbolize 
violence  and  injustice. 

December  9,  1918. 

The  Italo-Slav  Problem. 

The  Italo-Slav  problem  is  far  from  being  as  simple  as 
our  contemporaries  of  the  Allied  and  neutral  Press  are  pleased 
to  imagine. 

In  order  to  understand  it  thoroughly,  it  must  be  con- 
sidered as  a  whole  and  from  different  points  of  view  :  political, 
ethnical  and  economic. 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  289 

At  the  present  moment  the  Italian  irredentist  movement 
is  in  conflict  with  the  ethnical  factor  :  the  co-existence  in 
the  Julienne  region  of  two  races,  either  of  which  can  invoke 
the  principle  of  nationality  in  opposition  to  the  other. 
In  the  future  as  in  the  past,  Italian  Adriatic  irredentism  will 
be  in  conflict  with,  and  may  be  dominated  by,  the  economic 
factor.  "  The  policy  of  territorial  conquest  towards  which 
neo-nationalism  would  drive  Italy,"  Angelo  Vivanto  judici- 
ously wrote,  "  is  but  a  political  absurdity  as  regards  the  Adri- 
atic. The  annexation  of  a  very  small  zone  on  the  eastern 
coast  (the  Julienne  zone  only  represents  a  quarter  of  the 
whole  eastern  coast)  would  provoke  consequences  as  bad 
for  the  Julienne  region  as  for  the  Italian  State." 

Leaving  on  one  side  for  the  time  being  the  ethnical 
and  economic  factor,  we  will  consider  only  the  political  side 
of  the  question. 

In  Italy,  the  irredentist  conception  concerning  the 
Julienne  region  has  always  been  wanting  in  clearness  and 
precision.  Ever  since  the  beginning  of  the  movement  in 
favour  of  union,  the  Italian  aspirations  respecting  the 
Adriatic  frontier  appear  uncertain  and  contradictory.  Some- 
times it  is  national  reasons  which  are  invoked  and  sometimes 
geographical  and  military  reasons.  This  confusion  of  opinion 
has  been  manifested  whenever  there  was  question  of  indi- 
cating the  limits  of  these  aspirations.  In  1848,  the  "  Italian 
Federative  Union's "  manifesto  prescribes  very  narrow 
boundaries  for  Charles  Albert.  "  Italy,"  says  the  manifesto, 
"  can  never  be  happy  or  secure  until  she  reaches  the  banks 
of  the  Isonzo."  Emilio  Solitro,  in  the  Journal  de  Trieste, 
proclaiming  his  father  in  the  union,  also  alludes  to  the  Isonzo. 
In  1864,  an  official  map  published  in  the  new  kingdom  fixes 
the  Italian  frontier  on  the  Isonzo.  Mazzini  also  is  neither 
affirmative  nor  consistent  in  regard  to  this  question.  In 
183 1,  he  places  the  frontier  in  the  direction  of  Trieste,  without 
saying  exactly  where.  (General  explanation  for  the  members 
of  the  "  Giovane  Italia.")  In  1857  (Slav  letters),  he  writes 
on  the  subject  of  the  frontier  in  the  direction  of  the  Julian 
Alps  :  "  Europe  of  the  future  will  include  an  Italy  reaching 
from  Sicily  to  the  amphitheatre  of  the  Alps  at  Trieste." 
In  i860  (Doveri  dell'Uomo),  the  boundaries  are  marked  at 

20 


290  SERBIA  AND  EUROPE 

the  mouth  of  the  Isonzo ;  finally  in  1871,  the  great  apostle 
of  nationality  goes  beyond  the  limits  marked  by  national 
law,  by  including  in  the  peninsula  Adelsberg,  the  Carso, 
administrated  by  Laibach,  and  the  Tyrol  beyond  Brunek. 

Visconti-Venosta  and  Lamarmora  indicate  that  the 
Isonzo  is  the  real  Italian  frontier  in  the  direction  of  Frioul. 
The  second  of  these  two  statesmen  gives  the  following 
explanation  of  the  Italian  aspirations  (October,  1865)  : 
"  I  should  say  that  by  the  denomination  of  Italian  possessions, 
I  only  meant,  besides  Venetia,  the  really  Italian  part  of 
the  Tyrol.  I  have  never  thought  of  Trieste.  This  town 
is  surrounded  by  Slav  populations.  If,  by  any  chance, 
Trieste  belonged  to  Italy,  this  possession  would  be  a  source 
of  difficulties  and  very  grave  dangers  to  our  kingdom." 

"  One  man  only,"  says  Angelo  Vivante,  "  has  ideas  of 
his  own  :  Camilio  Cavour."  In  a  speech  on  foreign  policy 
in  the  Subalpine  Chamber  (October  20,  1848),  Cavour  proves 
that  he  has  clearly  understood  the  Austro-Hungarian  problem 
as  well  as  the  Italo-Slav  problem.  He  sees  the  national 
nature  of  the  Slav  movement  led  by  Yelatchitch.  He 
blames  the  Magyar  oligarchic  oppression  of  the  Slav  national- 
ities. He  foresees  the  victory  of  Slavism  in  the  eastern 
part  of  the  Monarchy.  "  The  Slav  race,"  he  says,  "  energetic, 
numerous,  oppressed  during  several  centuries,  approaches  its 
complete  emancipation.  Its  cause  is  just  and  noble ;  defended 
by  hardy  and  energetic  troops,  it  should  triumph  in  a  not 
far  distant  future."  These  were  prophetic  words,  which 
to-day  have  become  reality  !  As  a  Minister,  Cavour  appre- 
ciates the  ethnical  factor,  the  co-existence  of  two  races 
(Italian  and  Slav),  at  its  proper  value.  He  is,  it  would  seem, 
profoundly  conscious  of  the  Slav  power  and  the  future  of 
Slavism,  and  the  necessity  of  making  it  a  friend  of  Italy. 
He  may  thus  be  justly  considered  as  an  opponent  of  annexa- 
tion and  assimilation  by  force.  But  Cavour  seems  to  be 
the  only  person  possessing  a  proper  comprehension  of  the 
problem.  "  The  Kingdom's  irredentism  at  that  time,"  says 
A.  Vivante,  "  springs  from  a  superficial,  tumultuous,  oratorical 
state  of  mind  of  poor  intellectuality,  very  often  even  mixed 
with  ignorance."  The  irredentist  territories  are  the  subject, 
sometimes  of  forgetfulness,  sometimes  of  manifest  renun- 
ciation on  the  part  of  the  politicians  of  the  Kingdom. 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  291 

During  the  discussion  in  the  Chamber  (April,  1867)  of 
the  peace  treaty  with  Austria,  not  a  single  voice  was  lifted 
to  recall  the  existence  of  the  Julienne  region  or  to  protest 
against  the  renunciation  of  the  eastern  frontier. 

Mr.  Sonnino  himself  writes  a  few  years  later,  in  the 
Rassegna  Setimanale  of  May  29,  1881,  the  following  words  : 
"  The  question  of  irredentist  Italy  must  first  of  all  be  reso- 
lutely put  aside.  In  the  present  condition  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Empire,  the  possession  of  Trieste  is  of  the  greatest 
importance  to  it.  Also,  Trieste  is  the  most  convenient  port 
for  German  commerce  :  her  population  is  mixed  as  is,  in 
general,  that  which  is  spread  along  our  eastern  frontier. 
To  claim  Trieste  as  a  right  would  be  an  exaggeration  of  the 
principle  of  nationality."  This  disavowal  of  the  irredentist 
idea  on  the  part  of  the  politicians  of  the  Kingdom  is  not 
an  isolated  fact.  The  unionist  idea  has  been  disapproved 
almost  as  often  by  the  politicians  of  the  Kingdom  as  the 
separatist  idea  was  by  those  of  the  irredentist  provinces. 

Mancini,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  in  March  1883,  at 
Montecitorio,  took  all  the  trouble  in  the  world  to  prove 
that  Adriatic  and  Triestin  irredentism  is  not  in  keeping 
with  the  principle  of  nationality.  The  Crispian  regime, 
during  a  period  of  about  ten  years  (1887-1896),  repudiates 
any  claim  to  the  Austrian  possessions.  He  even  opposes 
the  candidature  of  the  Triestin  Barzilai  in  Rome.  In  spite 
of  all,  irredentism  did  not  disarm ;  on  the  contrary,  it  became 
more  and  more  imperialistic.  Nevertheless,  after  the  defeat 
of  Adua,  irredentism  seems  to  regain  a  clearer  vision  of  the 
actual  state  of  affairs,  influenced  by  the  ethnical  and  economic 
factor.  It  is  probably  this  vision  that  later  suggested  to 
Mr.  Sonnino  the  proposition  of  April  8,  1915.  The  solution 
of  the  Adriatic  problem  then  proposed  by  him  consisted  in 
autonomy  for  Trieste,  which  was  to  become  an  autonomous 
and  independent  State  and  was  to  be  declared  a  free  port. 
Tl  is  proposition,  made  on  the  eve  of  Italy's  entry  into  action, 
inflicted  a  cruel  disappointment  on  the  irredentist  pretensions 
claiming  Trieste  and  Gorizia  in  virtue  of  historical  right ; 
Fiume,  a  Croatian  town,  in  virtue  of  strategical  law  ;  and 
Dalmatia  in  virtue  of  her  artistic  and  intellectual  life  in 
the  past. 


292  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

At  the  time  of  the  Treaty  of  London,  Italian  policy 
returned  to  its  old  imperialistic  aims.  The  irredentism  of 
our  time  is  nothing  but  imperialism  disguised.  That  is 
because  present  day  politicians  are  obsessed  by  two  fixed 
ideas  or  rather  two  illusions.  The  first  is  the  result  of  an 
erroneous  conviction  :  the  possibility  of  the  absorption  of 
the  Slavs  by  the  Italians,  by  means  of  a  violent  and  forced 
assimilation.  But,  from  this  point  of  view,  the  culture  of 
the  Southern  Slavs  has  proved  itself  superior  not  only  to 
that  of  its  enemies  but  also  to  that  of  the  Italians.  Also, 
all  the  attempted  efforts  at  forced  assimilation  by  our  enemies 
in  the  past  have  been  without  success.  Those  which  the 
Italians  attempt  in  the  future  will  not  be  more  successful, 
because  the  individuality  of  a  nation  is  only  accentuated 
by  collision  with  another.  Camillo  Cavour  thought  so,  too. 
That  is  why  he  advised  his  compatriots  not  to  go  too  fast. 
According  to  him,  the  absorption  of  Slavism,  to  be  successful, 
should  develop  as  freely  and  spontaneously  as  possible  ; 
it  should  be  the  work  of  time,  of  a  progressive  Italian  de- 
velopment of  moral  force. 

Another  of  the  Italian  politicians'  illusions  is  their  belief 
that  the  imperialistic  penetration  of  the  Italians  in  the 
Balkans  would  be  possible  without  causing  prejudice  to  the 
future  economic  relations  between  the  Balkan  countries  and 
Italy.  After  having  despoiled  their  neighbours  of  their 
legitimate  possessions,  the  Italians  think  it  would  be  possible 
to  do  an  advantageous  trade  with  them  and  throw  their 
products  on  the  Southern  Slav  markets.  But  that  is  a 
mistake  in  perspective,  a  fatal  error  for  Italo-Slav  relations. 
Italians  should  understand  that  they  will  be  received  in 
the  Southern  Slav  countries  in  the  same  spirit  in  which  they 
penetrate  there.  If  they  come  as  friends  they  will  be  received 
as  such.  If  they  come  as  conquerors  and  plunderers,  annex- 
ing Slav  provinces  and  towns,  their  reception  will  be  very 
different.  Once  confidence  is  lost,  it  will  never  be  recovered. 
The  Customs-Tariff  war  which  Serbia  waged  against  Austria- 
Hungary  twelve  years  ago,  is  there  to  prove  that  it  is  possible 
to  struggle  successfully  against  those  who  would  oppress 
us  in  one  way  or  another. 

December  23,  1918. 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  293 


Italy  and  the  Balkans. 


The  principle  of  "  the  Balkans  for  the  Balkan  people  " 
was  directed  against  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia.  The 
Austro-Russian  rivalry  in  the  Balkans  for  a  long  time 
prevented  the  solution  of  the  famous  problem  known  as 
the  Eastern  Question.  For  different  reasons,  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Russia  took  an  interest  in  the  Balkan  peoples, 
interfered  in  their  internal  affairs,  excited  them  one  against 
the  other  and  thus  maintained  an  uncertain  and  troubled 
situation  which  best  suited  their  desires  for  conquest. 

While  Russia's  action  was,  on  the  whole,  defensive, 
doing  her  best  to  help  the  Christian  peoples  as  much  as 
possible  in  their  struggle  for  independence  and  liberty, 
Austria-Hungary  pursued  a  different  policy.  By  the  occu- 
pation of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  in  1878,  the  Dual  Monarchy 
inaugurated  a  policy  of  expansion  which  completely  dis- 
organized the  peninsula.  In  1912,  thanks  to  Russian  efforts, 
the  Balkan  peoples  agreed  on  common  action  against  Turkey 
and  eventually  Austria-Hungary,  but  this  Balkan  coalition 
did  not  last  long.  Bulgaria,  far  from  dreaming  of  following 
a  policy  of  Slav  entente  and  solidarity,  had  entered  the 
Balkan  block  in  1912  with  the  idea  of  defrauding  her  neigh- 
bours after  having  exploited  their  military  assistance.  When 
events  took  an  unfavourable  turn  for  Austro-Bulgarian 
plans  (the  Serbian  victories  of  Koumanovo  and  Monastir, 
the  Greeks'  entry  into  Salonica,  the  arrival  of  Serbian  troops 
on  the  Adriatic),  Bulgaria  threw  her  cards  on  the  table  and 
attacked  her  erstwhile  allies.  But  the  second  Balkan  war 
was  the  cause  of  new  deceptions  for  her.  In  1915  Bulgaria 
drew  the  sword  for  the  third  time  with  a  view  to  destroying 
her  neighbours  and  thus  smoothing  the  road  for  the  Germanic 
advance  in  the  East.  The  momentary  successes  gained  with 
German  help  made  the  Bulgarians  lose  their  heads,  and  they 
committed  brutalities  worthy  of  their  great  Touranian 
leaders,  Krum  and  Assen,  in  the  occupied  Serbian  territories. 
The  victorious  battle  of  the  Vardar  came  in  time  to  put 
an  end  to  the  puerile  Bulgarian  dream  of  the  conquest  of 
the  whole  of  the  Balkans.  The  collapse  of  Austria  and 
the  crushing  of  Russia  cleared  the  ground  in  their  turn  of 


294  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

the  old  imperialistic  combinations,  so  that  the  principle  of 
"  the  Balkans  for  the  Balkan  peoples  "  appears  to  have 
every  chance  of  being  fully  applied.  Wilson's  points  had 
given  even  greater  vigour  to  this  principle.  Also,  one  cannot 
help  being  irritated  by  the  thought  that  all  the  benefits 
of  victory  may  be  menaced  by  the  sudden  apparition  of 
Italy  burdened  with  all  the  ideas  of  the  blessed  period  of 
the  Triple  Alliance. 


The  question  of  Italo-Southern  Slav  relations  is  in  close 
connection  with  Italy's  position  in  general  as  regards  the 
Balkans.  Delimitation  of  the  frontier  will  be  all  the  more 
difficult  if  Italy  goes  any  further  with  her  plans  for  penetration 
in  the  Balkans.  Such  a  policy  could  only  excite  the  greatest 
uneasiness  amongst  the  Balkan  peoples,  and  unfortunately 
Italy  has  done  nothing  up  to  now  to  reassure  us  on  the  subject 
of  her  intentions  ;  on  the  contrary,  she  has  done  everything 
to  arouse  our  suspicions. 

During  the  period  of  Italian  neutrality,  August  1914  to 
May  1915,  Italy  continued  her  negotiations  with  Austria 
on  the  basis  of  compensations  in  the  Balkans  in  virtue  of 
Art.  VII  of  the  secret  treaty  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  This 
was  not  of  a  nature  to  gain  our  sympathy.  In  the  mean- 
time Italy  was  also  in  negotiation  with  the  Entente,  negotia- 
tions which  remain  secret  and  of  which  neither  the  Italian 
Green  Book  nor  any  Allies'  diplomatic  book  makes  the 
slightest  mention.  Above  all  Serbia  must  know  nothing. 
The  Treaty  of  London  of  April  29,  1915,  has  never  been 
communicated  to  the  Serbian  Government.  When  the 
terms  of  this  agreement  were  published  by  the  Bolshevists, 
everybody  understood  why  Italy  had  remained  silent.  For 
the  Treaty  of  London  had  for  objective,  not  only  the  terri- 
tories inhabited  by  Italians,  but  also  Serbo-Croat-Slovene 
territory. 

Since  then,  the  Italians  have  manifested  the  same  attitude 
to  the  great  detriment  of  her  international  position. 

Nevertheless,  in  a  moment  of  weakness,  Italy  seemed 
to  be  about  to  change  her  policy.  The  Congress  of  Rome 
in   April    1918,   solemnly  inaugurated  the  so-called  policy 


SERBIA    AND    ITALY  295 

of  nationality.  But,  on  that  occasion,  the  Southern  Slav 
representatives  made  the  mistake  of  not  claiming  as  a  pre- 
liminary condition  of  their  participation,  the  formal  renunci- 
ation of  the  Treaty  of  London  inasmuch  as  it  affected 
the  Southern  Slav  territories.  The  Armistice  Treaty  with 
Austria  would  have  had  a  different  appearance  if  the  Italians 
had  been  asked  to  declare  the  Pact  of  London  to  be  void, 
leaving  to  the  Peace  Conference  the  task  of  fixing  our  common 
frontiers.  The  attitude  of  the  Italian  occupation  troops  in 
Dalmatia  and  Istria  is  not  any  better  calculated  to  inspire 
confidence.  All  the  same,  there  are  numerous  grounds  for 
an  understanding  between  us  and  the  Italians,  and  all  hopes 
of  an  entente  are  not  lost. 

The  first  condition  for  an  entente  between  Italy  and  the 
Kingdom  of  the  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes  is  that 
they  should  consider  themselves  reciprocally  as  good  friends 
and  neighbours  and  abandon  all  thought  of  aggression  or 
domination,  that  is  to  say,  that  the  idea  of  strategical 
frontiers,  naval  bases  and  solid  guarantees  must  be  abandoned 
by  both  sides.  The  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes  are 
a  pacific  people,  they  have  never  threatened  Italy  ;  they 
have  therefore  the  right  to  make  the  most  formal  reservations 
in  respect  of  the  Italian  claim  to  strategical  guarantees. 
If  any  one  has  the  right  to  ask  for  guarantees  it  is  rather 
the  Southern  Slavs,  who  are  much  weaker  and  whose  political 
and  economic  development  could  be  threatened  by  Italy, 
a  great  Power. 

The  second  condition  is  the  reciprocal  guarantees  to  be 
given  by  all  the  Allies  and  the  League  of  Nations  to  the 
Italian  and  Slav  ethnical  centres,  which  by  force  of  events 
would  remain  within  the  boundaries  of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy 
and  the  Kingdom  of  the  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes 
respectively.  If  both  were  persuaded  to  give  effective 
guarantees  on  the  subject  of  language,  culture  and  the 
preservation  of  nationality,  without  detracting  from  the 
authority  of  the  respective  States,  the  Italians  would  have 
no  need  to  claim  Dalmatia,  a  purely  Slav  country,  in  order 
to  save  18,000  Italians ;  neither  would  they  make  the 
mistake  committed  by  the  Corriere  delta  Serra  in  claiming 
the  extension  of  the  Italian  frontier  to  Fiume  in  order  to 


296  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

include  Fiume  !  The  Southern  Slavs,  on  the  other  hand, 
would  be  more  easily  resigned  to  accept  the  necessary 
sacrifices  of  those  of  their  compatriots  who  inhabit  the 
regions  of  Western  Istria,  which  possess  an  Italian  majority 
and  should  consequently  belong  to  Italy. 

The  third  condition  is  that  Italy  should  adapt  her  present 
Balkan  policy,  which  strongly  resembles  the  old  Austrian 
policy,  to  the  new  conditions  in  the  Balkans  and  the  whole 
world.  In  other  words,  Italy  should  treat  the  Balkan  States 
as  fully  developed  people  having  a  right  to  equality.  What 
is  most  important  is  that  Italy  should  not  follow  the  example 
of  Austria  by  trying  to  benefit  from  Serbo-Bulgarian,  Greco- 
Bulgarian  or  Serbo-Roumanian  differences.  We  are  not 
reassured  in  this  respect  either.  What  we  hope  for  is  that 
Italian  policy  in  the  Balkans,  in  order  to  obtain  useful  results, 
should  be  inspired  by  the  same  principles  as  those  of  France 
and  Great  Britain.  Let  there  be  absolute  caution  in  the 
political  department  and  unlimited  activity  in  economic  and 
cultural  departments  for  the  real  benefit  of  the  two  nations 

It  is  true  that  the  Serbians,  Croatians  and  Slovenes  are 
unanimous  in  claiming  the  respect  of  the  principle  of  nation- 
ality and  that  they  do  not  agree  that  great  portions  of  their 
nations  should  be  attributed  to  Italy  in  virtue  of  alleged 
geographical,  strategical  or  other  reasons.  An  entente  with 
us  is  equivalent  for  Italy  to  the  loss  of  an  illusion  because 
we  only  ask  for  the  territory  inhabited  by  our  people ;  but 
on  the  other  hand  this  entente  constituted  for  the  Italians 
the  greatest  gain  which  a  country  can  realize,  that  which 
gives  absolute  security  and  firm  friendship  with  a  young  and 
vigorous  neighbour.  It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  Italy 
has  won  her  war  alone  by  the  fact  of  the  dissolution  of 
Austria-Hungary.  All  territorial  questions  are  secondary  in 
comparison  with  the  greatness  of  this  victory,  which  assures 
peace  and  security  for  Italy.  On  the  other  hand,  we  offer 
Italy,  because  of  her  proximity,  the  best  market  for  her 
industrial  products.  The  smaller  cost  of  transport  on  one 
hand,  the  peculiar  taste  of  the  Balkan  consumers,  the  prices, 
generally  lower  than  those  of  Anglo-French  goods,  on  the 
other  hand,  would  allow  Italian  commerce  to  occupy  a 
preponderant   economic   situation  in  comparison  with   the 


SERBIA   AND   ITALY  297 

other  Allied  Powers.  Lastly,  surplus  Italian  labour,  which 
used  to  emigrate,  could  find  work  in  our  country,  for  we 
are  in  need  of  engineers,  constructors,  contractors  and 
skilled  labourers.  That  the  frontier  to  be  fixed  should  be 
the  means  of  communication  and  not  a  barrier  is  the  indis- 
pensable condition  for  the  development  of  economic  relations. 
The  peoples*  welfare  is  the  supreme  reason  of  any  policy. 
May  our  Italian  friends  sincerely  think  over  what  the  Italian 
people  will  gain  by  following  one  road  or  the  other. 

February  10,  1919. 


CHAPTER    VI 

SERBIA    AND    GERMANY 

Germany  in  Distress. 

On  June  5th  the  German  Chancellor  said  in  the  Reichstag  : 
"  I  have  told  an  American  journalist  that  Peace  negotiations 
could  be  successful  only  on  condition  that  the  statesmen 
of  the  belligerent  Powers  took  the  real  military  situation 
into  consideration.  These  proposals  have  been  rejected  by 
the  other  side.  Recognition  of  the  war  map  is  refused; 
it  is  hoped  to  improve  it.  Meanwhile,  it  has  been  trans- 
formed in  our  favour.  The  enemy  refuses  to  recognize 
these  facts,  that  is  why  we  must,  we  wish,  and  we  will 
continue  the  struggle  until  we  obtain  a  definite  victory.' * 
On  December  28th,  nevertheless,  Bethmann-Hollweg  did  not 
insist  on  the  M  war-map,"  which  was  very  characteristic  of 
him.  In  June  the  Chancellor  of  the  German  Empire  had 
recalled  the  surrender  of  the  British  army  at  Kut-el-Amara, 
the  defeat  (!)  and  losses  of  the  French  at  Verdun,  the  check 
to  the  Russian  offensive  in  March,  and  the  powerful  Austrian 
offensive  against  Italy.  In  September  he  should  have 
enumerated  the  brilliant  results  of  the  Russian  offensive 
in  Galicia  and  Bukovinia,  the  complete  failure  of  the  German 
plans  at  Verdun — immortal  and  invincible  town — the  victory, 
the  great  Anglo-French  victory  on  the  Somme,  the  taking 
of  Combles  and  Thiepval,  the  partial  invasion  of  Transylvania 
by  the  Roumanians,  and  the  constantly  increasing  pressure 
of  the  army  of  Salonica  exerted  against  the  Bulgaro-German 
lines  in  Macedonia.  All  the  same,  without  directly  recalling 
the  military  successes  of  the  Allies,  the  Chancellor  showed 
by  the  whole  tone  and  spirit  of  his  speech  that  he  is  acutely 
conscious  of  the  fact  that  it  is  no  longer  Germany  who  does 
the  attacking.     The  parts  are  changed  and  at  the  time  when 


SERBIA    AND    GERMANY  299 

the  Chancellor  made  his  speech  the  German  Empire  was 
staggering  beneath  the  blows  received  on  the  Somme,  blows 
which  will  not  be  long  in  increasing  their  number  and  in 
becoming  decisive.  Germany  in  distress !  What  a  dis- 
quieting spectacle  for  her  leaders,  and  what  a  joyful  spectacle 
for  the  civilized  world  ! 

For  Germany  wanted  the  war,  and  it  was  she  who  provoked 
it  at  a  moment  which  she  considered  favourable  for  a  rapid 
and  complete  victory  of  her  arms.  The  mentality  of  modern 
Germany  is  the  result  of  various  influences  of  a  political, 
economic,  psychological  and  social  description  and  sees 
nothing  abnormal  in  this.  According  to  German  psychology, 
war  is  a  means  of  preservation  and  progress  and  it  is  by  it, 
by  international  strife,  that  the  question  of  the  organization 
of  the  world  should  be  decided.  The  doctrine  of  brute  force 
is  the  essential  element  of  modern  German  psychology,  and 
if  the  experiment  she  tried  in  1914,  by  provoking  the  Great 
War,  had  succeeded,  the  German  savants  would  have  seen 
in  it  the  justification  of  German  world  supremacy.  The 
German  philosophers  and  historians  have  explained  the  part 
played  by  Prussia  in  the  realization  of  German  unity  in 
1866  and  1870  by  this  theory  of  brute  force.  Prussian 
militarism  is  destined  to  break  with  German  particularism 
and  compel,  by  brute  force,  all  the  small  German  states 
to  unite  in  one  powerful  political  body.  To  superficial 
observers,  Germany  was  the  example  of  a  people  realizing 
its  own  national  unity  ;  to  more  clear-sighted  people,  the 
events  of  1864,  1866  and  1870  were  far  from  confirming  this 
point  of  view.  At  its  birth  the  German  Empire  committed 
a  grave  breach  of  the  principle  of  nationality  by  appropriating 
Alsace-Lorraine,  not  to  mention  the  Polish  and  Danish 
provinces  which  Prussia  had  already  annexed.  The  motive 
which  led  to  the  creation  of  German  unity  was  not  the 
principle  of  nationality  which  is  essentially  a  principle  of 
liberty,  but  the  idea  of  the  domination  of  weak  political 
bodies  by  the  strong.  And  the  ensuing  development  of 
Germany  has  justified  all  the  fears  of  those  who  prophesied 
that  nothing  good  could  come  of  this  new  Power  "  of  blood 
and  iron." 

The  direction  taken  by  the  development  of  the  Empire 


300  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

after  1870,  fully  proved  the  danger  of  a  materialistic  con- 
ception of  history  such  as  was  very  widely  spread  in  Germany. 
The  ideal  of  a  strong  and  invincible  Germany  preached  by 
the  German  philosophers  and  intellectuals,  was  realized  by 
the  Berlin  Government  in  practice,  by  means  of  formidable 
armaments  on  land  and  sea  and  by  the  constant  increase 
of  military  measures  of  all  descriptions.  The  realism  of  the 
German  leaders,  who  had  but  one  desire — to  increase  the 
armed  forces  of  the  Empire  and  prepare  for  the  inevitable 
struggle — corresponded  perfectly  therefore,  with  an  ideal 
founded  on  the  cult  of  brute  force  and  military  power.  When 
the  time  came,  the  German  armies,  symbols  of  the  cultural 
standard  of  the  Empire,  in  obedience  to  the  orders  of  their 
Chief,  advanced  and  began  the  task  which  was  assigned  to 
them  by  invading  Belgium. 

A  lasting  agreement  with  a  people  possessing  such  a 
mentality  will  never  be  arrived  at.  The  German  people 
must  be  radically  cured  of  the  obsession  of  its  civilizing 
mission,  of  the  Empire's  "  invincible  power,"  and  its  "  voca- 
tion "  for  organizing  and  dominating  the  whole  world.  And 
the  only  possible  remedy  is  to  prove  the  contrary  ;  this 
proof  can  only  be  furnished  by  the  decisive  victory  of  the 
Allies.  The  latest  speech  of  the  Chancellor  of  the  Empire, 
pronounced  after  the  first  Anglo-French  victories  on  the 
Somme,  is  the  best  proof  of  this  fact. 

Such  a  victory  only  will  be  able  to  assure  our  independence 
and  national  unity.  We  do  not  often  mention  Germany  in 
La  Serbie,  but  that  is  not  to  say  that  we  Serbians  do  not 
consider  her  to  be  our  principal  enemy.  On  the  contrary, 
we  are  well  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy  as  well  as  Turkey  and  Bulgaria  are  simply  acolytes, 
instruments  which  Germany  uses  in  order  to  realize  her 
dreams  of  world-conquest.  If  we  occupy  ourselves  with  the 
secondary  adversary,  Austria-Hungary,  it  is  simply  to 
divide  the  task.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  which 
holds  in  its  power  about  twenty  million  Slavs,  who  cannot  be 
liberated  unless  the  power  of  Germany  is  broken,  is  nearer  to 
us  and  we  realize  this  better  than  our  great  friends  do.  While 
our  Allies,  in  their  Press,  fight  principally  against  Germany, 
we  pay  much  more  attention  to  Austria-Hungary  and  Bulgaria 


SERBIA    AND    GERMANY  301 

who  must  also  be  beaten  if  a  lasting  Peace  is  to  be  obtained. 
And  if  we  try  to  dissipate  our  friends'  illusions  in  regard 
to  these  secondary  opponents,  Germany's  allies,  we  do  not 
lose  sight  of  the  principal  enemy,  already  shaken  by  the 
Allies'  vigorous  blows,  but  who  will  not  be  rendered  inoffensive 
before  he  is  "  knocked  out,"  as  Mr.  Lloyd  George  said  the 
other  day. 

October  8,  1916. 

Germany  and  the  Balkans. 

The  general  lines  of  the  German  expansionist  policy  have 
for   a   long   time   led   to   Constantinople   and   Asia   Minor. 
German  "  Weltpolitik  "  is  both  continental  and  maritime 
While  she  was  building  a  powerful  navy  and  an  imposing 
merchant  fleet — Germany  planned  the  railway  to  Bagdad, 
the  achievement  of  which  should  put  the  German  Empire 
in  direct  communication  with  the  coveted  territory  of  Asia 
Minor.     Therefore,  if  we  wish  to  know  what  concrete  ends 
Germany  proposed  to  attain  by  the  present  war,  we  have 
only  to  recall  the  two  pre-war  aspirations  which  have  remained 
the  principal  aims  of  German  foreign  policy  :    expansion  in 
the  East,  the  famous  "  Drang  nach  Osten,"  and  the  destruc- 
tion of  British  command  of  the  sea.     All  the  other  points 
of  the  German  political  programme  are  in  relation  to  these 
two  fundamental  ideas.     The  Serbian  question,  for  example, 
when   regarded   from   this   point   of   view,   loses   the   local 
character  which  the  Central  Empires  wished  to  give  to  it, 
and  becomes  a  European  question  of  the  greatest  importance. 
In    order    to    reach    Constantinople,    Germany    must    pass 
through  Serbia,  and  as  the  Serbian  question  also  interests 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  because  of  the  attraction 
exercised  by  the  Serbian  Kingdom  on  the  Southern  Slavs 
of   Austria-Hungary,    the   agreement    of   the   two   German 
powers  on  this  point  was  not  difficult  to  realize.     In  order 
to  clear  the  road  to  Constantinople,  Serbia  must  therefore 
be  got  out  of  the  way.     The  Austrian  ultimatum  of  July  23, 
1914,  purposely  couched  in  terms  which  rendered  all  dis- 
cussion and   any  pacific  solution   impossible,  betrayed  the 
pan-German   plans   to  every  one.     Europe    opposed    their 


302  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

realization,  and  Germany,  instead  of  drawing  back,  provoked 
the  Great  War,  hoping  to  reduce  Europe  by  force  and  compel 
her  to  submit  to  her  will. 

The  German  military  successes,  important  as  they  were 
during  the  first  two  years  of  the  war,  have  nevertheless 
failed  to  produce  the  desired  effect.  The  third  year  has 
begun  badly  for  Germany,  who  has  had  to  submit  to  reverses 
of  all  descriptions,  but  that  does  not  prevent  the  German 
statesmen  from  pursuing  their  original  programme  as  regards 
the  extension  of  German  political  supremacy  as  far  as  the 
Persian  Gulf.  We  have  already  spoken  of  the  efforts  of 
Dr.  Friedrich  Naumann  in  view  of  the  realization  of  the 
close  union  of  Central  Europe  with  Bulgaria,  and  one  cannot 
repeat  too  often  the  warning  against  the  danger  which  would 
threaten  Europe  if  these  plans  of  conquest  were  one  day 
realized.  This  time  we  wish  to  call  attention  to  an  article 
which  appeared  in  the  Berliner  Tageblatt,  and  which  should 
not  pass  unnoticed.  In  the  number  of  October  21st,  Mr. 
Hans  Vorst,  political  editor  of  the  paper,  treats  the  question 
of  the  Straits  from  the  German  point  of  view,  and  on  this 
occasion  speaks  with  a  frankness  not  often  exhibited  by 
German  publicists.  The  German  Eastern  plans  appear 
therein  in  all  their  splendour. 

Mr.  Vorst's  argument  may  be  reduced  to  this  :  for  many 
centuries  Russia  has  wanted  Constantinople,  but  to-day, 
more  than  ever,  this  desire  is  unattainable,  because  Germany 
mounts  guard  with  Turkey  on  the  Bosphorous.  In  recalling 
the  Russian  professor  Mitrofanoff's  letter  referring  to  Russian 
policy,  published  in  the  Preussische  Jahrbiicher  a  few  months 
before  the  war,  and  the  categorical  reply  of  the  German 
professor,  Hans  Delbruck,  the  editor  of  the  above-mentioned 
review  "  that  Germany  considers  it  her  duty  to  oppose  all 
Russian  expansion,"  Mr.  Vorst  finds  that  this  German 
political  principle  still  remains  in  force,  and  that  Russia 
must  definitely  abandon  her  plans  for  taking  Constantinople. 
"  If  Russia,"  he  adds,  "  still  hopes  to  possess  Constantinople 
and  the  Straits,  Germany  can  never  give  her  consent,  not 
only  because  of  the  alliance  with  Turkey,  but  because  our 
route  passes  by  Constantinople."  The  solution  which  Mr. 
Vorst    proposes   for   the    Straits   is   therefore   very    simple. 


SERBIA    AND    GERMANY  303 

Constantinople  and  the  Straits  are  to  remain  in  German 
hands,  but  free  passage  must  be  allowed  to  Russian  merchant 
ships  and  the  economic  needs  of  Russia  must  be  satisfied. 
We  leave  aside  the  German  publicists'  other  arguments, 
by  which  he  tries  to  show,  firstly,  that  Great  Britain  has 
political  reasons  for  preventing  the  Russian  entry  into  Con- 
stantinople ;  and,  secondly,  that  it  would  be  in  Russia's 
interest  to  demand  the  liberty  of  the  seas,  to  return  to  the 
principal  point,  Germany's  intention  of  cutting  a  road  through 
the  Balkans  and  installing  herself  permanently  in  Constanti- 
nople. Bulgaria  has  been  won  over  to  this  plan  and  has 
already  employed  all  her  moral  and  material  resources  to 
help  its  realization  ;  there  remains,  therefore,  only  Serbia 
and  Roumania,  but  especially  Serbia.  It  is  upon  Serbia 
that  the  Austro-Germans  throw  themselves  and  it  is  she 
whom  they  wish  to  put  out  of  action.  We  can  understand 
from  this  the  importance  which  Germany  attaches  to  the 
Balkan  front  and  what  a  considerable  advantage  the  Allies 
gain  by  preventing  the  success  of  this  German  plan.  Pressed 
on  all  sides  by  the  Allies'  armies,  it  is  only  on  the  Balkan 
front  that  Germany  possesses  any  liberty  of  movement. 
This  German  opening  must  be  closed.  What  the  Allies  did 
not  do  in  1915,  they  must  accomplish  in  1916.  The  fall 
of  Monastir  is  a  good  sign.  But  it  must  not  stop  there. 
November  26,  1916. 

Germany  Against  Serbia. 

German  world  policy,  because  of  the  impossibility  of 
obtaining  decisive  successes  on  the  principal  fronts,  has 
recently  assumed  a  more  modest  form  and  appearance,  in 
reality  no  less  dangerous.  Thus  Germany  announces  that 
she  is  willing  to  abandon  the  realization  of  all  her  war  aims, 
and  that  she  is  inclined  to  be  content  with  a  part  of  her 
objectives  only.  To  this  end,  she  tries  on  one  hand  to  appear 
pacific,  inoffensive  and  fair,  and  on  the  other  she  pursues 
her  Eastern  pretentions,  hoping  to  meet  with  less  resistance 
there.  As  Serbia  is  in  her  way,  Germany  simply  wishes 
to  suppress  her.  Not  only  pan-Germans  such  as  Count 
Reventlow,  but  also  German  democratic  circles  consider  that 


304  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

an  end  must  be  made  of  the  independence  of  Serbia  and  the 
Serbian  people,  so  that  the  Germans  may  invade  the  East. 
In  order  to  show  the  persistence  with  which  they  work 
for  this  plan  of  the  conquest  and  annihilation  of  a  whole 
people,  we  will  reproduce  a  few  extracts  from  documents 
relating  to  the  efforts  made  by  the  Germans  to  create  amongst 
the  Allies  a  general  atmosphere  favourable  to  peace.  We 
will  afterwards  explain  the  German  plans  which  aimed  at 
the  destruction  of  Serbia. 

"  Germany  is  waging  a  defensive  war.  .  .  .  We  have 
repulsed  our  attackers  and  as  Germany  does  not  wage  war 
for  its  own  sake,  consideration  for  the  common  interests 
of  humanity  regains  its  whole  value.  An  agreement  con- 
cerning the  war  aims  of  the  belligerents  can  be  reached  by 
negotiation.  .  .  .  We  do  not  speak  as  conquerors,  we  only 
make  suggestions  and  await  the  reply  " — (Frankfurter 
Zeitung  of  December  13).  "  Germany  does  not  beg  for 
negotiations,  but  she  recommends  them  in  the  general 
interest  of  Europe  " — (Dr.  L.  Haas,  M.d.R.  in  the  Berliner 
Tageblatt  of  December  13).  "  The  German  Note  is  the 
serious  expression  of  the  desire  to  end  a  war  which  threatens 
to  ruin  Europe  if  it  continues.  Germany  honestly  wants 
peace  and  her  conditions  will  prove  to  the  Entente  that  she 
wishes  to  live  in  peace  with  the  other  nations  " — (Frankfurter 
Zeitung  of  December  15).  "  We  have  found  that  the  rule 
1  if  you  want  peace,  prepare  for  war,'  was  not  a  justifiable 
theory.  To-day,  pacific  conventions  and  ententes  are  de- 
manded in  Germany  also  " — (Dr.  Bernhard  Dernburg  in  the 
Berliner  Tageblatt  of  December  17).  "  One  may  dictate 
terms  of  peace  to  the  vanquished,  but  Germany  is  not 
vanquished.  She  stands  for  moderation  and  all  such  arrange- 
ments as  could  prevent  other  massacres  in  the  future.  She 
does  so,  not  through  weakness,  but  inspired  by  a  sincere 
love  of  peace  " — (Theodor  Wolff,  in  the  Berliner  Tageblatt  of 
December  20).  u  What  Wilson  wants  is  a  peace  which  does 
not  require  too  great  sacrifices  by  any  group  of  belligerents, 
a  just  agreement  and  a  real  reconciliation.  Germany  would 
like  such  a  peace" — (Theodor  Wolff,  in  the  Berliner  Tageblatt 
of  December  20).  "  We  have  never  preached  the  crushing 
of  our  enemies,  we  have  never  proclaimed  the  annexation  of 


SERBIA    AND    GERMANY  305 

our  opponents'  territory  to  be  our  war  aim  " — (Dr.  Bernhard 
Dernburg,  in  the  article  "  The  Bells  of  Peace,"  which  appeared 
in  the  Berliner  Tageblatt  of  December  22).  "  Germany  is 
for  an  honourable  peace  which  would  take  her  claims  and 
pretensions  into  consideration  " — (The  Berlin  correspondent 
of  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung  of  December  24).  "  The  Central 
Empires  only  desire  to  live  in  peace  with  the  other  nations  " — 
{Frankfurter  Zeitung  of  December  27).  "  Nothing  could 
prevent  another  war  more  than  a  reasonable  peace  on  a 
basis  of  compromise  " — (Friedrich  Meineke,  in  the  Frank- 
furter Zeitung  of  December  31).  All  these  articles  are  by 
people  who  find  their  information  in  the  most  well-informed 
German  circles. 

But  now  look  at  the  other  side.  In  the  Frankfurter 
Zeitung,  which  is  the  most  important  German  newspaper, 
and  has  intimate  relations  with  the  Chancellor  of  the  Empire, 
this  peace  "  loyal,"  "  just,"  and  "  by  compromise,"  is  ex- 
plained as  follows  :  On  the  sea  the  war  has  not  furnished 
a  decision  and  this  must  be  come  to  by  negotiation.  Germany 
is  not  beaten  on  the  sea,  and  the  question  of  her  future 
relations  with  Great  Britain  must  be  solved  by  compromise. 
On  the  Continent,  the  Western  front  is  stationary,  and  in 
the  East  Germany  is  brilliantly  victorious.  Mittel  Europa 
has  become  the  centre  of  German  war  policy..  Germany 
will  re-establish  order  in  the  Balkans " — (Extract  from 
a  remarkable  article  entitled  "  The  Decisive  Question," 
published  on  December  19).  Another  article:  "The 
Situation  in  the  South-East  "  (December  21)  says  the  same 
thing  :  "  Up  to  now  the  war  has  resulted  in  the  suppression 
of  the  inconveniences  of  the  continental  situation  of  the 
German  Empire  because  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria  and 
Turkey  have  joined  Germany  in  order  to  help  her  to  accom- 
plish her  historical  mission.  .  .  .  Two  consequences  ensue, 
two  German  claims  which  are  in  complete  agreement  with 
the  war  map  :  the  maintenance  of  Turkey  as  a  great 
Europo-Asiatic  Power  and  the  constitution  of  a  Greater 
Bulgaria  including  Macedonia  and  parts  of  Serbia  and 
Roumania."  "  The  situation  does  not  permit  us  to  obtain 
all  that  many  of  us  hoped  for,  but  if  we  make  our  greatest 
efforts  in  the  most  opportune  direction  we  can  obtain  from 

21 


306  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

the  Entente  a  good  and  profitable  peace,  a  peace  which  would 
be  favourable  to  the  principal  Entente  countries.  .  .  .  Our 
programme  to-day  is  an  inflexible  attitude  in  the  East ;  nego- 
tiations in  the  West  " — (December  22).  And  in  the  article 
"  The  Policy  of  the  Balance  of  Power  "  (January  7,  19 17), 
the  same  thesis  is  mentioned,  only  it  is  given  a  more  general 
character. 

Germany  demands  a  free  hand  in  the  East,  and  as  regards 
the  rest  of  the  world  she  consents  to  conclude  an  agreement 
on  the  basis  of  the  balance  of  power  and  the  division  of 
world  supremacy. 

The  German  plans  are  therefore  clear.  Having  failed 
to  conquer,  Germany  is  looking  for  a  compromise  in  order 
to  prepare  for  another  struggle.  And  she  looks  for  this 
compromise  on  a  basis  which  represents  unspeakable  danger 
for  the  Allies,  and  means  the  end  of  Serbia.  A  glance  at 
any  map  will  show  what  a  formidable  Power  a  Germany 
stretching  from  Hamburg  to  beyond  Bagdad  and  controlling 
all  the  peoples  inhabiting  these  vast  territories  would  be. 
In  virtue  of  such  a  compromise,  Germany  would  become 
in  reality  the  mistress  of  the  world,  and  all  peoples  would 
be  obliged  to  accept  German  supremacy  without  a  fight  and 
without  resistance.  But  all  these  German  plans  for  world 
supremacy  will  remain  sterile.  The  Allies  now  know  how 
to  appreciate  the  political  value  of  the  East,  which  represents, 
not  a  secondary  front,  but  one  of  the  principal  ones.  In 
their  own  interests,  they  will  not  allow  the  German  helmet 
to  show  itself  for  long  in  the  Balkans. 

January  14,  1917. 

Serbia  and  the  German  Plans. 

Herr  Hermann  Wendel,  a  member  of  the  Reichstag,  has 
written  an  article  on  Serbia  which  is  worthy  of  attention, 
and  which  we  reproduce  in  extenso  in  La  Serbie.  This 
reply  to  one  of  our  articles  in  La  Serbie  obliges  us  to  reply 
in  our  turn  for  the  good  reason  that  it  is  the  first  time  that 
a  serious  German  publicist  publicly  treats  the  question  of 
Serbian  national  unity  in  a  way  that  renders  an  objective 
discussion  possible.    The  justice   of  the   Serbian  national 


SERBIA   AND    GERMANY  307 

claims,  the  immense  sacrifices  made  by  the  Serbian  people 
toward  its  absolute  liberation  and  complete  independence, 
preserve  us  from  any  accusation  of  exaggeration  and  from 
any  feeling  of  nervousness.  We  stand  firm  in  our  right  for  an 
independent  national  existence,  and  we  are  capable  of  speak- 
ing as  moderate  language  as  is  possible,  but  all  the  more  deter- 
mined and  resolute  are  we  as  to  its  real  object,  that  is  to 
say,  the  question  of  our  political  and  economic  independence. 

We  have  a  great  esteem  for  Herr  Wendel  personally, 
and  as  we  have  already  mentioned  in  the  article  to  which 
Mr.  Wendel  was  so  good  as  to  reply,  the  Serbians  have  no 
reason  to  be  ungrateful  to  a  man  who,  although  German, 
has  had  the  courage  to  publicly  denounce  the  premeditated 
Austrian  attack  on  Serbia.  If  we  have  nevertheless  affirmed 
that  Herr  Wendel's  ideas  as  regards  the  Serbo-Austro-German 
economic  community  mean  practically,  in  a  less  rigid  form, 
the  economic  slavery  of  Serbia  and  her  inclusion  in  German 
Central  Europe,  it  is  the  truth  to  which  we  still  hold  and 
can  easily  prove.  The  pan-Germanists  simply  wish  to  compel 
us  to  be  a  part  of  Central  Europe,  whereas  Herr  Wendel 
tries  to  persuade  us  that  her  economic  interests  oblige  Serbia 
to  sell  her  products  to  the  Central  Powers  and  buy  from  them 
the  things  which  she  needs  ;  that  through  this  traffic  she 
would  inevitably  be  subject  to  German  influence  in  other 
departments  and  that  any  Serbian  resistance  to  such  a  solution 
would  be  useless.  Therefore  the  result,  in  the  end,  would  be 
the  same  as  that  recommended  by  the  pan-Germans,  obtained 
in  another  and  more  prudent  way  which  would  avoid  hurting 
national  susceptibilities.  We  do  not  doubt  Herr  Wendel's 
honesty,  it  is  rather  his  simplicity  which  astonishes  us. 
Does  not  Herr  Wendel  tell  us  that  he  knows  nothing  about 
the  official  German  programme  in  the  Balkans,  whereas  the 
whole  German  expansionist  policy  is  founded  on  the  axiom 
that  the  Balkans  must  be  under  the  complete  and  exclusive 
domination  of  Germany  ? 

But  we  formally  contest  Herr  Wendel's  statement  that 
Serbia  is  a  part  of  Central  Europe  from  the  political,  economic 
or  any  other  point  of  view.  The  peculiar  circumstances  in 
which  our  country  found  itself  before  the  war,  without  any 
outlet  to  the  sea  and  without   free  communication  with 


308  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

Western  Europe,  had  necessarily  made  her  turn  towards 
Austria  and  Germany.  All  the  Serbian  products  went  to 
Austria-Hungary  and  Austro-Hungarian  industries  had  many 
customers  in  the  Serbian  market.  Nevertheless  political 
imperialism  aiming  at  the  possession  of  Salonica  and  the 
political  subjection  of  Serbia  had  blinded  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy.  It  thought  itself  all-powerful  and  by 
closing  its  frontier  to  Serbian  products  it  hoped  to  break 
Serbian  resistance  to  its  plans  in  the  Balkans.  This  blindness 
caused  it  to  go  as  far  as  to  declare  a  tariff  war  on  the  Serbian 
Kingdom.  Pressed  by  Austria,  Serbia  did  not  fail  to  ask 
for  Germany's  assistance,  as  Herr  Wendel  knows.  Very 
well,  but  she  met  with  the  coldest  of  receptions  in  Berlin. 
In  spite  of  the  great  advantages  which  German  industry 
would  have  gained  by  replacing  that  of  the  Monarchy  in 
the  Serbian  market,  Berlin  was  not  at  all  disposed  to  counter- 
act an  action  is  which  she  also  was  directly  interested.  The 
zeal  of  a  few  Germans,  such  as  Herr  Schlieben,  the  German 
Consul  at  Belgrade,  for  example,  was  soon  suppressed,  and 
Serbia  was  told  that  the  road  to  Berlin  was  through  Vienna. 
Serbia's  difficult  position  was  evident.  All  the  same  there 
were  people  in  our  country  who  did  not  understand  the 
German  policy,  and  refused  to  see  what  its  consequences 
would  be.  The  author  of  these  lines  was  one  of  these  credu- 
lous people.  The  brutal  ultimatum  of  1914  and  the  cordial 
support  which  Germany  gave  to  the  Monarchy's  sanguinary 
enterprise  have  opened  our  eyes  since  then,  and  all  the  fine 
speeches  in  the  world  will  not  be  able  to  alter  our  feelings. 
It  is  not  true  that  Serbia,  once  united  to  her  Serbian, 
Croatian  and  Slovene  brethren,  should  necessarily  belong 
to  Central  Europe  because  of  her  geographical  situation 
and  economic  structure.  If  the  conditions  of  our  economic 
development  are  to  be  changed — and  something  is  already 
being  accomplished  in  this  direction — a  change  in  the  direction 
taken  by  Serbian  commerce  will  follow  of  its  own  accord. 
Better  railways  and  the  proper  organization  of  river  navi- 
gation, will  put  Serbia  in  direct  communication  with  Western 
Europe.  The  Paris-Milan-Fiume-Zagreb-Belgrade-Salonica 
line  will  make  us  independent  of  Vienna  and  Budapest. 
A  canal  joining  the  Morava  to  the  Vardar,  another  joining 


SERBIA   AND    GERMANY  309 

the  Danube  and  the  Save  to  the  Adriatic  will  complete  our 
definite  liberation  from  German  influence.  The  Danube- 
Adriatic  Railway  is  the  great  line  of  the  future  which  will 
also  assure  the  emancipation  of  Roumania.  Serbia  will 
always  be  able  to  find  markets  for  agricultural  products, 
and  France  and  England  will  lend  us  capital  at  easier  rates 
than  Germany  did. 

All  these  considerations  and  many  others,  give  us  the 
right  to  say  that  there  is  no  common  bond  between  us  and 
Germany.  We  want  our  independence  and  national  unity, 
and  that  is  precisely  what  Germany  does  not  wish  to  grant 
us.  Herr  Wendel  himself  recognizes  that  the  fairest  and 
more  just  solution  of  our  national  question  would  be  the 
union  in  one  free  and  independent  national  State.  But 
instead  of  advising  Germany  and  Austria  not  to  oppose 
our  legitimate  desire,  Herr  Wendel  advises  us  to  abandon 
our  legitimate  aspirations  because  their  realization  is  im- 
possible without  more  bloodshed  !  But  why  do  the  Germans 
prefer  to  sacrifice  their  sons  rather  than  consent  to  the 
liberation  of  the  enslaved  Serbian  people  ?  Such  Germans 
have  no  right  to  remind  us  of  Goethe,  Schiller  or  Grimm. 
Hindenburg  is  their  idol  and  Mackensen  personifies  con- 
temporary Germany  These  modern  leaders  of  the  German 
nation  have  ruined  and  ravaged  the  beautiful  country  which 
the  German  thinkers  of  other  days  have  celebrated  and 
sung  about.  The  tomb  of  a  million  Serbians,  innocent 
victims  of  criminal  aggression,  separates  Serbia  from  Austro- 
Germany.  The  living  Serbians  would  rather  be  buried  there 
too  than  dishonour  their  people  by  an  unworthy  agreement. 

June  3,  1917. 

Germania  Liberatrix. 
The  Germans  are  fighting  for  freedom.  At  least  they 
say  so.  First  of  all  for  their  own  freedom  because  they 
are  threatened  with  suffocation  between  their  narrow  frontiers. 
Then  for  the  freedom  of  the  seas  because  England  rules 
them.  This  British  supremacy  on  the  sea  exists,  it  is  true, 
but  it  is  also  true,  and  the  Germans  themselves  cannot 
deny  it,  that  it  is  precisely  during  this  British  supremacy 


310  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

that  the  German  merchant  fleet  has  attained  its  greatest 
development.  But,  the  Germans  reply,  in  case  of  war  ? 
This  constant  thought,  "  in  case  of  war,"  has  never  left  the 
Germans  for  the  last  fifty  years ;  haunted  by  this  idea, 
they  can  no  longer  imagine  the  sea  to  be  free  unless  it  is  under 
the  "  protection  "  of  Germany.  Besides  the  sea,  Germany 
also  intends  to  deliver  the  land,  the  fertile  land,  as  well  as 
that  which  could  become  fertile  thanks  to  "  German  in- 
telligence, industry  and  honesty,"  as  they  are  fond  of  saying, 
the  land  of  Champagne,  Poland,  as  far  as  Pripete,  the  Balkans 
and  Asia  Minor.  The  German  mission  is  "to  organize 
energy."  Those  who  oppose  them  must  be  destroyed,  no 
matter  at  what  cost !  Lastly,  the  Germans  have  found  also 
some  people  to  whom  they  wish  to  devote  a  portion  of 
their  liberating  efforts.  The  Flemish  are  to  be  protected 
from  the  Wallons  ;  the  little  brothers  of  German  race  and 
language  (according  to  German  science)  must  be  saved  from 
Latin  domination  ;  the  Dutch,  also  a  German  tribe,  would 
be  glad  to  be  protected  by  Germany  on  the  sea  and  in  their 
colonies  from  the  rapacity  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan.  .  .  . 
The  Poles,  the  Ukrainians,  the  Letts,  the  Finns,  all  the 
thirty  M  nations  "  of  Caucasia,  the  Bulgarians  of  Roumania, 
the  Roumanians  of  Serbia,  the  Mohammedans  of  the  French, 
British  and  Russian  colonies,  there  are  oppressed  people 
everywhere  who  only  wait  to  be  freed  by  the  German 
sword.  .  .  .  And  even  if  the  Polish  peasants  in  Russia  have 
enjoyed  a  more  favourable  position  than  that  occupied 
by  the  Polish  peasants  in  Austria,  it  is  then  the  Jews  and  the 
nobles  who  are  ground  beneath  the  Russian  heel ;  in  Rou- 
mania, on  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  peasants  who  deserve 
Germany's  attention.  Only  in  Turkey  are  there  no  suffering 
natives  ;  in  Hungary  everything  is  for  the  best ;  in  Austria 
the  peoples  are  content  without  an  exception  (the  exceptions 
are  in  the  prisons  and  concentration  camps)  ;  in  Germany, 
the  perfect  organization  of  energy  assures  to  every  one  the 
fullest  development  of  his  capacities.  Those  who  do  not 
wish  to  believe  it  are  compelled  to. 

The  Germans  are  never  able  to  understand  that  there 
are  other  things  besides  organization,  order  and  economy 
of  energy  in  the  life  of  a  nation.     They  have  formed  a 


SERBIA    AND    GERMANY  311 

mechanical  and  selfish  conception  of  human  life.  They  do 
not  recognize  the  independent  moral  ideas  of  all  systems 
and  material  organizations  ;  they  do  not  understand  that 
it  is  the  economy  of  moral  energy  which  should  take  first 
place  in  the  hierarchy  of  different  forces.  They  always 
start  from  the  external  realities,  from  riches  and  military 
power.  Their  ideal  of  civilization  is  the  best  possible 
organization  of  all  energy,  of  human  beings  as  well  as  land 
and  water,  in  order  to  assure  the  greatest  possible  revenue 
from  material  riches  and  because  it  is  thanks  to  them  that 
humanity  has  attained  this  object,  they  should  also  enjoy 
the  "  contractor's  commission."  As  receivers  of  this  revenue, 
they  will  leave  in  all  countries  their  agents  and  confidants 
in  the  persons  of  monarchs,  great  and  humble  employees, 
bank  managers  and  managers  of  industrial  enterprises  .  .  . 
The  German  mind  is  too  curiously  limited  to-day  in  this 
mechanical  and,  in  the  long  run,  economic  conception,  that 
they  do  not  even  see  the  illusion  of  their  aspirations  as 
"  contractors  of  civilization,"  that  they  do  not  understand 
that  moral  liberty  can  serve  as  the  foundation  for  the  partic- 
ular brand  of  civilization  of  each  nation. 

History  shows  how  irrational  are  events  :  the  agents 
undertake  an  action  with  certain  intentions  but  they  do 
not  know  where  their  action  will  lead  them.  Germany 
wanted  the  "  contractor's  commission "  of  the  civilized 
world,  but  this  war  can  bring  about  nothing  but  the  partici- 
pation of  Germany  in  modern  evolution  in  the  direction 
of  international  democracy,  equality  and  liberty  of  the 
peoples  on  a  basis  of  right  and  justice. 

Yes,  paradoxical  though  it  may  appear,  Germany  is  fight- 
ing for  liberty  and  even  for  her  own  liberty,  but  she  does  not 
know  it  and  she  does  not  want  to.  On  the  day  that  the 
German  people  is  delivered  from  its  militarist  caste,  its 
Germano-maniacal  publicists  and  its  entire  egoistic  and 
materialistic  outlook,  on  that  day  we  shall  have  a  free 
Germany  in  the  League  of  Nations,  but  it  will  never  be  for- 
gotten that  she  was  not  her  own  liberator.  It  is  the  tragic 
destiny  of  the  Allied  peoples  to  be  obliged  to  fight  for  the 
freedom  of  the  German  people  also. 

January  28,  1917. 


312  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

The  Germans  of  Former  Days  and  the  Serbians. 

To  Germany  and  the  German  intellectuals,  the  Serbians 
are  a  small,  barbarous  people,  a  horde  of  frantic  revolu- 
tionaries, a  nest  of  murderers  and  regicides,  or  a  half-savage 
tribe  which  must  be  civilized  by  German  kultur  before  being 
granted  autonomy  and  political  independence.  It  is  sufficient 
to  hear  once  the  disdainful  remarks  of  the  Germans  on  this 
"  small  barbarous  people  "  in  order  to  form  an  idea  of  the 
general  opinion  in  contemporary  German  intellectual  circles 
regarding  Serbia  and  the  Serbians. 

Nevertheless,  the  Germans  of  former  times  were  not  of 
the  same  opinion.  A  little  book  on  Serbian  national  songs, 
recently  published  in  the  German  collection  Insel-Biicher 
(Serbische  Volkslieder,  Leipzig,  1916),  which  contains  a 
remarkable  collection  of  Serbian  songs  translated  into 
German  by  the  great  German  writers  of  the  beginning  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  gives  us  a  very  instructive  example. 
The  greatest  German  poet,  Goethe,  had,  in  1775,  translated 
into  German  "  The  lament  of  the  noble  women  of  Assan 
Aga,"  for  Herder's  collection  of  National  Songs.  Wilhelm 
von  Humbolt  and  Jacob  Grimm  took  the  trouble  of  learning 
Serbian  at  Vienna  during  the  Congress  of  1814-1815,  and 
it  was  Grimm  who  wrote  for  the  Wiener  Allgemeine  Litter  atur- 
Zeitung  a  very  judicious  article  on  the  first  collection  of 
Serbian  songs  prepared  by  Vouk  Stephan  Karadjitch.  It  is 
also  to  two  eminent  Germans  that  Karadjitch,  the  regenerator 
of  Serbian  literature,  owed  the  honour  of  receiving  from 
King  Frederick  William  of  Prussia  in  1852  the  Order  of 
the  Red  Eagle.  Speaking  of  the  Serbian  songs,  Grimm 
said  that,  since  Homer's  time,  no  epic  literary  production 
in  Europe  provided  so  much  information  and  material 
relating  to  the  source  and  nature  of  this  type  of  literature. 
Grimm  also  advised  Mademoiselle  de  Jakob  (Talvy)  to  study 
Serbian  songs  and  translate  them  into  German,  and  if  the 
old  Goethe,  enthusiastic  once  more  about  Serbian  songs, 
published  a  good  number  of  them  in  his  Review,  praising  them 
highly,  the  credit  for  it  belongs  to  Grimm. 

When  one  thinks  that  romantic  circles  in  Berlin  in  the 
first  half  of  the   nineteenth   century  passed  their  literary 


SERBIA   AND    GERMANY  313 

evenings  in  reading  Serbian  songs,  the  ardour  and  hate  with 
which  contemporary  Germans  threw  themselves  upon  Serbia 
to  annihilate  her,  is  really  astonishing.  The  Serbian  people, 
whose  nobility  of  soul  and  feelings  is  admirably  reflected  by 
the  national  epic  and  lyrical  poetry,  and  who,  having  been 
more  than  sympathetically  received  by  the  romantics  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  represents  for  modern  Germany 
to-day  a  pitiable  people  who  must  be  broken  and  whose 
natural  evolution  must  be  stopped.  In  presence  of  these 
facts,  it  is  pertinent  to  ask  why  the  Insel  Library  of  Leipzig 
thought  it  necessary  to  publish  this  collection  of  Serbian 
songs,  and  remind  the  public  that  old  German  opinions  of 
the  Serbians  differed  diametrically  from  those  expressed  by 
contemporary  German  political  and  literary  personalities. 
We  do  not  see  what  interest  the  German  public  can  have 
in  knowing  the  character  of  a  people  to  which  it  denies  the 
right  to  live  and  develop  !  And  we  also  ask  why  a  professor 
of  Belgrade  University  thought  it  was  an  opportune  moment 
to  collaborate  in  this  publication  at  a  time  when  the  German 
guns  were  demolishing  at  Belgrade  the  only  Serbian  uni- 
versity, and  when  the  Austro-Magyaro-German  emissaries 
were  emptying  the  libraries,  museums,  and  scientific  col- 
lections in  the  schools  and  seminaries  and  all  other  institutions 
of  Serbian  intellectual  life  ! 

August  6,  1916. 


Germany  and  Little  Serbia. 

"  I  am,  therefore  you  are  not." 

(Epigraph  applied  by  MM.   Lerolle  and  H.    Quentin  to   the 
egotistical  theory  in  German  philosophy.) 

The  first  rule  of  international  law  establishes  the 
equality  of  all  States  before  the  law,  without  taking  into 
consideration  the  extent  of  their  territory  or  their  economic 
and  military  power.  Equality  before  the  law  internally  and 
equality  before  the  Law  of  Nations  externally.  This  ele- 
mentary notion  of  right,  borrowed  from  morality,  has  never 
met  with  much  sympathy  in  Germany  where  the  theory 
of  degrees  or  of  the  ladder  is  preferred.     Far  from  being 


314  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

equal,  the  peoples,  according  to  the  German  philosophy, 
are  placed  one  above  the  other.  At  the  bottom  is  Luxem- 
bourg, which  can  be  conquered  on  a  pleasure  trip  ;  after 
her  comes  States  which  are  a  little  stronger  and  so  on.  At 
the  top  of  the  ladder  towers  "  Germania  invincible."  Ger- 
many and  her  neighbour,  Austria-Hungary,  have  practised 
this  doctrine  for  a  long  time.  Long  before  the  European 
war,  the  small  States  felt  the  full  weight  of  the  German  theory 
of  brute  force,  and  Serbia  could  claim  to  have  peculiar 
experience  in  this  respect.  Austria-Hungary  could  never 
consider  little  Serbia  as  an  equal,  from  the  judicial  point 
of  view,  of  the  Great  Power,  Austria-Hungary  !  The  daily 
history  of  Austro-Serbian  relations  is  nothing  but  that  of 
the  struggle  between  a  Power,  puffed  up  with  pride  and 
material  power,  and  a  small  State,  resolved  not  to  let  itself 
be  crushed. 

Here  are  a  few  examples.  When  the  commercial  treaty 
of  1906  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia  was  being 
negotiated,  the  Serbian  delegates  asked  that  the  discussion 
should  be  conducted  on  basis  of  the  principle  do  ut  des,  give 
and  take.  The  Austrian  delegates  thought  this  demand — 
which  was  very  natural — incompatible  with  Austria-Hun- 
gary's rank  as  a  Great  Power.  At  the  time  of  the  crisis 
provoked  by  the  annexation  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  Count 
Forgach,  the  Austrian  Minister  in  Belgrade,  repeatedly 
reminded  Milovan  Milovanovitch,  who  was  then  the  Serbian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  that  he  could  not  treat  with 
him  as  an  equal,  Serbia  being  a  small  country.  Milovanovitch 
naturally  protested  energetically  against  such  a  distinction, 
and  when,  on  July  23,  1914,  Austria  sent  the  famous  ulti- 
matum to  Serbia  which  disgusted  the  whole  world,  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary  could  not  hide  their  disdain  for  those 
who  took  such  interest  in  a  small  country. 

German  psychology  is  therefore  confirmed  on  this  subject 
and  the  new  manifestations  of  this  unhealthy  state  of  mind 
are  not  surprising.  But  the  brutal  form  taken  by  the  latest 
specimen  of  this  pathological  psychology  is  too  characteristic, 
too  German,  to  be  ignored. 

The  Frankfurter  Zeitung  of  June  3rd  published  a  long 
editorial  article  on  Germany  and   Belgium,   relating  to   a 


SERBIA   AND    GERMANY  315 

report  by  the  ex-military  governor  of  Belgium,  General 
Bissing,  on  Belgium's  future.  In  this  report  which  has  just 
been  published  by  the  pan-German  review  Das  grosser e 
Deutschland,  the  German  general  explains  all  the  reasons 
in  favour  of  the  annexation  of  Belgium  by  Germany.  The 
great  Frankfurt  newspaper,  knowing  very  well  that  the 
annexation  of  Belgium  is  impossible  without  a  German 
victory,  and  that  this  is  absolutely  beyond  the  bounds  of 
possibility,  tries  to  convince  its  fellow  citizens  that  the 
territory  in  question  is  large,  and  that  a  simple  annexation 
of  Belgium  would  create  difficulties  for  Germany.  It  would 
be  better  to  choose  a  less  brutal  way  in  order  to  respect 
the  principle  of  nationality  !  Because,  when  all  is  said  and 
done,  this  principle  is  not  to  be  disdained !  Only,  its 
application  to  Germany  or  Austria-Hungary  must  not  be 
demanded.  Whoever  has  the  audacity  to  attempt  to  do 
so  will  receive  the  proper  punishment.  "  Thus  the  little 
Serbian  people  who  dared  to  oppose  a  Great  Power  like 
Austria  has  received  an  exemplary  punishment.' ■  The 
quotation  is  textual  and  is  an  authentic  document  for  the 
study  of  the  mentality  of  the  pan-Germans  and  also  of  the 
so-called  German  "  democrats." 

June  24,  1917. 

Misplaced  Compassion. 

The  reconstitution  of  the  Serbian  army  and  its  transfer 
to  Macedonia  have  given  rise  to  different  commentaries  in 
our  opponent's  Press,  especially  in  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Press.  But  the  German  Press  has  also  mentioned  several 
times  the  "  remnants  "  of  the  Serbian  army,  as  it  is  in  the 
habit  of  expressing  itself,  in  order  to  make  the  public  think 
that  the  Serbian  army  no  longer  exists.  Lately,  nevertheless 
the  German  papers  have  changed  their  tone  and  opinion, 
and  instead  of  disdain  and  indifference,  are  anxious — risum 
teneatis — about  the  valiant  Serbian  nation  which  must  again 
begin  the  struggle  for  its  political  freedom  and  independence  ! 
Thus  the  Leipziger  Nachrichten  have  published  on  June  17th, 
in  its  No.  166,  an  article  on  Serbia  and  the  Serbian  army,  full 
of  pretended  compassion  and  friendship  for  the  Serbian  people. 


316  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

The  author  of  the  article  says  that  the  Serbian  army, 
by  fighting  valiantly,  has  made  enormous  sacrifices  in  the 
present  and  preceding  wars.  Sickness  and  epidemics, 
especially  cholera  and  typhus,  have  also  considerably 
weakened  it.  The  retreat  through  the  inhospitable  moun- 
tains, in  rain  and  snow,  finally  undermined  the  health  of 
the  hardiest  soldiers.  The  most  elementary  humane  feelings 
should  have  insisted  on  sparing  this  so  sorely-tried  nation 
the  sufferings  of  a  new  struggle  in  order  to  preserve  it  from 
complete  ruin  and  leave  it  the  possibility  of  forming  a  new 
people,  a  State  !  But  this  cruel  Entente,  which  has  neither 
heart  nor  pity,  asks  more  sacrifices  from  the  Serbian  people, 
and  compels  it  to  fight  on  ! 

The  Leipzig  paper  really  exaggerates  its  uneasiness  as 
to  the  fate  of  Serbia  and  the  Serbian  people  ;  but  supposing 
it  to  be  honest — rather  a  risky  supposition  ! — we  will  show 
a  very  simple  way  of  saving  the  Serbian  people.  Let  the 
German  and  Austro-Hungarian  armies  evacuate  Serbian 
territory  and  thus  spare  the  brave  Serbian  soldiers,  as  to 
whose  fate  the  Saxon  paper  is  so  uneasy,  the  trouble  of 
driving  them  out.  But  before  making  such  a  proposition, 
the  German  paper  should  ask  itself  why  Germany  attacked 
Serbia  against  whom  she  had  not  even  the  imaginary 
causes  for  complaint  which  the  Dual  Monarchy  invoked  in 
order  to  justify  its  war  of  destruction.  We  have  no  doubt 
that  the  conclusion  at  which  it  will  arrive,  will  prevent  it 
from  ever  again  mentioning  the  Serbian  people,  whose  present 
truly  tragic  position  is  solely  due  to  German  aggression. 

July  2,  1916. 


CHAPTER    VII 

SERBIA    AND    RUSSIA 

The  Extravagances  of  the  Leninist  Kamarades 

The  consolidation  of  the  interior  situation  in  Russia  is 
not  being  carried  into  effect  without  some  rather  violent 
changes.  Though  no  doubt  inevitable,  they  cause  a  certain 
uneasiness  in  the  countries  of  all  Russia's  friends  and  allies. 
The  last  manifestation  of  the  committee  of  workmen  and 
soldier  delegates,  demanding  a  peace  "  without  annexation 
and  without  indemnities/'  comes  certainly  within  the  category 
of  dangerous  extravagances  which  can  do  immense  harm, 
not  only  to  the  Russian  nation,  but  to  the  whole  of  demo- 
cratic Europe.  As  to  ourselves,  who  do  not  yet  know 
exactly  who  are  these  mysterious  and  anonymous  delegates, 
whose  ideas  are  in  perfect  agreement  with  German  and 
Austrian  desires,  we  have  the  right  to  protest  against  these 
manifestations  made  in  favour  of  the  servitude  and  oppression 
of  our  nation  under  Austro-Germano-Bulgarian  tyranny. 
The  indescribable  sufferings  of  the  Serbian  nation  and  its 
steadfast  faith  in  international  justice  and  morality,  should 
have  at  least  caused  the  "  Leninists,"  "  Maximalists,"  and 
associates,  to  abstain  from  insulting  a  whole  nation  by 
styling  its  struggle  for  liberty  and  independence,  "  policy 
of  conquest."  The  cruel  irony  of  it  is  shown  by  quoting 
an  Austrian  paper,  the  Zeit  of  Vienna,  which  said  the  other 
day  that  the  Entente  does  not  wish  for  annexations,  but  that 
it  asks  for  "  abnexions,"  that  is  to  say  the  annulling  of  all 
the  annexations  effected  in  the  past  against  the  will  of  the 
respective  nations.  How  could  the  Petrograd  committee 
be  ignorant  of  a  fact  well  known  even  to  our  enemies  ? 

We  have  been  fighting  for  exactly  one  year  in  La  Serbie 
for  the  liberty  of  our   people  and  for  the  victory  of  right 

317 


318  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

and  justice.  Any  annexation  signifies  violence  for  us,  and 
is  profoundly  repugnant  to  us.  But  is  there  a  single  sensible 
man  who  can  speak  of  annexations  when  it  is  a  question 
of  France  being  united  with  her  provinces  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
which  Germany  snatched  from  her  in  1870  ?  And  how  do 
Mr.  Lenin  and  his  friends  dare  to  style  "  policy  of  conquest 
and  annexation "  the  ardent  desire  of  the  Serbo-Croat- 
Slovene  people  to  be  delivered  from  the  Austro-Magyar 
yoke  ?  How  can  they  so  mistakenly  misinterpret  a  truth 
so  simple,  so  elequent  and  so  clear  to  the  narrowest  minds, 
as  to  speak  of  annexations  and  conquests  when  it  is  simply 
a  question  of  liberty  and  the  most  elementary  rights  of 
existence  ? 

As  to  the  peace  without  "  indemnities,"  the  manifestation 
of  the  committee  is,  if  possible,  still  more  inconceivable. 
The  Serbians,  the  Belgians,  the  French  and  the  Poles  have 
been  victims  of  a  premeditated  aggression,  and  the  aggressors, 
if  they  had  conquered,  would  have  forced  these  same  nations 
to  pay  to  them  the  costs  of  the  "  operation."  But  the 
enterprise  has  failed,  and  Lenin  and  his  associates  now  demand 
that  the  criminals  should  be  pardoned  and  not  asked  to 
repair  all  the  damage  they  have  caused  !  What  mental 
aberration,  or  how  German,  to  ask  pardon  in  advance 
for  the  authors  of  so  many  crimes  committed  among  the 
populations  of  the  devastated  Allied  countries  !  We  do  not 
need  to  invoke  the  picture  of  tortured  Serbia,  of  which  the 
Bulgarians  are  at  this  very  moment  completing  the  pillage 
and  devastation.  Let  the  Leninists  throw  a  glance  on  the 
"  glacis  "  contrived  in  France  by  the  Germans  at  the  time 
of  their  retreat  on  the  Somme,  and  may  they  spare  us  the 
sorrow  of  seeing  messages  come  from  Petrograd,  the  centre 
of  the  liberation  of  the  Russian  people,  so  celebrated  in  the 
democratic  world,  messages  bearing  the  Germanic  stamp. 
May  our  great  Russian  friends,  after  having  driven  out  the 
Germanic  agents  from  the  palaces,  also  clean  out  the  attics 
a  little,  where  these  people  seem  to  have  comfortably 
installed  themselves.  That  would  have  a  salutary  effect 
upon  Russian  democracy. 

May  13,  1917. 


SERBIA   AND   RUSSIA  819 

The  Terror  of  the  Four  Bastards  of  the 
Russian  Revolution. 

No  one  is  so  disillusioned  and  overcome  by  the  peace 
negotiations  between  Maximalists  and  Centrals  as  the  Serbian 
nation,  oppressed  by  Austria-Hungary.  The  Russo-Serbian 
relations  throughout  history  are  singular  :  nine  times  since 
Peter  the  Great,  Russia  has  risen  up  as  the  protectress  of 
the  Serbians,  and  each  time  some  catastrophe  has  forced 
her  to  leave  her  protege  in  confusion,  delivering  her  up 
to  extermination,  either  to  the  Sultan  of  Constantinople  or 
to  Vienna.  Each  time  Russia  said  :  "  This  time  we  were 
not  sufficiently  prepared,  but  next  time  you  will  see."  And 
now,  the  last  of  these  "  next  times,"  some  bastards  of  the 
Russian  revolution  sell  the  Serbian  nation  shamelessly  to 
the  capitalist-imperialists  of  Vienna  and  of  Budapest,  deliver 
it  up  to  be  taken  advantage  of  by  Magyar  feudalists. 

However,  it  would  be  unjust  to  deny  all  efficacy  to 
Russian  protection  ;  without  it,  the  Serbian  nation  would 
probably  have  been  completely  destroyed  a  long  time  ago  ; 
it  is  this  that  inspired  the  celebrated  Czech  poet,  Jan  Kollar, 
with  the  idea  that  the  mission  of  Russia  was  the  integral 
liberation  of  all  the  Slavs  from  the  Germano-Magyar-Turkish 
yoke.  The  Magyar  dictator,  in  1848,  Lajos  Kossuth,  has 
seized  upon  this  poetic  expression  of  an  ardent  desire  for 
liberty,  in  order  to  turn  it  into  the  scarecrow  "  pan-Slavism," 
and  he  succeeded  so  well  that  the  proud  and  temperate 
Albion  herself  was  afraid  of  it,  and  that  Beaconsfield-Disraeli 
consented  to  Bosnia-Herzegovina  not  being  united  to  Serbia, 
but  given  up  to  the  Austrian  occupation.  It  mattered  not 
at  all  that  the  number  of  Serbians  subjugated  to  the  double 
Monarchy  should  increase,  provided  the  "  pan-Slavic  danger  " 
was  avoided.  How  they  must  have  laughed  in  their  sleeve 
these  clever  rogues  of  Budapest  and  Vienna  !  Now,  England 
is  expiating  the  false  step  of  Beaconsfield,  and  Lloyd  George 
racks  his  brains  in  order  to  paralyse  the  consequences  of  it. 

In  Russia  even,  pan-Slavism  had  representatives  scarcely 
capable  of  exercising  a  profound  influence  on  the  Russian 
nation  :  the  too  famous  Katkov  was  more  a  sort  of  plotter 
than  a  sincere  pan-Slavist.     With  more  enthusiasm,  though 


320  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

with  less  judgment,  the  Serbian  nation  adhered  to  the 
different  anarchist  theories,  whether  those  of  Peter  Kropotkin 
or  those  of  Tolstoi,  which  moreover  are  distinguished  from 
all  the  others  in  that  they  disapprove  of  any  violence,  either 
on  the  part  of  the  revolutionaries  or  of  the  government. 
All  these  tendencies,  sometimes  noble  in  themselves,  have 
this  in  common,  that  they  are  at  least  indifferent,  if  not 
hostile,  in  regard  to  the  Russian  and  Slav  national  ideal. 
These  tendencies  had  no  effect  on  the  vigilant  enemies,  but 
only  gave  them  the  means  of  disaggregating  Russia. 

Only  one  among  the  great  sons  of  Great  Russia  cherished 
the  idea  of  an  indivisible  Russia  and  of  a  free  confederation 
of  all  the  Slavs,  based  on  friendship  and  affirmed  Russia's 
right  to  Constantinople.  That  was  Dostoievski.  But  hardly 
any  one  understood  his  ardour  ;  the  loyalist  of  his  adversaries 
treated  it  as  an  aberration  pure  and  simple,  while  for  the 
most  part,  Russians  and  non-Russians,  slandered  him  as 
the  valet  of  autocracy,  of  orthodoxy,  of  pan-Slavism,  of 
imperialism.  Alexander  II  followed  his  coffin  to  the  grave  ! 
Everywhere  else  one  would  have  praised  a  monarch  for  such 
an  action  ;  rendered  by  a  Russian  Emperor,  even  though 
it  was  the  Czar  liberator,  this  homage  only  served  to  ruin 
the  reputation  of  him  to  whom  it  was  rendered.  No  one 
has  described  with  such  lucidity  the  maladies  of  the  Russian 
mind  ergo  :  it  is  Dostoievski  who  is  ill,  a  maniac  who  takes 
his  doctor  for  a  madman  and  considers  himself  perfectly 
normal ! 

In  a  word,  one  did  not  recognize  Dostoievski's  right 
to  speak  in  the  name  of  the  Russian  nation.  And  now, 
four  bastards  of  the  revolution,  Oulianov-Lenin,  Bronstein- 
Trotski,  Apfelbaum-Zinoviov,  and  Rosenfeld-Kamenev,  are 
considered  worthy  to  represent  this  nation  ! 

It  is  the  whole  intellectual  class  of  Russia  that  is 
responsible  for  the  tragi-comic  development  of  the  revolution. 
Everywhere  else,  from  the  time  of  the  Hindoo  philosophers 
down  to  our  own  days,  a  thinking  man  is  idealist  or  positivist, 
materialist  or  metaphysician  ;  with  the  Russians  that  does 
not  follow  ;  for  them  the  point  of  view,  the  starting  point, 
the  root  of  all  things,  is  the  social  instinct.  The  Russian 
man  is  so  absorbed  in  society  that  he  has  no  time  to  reflect 


SERBIA   AND   RUSSIA  321 

about  himself.  He  is  social-revolutionary  or  agrarian  anti- 
revolutionary  ;  he  is  socialist  of  no  matter  what  shade,  and 
as  such,  anti-capitalist ;  or  else  he  is  of  the  reactionary  creed, 
that  is  to  say  an  adherent  to  the  present  social  order.  But 
always  his ' '  credo ' '  is  the  social  instinct .  And  the  man  guided 
by  instinct,  no  matter  which,  is  always  eager,  busy,  but  with- 
out ever  perceiving  clearly  his  aim.  The  Russian  intellectuals 
are  all  socialists-instinctivists  acting  for  the  future  happiness 
of  humanity — especially  that  of  the  planet  Mars.  The 
greater  part  of  the  leaders  of  the  proletariat-intellectuals 
is  composed  of  men  of  incomplete  education,  of  semi-scholars 
and  semi-students  of  the  Khazare  race,  known  generally 
by  the  name  of  Russian  Jews.  The  ancient  chronicle, 
called  that  of  Nestor,  mentions  the  Khazares  on  the  Dnieper, 
who  embraced  the  religion  of  Moses,  while  the  Russians 
were  baptized  according  to  the  Greek  rite.  There  was  later 
an  immigration  of  real  Jews  of  other  countries ;  but  up  to 
our  days  the  Khazar  type  can  be  easily  distinguished  among 
the  Russian  Israelites.  And  while  the  German  and  Austro- 
Hungarian  Jews  uphold  German  and  Magyar  imperialism, 
the  Russian  Khazar  Israelites  work  with  all  their  might 
against  the  Russian  State.  They  prefer  a  sordid  existence 
to  any  hard  work,  but  as  far  as  possible  they  transform 
themselves  from  poor  men  into  parasites  of  the  poor,  into 
"  organizers  "  of  the  working  classes.  Pogroms  organized 
by  the  secret  police  and  encouraged  by  generals  with  German 
names  (for  example  Kaulbars)  served  to  pollute  the  name 
of  the  Russian  people  and  to  tighten  the  bonds  between  the 
Jews  of  Vienna  and  Budapest  and  their  co-religionists  in 
Russia,  and  this  assured  to  many  Khazars  the  means  of 
leading,  in  the  colonies  of  Russian  emigrants,  an  eternal 
student's  life  with  eternal  chatter  based  upon  the  socialist 
catechism.  Thus  there  was  formed  a  strong  contingent  of 
fervent  Austrophiles. 

At  the  social-democrate  congress  at  Insbruck,  a  few 
years  before  the  war,  Bronstein-Trotzki  publicly  thanked 
the  Austrian  social-democracy  for  the  financial  aid  extended 
to  the  Russian  social  democracy,  directed  by  the  Khazar 
Israelites  ! 

Every  one  is  asking  to-day  whether  Lenin,  Bronstein  and 

22 


322  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

Co.  are  madmen  or  German  agents.  I  have  already  spoken 
of  the  secret  bonds  of  union  between  the  Russian  revolu- 
tionary committee  and  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  starting  from  1879,  when  Kalnoky  was 
ambassador  at  Petrograd.  The  Soukhomlinov  lawsuit  threw 
some  light  upon  it,  in  clearing  up  the  death  of  Stolypine. 
The  latter  has  transferred  Miassoiedov  from  Verjbohvo  to 
Samara,  saying  that  it  was  absolutely  necessary  that  this 
man  should  be  removed  to  thirty  meridians  from  the  German 
frontier,  and  he  wanted  to  ask  the  Czar  for  the  resignation 
of  Soukhomlinov.  That  is  why  the  "  revolutionary  "  Bagrov, 
a  Khazar,  fired  on  Stolypine  and  not  on  the  Czar  who,  how- 
ever, was  only  a  few  steps  away.  It  is  significant  that 
Bronstein-Trotzki  should  have  spoken  of  this  assassination 
in  the  same  speech  in  which  he  thanked  the  Austrian 
socialist-democrats.  But,  of  course,  he  did  not  tell  the  truth 
about  it,  namely,  that  Stolypine  was  assassinated  not  for 
being  an  autocrat-reactionary,  but  because  he  had  said  to 
the  Khazar  revolutionaries  :  "  It  is  in  your  interests  to  see 
Russia  shaken  ;    for  my  part,  I  want  her  to  be  great  !  " 

The  bastards  of  the  Russian  revolution  are  intimately 
related  to  Austria  by  a  long  past,  and  they  know  that  Austria 
could  threaten  them  with  the  publication  of  the  "  secret 
treaties,"  compromising  in  a  different  way  to  those  published 
by  Bronstein-Trotzki  in  betraying  the  allies  of  Russia. 

They  are  neither  madmen,  these  bastards  of  the  revo- 
lution, nor  essentially  agents  of  Germany  :  they  are  in  the 
first  place  accomplices  of  Austria-Hungary,  forced  to  save 
her  let  it  cost  what  it  may.     For  this  reason  they  must  : 

1.  Demoralize  the  Russian  army  down  to  utter  defeat. 

2.  Dissolve  all  authority  down  to  perfect  anarchy. 

3.  Prepare  the  national  bankruptcy. 

4.  Dishonour  the  Russian  people  in  making  it  responsible 

for  an  international  treason. 

5.  Ruin  Russian  industry  so  as  to  make  Russia  into  a 

simple  Austro-German  colony. 

6.  Assassinate  all  Russian  patriots  by  means  of  lynching. 

7.  Destroy  all  hope,  with  the  Slavs  oppressed  by  Austria- 

Hungary,  of  Russia  ever  being  able  to  protect  them. 


SERBIA   AND    RUSSIA  323 

That  is  what  the  real  treaty  of  peace  between  Lenin 
and  Czernin  consists  in. 

All  the  rest  is  only  a  farce  made  up  beforehand,  disguised 
in  phrases  of  the  socialist  catechism. 

Now  that  the  secret  treaties  with  the  former  allies  are 
published,  it  is  incumbent  upon  Russian  intellectual  classes, 
as  their  strict  duty,  to  ask  the  present  despots  of  Russia 
that  they  may  at  least  obtain  justice,  though  too  late,  by 
publishing  the  source  of  all  the  funds  of  the  revolutionary 
Committee  during  the  course  of  these  forty  years,  and  the 
use  made  of  these  funds.     That  is  the  first  point. 

January  6,  1918. 

The  Death  of  Nicholas  II. 

The  Emperor  of  all  the  Russians  has  just  been  executed 
by  a  band  of  irresponsible  persons  having  no  right  whatever 
to  speak  or  act  in  the  name  of  the  Russian  nation.  But  the 
Emperor  Nicholas  II  happened  to  be  in  their  hands,  and  they 
shot  him  in  a  manner  that  may  be  called  repugnant.  The 
people  who  have  sold  Russia  to  Germany,  and  who  hold 
their  power  only  by  force  and  by  German  favour,  are  so 
little  qualified  to  judge  the  ex-Czar  that  their  act  bears 
rather  the  mark  of  common  murder. 

In  spite  of  all  the  faults  committed  by  the  Emperor 
Nicholas,  the  news  of  his  tragic  death  has  been  received 
in  Serbian  circles  with  a  sentiment  of  profound  compassion. 
The  ex-Czar  was  a  friend  of  the  Serbian  nation,  and  if  for 
no  other  reason  than  for  his  personal  intervention  in  favour 
of  Serbia,  his  sincere  and  friendly  promise  to  protect  the 
Serbian  nation  against  the  premeditation  of  the  Austrian 
aggressors,  we  owe  him  our  eternal  gratitude.  At  the  most 
critical  moment  of  the  existence  of  the  Serbian  nation, 
July  14-27,  1914,  the  Emperor  Nicholas  telegraphed  to  His 
Royal  Highness  the  Prince  Alexandre  of  Serbia,  these  historic 
words  :  "  Your  Royal  Highness  in  applying  to  me  at  a 
particularly  difficult  moment,  has  not  been  mistaken  as  to 
my  cordial  sympathy  for  the  Serbian  nation.  .  .  .  Your 
Highness  can  rest  assured  that  under  no  circumstances 
will  Russia  lose  interest  in  the  fate  of  Serbia."     We  know 


824  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

what  happened.  At  the  last  moment,  the  Emperor  Nicholas 
urged  the  Kaiser  to  accept  the  arbitrage,  but  Berlin  refused. 
And  so  it  was  war,  a  frightful  war  for  which  the  responsibility 
does  not  fall  upon  Nicholas  II. 

In  Russia  certain  democratic  circles  have  a  grudge 
against  Serbia  for  her  attachment  to  official  Russia,  to  the 
Court,  to  the  autocracy.  But  could  we  do  otherwise  ? 
Serbia  had  only  one  policy,  the  policy  of  liberty,  of  Slav 
solidarity,  above  all  an  anti-German  policy.  She  sought  the 
support  of  Russia  and  applied  to  the  quarter  from  which 
this  support  could  be  obtained.  An  ultra-democratic  country 
like  ours  would  have  greeted  with  the  greatest  joy  a  demo- 
cratization of  Russia,  but  before  thinking  of  that,  it  had  to 
take  precautions  against  its  own  bondage,  against  the  Austro- 
Germano-Magyar  menace.  We  could  not  do  like  the 
Bulgarians,  who  wavered  between  Austria  and  Russia,  and 
whose  politicians  divided  their  roles  so  as  to  adapt  them- 
selves to  Russian  home  affairs.  Some  moved  with  the 
Imperial  Court,  others  sought  contact  with  the  democratic 
centres.  But  while  the  Serbians  loved  and  respected  Russia 
and  were  ready  to  help  her  within  the  limits  of  their  strength, 
the  Bulgarians  only  looked  upon  their  deliverer  as  a  milch 
cow  from  which  one  must  endeavour  to  extract  the  last 
drops.  In  this  way  the  difference  between  the  feelings  of 
the  Serbians  and  the  Bulgarians  can  be  explained  on  learning 
the  death  of  their  mutual  protector.  The  Serbians  will  not 
fail  to  pray  for  the  soul  of  the  ex-Czar,  who  was  sometimes 
unjust  towards  them,  but  who  was  their  benefactor.  The 
Bulgarians,  according  to  the  minister  Madjaroff  (see  the 
Vossische  Zeitung  of  July  12),  are  preparing  to  erect  to 
the  Kaiser  a  monument  much  finer  than  that  of  the  Czar 
liberator  at  Sofia  ! 

August  3,  1918. 


CHAPTER    VIII 

THE   POLITICS    OF    ROUMANIA 

Roumanian  Hesitations. 

The  attitude  of  Roumania  remains  stationary.  The  Govern- 
ment of  Bratiano  still  keeps  an  enigmatic  silence,  and  in 
spite  of  the  numerous  article  of  the  Press  about  "  l'heure 
roumaine,"  it  appears  that  Roumania  will  not  give  up  her 
policy  of  expectation.  The  Roumanian  leaders  prefer  to 
remain  neutral  and  to  leave  to  future  events  the  determination 
of  their  final  politics.  But  these  events,  as  far  as  the  offensive 
of  the  Allies  is  concerned,  and  especially, the  Russian  offensive, 
have  not  yet  in  the  eyes  of  the  Roumanians,  led  to  such 
a  change  in  the  military  situation,  that  a  Roumanian  inter- 
vention should  impose  itself  as  an  absolute  necessity.  As 
long  as  everybody  is  doubtful  as  to  which  side  will  be 
victorious,  Roumania  remains  quiet.  The  causes  of  this 
purefy  negative  policy  are  very  diverse.  On  the  one  side 
they  depend  on  the  politics  pursued  by  Roumania  for  the 
last  thirty  years,  and  on  the  other  side  on  the  general  situation 
of  the  country. 

Up  to  the  last  Balkanic  wars,  up  to  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest 
of  1913,  Roumania  has  practised  an  openly  Germanophile 
policy.  A  secret  convention  with  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  has  even  put  her  in  the  rank  of  the  powers  of  the 
Triple  Alliance.  In  this  combination  Roumania  was  taken 
for  a  sort  of  Austro-German  avant-garde  opposite  to 
Russia,  and  thanks  to  the  efforts  of  King  Carol  Hohenzollern, 
the  policy  based  on  the  hypothesis  of  a  Russian  danger 
was  practiced  until  1913,  up  to  the  intervention  of  Roumania 
against  Bulgaria.  The  Treaty  of  Bucarest  in  1913  signified 
a  new  orientation  of  the  Roumanian  policy  in  the  sense 
of  an  emancipation  from  the  Central  Powers.     But  this  new 


326  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

policy  could  not  be  pursued  lo  its  end,  the  European  war  not 
having  left  time  for  Roumania  to  pass  through  the  transitory 
phase  and  prepare  the  ground  for  a  definite  rapprochement 
with  the  Allied  powers,  friends  and  protectors  of  the  liberty 
of  the  small  nations.  The  European  war  has  so  much  sur- 
prised Roumania  that  she  does  not  know  on  which  side 
to  turn.  The  principal  reason  for  the  Roumanian  situation 
must  be  looked  for  in  these  oscillations  between  the  two 
groups  of  Powers. 

The  Balkanic  policy  of  Roumania  was  clearly  drawn  up  in 
1913,  and  if  the  European  war  had  not  broken  out  so  suddenly 
the  Roumanian  statesmen  would  have  had  time  to  accom- 
modate the  general  policy  of  the  country  to  the  new  situation 
created  by  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest.  There  were  in  the 
first  place  the  relations  with  Russia  and  all  the  questions 
so  concerned,  the  importance  of  which  Roumania  could  not 
leave  without  consideration.  Yet  there  is  no  doubt  that 
the  happy  results  of  the  new  Roumanian  orientation  would 
have  facilitated  the  conclusion  of  a  definite  understanding 
between  Roumania  and  Russia  and  would  have  rendered 
possible  the  continuation  of  the  policy  inaugurated  by  the 
Treaty  of  Bucarest.  But  the  German  diplomacy  did  not 
remain  inactive.  As  it  had  lost  the  Balkanic  party  in  1913, 
it  redoubled  its  efforts  not  to  lose  the  European  party  in 
Roumania.  By  an  unexpected  movement,  the  Emperor 
William  approved  of  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest,  and  let  them 
know  in  Athens  and  Bucarest  that  the  two  countries  still 
enjoyed  in  Berlin  the  old  sympathies.  In  the  short  interval 
between  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest  and  the  European  war, 
Germany  had  worked  for  the  strengthening  of  the  ancient 
ties  of  friendship,  and  when  war  broke  out  Roumania,  un- 
certain of  her  position,  showed  herself  friendly  to  both 
sides.  She  did  not  want  to  ally  herself  to  the  Central  Powers, 
which  practically  signified  that  she  was  abandoning  the 
secret  convention  with  Germany.  But  Roumania  would  not 
either  range  herself  on  the  side  of  the  Entente,  in  order  to 
continue  the  policy  based  on  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest. 

There  was  a  time  when  Roumania  tried  to  distinguish 
between  the  Balkanic  and  the  European  situation.  A 
Roumanian  diplomat  explained  to  us  at   the  beginning  of 


THE    POLITICS    OF    ROUMANIA  327 

1915  that  neutral  Roumania  implied  the  passivity  of  Bulgaria, 
and  that  Serbia  was  not  to  demand  anything  more  of 
Roumania,  who  was  obliged  also  to  reckon  with  her  Euro- 
pean interests.  This  diplomat  assured  us  that  the  Roumanian 
neutrality  towards  the  Germanic  empires  was  conditioned 
by  the  Bulgarian  non-intervention,  and  that  Roumania 
would  come  on  the  scene  at  the  moment  when  Bulgaria 
would  attack  Serbia.  That  attitude  of  the  Roumanian 
Government  signified  in  reality  the  maintenance  of  the 
state  of  things  created  by  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest.  But 
unfortunately  the  military  defeats  of  the  Allies  in  1915  had 
weakened  the  Roumanian  resistance  against  the  Bulgarian 
intervention.  When  Bulgaria  mobilized  in  September  1915 
Roumania  did  not  stir,  sacrificing  her  own  work,  the  Treaty 
of  Bucarest.  This  was  a  great  deception  for  Serbia,  who 
found  herself  abandoned  by  a  country  on  which  the  Serbs 
had  never  ceased  to  count.  The  deception  was  all  the 
more  painful,  and  the  Roumanian  neutrality  all  the  more 
to  be  regretted,  as  the  policy  of  the  Serbo-Roumanian  entente 
was  alone  capable  of  assuring  the  Roumanian  interests 
vis-d-vis  to  Hungary  and  Bulgaria,  and  of  facilitating  the 
conclusion  of  a  satisfactory  understanding  with  Russia. 
Yet  Roumania  stood  by  unmoved  at  the  crushing  of  Serbia, 
and  German  influence  triumphed  at  Bucarest. 

Nevertheless,  Roumania  has  never  had  the  intention  of 
remaining  definitely  neutral,  and  especially  has  never  ceased 
to  think  of  the  realization  of  her  aspirations  in  Transylvania. 
The  last  word  has  not  yet  been  spoken  at  Bucarest,  and  there 
is  still  some  hope  that  Roumania  will,  in  spite  of  all  her 
hesitations,  end  by  associating  with  the  Allied  Powers  and 
contribute  to  their  decisive  victory.  The  chief  obstacle  to 
a  Roumanian  intervention  is  to  be  found  in  the  person  of 
King  Ferdinand,  who,  as  a  Hohenzollern,  cannot  march 
directly  against  Germany  and  the  Hohenzollern  who  are 
leading  her.  As  long  as  Germany  is  not  beaten  by  the 
Allies,  King  Ferdinand  will  find  means  to  keep  the  country 
neutral.  Once  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  are  beaten, 
Roumania  will  offer  her  military  participation  in  order  to 
have  the  right  of  taking  part  in  the  distribution  of  the 
Monarchy.     To    attack     Austria-Hungary    and    Germany 


328  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

directly,  and  to  help  materially  in  the  breaking  of  their 
forces  is  a  thing  that  Roumania  will  in  all  probability  not 
do.  "  L'heure  roumaine  "  has  not  yet  come  because  the 
end  of  the  war  is  not  yet  near.  It  is  a  regrettable  fact, 
especially  for  Roumania,  but  it  is  a  fact  with  which  we 
must  calculate. 
July  30,  1916. 

Roumanian  Intervention. 

The  Roumanian  intervention  will  certainly  have  a  double 
result  :  a  moral  and  a  material  one.  A  neutral  power,  rich, 
flourishing,  governed  by  a  prince  of  the  House  of  Hohen- 
zollern  is  associating  with  the  Allies  to  fight  for  the  same 
ideal  of  right  and  justice,  and  to  contribute  materially  to 
the  realization  of  a  new  Europe,  constructed  on  the  basis 
of  the  liberty  of  nations,  organized  democratically  and 
inspired  with  a  humanitarian  pacifism.  The  immediate 
motive  which  has  determined  Roumania  to  give  up  her 
neutrality  was  the  wish  to  liberate  her  Roumanian  brethren 
from  the  foreign  yoke  and  to  complete  her  national  unity. 
The  fundamental  cause  of  the  Roumanian  intervention  is 
to  be  found  in  the  conviction  of  the  Roumanian  statesmen 
that  the  allied  cause  is  morally  finer  and  materially  surer, 
and  from  the  political  point  of  view  nearer  to  the  vital 
interests  of  Roumania.  Such  an  appreciation  does  honour 
to  the  perspicacity  of  the  Roumanians,  and  we  are  very 
happy  to  state  that  the  doubts  expressed  in  La  Serbie  on 
the  possibility  of  a  Roumanian  intervention  have  not  been 
confirmed. 

As  Serbians,  we  wish  to  state  that  the  Roumanian  action 
is  greeted  in  the  Serbian  circles  with  the  same  enthusiasm 
as  in  1913,  when  Roumania  took  up  her  position  against 
Bulgaria,  and  contributed  to  crush  the  Bulgarian  plan  of 
a  Balkanic  hegemony  in  its  germ.  Serbia  and  Roumania 
are  natural  allies,  because  both  being  of  a  pacific  character, 
they  aspire  to  the  same  ideals  of  equality  and  pacific  develop- 
ment of  their  liberated  national  forces.  Roumania  returns 
to  the  policy  inaugurated  by  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest,  and  the 
Allies,  after  many  hesitations  and  indecisions,  are  admitting 


THE    POLITICS    OF    ROUMANIA  329 

now  that  only  this  policy  was  just  and  that  they  ought  to  have 
practised  it  to  the  end,  The  plan  of  a  Balkanic  bloc,  of  which 
Bulgaria  would  be  also  a  party,  in  spite  of  all  its  beauty 
and  idealism,  could  not  be  realized  because  the  Bulgarian 
people,  led  by  King  Ferdinand,  pursued  a  contrasting  ideal — 
the  absolute  domination  in  the  Balkans  under  the  auspices 
of  the  Austro-Germans.  Roumania  saw  clearly  that  her 
place  was  not  at  the  side  of  Bulgaria,  and  very  nobly  she 
associated  with  those  who  are  fighting  for  the  liberty  and 
independence  of  small  nations.  Thanks  to  her  large  and 
fresh  army,  she  will  soon  obtain,  in  collaboration  with  the 
Allied  forces,  decisive  successes. 

September  3,  1916. 


The  Fall  of  Bucarest. 

A  Success  but  not  a  Victory. 

The  Austro-German  armies  entered  Bucarest  and  this 
German  success,  of  which  we  do  not  wish  to  diminish  the 
importance,  will  not  fail  to  produce  a  certain  despondency  in 
the  ranks  of  all  the  Allies.  But  in  spite  of  the  appearance 
of  a  German  victory,  the  occupation  of  Bucarest  is  but 
a  simple  success,  one  of  those  strokes  which  the  Germans 
are  such  masters  of,  and  which  have  become  their  speciality. 
Not  having  been  able  to  obtain  the  victory  on  the  principal 
fronts,  there,  where  the  Allies  have  the  same  possibilities 
of  bringing  reserves  and  concentrating  a  sufficient  quantity 
of  great  guns,  the  Germans  are  attacking  the  eccentric 
points  of  the  Allied  front.  They  have  invaded  Serbia  and 
now  are  proceeding  to  invade  a  part  of  Roumania.  Of 
these  momentary  successes  which  will  incontestably  procure 
to  the  Germans  many  economic  and  military  advantages, 
they  will  probably  make  a  great  fuss.  But  in  fact,  it  is 
not  a  German  victory,  it  is  only  an  unpleasant  incident 
which  puts  off  the  time  for  the  Allied  victory.  Materially 
and  morally  the  Allies  are  stronger,  and  they  will  win  the 
war  despite  all  the  reverses,  despite  the  fall  of  Bucarest. 
Only — yes  there  is  an  "  only." 


330  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

At  this  point  we  wish  to  mention  only  two  Roumanian 
errors  which  are  the  principal  cause  of  their  reverses. 
Roumania,  by  abstaining  from  intervention  at  the  moment 
when  Serbia  was  attacked  by  Bulgaria,  has  weakened  her 
political  situation,  in  rendering  it  possible  to  the  Germans 
to  reduce  separately  the  two  countries  which  should,  on 
the  basis  of  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest,  have  remained  united. 
It  was  the  initial  mistake.  The  other  which  followed  it 
was  the  belief  in  the  possibility  of  a  war  limited  to  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  front,  the  same  mistake  committed  by  Italy  at 
the  beginning  of  her  intervention.  Bulgaria  has  played  her 
role  of  seducer  well.  At  the  moment  when  the  Roumanians, 
over-confident,  penetrated  into  Transylvania  to  liberate  their 
brethren,  the  Bulgarians  fell  on  them  from  behind.  Attacked 
on  two  sides,  the  Roumanians,  to  whose  aid  the  Allied 
forces  could  not  come  in  time,  have  been  obliged  to  retreat 
and  even  to  abandon  their  capital. 

We  are  firmly  convinced  that  this  misfortune  will  not 
shake  the  will  of  the  Roumanian  people  to  continue  the 
struggle  with  still  more  force  and  endurance,  with  the  clear 
consciousness  of  the  necessity  of  a  victory  which  should 
render  impossible  a  new  Bulgarian  aggression  and  would 
lead  to  the  Roumanian  national  unity. 

December  10,  1916. 

Serbia  and  the  Roumanian  Debacle. 

The  tragic  situation  of  Roumania  and  the  shameful 
peace  the  Central  Powers  are  imposing  upon  her  have  pro- 
duced in  Serbian  circles  a  comprehensible  feeling  of  dis- 
comfort. The  betrayal  of  the  Russian  maximalists  forcing 
the  Roumanians  to  capitulate,  is  apt  to  have  in  the  Balkans 
a  still  more  disastrous  effect.  After  the  Serbian  retreat, 
the  Roumanian  catastrophe  seems  to  be  the  greatest  diplo- 
matic and  military  reverse  of  the  Allies,  which  could  affect 
the  whole  issue  of  the  war.  If  the  Allies  do  not  decide  on 
reinforcing  the  Salonica  front  in  time  there  would  be  a  great 
risk  of  losing  definitely  the  party  in  the  Balkans  just  as 
it  had  almost  been  lost  in  Russia. 

Independently  of  this  military  consideration  it  must  be 


THE    POLITICS    OF    ROUMANIA  331 

stated  with  regret  that  Roumania  also  has  her  part  of 
responsibility  in  the  actual  disaster.  We  may  be  allowed 
to  reprint  on  this  subject  what  we  have  written  in  our  paper 
on  Roumanian  politics. 

"  The  Treaty  of  Bucarest  in  1913  marks  the  first 
step  of  a  new  orientation  in  the  Roumanian  policy.  The 
Roumanian  politicians  did  not  fail  to  perceive  the  danger  of 
a  Bulgaria  extending  as  far  as  three  seas,  and  the  Bulgarian 
plans  of  a  Balkanic  hegemony  awoke  suspicion  at  Bucarest. 
The  Bulgarian  attack  of  June  16-29,  I9I3»  found  the  three 
States  united  in  the  defence  of  their  common  interests. 
The  allied  victory  was  sealed  by  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest, 
which  ratified  the  Serbo-Roumanian  friendship  and  re- 
established in  the  Balkans  a  state  of  just  equilibrium. 

"  The  German  diplomacy  has  worked  well  and  obtained 
an  almost  incredible  success.  When  the  European  war 
broke  out,  the  politicians  of  Bucarest  declared,  under  the 
influence  of  German  suggestions,  that  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest 
did  not  form  any  more  the  basis  of  the  Roumanian  policy- 
They  considered  that  the  political  aims  of  Roumania  had 
to  adapt  themselves  to  the  new  circumstances  created  by 
the  European  war.  It  was,  we  think,  a  grave  mistake  of 
Roumanian  diplomacy,  which  abandoned  suddenly  a 
reasonable  and  consistent  policy  to  start  interminable 
discussions  with  all  the  belligerents. 

"  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  obtained  in  that  way 
a  diplomatic  success,  which  compensated  them  largely  for 
the  non-execution  of  the  secret  alliance  concluded  with  King 
Carol.  Roumania  had  become  free  and  ready  to  enter  into 
discussions.  Her  obligations  to  Serbia  lost  their  value, 
and  the  Central  Powers  had  the  chance  to  separate 
Roumania  definitely  from  Serbia  and  to  render  possible 
Bulgarian  action  against  her. 

"  Entente  diplomacy  knew  of  these  plans,  but  it  hoped 
to  spoil  them  by  advances  to  Bulgaria.  The  Allied  diplomats 
were  making  great  efforts  to  conciliate  the  Balkanic  States 
and  to  re-establish  a  perfect  understanding  among  them, 
not  wanting  to  resign  themselves  to  see  Bulgaria  definitely 
range  herself  on  the  side  of  the  Germanic  Empires.  This 
was  a  noble  task,  and  one  is  forced  to  admit  that  the  attitude 


332  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

of  the  Entente  really  represented  a  policy  of  incomparable 
unselfishness  and  idealism. 

"  But  all  these  efforts  seemed  futile,  as  Bulgaria  had 
very  different  political  ambitions.  What  has  the  Roumanian 
Government  done  in  presence  of  this  situation,  full  of 
indecision  and  dangers,  even  for  Roumania  ?  It  has  con- 
tinued to  negotiate  and  discuss,  removing  itself  farther  and 
farther  from  the  programme  inaugurated  by  the  Treaty  of 
Bucarest.  Its  resistance  of  the  idea  of  an  armed  Bulgarian 
intervention  against  Serbia  was  diminishing  rapidly.  In 
September  1915  when  the  Bulgarian  mobilization  was 
proclaimed,  the  Bulgarian  Premier,  Mr.  Radoslavoff,  was 
able  to  declare  to  the  leaders  of  the  opposition  that,  if 
Bulgaria  was  obliged  to  enter  into  the  war,  the  Bulgarian 
army  would  fight  only  on  a  single  front.  Germany  had 
succeeded  in  assuring  herself  of  Roumanian  neutrality  in 
the  case  of  a  Bulgarian  aggression  against  Serbia.  In 
guaranteeing  this  neutrality  Roumania  definitely  abandoned 
the  Treaty  of  Bucarest  "  ("  The  Treaty  of  Bucarest  and 
Roumania,"  No.  2,  May  14,  1916). 

"  There  was  a  time  when  Roumania  tried  to  distinguish 
between  the  Balkanic  and  the  European  situation.  A 
Roumanian  diplomatist  explained  to  us  at  the  beginning  of 
1915  that  neutral  Roumania  implied  the  passivity  of  Bulgaria, 
and  that  Serbia  was  not  to  demand  anything  more  of 
Roumania,  who  is  obliged  also  to  reckon  with  her  European 
interests.  This  diplomatist  assured  us  that  the  Roumanian 
neutrality  towards  the  Germanic  Empires  was  conditioned 
by  the  Bulgarian  non-intervention,  and  that  Roumania 
would  enter  the  scene  the  moment  when  Bulgaria  would 
attack  Serbia.  That  attitude  of  the  Roumanian  Government 
signified  in  reality  the  maintenance  of  the  state  of  things 
created  by  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest.  But  unfortunately  the 
military  defeats  of  the  Allies  in  1915  had  weakened  the 
Roumanian  resistance  against  the  Bulgarian  intervention. 
When  Bulgaria  mobilized  in  September,  1915,  Roumania  did 
not  stir,  sacrificing  her  own  work,  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest. 
This  was  a  great  blow  for  Serbia,  who  found  herself  abandoned 
by  a  country  on  which  the  Serbs  had  never  ceased  to  count. 
The  deception  was  all  the  more  painful  and  the  Roumanian 


THE    POLITICS    OF    ROUMANIA  333 

inactivity  all  the  more  to  be  regretted  as  the  policy  of  the 
Serbo-Roumanian  entente  was  alone  capable  of  assuring 
the  Roumanian  interests  vis-d-vis  to  Hungary  and  Bulgaria, 
and  facilitating  the  conclusion  of  a  satisfactory  understanding 
with  Russia.  Yet  Roumania  stood  by  immoved  at  the 
crushing  of  Serbia,  and  German  influence  triumphed  at 
Bucarest  "   ("  Roumanian  Hesitations,"  July  30,  1916). 

"  As  Serbians  we  wish  to  state  that  the  Roumanian 
action  is  greeted  in  the  Serbian  circles  with  the  same  enthu- 
siasm as  in  1913,  when  Roumania  took  up  her  position  against 
Bulgaria  and  contributed  to  crush  the  Bulgarian  plan  of 
a  Balkanic  hegemony  in  its  germ.  Serbia  and  Roumania 
are  natural  allies,  because  both  being  of  a  pacific  character, 
they  aspire  to  the  same  ideals  of  equality  and  pacific  develop- 
ment of  their  liberated  national  forces.  Roumania  returns 
to  the  policy  inaugurated  by  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest,  and  the 
Allies  after  many  hesitations  and  indecisions,  are  admitting 
now  that  only  this  policy  was  just,  and  that  they  ought  to 
have  practised  it  to  the  end.  The  plan  of  a  Balkanic  bloc, 
of  which  Bulgaria  would  also  be  a  party,  in  spite  of  all  its 
beaut}'  and  idealism,  could  not  be  realized  because  the 
Bulgarian  people,  led  by  King  Ferdinand,  pursued  a  con- 
trasting ideal — the  absolute  domination  in  the  Balkans 
under  the  auspices  of  the  Austro-Germans  "  ("The  Rou- 
manian Intervention,"  No.  18,  September  3,  1916). 

"  At  this  point  we  wish  to  mention  only  two  Roumanian 
errors  which  are  the  principal  cause  of  their  reverses. 
Roumania,  by  abstaining  from  intervening  at  the  moment 
when  Serbia  was  attacked  by  Bulgaria,  has  weakened  her 
political  situation  in  rendering  it  possible  for  the  Germans 
to  reduce  separately  the  two  countries  which  should,  on  the 
basis  of  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest,  remained  united.  It  was 
the  initial  mistake.  The  other  which  followed  it  was  the 
belief  in  the  possibility  of  a  war  limited  to  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  front,  the  same  mistake  committed  by  Italy  at 
the  beginning  of  her  intervention.  Bulgaria  has  played  her 
role  of  seducer  well.  At  the  moment  when  the  Roumanians, 
too  confident,  penetrated  into  Transylvania  to  liberate  their 
brethren,the  Bulgarians  attacked  them  from  behind.  At- 
tacked on  two  sides,   the   Roumanians,   to  whose  aid  the 


334  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

Allied  forces  could  not  come  in  time,  have  been  obliged  to 
retreat  and  even  to  abandon  their  capital"  ("  The  Fall  of 
Bucarest,"  No.  32,  December  10,  1916). 

Painful  as  the  memory  of  these  errors  may  be,  it  is  not 
useless  to  remember  them.  The  lesson  implied  will  serve 
as  a  basis  to  the  future  policy  of  Roumania,  after  the  Allies 
have  cancelled  the  treaty  of  peace  which  the  Germano- 
Bulgaro-Magyars  are  imposing  at  this  moment  on  our 
gallant  neighbours. 

March  16,  1918. 

Roumania  and  Her  "  Treaty." 

The  statement  of  the  Roumanian  delegation  concerning 
the  claims  of  Roumania  on  the  Banat  is  based,  excepting 
the  ethnical  arguments,  which  are  applicable  only  to  the 
eastern  part  of  this  province,  principally  on  the  secret  treaty 
of  1916  concluded  with  the  Entente.  To  the  Serbian  ob- 
jection that  the  treaty  does  not  take  into  account  either 
Serbia  or  the  United  Kingdom,  the  Roumanians  have  replied 
with  arguments  which  have  astounded  us. 

In  a  memorandum  handed  over  to  the  conference,  Mr. 
Bratianu  defines  the  situation  of  Serbia  relative  to  the  said 
treaty.  The  Roumanians  afhrm  that  Serbia  was  not  in  a 
position  to  treat  at  the  moment  when  the  pact  was  concluded. 
Considering  her  unhappy  situation  it  would  have  been  cruel 
to  impose  on  her  conditions  of  any  nature.  Moreover, 
Serbia  was  represented  by  Russia,  who  agreed  in  her  name  to 
the  acquisition  of  the  Banat  by  Roumania.  The  Serbians, 
if  they  did  not  know  the  text  of  the  treaty,  have  benefited 
by  the  effects  of  the  Roumanian  entrance  into  the  war. 
It  made  it  possible  for  the  Allies  to  hold  Salonica,  which 
consequently  assured  the  liberation  of  Serbia. 

All  this  controversy  is  painful  and  contrary  to  the  true 
interests  of  the  Roumanian  people.  Roumania  has  the  un- 
expected chance  of  re-uniting  her  racial  brethren.  This  right 
of  nationality  will  go  a  long  way  to  assure  the  happiness  and 
greatness  of  the  Roumanian  people.  But  as  the  Roumanian 
delegation  invokes  particularly  the  treaty  of  1916,  we  do 
not  hesitate  to  tell  them  what  we  think  of  it. 


THE    POLITICS    OF    ROUMANIA  335 

First,  we  may  call  to  mind  that  the  European  war 
surprised  Roumania  in  an  ambiguous  position.  On  the 
one  side  she  had  formal  engagements  with  the  Triple  Alliance, 
on  the  other  she  was  obliged  to  defend  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest 
of  1913.  This  dilemma  was  solved  by  abandoning  the  Treaty 
of  Bucarest.  Bulgaria  would  not  have  dared  to  attack 
Serbia  if  Roumania  had  not  promised  to  keep  quiet.  Rad- 
oslavoff  could  state  with  pride  one  month  before  Bulgaria's 
intervention  that  her  army  would  fight  only  on  a  single 
front.  This  proves  that  he  had  received  formal  assurances 
concerning  the  Roumanian  attitude.  The  Serbian  disaster 
was  greatly  due  to  this  Roumanian  policy,  which  did  not 
follow  the  line  adopted  in  1913,  that  is  to  say,  the  policy 
of  Balkanic  solidarity.  We  do  not  recriminate,  we  only 
state  facts. 

In  1916,  after  the  reconstitution  of  her  army,  Serbia 
impatiently  awaited  her  revenge.  At  this  moment  Roumania 
was  negotiating  her  treaty — imitating  Italy — meaning  that 
she  stated  as  a  preliminary  condition  that  Serbia  should 
know  nothing  of  a  treaty  which  was  going  to  be  concluded 
to  her  disadvantage — Serbia,  who  once  already  had  been 
abandoned  by  Roumania,  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the 
Treaty  of  Bucarest  of  1913.  How  then  the  Roumanian 
delegates  have  the  courage  to  say  to-day  that  the  treaty  of 
1916  was  concluded  with  Serbia  represented  by  Russia  we 
cannot  understand. 

We  may  add  that  Russia  had  no  mandate  to  represent 
Serbia.  Still  less  could  she  sign,  in  our  name,  a  condition 
directed  against  us  and  having  our  lands  as  its  object. 
Roumania  knows  it  very  well.  That  is  why  in  1913  she 
negotiated  with  us  directly,  without  any  intermediation, 
a  military  convention  in  the  eventuality  of  a  Bulgarian 
aggression. 

The  Roumanian  delegation  considers  that  Serbia  has 
profited  by  the  effects  of  the  treaty  of  1916.  We  admit 
that  we  could  have  taken  advantage  of  the  Roumanian 
intervention,  but  unfortunately  it  was  not  the  case.  On 
the  contrary,  it  was  the  voluntary  divisions  of  Serbs,  Croates 
and  Slovenes,  commanded  by  officers  of  the  Royal  Serbian 
army,  whose  exploits  the  Roumanians  themselves  celebrated, 


336  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

declaring  that  they  had  fought  like  heroes,  and  have  con- 
tributed in  Dobroudja  to  save  Roumania  from  a  complete 
disaster.  The  Roumanian  intervention  has  been  paid  for 
by  the  blood  of  Serbia's  best  soldiers  and  officers.  This 
intervention,  terminating  by  a  downfall  only  six  weeks  later, 
has  rendered  the  task  of  the  Oriental  Army  singularly  difficult. 
In  1918,  thanks  to  the  Serbian  heroism,  this  Oriental 
Army  delivered  Roumania  from  German  bondage.  The 
Roumanian  delegation  ought  not  to  have  forgotten  it. 

Such  are  the  facts  which  weigh  more  than  any  secret 
treaties.  Roumania,  in  signing  the  peace  of  Bucarest  in 
1918,  cancelled  the  treaty  of  1916.  According  to  the  testi- 
mony of  the  special  correspondent  of  the  Petit  Parisien, 
everybody  in  Roumania  approved  the  signature  of  this 
peace.  But  may  we  be  permitted  to  remind  the  Roumanians 
that  Serbia  was  in  the  same  situation  in  1915.  Betrayed 
by  King  Constantine's  Greece,  abandoned  by  Roumania, 
in  spite  of  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest  of  1913,  Serbia  preferred 
her  Calvary  of  Albania  and  wandering  in  exile  to  the  accept- 
ance of  a  shameful  peace. 

The  peace  of  1918  was  imposed  on  the  Roumanians : 
we  recognize  that  readily.  But  in  the  same  way  the  treaty 
of  1916,  as  well  as  the  Treaty  of  London  in  1915,  were  also 
imposed  on  the  Allies.  One  coercion  balances  another,  and 
our  Roumanian  friends,  well  aware  of  the  principles  of  law 
and  equity,  cannot  deny  it. 

February  10,  1919. 


The  Question  of  the  Banat. 

The  Roumanians  are  making  a  supreme  effort  to  complete 
their  unity  ;  their  aim  is  to  take  possession  of  the  Banat, 
a  Serbian  province,  as  it  may  be  seen  in  the  article  of  Mr. 
Ursu  ("  Genevois,"  February  17).  Like  true  conquerors 
they  add  to  Wilsonian  principles  geographical  and  strategical 
considerations.  Basing  their  excuse  on  the  geographical 
unity  of  Great  Roumania,  the  Roumanians  want  to  snatch 
away  the  Banat,  but  there  are  some  Roumanians  who  do 
not  employ  these  Balkanic  methods  of  false  reasoning  and 
do  not  deny  the  fact  of  the  existence  of  300,000  Serbs  in  the 


THE    POLITICS    OF    ROUMANIA  337 

Banat.  Mr.  Ursu,  the  learned  professor  of  the  University 
of  Jassy,  commits  therefore  a  culpable,  blamable  error  in 
pretending  that  the  Serbians  cannot  invoke  any  reason 
"  neither  ethnical,  historical  nor  geographical."  The  Peace 
Conference  would  certainly  have  refused  our  aspirations  if 
v  we  had  not  ethnical  arguments.  As  regards  the  history, 
excepting  the  time  of  the  Emperor  Trajan — which  was 
with  the  professor's  permission  rather  Roman  than  Rou- 
manian— what  part  have  the  Roumanians  ever  played  in 
the  Banat  ?  Even  the  works  on  Roumanian  history  are 
mute  on  this  point.  On  our  side,  to  speak  only  of  recent 
facts,  we  can  inform  the  Professor  Ursu  that  the  great  Serbian 
Assembly  of  1791,  held  in  Temesvar,  claimed  the  autonomy 
of  Serbian  territory,  including  the  Banat,  which  of  course 
the  Magyars  did  not  grant.  In  1848,  the  Serbian  Vojvodina, 
englobing  also  the  Banat,  had  Temesvar  as  her  capital.  The 
Habsburgs,  up  to  the  last  emperor,  who  has  just  descended 
from  the  throne,  have  always  had  the  title  of  Serbian 
Vojvode.  Yet  history  absolutely  ignores  the  corresponding 
position  of  the  Roumanians  in  the  Banat  for  the  simple 
reason  that,  as  a  historical  element,  they  did  not  exist  there. 
The  geographical  reasons  insisted  on  by  the  learned 
professor,  are  incomprehensible  at  a  time  when  the  principle 
of  self-determination  of  the  people  should  decide  the  future 
frontiers.  Besides,  the  Banat  is  not  a  sea  coast  nor  a  natural 
outlet  for  Roumania.  But  it  is  an  extremely  rich  province, 
and  our  friends,  the  Roumanians,  certainly  think  it  worth 
while  to  fight  for  it,  without  even  having  any  ethnical  title 
to  it.  The  Roumanians  have  taken  Bessarabia  from  the 
Russians  despite  the  fact  that  there  are  many  Russians  and 
Ukrainians  there.  After  the  collapse  of  the  Dual  Monarchy 
the  Roumanians  occupied  Bukovina,  which  parts  are  claimed, 
not  without  reason,  by  the  Ukrainians,  and  the  Dobroudja. 
Now  Roumania  also  claims  the  Banat  as  well  as  Transylvania, 
i.e.  26  departments  containing  2,900,000  Roumanians  and 
3,900,000  foreign  people,  among  whom  there  are  300,000 
Serbians.  We  understand  the  necessity  for  Roumania  to 
take  in  masses  of  Magyars  and  Germans,  because  they  are 
confined  to  districts  impossible  to  divide  ;  besides,  they  are 
plunderers  who  would  keep  on  menacing  the  Allies  and  the 

23 


338  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

entire  world.  But  we  Serbians  do  not  understand  why  we 
should  be  forced  to  share  the  fate  of  the  Magyars  or  Germans. 
Have  we  failed  in  keeping  our  engagements  towards  the 
Allies  ?  Have  we  bowed  down  before  the  superior  strength 
of  the  enemy  and  concluded  a  separate  peace  ?  Have  we 
ever  been  the  members  of  the  Austro-German  Alliance  ? 
Has  there  ever  been  found  in  Serbia  any  politician  who  traffics 
with  the  enemy  ?  Has  the  enemy  ever  been  able  to  organize 
new  elections  in  our  country  and  to  make  the  Parliament 
condemn  the  government  ?  Even  our  "  Austrophiles  "  of 
pre-war  time  were  interned  by  Austrians  because  no  Serbian 
of  any  political  conviction  whatsoever  would  ever  have 
consented  to  bow  down  before  the  conqueror.  Is  it  the 
Serbians  who,  before  intervening  in  the  struggle  for  the 
right  of  the  nations,  made  a  very  profitable  trade  with  the 
enemy  of  to-morrow,  and  later  who  cheapened  their  part 
in  the  war  ?  Have  we  not  conducted  an  internal  campaign 
in  the  Habsburg  Monarchy  which  ended  with  the  dissolution 
of  this  empire  ?  Our  sons  have  been  hunted  like  fallow 
deer  in  Austria,  and  numerous  gibbets  were  erected  for 
them.  In  the  fights  in  Dobroudja,  the  Southern  Slav 
volunteers,  many  of  them  from  Banat,  have  fought  so 
heroically  that  the  Bulgarians  themselves  could  not  deny 
the  Serbian  success  even  in  the  midst  of  the  general  con- 
fusion. In  fine,  they  were  Serbian  soldiers  who,  aided  by 
our  admirable  Allies,  led  that  terrible  offensive,  "  brave  as 
fiends  and  ruthless  as  judges."  They  liberated  Serbia  and 
dealt  the  death-blow  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy. 
When  our  troops  had  crossed  the  Danube  and  occupied  the 
Serbian  Banat,  Roumania  found  it  convenient  to  declare 
war  a  second  time,  but  really  it  was  only  executing  the 
conditions  of  armistice. 

But  in  spite  of  all  this,  and  notwithstanding  the  religious 
fidelity  of  a  peasant  people  who,  though  wounded,  did  not 
utter  any  complaint,  the  Roumanian  friends  and  allies  are 
not  willing  to  recognize  the  right  of  liberty  to  a  Serbian 
province,  to  the  Banat  for  which  we  have  shed  our  blood. 
With  what  argument  are  the  Roumanians  opposing  our 
right  ?     With  geographical  reasons. 

Finally,  they  add  the  objection  that  a  great  number 


THE    POLITICS    OF    ROUMANIA  339 

of  Roumanians  live  in  the  valley  of  Timok,  in  Serbia.  It 
is  true,  but  these  Roumanians  or  these  Roumanianized 
Serbians  or  immigrated  Serbians,  obliged  by  want  to  leave 
Roumania,  have  never  manifested  any  wish  to  be  incorporated 
by  Roumania,  for  reasons  which  are  very  well  known  by 
our  Roumanian  friends.  Serbia  is  a  profoundly  democratic 
country  where  all  peasants  are  landlords  and  masters  of  the 
fruit  of  their  labour.  As  a  free  and  contented  citizen, 
the  Roumanian  from  Serbia  looks  to  regard  the  Roumanian 
from  Roumania  with  disdain  and  pity,  which  the  well-to-do 
people  have  for  the  poor,  and  incapable  of  shaking  off  the 
yoke. 

The  learned  professor  is  going  still  further.  He  is 
advancing  the  prospect  of  a  new  war  if  we  should  dare  to 
violate  "  these  secular  and  well-defined  frontiers."  Such 
words  are  afflicting  to  us,  but  we  are  obliged  to  abandon 
for  a  moment  our  reserve.  We  abhor  war,  but  conscious 
of  our  right  and  enamoured  of  our  liberty,  we  are  not  the 
men  to  be  intimidated  by  such  a  menace.  During  seven 
years  we  have  contributed  with  all  our  power  to  the  anni- 
hilation of  two  despotic  empires,  because  we  were  not  willing 
to  be  slaves  of  anybody.  It  would  be  an  unpardonable 
crime  to  tolerate  our  brethren  becoming,  after  so  many 
struggles,  the  prey  of  the  Roumanian  "  boyards."  This  is 
our  answer  to  Mr.  Ursu. 

February  24,  1919. 


CHAPTER    IX 

SERBO-GREEK    RELATIONS 

The  Serbo-Greek  Treaty. 

We  have  already  had  occasion  to  set  forth  here  the  Serbian 
point  of  view  with  regard  to  Greece  and  her  attitude  in 
the  European  conflict.  Without  insisting  upon  the  juridical 
side,  namely,  as  to  whether  Greece  was  or  was  not,  according 
to  the  treaty  of  alliance  with  Serbia,  under  the  obligation 
of  interfering  in  the  event  of  a  Bulgarian  attack,  we  have 
maintained,  and  we  maintain  still  to-day,  the  theory  that 
the  vital  Hellenic  interests  called  for  Greek  intervention  on 
the  side  of  Serbia.  Even  if  no  treaty  of  alliance  had  existed, 
Greece,  conscious  of  her  Mediterranean  and  Balkanic  situation, 
should  not  have  abandoned  the  policy  of  union  with  Serbia, 
inaugurated  in  1912  and  1913  and  crowned  with  the  best 
results.  The  Serbo-Greek  treaty  not  having  been  published, 
any  discussion  as  to  its  bearing  and  its  terms  appeared  to 
us  useless  and  without  practical  value.  Indeed,  what  ad- 
vantage could  Greece  have  in  declaring,  juridically,  that 
she  was  not  obliged  to  take  action  ;  if,  in  consequence  of  her 
passive  attitude,  all  the  fruits  of  the  Balkanic  campaign  were 
snatched  from  her ;  if  the  Bulgarian  menace,  averted  in  1913 
by  the  Treaty  of  Bucarest  presented  itself  under  a  fresh 
aspect  much  more  serious ;  and  if  the  most  legitimate  hopes 
of  the  Hellenic  world  regarding  the  liberation  and  union 
of  all  the  Hellenes  were  destroyed  ?  The  difficult  situation 
in  which  Greece  is  struggling  to-day,  speaks  better  than 
any  other  argument  against  the  harmful  policy  of  Messrs. 
Gounaris  and  Scouloudis.  But  this  is  not  all.  These  same 
politicians,  who  have  brought  Greece  into  the  fix  in  which 
she  now  finds  herself  and  compromised  her  most  elementary 
interests,  have  also  caused  most  serious  moral  injury  to  their 

340 


SERBO-GREEK    RELATIONS  341 

country.  It  is  they  who  have  prevented  Greece  from  meeting 
a  formal  obligation  towards  her  ally,  Serbia.  This  accusation, 
so  often  repeated  in  the  foreign  Press  and  refuted  with 
indignation  by  honest  Greeks,  can  no  longer  be  questioned, 
because  new  documents  have  appeared  which  support  it  in 
an  incontestable  manner.  That  official  Greece  has  failed 
to  keep  her  word  is  therefore  a  fact  ;    it  is  only  too  true  ! 

The  Greek  and  Serbian  Governments  have  abstained  up 
to  now  from  publishing  the  treaty  of  alliance  which  united 
the  two  countries,  and  all  hypothesis  as  to  its  terms  and 
contents  were  permitted.  What  was  said  about  this  treaty 
in  the  Greek  Parliament  at  the  time  of  the  discussion  on 
foreign  policy,  and  what  Dr.  Platykas  communicated  re- 
garding it  in  his  study  on  Greek  policy,  was  not,  however, 
sufficient  to  create  a  definite  judgment.  Only  two  weeks  ago 
the  Temps  published  in  its  number  of  August  15,  the 
principal  clauses  of  the  Serbo-Greek  treaty.  The  treaty  has, 
according  to  this  information,  two  parts.  The  first  deals 
with  the  political  situation  at  the  moment  when  the  agree- 
ment was  concluded  and  conjecturing  a  Bulgarian  attack. 
We  can  read  there  the  engagements  entered  upon  by  the 
contracting  parties  to  help  each  other  mutually,  in  order 
that  Serbia  and  Greece  should  obtain  a  common  frontier. 
In  the  event  of  failure  in  coming  to  an  agreement  with 
Bulgaria  and  of  the  latter  trying  to  impose  her  claims  upon 
them  by  force,  Serbia  and  Greece  undertook  to  render  each 
other  mutual  assistance  to  the  utmost  of  their  armed  strength. 
The  second  part  is  of  a  general  nature.  It  stipulates  that 
in  case  of  war  between  one  of  the  two  contracting  parties 
and  a  third  power,  or  in  case  of  important  Bulgarian  armed 
forces  attacking  the  Greek  army  or  the  Serbian  army,  Greece 
and  Serbia  enter  upon  the  reciprocal  engagement  that  Serbia 
will  help  Greece  with  all  her  armed  forces  and  that  Greece 
will  help  Serbia  with  all  her  forces  of  land  and  sea. 

These  two  parts  of  the  treaty  affect  two  different  situa- 
tions :  (1)  the  situation  in  1913,  before  the  Bulgarian  attack, 
and  the  eventuality  of  such  an  attack  ;  (2)  the  general 
situation  of  the  two  countries,  after  the  crisis,  in  their  relations 
with  Bulgaria  in  1913.  If  the  published  text  is  exact,  the 
Greek  obligation  to  interfere  in  case  of  a  Bulgarian  attack 


342  SERBIA  AND  EUROPE 

or  of  an  attack  coming  from  a  third  party,  is  set  forth  in  an 
irrefutable  manner.  The  affirmation  of  Messrs.  Gounaris  and 
Scouloudis  that  the  treaty  had  only  provided  for  the  hypo- 
thesis of  a  Bulgarian  attack  alone,  and  that  it  was  not 
applicable  in  the  case  of  a  complex  war,  would  therefore 
be  denuded  of  any  foundation,  because  the  treaty  provided 
distinctly  for  the  case  of  war  between  one  of  the  contracting 
parties  and  a  third  power  and  the  obligation  of  the  other 
contracting  party  to  lend  military  co-operation. 

We  are  then  in  a  position  to  confirm  the  exactitude  of 
the  information  of  the  Temps,  which  corresponds  in  its 
general  lines  to  the  text  of  the  Serbo-Greek  treaty.  We 
will  quote,  however,  another  article  of  the  same  treaty, 
which  is  not  reproduced  in  the  Temps,  and  which  is  of  capital 
importance.  It  can  be  applied  to  the  situation  of  Serbia  in 
September-October  1915,  at  the  time  of  the  Austro-German 
offensive  and  the  simultaneous  Bulgarian  attack,  and  its 
text  fully  confirms  the  bearing  of  the  preceding  article 
which  speaks  of  the  obligation  of  the  contracting  parties 
to  afford  each  other  mutual  military  assistance.  This  article 
provides,  in  fact,  for  the  case  of  Greece  being  at  war  with 
another  power  other  than  Bulgaria,  and  of  Bulgaria  attacking 
her,  in  which  case  Serbia  is  obliged  to  come  to  her  assistance, 
even  if  she  herself  is  engaged  in  another  war  ;  only  the 
military  assistance  would  be  in  this  case  inferior  to  the 
figures  provided  for  in  the  preceding  case.  And  on  the  other 
hand,  if  Serbia  is  at  war  with  a  power  other  than  Bulgaria 
and  if  Bulgaria  attacks  her,  Greece  is  obliged  to  give  her 
military  assistance,  even  if  she  herself  is  engaged  in  another 
war,  always  with  forces  inferior  to  those  provided  for  in 
the  preceding  case. 

The  juridical  obligation,  a  solemn  and  formal  obligation 
for  Greece  to  interfere  in  favour  of  Serbia,  can  therefore 
no  longer  be  questioned.  The  Serbo-Greek  treaty  of  alliance 
imposed  upon  Greece  the  duty  of  interfering  in  the  case 
of  a  Bulgarian  attack,  even  if  Greece  was  already  at  war 
with  another  power  !  The  Serbo-Greek  treaty  established 
such  a  solidarity  between  the  two  countries,  that  it  required 
of  them  mutual  assistance  in  all  possible  situations.  That 
Messrs.  Gounaris  and  Scouloudis  should  have  been  able  to 


SERBO-GREEK    RELATIONS  343 

maintain  the  contrary  theory,  in  face  of  such  clear  and 
precise  texts  which  were  well  known  to  them,  is  a  thing 
that  does  not  concern  us.  But,  as  Serbians,  we  must  say 
that  in  1913  Greece  had  nobly  fulfilled  her  obligation,  and 
the  heroic  resistance  of  the  Serbian  army  and  of  the  army 
of  her  Greek  allies,  had  put  an  end  to  the  Bulgarian  plan 
of  reducing  the  two  countires  to  impotence.  In  1915  Serbia 
counted  upon  Greece  and  her  alliance,  but  the  Greek  support 
provided  for  in  the  treaty  of  alliance  has  not  been  given. 
One  cannot  deny  that  Greece,  in  consequence,  bears  part 
of  the  responsibility  in  the  Serbian  disaster.  This  mistake 
on  the  part  of  Greece,  the  work  of  a  small  number  of  misled 
politicians,  can  still,  in  our  opinion,  be  made  good,  and  the 
desperate  resistance  of  the  Greek  detachments  to  the 
Bulgarian  advance  into  Greek  territory,  shows  by  what 
way  Greece  can  return  to  the  path  she  momentarily  forsook. 

September  3,  19 16. 

CONSTANTINE    I    OR   VENIZELOS. 

There  are  names  which  symbolize  an  idea,  an  epoch  or 
else  a  nation,  and  have  for  that  a  singular  power  of  evocation. 

Who  speaks  of  Nero  speaks  of  tyranny,  while  the  names 
of  Aristides  and  of  Marcus  Aurelius  are  synonymous  with 
justice  and  equity  ;  those  of  Tell  and  of  Washington,  with 
independence  and  liberty. 

The  name  of  King  Albert  I  will  stand  as  the  symbol 
of  fidelity  to  a  given  word,  just  as  the  name  of  a  Balkan 
sovereign,  which  it  is  not  necessary  to  mention  here,  will 
remain  the  symbol  of  ingratitude  and  treachery. 

But  here  are  two  names  which  are  at  this  moment  arousing 
passions  to  the  highest  degree  in  Hellenic  centres,  and 
causing  much  ink  to  flow  with  the  publicists  of  all  countries 
— those  of  King  Constantine  and  Venizelos. 

The  one  represents  indecision,  incoherence,  mystery  ;  the 
other  integrity,  firmness,  perspicuity. 

The  first  by  his  undecided  and  irresolute  attitude,  reminds 
one  of  the  classical  individual  in  the  fable — a  being  as  simple 
as  irresolute,  who  ends  by  dying  of  hunger  for  want  of  being 
able  to  decide  between  two  foods. 


344  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

Venizelos,  on  the  contrary,  shows  himself  resolute  in 
marching  boldly  towards  the  object  which  he  has  set  himself 
to  attain. 

A  preceding  article,  speaking  of  the  departure  of  Venizelos 
for  the  Islands,  insisted  on  the  quasi- providential  role  which 
this  man  is  called  upon  to  play  in  these  critical  moments  of 
the  history  of  his  country.  Since  the  commencement  of 
her  existence  Greece  has  hardly  ever  traversed  a  similar 
crisis.  It  is  no  longer  her  future  that  is  at  stake,  it  is  her 
very  existence.  It  is  the  dismemberment  of  an  entire 
kingdom  that  is  taking  place  slowly  and  methodically  before 
the  eyes  of  the  nation  that  looks  on  as  an  indifferent  spectator. 
For  to  a  great  part  of  the  Greek  nation  the  question  of 
knowing  who  will  be  called  to-morrow  to  the  presidency  of 
the  Council,  seems  to  be  of  more  interest  and  importance 
than  the  question  of  the  future  and  of  the  very  existence 
of  the  country.  All  that  reminds  one  greatly  of  the  situation 
of  the  ancient  Byzantine  State  when,  under  the  Lower 
Empire,  linguistic  and  other  quarrels  roused  the  passions 
of  the  people  to  the  highest  pitch  at  the  very  moment  when 
the  enemy  was  knocking  on  the  door  of  Constantinople.  It  is, 
allowing  for  the  distance  of  time,  a  situation  nearly  identical, 
with  the  sole  exception  that  the  enemy  this  time  is  in  greater 
numbers  and  is  threatening  the  country  on  several  sides. 

After  Serres  and  Drama,  Demir  Hissar  and  Cavalla  ; 
after  Cavalla,  Arguj'rocastro,  not  counting  the  scission 
produced  within  the  country  by  the  adhesion  of  the  Isles 
to  the  national  movement  represented  by  the  provisional 
government.  And  if  that  continues,  before  long  the  Kingdom 
of  Greece  will  have  ceased  to  exist. 

According  to  the  present  sate  of  things,  it  seems  to  us 
that  it  is  rather  to  the  Government  of  Athens  that  the  title 
of  provisional  government  now  belongs.  The  resignation  of 
the  Callogeropoulos  ministry  has  just  proved  it  in  a  remarkable 
manner.  The  new  ministry,  have  at  its  head  an  archae- 
ologist, Mr.  Lambros,  just  discovered  at  the  last  moment 
from  under  the  white  and  venerable  dust  of  the  Acropolis, 
who,  seeing  its  absolute  incompetence  in  the  matter  of 
politics,  gives  no  reason  to  hope  that  its  duration  will  exceed 
that  of  its  unfortunate  predecessor. 


SERBO-GREEK    RELATIONS  345 

In  order  to  save  the  country  from  the  state  of  agony 
in  which  it  is  writhing,  Venizelos  is  desperately  endeavouring 
to  shake  it  into  an  awakening.  It  would  be  necessary  for 
the  Greek  nation  to  accomplish  a  veritable  feat  of  strength, 
something  similar  to  the  effort  of  the  French  nation  in  1789, 
in  order  to  become  capable  of  issuing  from  this  situation 
with  honour. 

They  must  risk  much  and  act  quickly.  They  must 
besides  be  ready  to  sacrifice  many  things  on  the  altar  of  the 
Fatherland. 

The  Greeks  have  not  much  longer  to  decide.  If  the 
operation  is  not  performed  this  very  day,  to-morrow  it  will 
perhaps  be  too  late,  as  the  country  is  completely  falling 
to  pieces. 

Between  the  two  chiefs  there  is  not  much  to  choose. 
It  is  not  Pausanias  who  has  rendered  Hellade  immortal ; 
it  is  Leonidas. 

October  15,  1916. 


CHAPTER    X 

AUSTRO-GERMANO-BULGARIAN   ATROCITIES 

The  Last  Straw. 

"Besides,  it  is  a  right  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  enemy  countries 
that  the  invader  shall  be  authorized  to  restrict  their  individual  liberty 
only  when  the  necessities  of  war  absolutely  require  it,  and  that  all 
molestation  that  is  useless  and  that  exceeds  these  necessities  is  to 
be  spared  them." — (Les  lois  de  la  guerre  continentale,  Kriegsbrauch 
im  Landkriege.  Publication  historique  du  grande  6tatmajor  allemand. 
Traduit  par  P.  Carpentier,  page  105). 

During  this  war  our  enemies  have  done  everything  to 
cause  the  retrogression  of  humanity.  They  have  removed 
from  war  all  that  former  wars  might  have  had  of  beauty 
and  of  nobility.  It  is  now  a  sly  and  brutal  struggle,  with 
personal  bravery  almost  excluded  and  warriors  transformed 
into  automatons  destined  for  hecatombs.  This  new  method 
of  making  war  was  inaugurated  by  the  Germans.  It  sub- 
stitutes numbers  for  genius,  quantity  of  material  for  bravery, 
matter  for  mind,  and  it  is  marvellousty  adapted  to  the 
character  and  the  capacities  of  our  adversaries. 

Corresponding  to  these  scarcely  refined  methods  employed 
at  the  front  by  the  military  forces,  are  the  still  less  refined 
methods  employed  behind  the  lines  by  the  civil  authorities 
which  govern  the  invaded  countries.  Thus  it  is  that  the 
Austrians  and  the  Bulgarians  vie  with  one  another  in  their 
inhuman  behaviour  toward  the  Serbian  civil  population 
obliged  to  submit  to  their  provisional  domination.  They 
act  without  consideration,  without  scruples  and  without  fear 
of  bringing  themselves  into  disrepute  in  the  eyes  of  the  neutral 
nations,  to  whom  they  will,  in  all  probability,  be  obliged  to 
apply,  asking  their  good  offices  in  view  of  the  peace  for  which 

346 


AUSTRO-GERMANO-BULGARIAN    ATROCITIES     347 

they  are  already  beginning  to  sigh.  They  have  a  singular 
tendency  to  believe  that  neutral  nations  and  places,  in  order 
to  remain  neutral,  have  become  incapable  of  perceiving  what 
is  going  on  about  them.  They  do  not  see  that  these  neutrals, 
precisely  because  they  are  impartial  and  out  of  court,  are 
in  a  better  position  to  see  and  judge  clearly  the  actions  of 
the  belligerents.  All  the  measures  that  the  Germanic 
empires  and  their  allies  are  taking  to  prevent  the  neutrals 
seeing  through  their  game  will  be  of  no  avail.  The  Chinese 
wall  with  which  they  would  like  to  surround  Serbia  by 
cutting  off  her  communications  and  by  jealously  guarding 
her  frontiers,  cannot  prevent  the  cries  of  distress  being 
heard  outside  the  invaded  country,  nor  can  it  succeed  in 
hiding  the  horrors  of  a  tyrannic  rule. 

When  they  entered  Serbia,  the  Austrians  and  the  Bul- 
garians commenced  by  interning  almost  the  entire  male 
population  of  the  country.  The  only  crime  of  this  population 
was  the  stubborn  belief  that  our  enemies  intended  to  wage 
war  like  civilized  men,  respectful  of  the  rights  of  the  peaceable 
and  loyal  civil  population.  That  is  why  a  great  number  of 
our  compatriots  refused  to  leave  the  country  at  the  time 
of  the  invasion.  But  how  greatly  were  these  honest  people 
deceived,  and  how  dearly  they  paid  for  their  illusions 
regarding  the  enemy,  to  whom,  in  fact,  all  ideas  of  law  and 
justice  were  foreign.  For,  in  spite  of  the  irreproachable 
attitude  of  these  victims,  they  were  treated  like  convicts, 
and  were  sent  to  the  most  remote  localities  in  Hungary  and 
Bohemia,  to  obscure  unwholesome  holes,  the  names  of 
which  are  not  even  marked  on  the  most  carefully  prepared 
geographical  maps. 

But  it  was  not  enough  for  our  enemies  that  the  Serbian 
civil  population  literally  died  of  hunger,  thanks  to  their 
masters  who  swept  away  all  the  food  the  country  possessed  ; 
they  did  not  leave  the  Serbs  even  the  sad  consolation  of  dying 
at  home  on  their  native  soil.  To  add  the  last  straw,  the 
military  government  of  occupied  Serbia  has  just  imposed 
upon  the  population  an  enormous  war  tax  which  will  complete 
the  ruin  of  the  country. 

These  cruelties,  which  have  for  their  object  the  annihilation 
of  an  entire  nation  and  which  are  not  justified  in  any  way, 


348  SERBIA   AND   EUROPE 

will  at  last  fill  the  cup  to  overflowing  and  rouse  indignation 
even  in  those  places  best  disposed  toward  our  enemies. 
The  supreme  head  of  the  Church,  in  the  name  of  the  sacred 
principles  of  the  Christian  religion  ;  the  sovereigns  and  the 
governments  of  neutral  countries,  in  the  name  of  the  higher 
rights  of  humanity  and  of  the  moral  solidarity  of  civilized 
peoples,  ought,  in  view  of  these  misdeeds,  to  raise  their 
voices  and  intervene  as  soon  as  possible,  both  to  save  a  people 
from  annihilation  and  to  prevent  our  enemies  from  debasing 
themselves  morally  to  such  a  degree  that  at  last  they  will 
be  ashamed  of  themselves. 

October  29,  1916. 

Germany  and  the  Deportations  in  Serbia. 

"  Hypocrisy,  from  the  Greek  hypokrisis,  a  vice  which 
consists  in  affecting  a  virtue  or  a  praiseworthy  sentiment 
which  one  has  not  "  (Petit  Larousse,  p.  484).  As  an  example 
of  the  true  application  of  this  formulae  we  quote  the  recent 
speech  of  the  German  Chancellor  in  the  debate  on  the  sub- 
marine war.  The  phrases  most  frequently  heard  were  those 
of  indignation  against  the  "  unheard-of  violations  "  of  the 
law  of  nations  committed  by  the  Allies !  The  Imperial 
Chancellor,  grown  more  prudent  since  his  maladroit  declara- 
tions concerning  the  "  scrap  of  paper  "  and  the  invasion 
of  Belgium,  "  an  act  certainly  contrary  to  International 
Law,  but  necessary  to  safeguard  Germany,"  took  great 
pains,  on  this  occasion,  to  persuade  his  auditors  that  the 
submarine  warfare  was  entirely  in  conformity  with  the  law 
of  nations.  After  him  it  was  the  turn  of  the  Minister  of 
War,  General  Stein,  to  divert  the  discussion  to  the  pretended 
ill-treatment  inflicted  upon  German  prisoners  in  France, 
Russia  and  England  ;  he,  too,  indulging  in  vehement  attacks 
upon  "  those  who  trample  under  foot  the  precepts  of  the 
law."  And  to  complete  the  picture,  with  no  other  object 
than  to  conceal  the  atrocious  character  of  the  German 
submarine  warfare,  Dr.  Kriege,  Director  of  the  Department 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  judicial  counsellor  of  Wilhelmstrasse,  the 
man  who  contributed  to  the  miscarriage  of  all  the  efforts 
of  the  conferences  of  The  Hague  to  establish  compulsory 


AUSTRO-GERMANO-BULGARIAN    ATROCITIES     349 

universal  arbitration,  came  to  expose  "  the  sad  lot  of  the 
German  prisoners  and  internes,"  and  to  give  the  Reichstag 
the  opportunity  publicly  to  stigmatize  as  M  inhuman  "  the 
behaviour  of  the  enemies  of  Germany. 

The  French  Government  has  already  done  justice  to  all 
these  accusations,  and  we  are  certain  that  the  Russian 
Government  will  not  be  slow  to  do  the  same,  since  the  Russian 
people,  with  their  natural  kindness,  cannot  indulge  in  any 
ill-treatment  of  the  prisoners.  However,  the  lot  of  prisoners, 
in  itself,  is  sad  enough,  and  it  is  one  of  the  most  elementary 
duties  of  each  belligerent  to  do  everything  possible  to 
ameliorate  it.  But,  even  admitting  that  the  German 
accusations  were  justified — a  purely  theoretic  supposition, 
in  view  of  the  very  well-known  facts — the  indignation  in 
German  official  circles  seems  to  us  lacking  in  sincerity, 
knowing  what  the  Germans  have  done  in  Belgium  and  what 
they  have  sanctioned  in  Serbia.  The  European  public  is 
already  informed  of  the  behaviour  of  the  Germans  in  Belgium, 
but  it  knows  very  little  of  what  is  happening  in  Serbia. 
Germany  cannot  excuse  herself  by  the  remark  that  it  is 
Austria-Hungary  and  Bulgaria  who  are  administering  to 
invaded  Serbia.  A  word  from  Berlin  would  be  sufficient 
to  make  their  allies  relinquish  their  illegal  and  truly  inhuman 
practices.  But  Berlin  does  not  want  to  intervene,  and  so 
she  becomes  the  conscious  accomplice  of  all  the  misdeeds 
to  which  the  Serbian  population  in  the  invaded  regions 
is  exposed. 

What  is  the  situation  in  Serbia  ?  We  know  it  only 
through  what  our  adversaries  tell  us,  and  it  is  already  ex- 
tremely serious.  The  military  governor  of  Serbia  has  declared 
repeatedly  that  perfect  order  reigns  in  Serbia,  that  the 
population  obeys  with  docility  all  the  measures  of  the 
military  government,  however  contrary  they  may  be  to  the 
law  of  nations.  Still,  from  the  confession  of  this  governor 
himself  (see  the  Ax  Est  of  December  7,  1916),  a  large  number 
of  the  inhabitants  are  interned  and  deported  to  Bohemia 
and  to  Hungary  !  More  than  50,000  old  men,  women,  and 
even  children  were  forced  to  abandon  their  homes  and  to 
go  to  work  for  their  enemies  or  to  perish  in  the  concentration 
camps.     The   Austrian   newspaper,   Beogradske  Novine,   ac- 


350  SERBIA    AND   EUROPE 

knowledged,  in  its  edition  of  September  24,  that  Serbian 
women  are  being  deported  into  Austro-Hungary,  not  to  the 
concentration  camps,  as  the  French  newspapers  had  claimed, 
"  but  to  work  in  the  munition  factories,  in  the  fields,  or  as 
servants  in  the  officers'  quarters."  Other  Austro-Magyar 
papers  have  published,  as  an  interesting  piece  of  news,  "the 
information  that  special  schools  had  been  opened  at  Aschach 
and  at  Braunau  for  the  interned  children !  There  are, 
then,  so  many  interned  Serbian  children  that  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  authorities  have  been  obliged  to  open  special 
schools  for  them — naturally  German  schools  !  The  Austrians 
do  not  hesitate  at  all  to  employ  these  methods,  and  they 
talk  of  them  as  if  they  were  quite  natural.  Has  the  idea 
ever  occurred  to  a  single  German  to  protest  against  such 
practices  ? 

Mr.  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  has  also  said  that  it  is 
England  that  has  made  this  war  not  one  between  armies, 
but  between  people.  We  are  quite  vexed  at  the  short  memory 
of  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  and  we  take  the  liberty  of  remind- 
ing him  that  that  honour  belongs  solely  to  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy.  The  Austrian  generals  who  were  in 
command  of  the  armies  operating  against  Serbia  had,  in 
fact,  given  formal  orders  not  to  spare  the  population.  The 
original  of  such  an  order  was  taken  from  an  Austrian  superior 
officer  when  he  was  made  prisoner,  and  it  was  brought, 
by  the  Serbian  Government,  to  the  knowledge  of  all  the 
Allied  and  neutral  governments.  Professor  Reiss  also  re- 
produced it  in  his  book  on  the  atrocities  committed  by  the 
Austro-Magyars  in  Serbia,  as  a  document  in  reference  to 
the  causes  of  the  attitude  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  army 
(see  R.  A.  Reiss :  Austro-Hungarian  Atrocities,  London,  1916, 
p.  181).  The  Austrian  method  was  not  followed  by  any 
other  belligerent,  and  least  of  all  by  the  English — who  have 
not  even  had  occasion  to  be  in  direct  contact  with  the  civil 
population  of  their  adversaries.  The  Germans,  nevertheless, 
have  permitted  their  allies  to  act,  and  it  is  not  at  all 
astonishing  that  it  should  be  a  German,  the  author,  Oskar- 
Maurus  Fontana,  who,  in  the  magazine  Schaubuhne,  of 
January  4 ,  glorifies  the  beautiful  exploits  of  the  Austrians  ! 
This  article,  which  we  reproduce  in  La  Serbie,  will  present 


AUSTRO-GERMANO-BULGARIAN    ATROCITIES      851 

clearly  to  an  impartial  public  the  humanitarian  sentiments 
prevalent  in  Germany. 

March  IX,  1917. 

The  Bulgarians  versus  the  Law  of  Nations. 
An  Appeal  to  the  Allied  Governments. 

The  war  is  entering  its  decisive  phase,  and  humanity 
awaits  with  anguish  the  next  conflict  of  the  formidable 
forces  of  the  belligerents.  The  Allies  are  to-day  in  possession 
of  abundant  material  resources,  their  effective  forces  are 
superior  to  those  of  Germany  and  her  acolytes,  and  the 
morale  of  the  troops  is  very  high.  The  cause  of  right  and  of 
justice  for  which  the  Allies  are  fighting,  united  to  the  valour 
of  the  soldiers  and  to  a  perfect  material  preparation,  assures 
them  success  in  the  end.  The  hard  times  when  the  Allies 
had  to  fight  with  inadequate  arms  are  now  in  the  past,  and 
it  is  with  a  deserved  pride  and  justifiable  satisfaction  that 
they  may  look  upon  all  the  work  they  have  accomplished. 
The  time  of  indemnities  and  of  reparations  is  not  far  distant, 
and  the  reserve  that  governments  have  maintained  up  to 
the  present,  cannot  longer  prevent  them  from  saying 
resolutely  what  they  consider  proper  punishment  for  the 
guilty.  Indeed,  our  enemies  must  know,  and  they  must 
learn  it  from  those  who  are  authorized  to  speak,  that  victory 
will  bring  up  for  immediate  consideration  the  question  of 
responsibility,  and  that  direct  and  individual  indemnities 
will  be  ordered  without  delay  and  without  pity. 

The  abuse  of  power  by  the  Bulgarians  in  occupied  Serbia 
makes  this  question  one  of  very  present  interest.  Things 
are  happening  in  our  country,  in  fact,  that  are  incredible, 
and  it  would  be  impossible  to  believe  them  if  the  Bulgarian 
newspapers  themselves  did  not  contain  precise  and  indis- 
putable information  concerning  them.  The  Bulgarians  call 
the  Serbians  of  Serbia  to  arms,  they  enroll  by  force  our 
unhappy  brothers  who  have  remained  at  home.  Then  they 
propose  to  expose  the  brothers  and  the  children  of  our 
soldiers  to  the  Serbian  cannons  and  machine  guns  in 
Macedonia. 


352  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

Never  has  any  people  at  any  time  in  its  history  abandoned 
itself  to  such  a  deed.  All  the  crimes  and  all  the  violations 
of  the  law  of  nations  committed  up  to  now  are  as  nothing 
in  comparison  with  the  measure  that  the  Bulgarians  are 
on  the  point  of  carrying  out.  It  is  not  only  in  new  Serbia 
that  the  Bulgarians  have  resorted  to  forced  recruiting,  but 
also  in  all  Northern  Serbia.  The  official  newspaper,  Narodni 
Prava,  published  in  the  numbers  for  March  4  and  5,  the 
order  of  the  Ministry  of  War  commanding  the  recruitment 
of  all  the  Serbians  from  18  to  40  years  at  Nisch,  Pirot, 
Vranje,  Cuprija,  Paracin,  Svilajnac,  Veliko  Gradiste — in  the 
very  centre  of  our  country. 

This  act  is  all  the  more  odious  since  the  Bulgarians 
know  very  well  that  the  Serbians  will  never  consent  to  fight 
against  their  own  sons.  There  is  no  power  in  the  world  which 
could  force  our  heroes  of  Morava,  of  Timok,  and  of  Vlasina 
to  fight  for  the  Bulgarians.  The  Bulgarians  are  enrolling 
them  then,  either  to  massacre  them  themselves  by  placing 
them  in  front  of  their  lines,  or  to  shoot  them  on  a  pretext 
of  insubordination.  They  do  it,  therefore,  with  the  intention 
of  annihilating  the  last  remnants  of  the  Serbian  masculine 
population.  With  a  cold-bloodedness,  exceeding  anything 
one  could  imagine,  they  set  about  this  work  of  extermination 
without  even  dreaming  of  the  consequences  that  such 
behaviour  may  entail. 

In  the  presence  of  these  facts,  which  are  as  sad  as  they 
are  revolting,  we  do  not  wish  to  raise  mere  friendly  objections 
which  lead  nowhere.  The  Bulgarian  leaders  have  no  feelings 
for  considerations  of  a  moral  nature,  and  talking  to  Bulgarians 
of  humanity  would  be  like  playing  symphonies  before  deaf 
mutes.  We  therefore  apply  to  the  Allied  governments  with 
the  demand  that  they  hold  the  officials  of  Sofia  responsible 
for  the  tragedy  they  are  preparing  in  our  country.  Our 
good  friends  and  Allies  have  a  moral  duty  to  prevent  the 
destruction  of  the  Serbian  population  and  to  curb  Bulgarian 
audacity.  Means  are  not  lacking,  and  an  official  declaration, 
defining  precisely  the  individual  and  inevitable  penalties  if 
the  Bulgarians  do  not  leave  the  Serbian  population  in  peace, 
would  suffice  to  save  many  innocent  lives.  No  weakness 
is  admissible  at  this  moment,  and  a  firm  attitude  on  the 


AUSTRO-GERMANO-BULGARIAN  ATROCITIES       353 

part  of  our  Allies  is  the  more  necessary,  since  their  own 
honour  is  in  question.  They  must  not  permit  the  Bulgarians 
to  treat  with  impunity  the  Serbians  as  they  would  never 
dare  to  treat  the  other  Allies.  The  allied  solidarity  cannot 
be  better  manifested  than  by  the  threat  of  reprisals,  ex- 
pressed by  all  the  Allied  governments  and  followed  by  acts 
calculated  to  carry  it  out.  It  is  certainly  time  to  show 
the  politicians  of  Sofia  that  France,  Great  Britain,  Russia 
and  Italy  are  also  not  to  be  ignored.  The  Serbians  have 
the  right  to  demand  it,  for  their  sufferings  have  assumed 
such  proportions  that  silence  would  be  a  veritable  crime. 
March  18,  1917. 

The  Unknown  Martyrs. 

In  all  the  windows  of  the  book  stores  in  Switzerland 
can  be  seen  a  book  bearing  the  above  title  ;  the  author  is 
Dr.  Victor  Kuhne.1  Never  has  any  publication  appeared 
more  seasonably  than  this  book  by  the  very  sympathetic 
writer  and  physician  of  Geneva,  Dr.  Kuhne,  already  known 
for  his  remarkable  articles  on  Balkan  problems.  At  the 
moment  when  the  Allies  were  declaring,  in  their  reply  to 
Mr.  Wilson's  Note,  that  a  real  peace  could  not  be  concluded 
until  oppressed  peoples  wTere  set  free,  a  neutral  publicist, 
a  mind  imbued  with  the  ideas  of  justice  and  of  morality, 
had  just  presented  to  the  public  of  the  entire  world  proofs 
of  the  justice  of  this  point  of  view  as  far  as  it  related  to  the 
Serbian  or  Southern  Slav  people.  The  book  of  Dr.  Kuhne 
is,  indeed,  a  striking  speech  for  the  prosecution  in  the  case 
against  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  and  its  oppressive 
policy  toward  the  Slavs  ;  a  manifest  proof  of  the  necessity 
of  changing  that  policy  in  states  nationally  independent. 
What  is  especially  important  is  that  Dr.  Kuhne  has  not 
merely  recounted  acts  of  injustice  and  violence  committed 
by  the  Austro-Hungarian  authorities.  He  has  gone  further 
and,  while  furnishing  on  each  page  authentic  proofs  and 
evidence  revealing  the  martyrdom  and  the  sufferings  endured 
by  the  Serbian  people,  he  has  striven  to  give  a  complete 

1  Dr.  Victor  Khune:   Ceux  dont  on  ignore  le  martyre,     (Les  Yougo- 
slaves  et  la  guerre.)     Geneve.     1917- 

24 


354  SERBIA  AND   EUROPE 

picture  of  this  incredible  policy,  and  to  show  us  the  true 
motives  underlying  it.  It  is  particularly  in  this  respect 
that  his  book  merits  special  attention. 

Mr.  Kuhne  speaks  to  us  first  of  the  Southern  Slavs,  that 
is  to  say,  of  the  Serbs,  the  Croats  and  the  Slovenes,  who 
form  one  people,  speaking  the  same  language,  having  the 
same  national  feeling  and  aspiring  to  the  same  liberty  and 
the  same  national  unity.  In  spite  of  the  three  names  they 
bear,  the  Serbs,  the  Croats  and  the  Slovenes  constitute, 
therefore,  a  determinate  ethnic  unity,  having  special  dis- 
tinctive characteristics,  and  being  adapted,  from  all  points 
of  view,  to  a  common  and  independent  political  life.  Now, 
two  great  branches  of  the  Serbian  or  Southern  Slav  people 
live  in  Austro-Hungary,  while  the  third,  small  but  vigorous, 
enjoys  political  liberty  in  the  form  of  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia. 
All  the  mystery  of  the  Austrian  or  Magyar  rancour  against 
the  Southern  Slavs  lies  in  the  fact  that  this  people  will  not 
and  cannot  remain  slaves.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy 
is  therefore  seeking  to  restrain  this  movement  and  to  stifle 
the  ever-growing  desire  of  the  Slavs  of  Austro-Hungary  to 
be  free  of  foreign  domination.  To  this  end  she  is  emp^ing 
every  possible  means  :  the  imprisonment  of  Serbian  leaders  ; 
the  organization  of  monstrous  trials  for  "  high  treason  "  ; 
and  innumerable  prosecutions,  of  which  Mr.  Kuhne's  book 
offers  us  a  startling  picture.  Such  proceedings  have  caused 
a  reaction  which  has  taken  the  form  of  criminal  attempts 
against  Austrian  political  personages,  and  which  culminated 
in  the  attempt  of  Sarajevo.  Instead  of  putting  an  end 
to  this  policy  of  violence,  the  Monarchy  redoubled  its  efforts 
to  "  purify  "  the  Serbian  people.  The  records  of  actions 
begun  during  the  war,  as  well  as  the  exceedingly  large  number 
of  executions,  of  sentences  to  forced  labour,  of  confiscations 
and  of  other  penalties  inflicted  upon  the  Serbian  population, 
which  the  book  of  Mr.  Kuhne  reveals  to  us,  demonstrate 
conclusively  that  the  question  here  is  one  of  a  system,  a 
method,  or  rather,  of  a  plan.  That  plan  Austro-Hungary 
unveiled  when  she  gave  to  the  officers  of  the  army  operating 
against  Serbia  the  formal  order  to  destroy  all  and  to  spare 
none.  It  is,  then,  a  whole  people,  the  Serbian  people,  that 
they  wished,  and  that  they  wish,  to  annihilate  ! 


AUSTRO-GERMANO-BULGARIAN   ATROCITIES       355 

Mr.  Kuhne  hopes  that  his  book  may  open  the  eyes  of 
those  who  have  not  yet  perceived  the  martyrdom  of  the 
Southern  Slavs.  We  can  only  express  the  same  hope, 
especially  at  this  present  hour  when  the  Allies  actually  wish 
to  set  the  peoples  free  from  all  foreign  domination.  In 
spite  of  the  unheard-of  sufferings  of  the  Serbian  people, 
there  are  always  those  who  pass  by  these  martyrdoms  in 
silence,  and,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  contribute  to 
their  prolongation.  With  what  sadness  have  we  read,  for 
example,  the  article  of  a  publicist  as  eminent  as  Mr.  W'agnieres, 
director  of  the  Journal  de  Geneve,  in  which  he  says  that  the 
question  of  Slavic  nationalities  in  Austro-Hungary  is  non- 
existent, the  Slavs  of  the  Monarchy  having  shown  their 
devotion  to  the  Habsburgs  !  We  feel  sure  that  Mr.  Wagnieres 
will  change  his  mind  after  he  has  read  this  book,  and  that 
he  cannot  then  help  joining  those  who,  like  Mr.  Kuhne,  find 
that  u  such  proceedings  overthrow  all  our  conceptions  of 
law  and  of  the  most  elementary  morality."  The  logical 
conclusion  evolved  is  the  demand  for  the  liberation  as  a 
unit  of  the  Southern  Slav  race.  The  conscientious  study 
of  an  impartial  publicist  cannot  produce  any  other  result, 
and,  while  congratulating  Mr.  Kuhne  on  the  success  that 
his  study  cannot  fail  to  have,  we  take  the  liberty  of  expressing 
to  him  here,  in  the  name  of  the  oppressed  Serbian  people, 
our  profound  gratitude  for  the  moral  support  he  has  given 
to  our  national  cause. 

January  28,  1917. 


Printed  tn  Great  Britain  by 

CXWIN  BROTHERS,  UMIT2D 

WOKING  AND  LONDON 


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